























The contributions to the present volume show that the countries that are often presented in the literature as forming part of a stereotypical and seemingly monolithic “Islamic 
world” in fact represent considerable diversity. From Iran to Senegal, we encounter a 
vast array of social and religious structures, historical trajectories, political regimes and 
relative positions of societies and individuals. We encounter also, in many different and 
often unexpected ways, the individual in multiple contexts. The present volume presents 
perspectives on everyday life in Muslim societies beyond the spectacular. From a broad 
academic background in Islamic and Iranian studies, social anthropology, sociology, 
philosophy and history, its contributors show that everyday life as well as religious 
practice in countries as diverse as Senegal, Niger, Egypt, Tunisia and Iran is not informed 
by one single “Islamic” tradition, but rather by multiple and often surprisingly different 
modes of religiosity and non-religiosity.
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Foreword by the Editor
The present volume is the result of a conference organised by the ERC-funded re-
search project “Private Pieties . Mundane Islam and New Forms of Muslim Religios-
ity: Impact on Contemporary Social and Political Dynamics” . In the context of our 
research, our research group, consisting of Roman Loimeier (PI, focus on Tunisia), 
Nadine Sieveking (focus on Senegal), Liza Franke (focus on Egypt), Johanna Kühn 
(focus on Lebanon), Katja Föllmer (focus on Iran) and Jan-Peter Hartung (focus on 
Pakistan), has worked hard to cultivate academic partnerships with colleagues in our 
respective fields of research . I would like to thank the members of our group for their 
numerous constructive comments and their support in realizing our annual confer-
ences, which we also used as a special opportunity to invite guests from our countries 
of research . This volume thus also represents an effort to give our guests and local 
interlocutors a voice .1
Avant-propos de l’éditeur
Le présent document est le résultat d’une conférence organisée dans le cadre d’un pro-
jet de recherche intitulé « Private Pieties: Private Pieties, Mundane Islam and New 
Forms of Muslim Religiosity: Impact on Contemporary Social and Political Dynam-
ics » financée par le Conseil européen de la recherche (CER) . Dans le contexte de no-
tre travail, l’équipe de recherche (composée de Roman Loimeier, PI, pour la Tunisie, 
Nadine Sieveking pour le Sénégal, Liza Franke pour l’Égypte, Johanna Kühn pour le 
Liban, Katja Föllmer pour l’Iran et Jan-Peter Hartung pour le Pakistan), s’est efforcée 
d’établir des liens de partenariat avec nos collègues résidant dans les différents pays 
concernés . Je tiens à remercier les membres de notre groupe de recherche pour leurs 
commentaires constructifs et leurs efforts, surtout en ce qui concerne l’organisation 
des conférences annuelles à l’occasion desquelles nous avons pu inviter des partenaires 
de nos domaines de recherche . Le présent document est donc aussi l’occasion de leur 
donner la parole .2
1 I would like to thank Philip Reuben for proofreading the English language chapters .
2 Je remercie Alexandre Moreau pour la relecture des chapitres en langue française .

Introduction: Negotiating the Religious  1a 
in Contemporary Everyday Life in the 
“Islamic World”
Roman Loimeier
For some time, Western academia and journalists have tended to focus on sensational-
ist representations of religion in the “Islamic World”, particularly “Islamic terrorism” 
and related political movements . As a result, the more banal, everyday and unremark-
able aspects of life in the various countries of this region are often perceived incorrectly 
(although some prominent exceptions do exist)1 . In addition, the countries of the re-
gion are often said to be “saturated by religion” .2 However, in the present volume we 
contend that the citizens of these countries (who are often referred to, simplistically, as 
“Muslims”) are not mere “epiphenomena” of Islam, i .e . prisoners of a reified concept 
of Islam that towers over human beings and societies and neglects their agency . Egyp-
tians, Iranians, Tunisians, etc . (who happen to be Muslims) have multiple areas of 
expertise and negotiate their everyday lives in this world – as men and women, as elders 
and youth, as traders and farmers, as scholars and computer experts – in dynamic in-
teraction with governments, religious organizations, society and texts .
1 See, for instance, Samuli Schielke’s “Snacks & Saints” (2007) .
2 The idea of a (religious) “saturation” of a society is somewhat problematic; the term “saturation” – 
which can point to both a condition and a process – suggests there was a time when that society was in a 
“non-saturated” condition, and such a condition is usually defined in a rather chronocentric perspective 
relative to the present day . In addition, it raises the question of who determines what “saturated” actually 
means or should mean . The potential meaning of the term “saturation” is further expanded if we consider 
the possibility of an ‘over-saturation’ of a society by, for instance, religion .
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Still, the “religious” does play a greater role in both politics and everyday life in Senegal 
and Iran, in Egypt and in Pakistan, than it does in Germany or even France . “Religion” 
is often seen, in fact, as the basis of the “Moralordnung” of a society, a “moral order” 
that must be defended against all kinds of threats and attacks, both external and inter-
nal . There are many groups who often claim to defend the “moral order” of a given 
society, including governments, “Islamic” NGOs and semi-independent bodies such 
as the Muslim World League, religious movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and self-proclaimed vigilante groups . They do this by referring to the concept of “com-
manding right and forbidding wrong” (al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-l-nahy aʿn al-munkar) . 
This concept often provides a religious legitimization of efforts to defend the moral 
order of a given society and to consequently impose a hegemonic interpretation of 
what this moral order should look like and what it should mean for that society .
However, it is not only governments, NGOs and religious organizations/institu-
tions that aim to establish a particular (moral) order; society, or rather, “public opin-
ion”, should be considered as well . Public opinion – as manifested and mediated in 
different milieus and as informed by specific historical and cultural traditions as well as 
specific economic and political dynamics – plays a comparable role in proposing (and 
sometimes imposing) concepts of moral order . Public opinion defines, for instance, 
the question of whether and how women may move (or may not move) in the public 
(and semi-public) sphere .
Societies (i .e . “people”, “social groups”, etc .) thus have an idea of what is “proper” 
and what is “wrong” – what is possible/acceptable (ḥalāl) and what is impossible/un-
acceptable (ḥarām) . They know what can and cannot be said (in terms of speech itself 
and etiquette) when, by whom and in what form; what can be done and shown (in 
terms of dress and behaviour, for example) and what cannot; what must remain hid-
den – but may perhaps be permitted in the “private sphere” (if such a sphere exists at 
all) . Societies also define the “bare minimum” that makes one a Muslim, which may 
not be transgressed at all (even in the private sphere) . At the same time, people learn 
rules and methods that grant them diplomatic/sensitive ways to breach or circumvent 
taboos and to address problematic issues and questions of etiquette . For example, ac-
cepted forms of talking about conventions (of speech and etiquette) and taboos are 
closely linked to concepts of apology and techniques used to ask for exceptions .
A major question that arises in disputes over the moral order and what it actually 
means in a specific context is that of how the reference to a moral order informs the 
ways in which individuals act and communicate . In other words, what influence does 
the moral order have on what one can say/show/reveal and in what ways, i .e . openly, 
discreetly/indirectly, or not at all? In many contexts we encounter “Leerstellen” (voids, 
vides)3 in communication that point to social taboos, to scenarios of political and reli-
3 The term “void” should be distinguished from a “taboo” . When people do not consciously talk about 
particular topics, even though they are aware of these topics, we usually describe this as a “taboo” . Only 
when people are not aware of certain themes or concepts do we talk about a “void”, i .e . a situation where 
people do not know that such a concept exists at all .
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gious insecurity and to (hidden) threats . Such voids can be addressed and expressed in 
terms of jokes and rumours, but also in terms of silence, even multiple silences4, and 
can also be expressed in terms of (multiple) absences . Jokes, rumours, silence(s) and/or 
absence(s) can thus be seen as powerful forms of communication, and may be viewed 
as a means expressing power dynamics (forms of non-communication are themselves 
seen here, of course, as a form of communication) .
The central question of the present volume – namely, how individuals act and 
communicate and in which ways – is thus a question of the social and political con-
texts in which people live and in which we move as researchers . In many contexts, 
we encounter voids in communication that point to social taboos, to themes that 
are difficult to talk about (in public, or perhaps even in private amongst our families 
and friends) such as one’s “true” religious feelings and beliefs, one’s “true” political 
position, one’s “true” economic status, one’s “true” origin and descent (in the case 
of “casted” societies) or one’s “true” sexual orientation, but also issues such as drug 
addiction, pre-marital sex, suicide, psychological problems, and – last but not least – 
sexual and/or physical abuse of women and both male and female children . These 
examples show how difficult it is to identify the voids (Leerstellen, vides), taboos and 
“difficult” themes that any given society cultivates . They show that we as researchers 
must develop a sense for that society’s specific ways of talking and not talking, of ex-
pressing and not expressing voids, taboos and “difficult” themes . Each society in fact 
cultivates its own voids, taboos and “difficult” themes, and, in a larger sense, its own 
strategies for coming to terms with them . In particular, societies differ regarding four 
questions, namely, how open that society is regarding taboos and “difficult” themes; 
second, what is perceived at all as a taboo or a “difficult” theme, and in which contexts 
we encounter voids; third, the ways in which such voids, taboos and “difficult” themes 
can be addressed and expressed; and fourth, which issues can be a subject of jokes, 
satire or caricature, and which issues are “sacred” .
Within this framework of inquiry our basic questions are, thus: how do people 
(both individuals and social groups) navigate hegemonic discourses, as represented 
by a state, an organization/movement/group, or even by their society as a whole (in 
the guise of public opinion)? Do people talk openly about specific issues (such as reli-
gion)? With whom do they talk about them, and how? What do they omit? What do 
they stress, deny, reject, support, underline, show, hide, reveal, display or disguise? Are 
the ways of negotiating these boundaries open to everybody (i .e . men and women, rich 
and poor), and are there regulations/conventions that must be respected when being 
evasive? Are there established ways of communicating to show dissent, unhappiness 
and doubt?
4 Michel-Rolph Trouillot has thus stated famously that “silences enter the process of historical produc-
tion at four crucial moments; the moment of fact creation (the making of sources); the moment of fact as-
sembly (the making of archives); the moment of fact retrieval (the making of narratives); and the moment 
of retrospective significance (the making of history in the final instance)” (Trouillot 1995: 26) .
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We must also ask who speaks and who does not . Is this (as we assume) a question 
of seniority, gender and/or power? Who speaks when, why, how, using what kind of 
language, and in which contexts? Are the dynamics of hiding and revealing linked 
with specific times and places? How important are taqiyya (dissimulation) and ta aʿrruf 
(mutual recognition), pretence and politeness, jokes and rumour as “strategies” for 
navigating difficult contexts? How important are music, art, theatre and social media 
for the expression of the “unsaid”? Essentially, is religion a domain that limits commu-
nication to specific patterns of expression or is religion a domain that provides space 
for communication?
The contributions to the present volume show, first and foremost, that the coun-
tries that are often presented in the literature as forming part of a stereotypical and 
seemingly monolithic “Islamic world” in fact represent considerable diversity . From 
Iran to Senegal, passing through Lebanon, Egypt and Tunisia, we encounter (in both 
historical and contemporary times) a vast array of social and religious structures, his-
torical trajectories, political regimes and relative positions of societies and individuals . 
We encounter also, in many different and often unexpected ways, the “individual” in 
multiple contexts . Citizens of Senegal, Iran, Lebanon, Egypt and Tunisia, are not “epi-
phenomena of Islam”; rather, they are navigating their often difficult social, economic 
and political contexts as individuals . In their own individual ways, they try to come 
to terms with the various problems and challenges they face, developing individual 
“prises de position” with respect to political, social and religious structures . Although 
we did not have time to explore the historical foundations of processes of “individu-
alization”, we contend that – despite the “Islamic” emphasis on communality – “indi-
viduality” and concepts of the “self” are not a modern invention but have been present 
and deeply rooted in the people and societies of the region for a long time . We also 
contend, however, that expressions of individuality have changed over time and have 
taken new forms against the background of the processes of modernization (coloniza-
tion and de-colonization), urbanization and globalization .
The issue of individual “prises de position” in the context of “religious politics” 
is the central theme of Liina Mustonen’s contribution, which deals with questions 
of gender and class during the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 2012 . In 
her contribution, she stresses the major role of satire (related to politics and religion) 
in contemporary Egyptian politics, and the ways in which satire is incorporated by 
people in their individual ways of combating their frustration with political develop-
ments . She also shows how debates over different versions of the Egyptian constitu-
tion have been informed by individual “prises de position” .
The “individual” is also of paramount importance for Lisa Maria Franke’s contri-
bution on “self-pietization” in the context of Qurʾānic reading circles in contempo-
rary Alexandria . While one might assume that people (specifically women, in Franke’s 
case) attend Qurʾānic reading circles for primarily religious purposes, she shows that 
these gatherings also serve to develop individual pieties that again serve to foster the 
“personality” (and the pious self) of women .
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Individuality is again a central focus in Ariane Sadjed’s contribution on the difficulties 
in defining religious dissent in contemporary Iran . Sadjed not only stresses the fluid-
ity and flexibility of Iran’s religious “scene” and disputes the analytical value of view-
ing societies in terms of a clear-cut “secular-religious” divide, but also stresses the fact 
that popular dissent and protest are often not directed against the regime (as Western 
media reports usually assume), but rather tend to negotiate with the regime . On a 
personal level, contemporary Iranian society is thus not characterized by a seemingly 
pro-Western “lipstick” faction against the “reactionary” “chador” faction (when look-
ing at women), but rather by multiple “prises de position” that reflect different and 
evolving social, economic, religious and political contexts .
The theme of individual “prises de position” is also addressed by Katja Föllmer in 
her contribution on unveiling, everyday life and the significance of silence in contem-
porary Iran . In particular, Föllmer introduces “bad hejabi”, i .e . “unorthodox” forms 
of veiling (and unveiling) in Iran, and the way in which “bad hejabi” is presented as 
a form of silent protest against certain religious regulations . Since “bad hejabi” is not 
commented upon by citizens, non-comment can be seen as a form of tolerance of 
silent protest by everyday citizens .
The veil and acts of veiling (and unveiling) are also the central theme in Khaoula 
Matri’s contribution on veils, veiling and modalities of religiosity in contemporary 
Tunisia . Matri shows that both upveiling and downveiling are informed not only by 
state policies regarding dress codes, but also by processes of profanization and sacrali-
zation of the veil in recent decades, and that women use a plethora of veiling styles to 
express both individual “prises de position” and individual forms of religiosity (and 
non-religiosity) .
The sacralization and profanization of the veil are equally addressed by Abdou-
laye Sounaye’s contribution on ethics and aesthetics among Salafis in Niger . Sounaye 
shows that the “Islamic” veil (“hijabi” in the Hausa and Zarma languages) has become 
a major sign of the increasing growth of the Salafi-oriented Yan Iazala (and Sunnance) 
movement in Niger . Sounaye also shows that women have started to tweak and stylize 
the veil, making it their own, a development that can be observed even in the veiling 
habits of female sex workers in Maradi and Niamey .
The focus on text that characterizes academic publications is complemented in 
the present volume by a visual account of religious (and non-religious) aspects of Sen-
egalese everyday lives provided by the artist and photographer Elise Fitte-Duval – as 
introduced by Nadine Sieveking – who presents a very personal and intimate take on 
gestures through which she aims “to portray people in their environment” . Nadine 
Sieveking’s contribution on fitness and the bracketing of religiosity in Senegal conse-
quently opens a third major theme of the present volume, addressing spaces, times and 
modes of practice where religiosity is “taking place” in new (and sometimes limited) 
ways . This development is explained by Sieveking (and in the subsequent contribu-
tions by Awa Diop, Mouhamed Ly and Abdourahmane Seck) with reference to certain 
major changes in Senegalese society since the 1980s, most importantly the processes 
of economic and political liberalization and the resulting transformation of Senegalese 
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(urban) society . These processes of change have brought about not only a process of 
“Islamization from below” and a corresponding development of new approaches to 
and modes of religiosity by individuals, but also social development that allows for 
the conscious “self-fashioning” of citizens, who may now even present themselves (in 
specific times and places) as being “non-religious” .
In her contribution on public silences and private relationships, Awa Diop ad-
dresses the question of why Senegalese religious authorities – particularly the lead-
ers of Senegal’s dominant Sufi orders, Tijāniyya and Murīdiyya – refuse to comment 
on social scandals and transgressive behaviour of public figures, a phenomenon she 
describes as a “fuite de communication” . Diop explains this development with refer-
ence to social changes in Senegal in recent decades that have been characterized by 
the fact that marabouts have become increasingly involved in politics and business . 
This involvement has led to the “corruption” of religious authorities and to a certain 
distancing of religious authorities from their own domain, spirituality . As a result, the 
leaders of Senegal’s major Sufi order try to stay “aloof” (and remain silent) in order to 
avoid being identified with “corruption” . At the same time, the political and econom-
ic activities of marabouts have been interpreted and commented upon by Senegalese 
citizens as a form of pursuit of personal (i .e . non-religious) interests, which has again 
“legitimized” individual “transgression” .
Mouhamed Ly’s and Abdourahmane Seck’s contribution continues the theme of 
“transgression” by presenting the case of a specific “transgressor”, Assane Diouf, and 
his career as an “undisciplined disciple” . Diouf became famous as a “webactiviste” in 
the United States of America (where he had been living since 2002), due in particular 
to his inflammatory statements on social media, especially on YouTube, regarding cor-
ruption in Senegalese politics, the kleptomania of marabouts, social injustice, social 
hypocrisy, homosexuality, “transhumance politique” and deficient public morals . His 
rise to fame was linked with the rapid development of social media in Senegal from the 
early 2000s and his ability to represent himself to Senegalese audiences as “le proto-
type de débrouillard”, i .e . an individual who tries to come to terms with the demands 
of life, politics and economics, thus reflecting, in paradigmatic ways, the daily realities 
of many Senegalese .
In his conclusion, Robert Launay, finally challenges (again) established notions 
of piety and asks us to move towards “a broader theory of piety” . Against his own 
background of research in West Africa, he stresses, for instance, the need to look at 
factors such as age and generation when talking about piety . In this context, he quotes 
one of his local interlocutors in Ivory Coast, who, when questioned on issues of piety, 
responded “I have not yet finished misbehaving” . Equally, Launay proposes to focus 
in future research on piety on distinctly pre-modern shifts in modes of piety to get 
away from the by now well established focus (in academic literature) on “piety and 
modernity” that views shifting modes of piety primarily as a function of processes of 
modernization .
Ultimately, it is clear indeed that the daily realities of life, in Senegal and in the 
other countries of the region, are informed not only by “religion” but also (often more 
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strongly) by political, economic and social dynamics, as well as age and generation, and 
that Iranians, Tunisians and Egyptians are trying to develop individual strategies and 
“prises de position” in these varying and evolving contexts . This is, therefore, the com-
mon theme of the contributions in the present volume, and also points to a serious 
gap in research that should be addressed more prominently in future research, namely 
the predicament faced by individuals in their quest to make a (decent) living in a world 
full of challenges and problems . In this quest, Iranians, Tunisians and Senegalese show 
that they are acting more as individuals than as “epiphenomena of Islam” . Accord-
ingly, they develop an array of different forms of religiosity (and non-religiosity) that 
are often difficult to explain based on what is found (so far) in the literature .
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dans la vie quotidienne contemporaine du 
« Monde Islamique »
Roman Loimeier
Du fait d’une focalisation particulière des milieux académiques occidentaux et du 
goût des médias pour le journalisme à sensation, on identifie souvent le « Monde Isla-
mique » à travers le prisme du terrorisme islamiste et de leurs différents mouvements 
politiques et religieux, au détriment de la vie normale et quotidienne des habitants de 
ces régions dans ses aspects les plus banals, qui n’est que rarement présentée de façon 
neutre (à quelques exceptions près)1 . On considère fréquemment les sociétés des pays 
de ces régions comme étant saturée par la religion .2 Mais nous pensons que les citoyens 
de ces pays (souvent dit « pays musulmans ») ne sont pas des épiphénomènes de l’Is-
lam, prisonniers d’un islam réificateur qui domine les gens et les sociétés et soustrait 
leurs capacités à agir . Égyptiens, Iraniens ou Tunisiens (musulmans ou non) possè-
dent des compétences multiples ; ils abordent leur vie quotidienne en tant qu’hommes 
et femmes, commerçants ou paysans, instituteurs ou informaticiens, et ils le font dans 
une interaction dynamique avec des gouvernements, des organisations religieuses, des 
sociétés et des textes .
1 Voir par exemple « Snacks & Saints » de Samuli Schielke (2007) .
2   L’idée d’une saturation (religieuse) d’une société est problématique : le terme de « saturation » – que 
peut se référer ou à une condition ou à un processus – suggère qu’on a connu une époque historique 
dans la quelle une société n’était pas encore saturée . Une telle condition est cependant définit souvent 
d’une perspective chronocentriste contemporaine . De plus, la question doit être posée de qui définit ce 
que le terme « saturée » signifie . Une extension additionnelle de la signification du terme de saturation 
est achevée quand nous pensons à la possibilité d’une « sursaturation » d’une société par la religion, par 
exemple .
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La religion joue malgré tout un rôle plus important dans la vie politique et quotidien-
ne au Sénégal, en Iran, en Égypte ou au Pakistan qu’en Allemagne ou en France . En 
effet, la religion est souvent perçue comme le rempart moral de la société, qui doit être 
défendue contre des dangers de toute sorte, externes comme internes . Des gouverne-
ments, des ONG islamiques (ou chrétiennes), des organisations semi-indépendantes 
comme la Ligue islamique mondiale, des mouvements religieux comme les Frères mu-
sulmans ou encore des groupes auto-proclamés de défense de la religion prétendent 
défendre l’ordre morale de la société . Cela, ils le font en appliquant le principe d’« or-
donner le bien et interdire le mal » (al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-l-nahy aʿn al-munkar), qui 
fournit une légitimation religieuse à leurs actions visant à imposer une interprétation 
hégémonique de la religion et son importance dans la société .
Gouvernements, ONG, organisations et/ou institutions religieuses ne sont cepen-
dant pas les seules corporations qui cherchent à établir un ordre moral spécifique : la 
société, ou plus précisément, l’opinion publique, doit aussi être considérée . L’opinion 
publique relayée par les médias en différents milieux, influencée par des traditions his-
toriques et culturelles de même que par des dynamiques économiques et politiques 
spécifiques, propose (et impose) également des concepts d’ordre moral et définit par 
exemple la liberté (ou la restriction de liberté) de mouvement des femmes dans la sphè-
re publique et semi-publique .
Ainsi, les sociétés (c’est-à-dire l’ensemble de leurs membres, les différents groupes 
sociaux, etc .) ont une idée de ce qui est « bien » et de ce qui est « mal » ; de ce qu’il 
est permis de faire et acceptable (ḥalāl), et de ce qui n’est pas permis et inacceptable 
(ḥarām) ; de ce qu’on est autorisé à dire (en termes de langage et de savoir-vivre), de 
qui peut le dire, quand et sous quelle forme, et de ce qu’on n’est pas autorisé à dire ; de 
ce qu’on peut faire et montrer publiquement (par exemple, en termes de vêtements et 
de comportement) et de ce qu’on ne peut pas faire et/ou montrer publiquement ; de 
ce qui doit rester caché, mais qui peut quand même exister dans la sphère privée (dans 
la mesure où une telle sphère existe) . Des critères minimum auquel aucun musulman 
ne peut se soustraire (y compris dans la sphère privée) sont aussi définis par ces mêmes 
sociétés . Cependant, en pratique, il existe toujours des moyens de contourner les règles 
de la société et d’aborder les sujets sensibles, par exemple en s’excusant ou en deman-
dant qu’exception soit faite .
Un aspect central de la confrontation avec cet ordre moral et sa réelle signification 
dans un contexte spécifique est la manière dont il influe sur la façon qu’on les gens de 
communiquer et d’agir : qu’a-t-on le droit de dire, quelle partie du corps a-t-on le droit 
de révéler, et de quelle manière ? Discrètement, directement ou pas du tout ? Souvent, 
l’existence de tabous sociaux, d’insécurité politique ou religieuse ou de quelconque 
danger se perçoit dans les trous, les « vides » (voids en anglais/Leerstellen en allemand) 
présents dans la communication .3 Ces vides peuvent prendre la forme de rumeurs ou 
de plaisanteries, mais aussi de silences multiples ou d’absences . Il s’agit de formes de 
3   Le terme du « vide » doit être qualifié : Quand on ne parle pas avec intention d’un thème spécifique, 
même quand on est conscient de l’existence d’un tel thème, nous rencontrons un « tabou » . Nous pou-
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communications (verbales ou non verbales) puissantes que l’on peut percevoir comme 
des expressions d’une relation de pouvoir .
Le thème central du présent document, à savoir la façon dont les individus agissent 
et communiquent au sein d’une société (ouvertement, discrètement, indirectement, 
de façon déguisée ou par silence), est donc indissociable du contexte social et politique 
de ladite société que nous, chercheurs, observons . Dans de nombreuses situations de 
la vie courante, nous sommes témoins de vides de communication qui renvoient à 
des tabous sociaux et à des thèmes dont il est difficile de parler en public, mais aussi 
en famille ou entre amis, comme le sentiment religieux, ses positions politiques, sa 
situation économique, son origine ethnique et généalogique (dans le cas des sociétés 
de castes), son orientation sexuelle, mais aussi des thèmes comme la toxicomanie, les 
relations sexuelles avant le mariage, la dépression, le suicide ou encore les abus sexuels 
ou physiques des enfants et des femmes en public .
Les vides de conversation peuvent aussi être signes d’insécurité politique ou reli-
gieuse, ou de dangers invisibles . Ces vides peuvent prendre la forme de plaisanteries, 
de silences (parfois multiples4) et parfois d’absences . Plaisanteries, rumeurs, silences 
et absences doivent donc être compris comme des formes de communication fortes, 
mais aussi comme le moyen d’exprimer des relations de pouvoir . La communication 
non-verbale est aussi une forme de communication . On comprend ainsi la difficulté 
d’identifier les vides, les tabous et les sujets sensibles propres à une société particulière, 
et à quel point il est important de développer un sixième sens pour décoder ces formes 
de communications verbales et non-verbales . Chaque société a ses propres tabous et 
sujets sensibles, et développe ses propres formes de communication et de vides autour 
de ces thèmes . On peut habituellement distinguer les sociétés selon les quatre points 
suivants : le degré de franchise d’une société envers les tabous et les sujets sensibles ; 
ce qui est considéré comme tabou ou sujet sensible, et le moment et le contexte dans 
lequel les vides peuvent être observés ; la manière avec laquelle de tels vides, tabous et 
sujets sensibles sont /peuvent être abordés et exprimés ; ce qui ne peut pas faire l’objet 
de plaisanteries, de satires ou de caricatures : ce qui est sacrosaint .
Dans un tel cadre d’investigation, la première question qui se pose est donc de 
savoir comment est-ce que les individus et les groupes sociaux vivent-ils les discours hé-
gémoniques d’un État, d’une organisation, d’un mouvement, d’un groupe ou même 
d’une société (sous couvert de l’opinion publique) . Les gens parlent-ils de manière 
transparente de questions spécifiques comme la religion ? Avec qui parlent-ils, et com-
ment ? Que décident-ils d’omettre, d’accentuer, de soutenir, de rejeter, de montrer, 
de révéler ou de cacher ? Tout le monde peut-il discuter des sujets sensibles, ou est-
vons parler d’un « vide » seulement, quand on n’est pas conscient d’un thème spécifique . C’est-à-dire, on 
ne connait pas même l’existence d’un tel thème .
4 Michel-Rolph Trouillot a constaté ainsi que les « silences enter the process of historical production at 
four crucial moments ; the moment of fact creation (the making of sources); the moment of fact assembly 
(the making of archives) ; the moment of fact retrieval (the making of narratives) ; and the moment of 
retrospective significance (the making of history in the final instance) » (Trouillot 1995 : 26) .
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ce réserver à un groupe social en particulier (hommes ou femmes, riches ou pauvres, 
etc .) ?  Existe-t-il des règles et/ou des conventions devant être respectées à tout mo-
ment, même quand on est évasif ? Existe-t-il des manières établies et acceptées par tous 
de communiquer et d’exprimer son opposition, son doute ou son mécontentement ? 
Nous devons aussi nous demander qui a le droit de parole (et qui ne l’a pas) : est-ce une 
question d’âge, de sexe et/ou de pouvoir (comme nous le pensons) ? Qui parle quand, 
pourquoi, comment et dans quel contexte ? Les dynamiques de dissimulation et de 
révélation sont-elles liées à des facteurs de temps ou de lieu ? Quelle importance pren-
nent les techniques de dissimulation (taqiyya), de reconnaissance mutuelle (ta aʿrruf), 
de simulation et de politesse, ou encore les plaisanteries et les rumeurs, lorsqu’il s’agit 
de parler de sujets délicats ? Quelle importance ont la musique, la littérature, le théâ-
tre et les nouveaux médias dans l’expression du non-dit ? La religion limite-t-elle la 
communication à des formes d’expression spécifiques ou ouvre-t-elle des espaces de 
communication ?
Les contributions regroupées dans le présent document montrent d’abord que les 
pays de la région, souvent présentés de façon stéréotypée comme formant un monde 
islamique monolithique, sont en réalité d’une grande diversité : de l’Iran au Liban, de 
l’Égypte et de la Tunisie jusqu’au Sénégal, il existe une grande palette de formations so-
ciales et religieuses, de trajectoires historiques multiples, de régimes politiques divers et 
des formes différentes de positionnement des sociétés et des individus en périodes his-
toriques et contemporaines . On rencontre aussi des individus dans des contextes mul-
tiples et souvent inattendus . Les citoyens des pays comme le Sénégal, l’Iran, le Liban, 
l’Égypte et la Tunisie ne sont pas donc des épiphénomènes de l’Islam mais naviguent 
en tant qu’individus dans des contextes sociaux, politiques et économiques souvent 
difficiles . Ils s’efforcent individuellement de faire face aux problèmes et aux défis qu’ils 
connaissent et développent des prises de position individuelles envers des formations 
politiques, sociales et religieuses . Même si nous avons pas eu le temps de nous immer-
ger dans les fondations historiques des processus d’individualisation, nous affirmons 
quand même – et malgré l’importance de la communauté dans l’islam – que l’indivi-
dualisme (et les considérations du soi) n’est pas une invention de la modernité mais est 
depuis longtemps enraciné au sein des peuples et des sociétés des pays concernés . Nous 
affirmons cependant aussi que les expressions de l’individualisme ont évolué au fil du 
temps et pris des formes spécifiques dans le contexte des processus de modernisation 
(colonisation et décolonisation), d’urbanisation et de mondialisation .
Le thème des prises de positions individuelles dans le contexte d’une politique re-
ligieuse est le thème central de la contribution de Liina Mustonen sur les questions de 
sexe et de classe sociale pendant l’administration des Frères musulmans en Égypte en 
2012 . Dans sa contribution, la chercheuse met en avant le rôle majeur de la satire (en 
ce qui concerne la politique et la religion) dans la politique contemporaine en Égypte, 
et la manière dont le gens s’en servent individuellement pour exprimer leur frustra-
tion du développement politique . La chercheuse montre aussi la façon dont les débats 
concernant les différentes versions de la constitution égyptienne ont été influencés par 
des prises de positions individuelles .
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L’individualisme tient encore une fois une place centrale dans la contribution de Liza 
Maria Franke sur les formes de « piétisation de soi » dans le contexte des cercles de 
lecture du Qurʾān à Alexandrie . Tandis qu’on peut s’attendre à ce que les gens (des 
femmes dans le cas de l’étude de Liza Maria Franke) participent à des cercles de lecture 
du Qurʾān pour des raisons purement religieuses, la chercheuse montre que ces cercles 
servent aussi au développement des piétés individuelles qui sont encore une fois cen-
trales dans le développement de la personnalité (et la piétisation de soi) des femmes .
L’individualisme est aussi un aspect central de la contribution d’Ariane Sadjed 
sur les difficultés de définir la dissension religieuse dans l’Iran contemporaine . Sadjed 
souligne d’abord la fluidité et la flexibilité du paysage religieux iranien avant de s’in-
terroger sur la pertinence de la différentiation entre les sociétés laïque et religieuse . La 
chercheuse souligne aussi le fait que la dissension populaire et les protestations ne sont 
souvent pas dirigées contre le régime iranien (à l’inverse de ce qui est présenté dans 
les médias occidentaux), mais ont plutôt un but de négociation avec le régime . En ce 
qui concerne les femmes, par exemple, la société contemporaine iranienne n’est donc 
pas caractérisée au niveau personnel d’un côté par une communauté pro-occidentale 
« pro-maquillage » et de l’autre une communauté réactionnaire « pro-chador », mais 
plutôt par de multiples prises de position qui sont l’écho de contextes sociaux, écono-
miques, politiques et religieux variés et évolutifs .
Le thème des piétés individuelles est aussi abordé par Katja Föllmer dans sa contri-
bution sur les processus d’abandon du port du voile, sur la vie quotidienne et la signi-
fication des silences dans l’Iran contemporaine . Katja Föllmer se concentre en particu-
lier sur le bad hejabi, c’est-à-dire sur les formes non traditionnelles de se voiler (et de 
retirer son voile), et la manière dont le cette tendance est présentée comme une forme 
de protestation silencieuse contre des régulations religieuses spécifiques . Le fait qu’on 
ne parle pas du bad hejabi dans la société iranienne peut en effet être compris comme 
une forme de tolérance de la protestation silencieuse des membres de la société .
Le thème du voile revient dans la contribution de Khaoula Matri, qui aborde no-
tamment le processus de se voiler (et de retirer son voile) ainsi que les modes de reli-
giosité dans la Tunisie contemporaine . Khaoula Matri montre que le port du voile 
– comme son retrait – n’est pas seulement régit par les lois relatives à l’habillement, 
mais aussi par des processus de profanation et de sacralisation du voile . Les femmes se 
voilent de différentes façons pour exprimer leurs positions individuelles et indiquer 
leur rapport à la religion .
Les phénomènes de sacralisation et de profanation du voile sont aussi abordés dans 
la contribution d’Abdoulaye Sounaye sur les éthiques et les esthétiques des Salafis au 
Niger . Abdoulaye Sounaye montre que le voile islamique (hijabi en langues Haussa et 
Zarma) n’est pas seulement devenus un signal central de la croissance du mouvement 
Salafi des Yan Izala (et des Sunnances) au Niger, mais aussi que les femmes ont com-
mencé à styliser, fléchir et courber les habitudes relatives au voile, et donc à se l’appro-
prier ; un développement qu’on peut observer même chez les prostituées à Maradi et 
Niamey .
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Le genre de textes qui caractérise les publications académiques trouve un complément 
visuel, dans ce présent volume, avec la contribution de la photographe et artiste Élise 
Fitte-Duval (présentée par Nadine Sieveking) . Avec son regard très personnel et intime 
sur les aspects religieux (et non-religieux) du quotidien au Sénégal, Élise Fitte-Duval 
vise à « figurer les gens dans leur environnement » . La contribution de Nadine Sieve-
king, qui présente des salles de fitness à Dakar comme des espaces où la religiosité est 
mise en « parenthèses », aborde, dans cette logique, un troisième thème du présent 
ouvrage concernant la façon dont la religiosité se produit dans des formes nouvelles 
(et parfois limitées) en termes d’espace, de temps et de pratiques . Nadine Sieveking 
(et après elle, les contributions de Awa Diop, Mouhamed Ly et Abdourahmane Seck) 
explique ce développement par les changements qu’a connus la société sénégalaise de-
puis les années 1980, avec en particulier la libéralisation politique et économique et 
les transformations qu’elle a provoqué dans la société urbaine sénégalaise . Ces trans-
formations n’ont pas seulement provoqué un processus d’islamisation par le bas et le 
développement correspondant de nouvelles approches de la religiosité, elles ont aussi 
été à l’origine d’un développement social qui tolère le self-fashioning (« auto-façon-
nage ») des membres de la société qui peuvent même se présenter dans certaines situa-
tions comme étant « non-religieux » .
Dans sa contribution sur les silences publiques et les relations personnelles, Awa 
Diop s’interroge sur le refus des autorités religieuses sénégalaises, et en particulier les 
guides des ordres soufis dominants du Sénégal, c’est-à-dire la Tijaniyya et la Mouridiyya, 
de commenter les scandales sociaux et le comportement transgressif des figures publi-
ques, un phénomène qu’elle caractérise comme une « fuite de communication » . La 
chercheuse explique cette fuite de communication en se référant au changement social 
qu’a connu le Sénégal dans les dernières décennies, notamment avec l’augmentation de 
l’engagement de beaucoup de marabouts dans la politique et les affaires économiques 
du pays . Ce développement a conduit à une corruption des autorités religieuses et à 
une certaine distanciation de celles-ci par rapport à leur propre terrain : la spiritualité . 
En conséquence, les guides des confréries dominantes du Sénégal ont essayé de rester 
distant (et silencieux), par peur d’être accusé de corruption . Parallèlement, les activités 
politiques et économiques des marabouts ont été perçues par les sénégalais comme 
une poursuite d’intérêts personnels non-religieux, ce qui a contribué à la légitimation 
de la transgression individuelle .
La contribution de Mouhamed Ly et Abdourahmane Seck continue sur le thème 
de la transgression en présentant le cas spécifique d’un transgresseur célèbre, Assane 
Diouf, et sa carrière de « disciple indiscipliné » . Assane Diouf est devenu un web-acti-
viste célèbre aux États-Unis (où il habite depuis 2002) particulièrement sur YouTube, 
pour ses prises de positions et ses déclarations acerbes sur la corruption de la politique 
sénégalaise, la cleptomanie des marabouts, l’injustice sociale, la corruption, l’hypocri-
sie sociale, l’homosexualité, la transhumance politique et l’absence de moral publique . 
Son ascendance en tant que web-activiste est due au développement rapide des réseaux 
sociaux au Sénégal et à son don de se présenter aux Sénégalais comme quelqu’un de 
débrouillard qui essaye de (sur)vivre de quelque manière que ce soit avec les exigen-
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ces politiques, économiques, sociales et religieuses du Sénégal contemporain, reflétant 
ainsi de manière paradigmatique les réalités quotidiennes de beaucoup de Sénégalais .
Dans sa conclusion, Robert Launay critique une nouvelle fois la recherche contem-
poraine sur les différentes formes de piété, et nous demande de nous diriger vers une 
« théorie plus large de piété » . En se basant sur sa propre expérience de ses recherches 
en Afrique de l’Ouest, Launay souligne par exemple la nécessité de prendre également 
en compte des facteurs comme l’âge et la génération dans l’analyse de mouvements de 
piété . Dans ce contexte, il cite un de ses interlocuteurs locaux en Côte d’Ivoire, qui re-
marquait à l’occasion d’une discussion sur les modes de piété, « I have not yet finished 
misbehaving » . Toujours sur le thème de la piété, Launay propose aussi de mettre 
davantage l’accent sur les changements prémodernes distincts des modes de piétés, afin 
de se libérer de la focalisation bien établie de la littérature académique sur le thème 
« piété et modernité » qui considère les différents formes de piété surtout comme une 
fonction des processus de modernisation .
Les réalités contemporaines au Sénégal, mais aussi dans les autres pays de la région, 
ne sont pas seulement influencées en fait par la religion mais aussi (et souvent dans une 
manière plus proéminente) par des dynamiques politiques, économiques et sociales 
comme aussi les facteurs « âge » et « génération » . Les citoyens de ces pays essayent 
de développer des stratégies et des prises de position individuelles dans ces contex-
tes changeants et variés . Dans leur recherche d’une vie meilleure, Iraniens, Sénégalais, 
Tunisiens et Égyptiens montrent qu’ils agissent en tant qu’individus et non en tant 
qu‘« épiphénomènes de l’Islam » . Par conséquent, ils développent aussi des formes 
différentes de religiosité (et de non-religiosité) qui sont difficiles à expliquer sur la base 
des textes disponibles (jusqu’à aujourd’hui) . Au-delà du présent projet de recherche, 
le combat de ces hommes et de ces femmes pour la recherche d’une vie décente au sein 
d’un monde plein de défis constitue une lacune de la recherche actuelle qui doit être 
adressée de manière plus proéminente à l’avenir .
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The Disguise of the “Secular”: Questions of 2 
Gender and Class During Islamist Rule in Egypt
Liina Mustonen
The Egyptian uprising in early 2011, and the overthrow of Egypt’s autocratic long-term 
president, Hosni Mubarak, were followed by unprecedented changes in the country’s 
political arena . The initial 18 days of demonstrations in Cairo’s Tahrir square and in 
Egypt’s other cities, squares, streets and factories, which brought Mubarak’s 30-year 
rule to an end, were succeeded first by a period of military rule under the leadership of 
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), and then approximately one year 
later by the parliamentary elections in late 2011 and early 2012, which saw electoral 
victories by the Muslim Brotherhood and a group of smaller Salafi parties such as the 
al-Nour party (“the party of light”) . These new ruling parties and their supporters are 
often referred to as “Islamists” . Consequently, I will use that term in this chapter to re-
fer to representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood – a previously oppositional organi-
zation and target of state repression – and the Salafi parties . Despite the Muslim Broth-
erhood’s claim that they would not run for Egypt’s presidency, the Islamists’ electoral 
success was repeated in the presidential election in the summer of 2012, which was 
won by Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohammad Morsi (Wickham 2015: 170) . In 
the second round of what has been often referred to as Egypt’s first free and fair presi-
dential elections, Morsi competed against a representative of Egypt’s previous ruling 
apparatus . He won by a narrow margin against the former senior commander of the 
Egyptian air force, Ahmed Shafik, who, in the eyes of many Egyptians, epitomized the 
regime of the deposed president, Hosni Mubarak . Although many revolutionaries and 
activists saw Morsi’s electoral victory as a significant setback on the revolutionary road, 
it still demonstrated a clear and visible change from past regimes .
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Egyptians who did not vote for Morsi considered the revolution doomed and were 
worried about the possible consequences of electing a new political elite . Whether in 
the world of business or in Egypt’s political arena, those who opposed the uprising 
in 2011 and the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012 saw their personal interests and so-
cietal positions threatened . As scholars have shown, the two fields – economics and 
politics – were strongly intertwined during Egypt’s previous regime, where, among 
other things, formerly state owned property and land were distributed to the Mu-
barak entourage in the course of Egypt’s privatization boom (Mitchell 1999, Achcar 
2013) . During the Mubarak era, a small number of businessmen took control of the 
country’s economy (Roll 2013: 5) . It was not uncommon for politicians to invest like 
businessmen and businessmen to perform the roles of politicians . While some Muslim 
Brotherhood members had managed to build their own business empires as well, the 
old Mubarak elite was far more powerful and capable of preserving its influence dur-
ing Morsi’s presidency . (Roll 2013: 5, 6, 15) .
Beneficiaries of the previous regime had a clear material interest in the failure of 
Egypt’s transition to democracy (a version of democracy that would have included the 
opposition in general and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular) and experienced 
some anguish in the face of a possible reallocation of power and resources . However, 
despite this, the transitional period (2011–2013) has been commonly viewed as the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s failure1 and not as the previous (and current) regime’s success . 
In late 2012 and the first half of 2013, the new environment of relative freedom of 
expression allowed for critique of the government to be heard when this was impos-
sible before . This in turn allowed the binary of “religious versus secular” to provide 
a framework for criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood . This framework, as Hussein 
Agrama (2012: 26) astutely explains, visualizes two opposite futures for Egypt: either 
it could become a democratic country with democratic freedoms, or it could become 
a religious state – possibly ruled by the Muslim Brotherhood – and Egyptians would 
have none of the freedoms that the democratic system would guarantee . Within this 
framework, the Islamists not only faced criticism for their mixing of politics with re-
ligion but also became objects of derision in various media channels . Bassem Youssef, 
a former surgeon who become one of the Arab world’s most successful political sati-
rists in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising, was among the most prominent critics 
of the new government . He made a great but short-lived career out of mocking the 
incumbent President Morsi on his TV show “El-Barnameg” (“the programme”) .2 
After initially finding success broadcasting from his small home studio, Youssef was 
1 Contributing to this view was discourse about the Muslim Brotherhood’s inability to govern the 
country . In 2013, on the eve of President Morsi’s overthrow, opposition leader Mohamed ElBaradei 
published an article in Foreign Policy under the telling article title “You Can’t Eat Sharia”, in which he 
explained that the Muslim Brotherhood was losing support because they were not able to govern and 
did not have qualified people (Mohamed ElBaradei: You Can’t Eat Sharia . Foreign Policy, 24 June 2013 . 
https://foreignpolicy .com/2013/06/24/you-cant-eat-sharia/) .
2 Bassem Youssef’s career in Egypt was short-lived . A few months after the military coup he was forced to 
cancel his show – and, like many others, he left Egypt soon after the military coup in 2013 . 
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invited to perform in the studios of ONTV, a private TV channel owned by Naguib 
Sawiris, a wealthy businessman and critic of the Muslim Brotherhood (Gordon and 
Arafa 2014: 35) . As Gordon and Arafa note, for a year Youssef’s “bread and butter” 
was critique of President Morsi and his government (ibid .: 37) . In his widely viewed 
show, the comedian carefully picked out the religious references that the new political 
leaders used, and, among other things, referred to the newly governing Islamist forces 
as “merchants of religion” (Pratt and Rezk 2019: 245) .3 Youssef’s underlying warn-
ing to audiences was that the Islamists were misusing religion to advance their own 
causes . Claims about the Muslim Brotherhood’s religiosity also fed into the discourse 
of Egypt as a secular country . During my fieldwork, I was often told that Egyptians 
– though sometimes referred to as a deeply religious people by the same individuals – 
were not willing to accept the way in which Islamist political figures mixed politics 
with religion . This, combined with the new leadership’s mismanagement of state af-
fairs in other areas, was considered a recipe for the organization’s downfall .4 In this 
context, as Gordon and Arafa (2014) note, Bassem Youssef’s TV show “El Barnameg” 
did not cause the deposition of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013, but did actively 
contribute to it by demonizing the new rulers .
Without trying to deny the mistakes of the Muslim Brotherhood and President 
Morsi, or ignore their failure to reach out to other oppositional factions and revolu-
tionary activists during their political tenure, I suggest that we should take a critical 
approach in positioning religion and Islam in Egypt’s transitional period . More pre-
cisely, I suggest that we should scrutinize the ways in which the presumed mixing of 
religion and politics by the new leaders was used against them . This context calls for a 
critical examination of the ways in which the ambiguous terms “religious” and “secu-
lar” are presented as diametrically opposed . The material that I study in this chapter il-
lustrates that the opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood portrayed the organization’s 
presumed mixing of religion and politics as a new phenomenon . Furthermore, they as-
sessed the Muslim Brotherhood’s way of practising religion as reactionary and a “false 
interpretation of Islam” . In comparison to other possible ways of practising religion, 
the organization’s practices were deemed inferior . Although much more thorough 
research is needed to uncover the long-term motivations behind the discourse that 
demonized the Islamists in general and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular during 
the transitional period of 2011–2013, in this chapter I illustrate that the claims about 
mixing religion and politics cannot be seen as separate from the larger power strug-
gle that unfolded in Egypt during the transitional period . My focus is on the claims 
regarding the supposed newness of the phenomenon, which relate to a larger frame-
work of nostalgia for Egypt’s presumably better past – one that flourished in 2012 
and which I discuss elsewhere (Mustonen 2020) . As the following pages will show, the 
3 See also Max Fisher: The Real Tragedy of Egyptian Satirist Bassem Youssef’s Censorship Is He Played 
a Role in It . Vox .com, 2 June 2014 (http://www .vox .com/2014/6/2/5772102/the-real-tragedy-of-egyp 
tian-satirist-bassem-youssefs-censorship-is) .
4 See also ElBaradei’s article “You Can’t Eat Sharia” mentioned in the previous footnote . 
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concerns about the mixing of religion and politics were also articulated in gendered 
terms . A closer look at the arguments that suggested “mixing religion and politics” 
was a new phenomenon brings to light a question that remained unexpressed – one 
that was less about religion’s presence and more about who has the authority to decide 
how religion is practised .5 The developments that followed the overthrow of President 
Morsi in Summer 2013 – including the election of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and 
the imprisonment of not only Muslim Brotherhood members but also activists, civil 
society workers, and representatives of other oppositional forces – demonstrates that 
for many of Morsi’s critics, the question was not whether religion should be a part of 
the country’s governing principles, but who has the right to interpret religion .
Notes From the Field
In the aftermath of the Egyptian uprising in 2011 and the election of the Islamists, my 
primary interest was to understand how the changes in Egypt’s political agenda were 
received by those who opposed the new rulers . One of the less commonly discussed 
aspects of Egypt’s transitional period is that, despite the revolutionary euphoria in 
Egypt that characterized the period from 2011 to 2012 and the international praise 
for the Egyptian people who had bravely demanded their rights and deposed an au-
tocrat, many beneficiaries of the previous regime were unhappy . In my fieldwork in 
Egypt I took on the task of listening to the murmurs that were uttered by critics of the 
new Islamist regime and that echoed in various locations in Cairo . The disapproval 
of the Islamists among my interlocutors was evident from the early days of the Islam-
ists’ electoral victories and had little to do with their legislative work . Gradually, after 
Mohammad Morsi’s election, a broader spectrum of society expressed its unhappiness 
with the new political direction and joined the chorus of dissatisfied beneficiaries of 
the previous regime . This manifested clearly in the number of signatures collected by 
the Tamarod campaign, which demanded new elections in the summer of 2013 and 
eventually led to the military coup .
I was interested in finding out how the election of the previously imprisoned Mus-
lim Brotherhood members and other Islamists would be received by those whose so-
cial imaginary differed considerably from that of the new rulers . On that note, the 
time I spent in Egypt between mid-2010 and early 2014 allowed me to closely ob-
serve the reactions of a milieu of self-defined liberals who were in socio-economically 
privileged positions in Egyptian society . “Muslim” was not my informants’ primary 
self-definition, and they never talked about their religious practices (which is not to 
say that they did not practise religion) . They were nominally Christians and Muslims . 
While religion was rarely mentioned, on the rare occasions when the discussion turned 
5 Nathan Brown (2017: 123) discusses this in detail with regard to the Middle East and points out that 
the most pertinent question is not how much or how little religion, but who has the right to interpret 
sharī‘a . 
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to politics and the new regime, some of my informants would mention that they were 
Christians . They wondered whether they still had a place in Egyptian society, and their 
main point of critique was the Muslim Brotherhood’s usage of religion in politics . 
My informants – who attended opera performances and spent their leisure time in 
the previously colonial Gezira Club or sipping cocktails in the nightclubs of expen-
sive hotels – had a different understanding of what Egypt was and what it should be . 
The annual Christmas fair in 2012 – organized by the representatives of European 
countries and attended by upper middle-class Egyptians – is a telling example of such 
a difference . It was rumoured in 2012 that alcohol might soon be banned . As a result, 
wine and spirits sold out quickly due to the fear that was instilled by the new rulers’ 
relationship to alcohol . The ethnographic fieldwork that I conducted in places of elite 
social interaction allowed me to form a picture of the social milieu of the quantitative-
ly tiny upper middle-class that opposed the Islamists . A number of interviews helped 
me to make sense of my informants’ motivations . For the interviewees, it was hard 
to understand why anyone would vote for the Muslim Brotherhood . The fact that, 
at the societal level, religion and religious organizations had played an increasingly 
important role in Egypt since the 1970s, as shown by other scholars (Browers 2009; 
Ahmed 2011; McLarney 2015), was rarely remembered when support of the Islam-
ists was criticized . Nor was there any mention of the state’s increasing participation 
in shaping the role of Islam in society (Rock-Singer 2019: 6) . At the same time, the 
discontent with the new political leaders should be viewed against the backdrop of the 
propaganda that Egyptian cultural actors had fuelled for decades . As shown by Lila 
Abu-Lughod (2005), television dramas frequently portrayed the Islamists as dumb or 
violent terrorists in contrast to more enlightened teachers . There is not enough space 
for me to delve deeper into these important aspects of the social context within which 
the specific discourse about religion and its place in Egypt’s transitional period oc-
curred, but this brief description highlights the social actors’ distinct status in Egypt .
Islam in Egypt’s Sociolegal Context
Despite the claims of those who opposed the Muslim Brotherhood and criticized the 
way it used religion in its rhetoric, the debate about Islam’s place in Egypt’s state affairs 
and society was not a new phenomenon . Islam has been mentioned as the state religion 
in the Egyptian constitution since the country’s independence . Hussein Ali Agrama 
frames the question that has been at the centre of Egypt’s state formation ever since 
the beginning of the modern state’s establishment as follows: “To what extent can and 
should it [the Egyptian state] incorporate the long-standing Islamic traditions [Shari aʿ] 
that had become deeply embedded in Egyptian social institutions and which exerted 
authority over a wide range of social activities?” (Agrama 2012: 42) . Article 2 of the 
Egyptian constitution defines the place of religion by stating that “Islam is the religion 
of the state and Arabic is its official language” . The clause “Sharī aʿ is a source of legisla-
tion” was introduced by President Anwar Sadat in the 1970s; it was later amended to 
30 Liina Mustonen
read “Sharī aʿ is the main source of legislation .” Article 2 thereby formally resolves the 
question of religion’s place by separating the jurisdiction of public issues and family 
issues . Under this division, issues that relate to the family (often called “family law”) 
are delegated to religious authorities, thereby allowing for denominational differences 
in the regulation of family matters .6 “Sharī aʿ law” thus regulates the personal status of 
Egyptian Muslims, while the family law of the Coptic Orthodox Church regulates the 
family affairs of Egyptian Christians, who make up approximately ten percent of the 
population (Agrama 2012) . This division has the consequence that many Egyptian 
Coptic Christians are forced to contend with a strict family law which, for example, 
limits the grounds for divorce to adultery and conversion, while Muslim family law is 
considered more liberal (Mahmood 2012) . Agrama (2012), building on Talal Asad’s 
work, notes that this arrangement, by confining both sharī aʿ and the religious refer-
ences of Coptic Orthodox Christians to the private sphere, actually speaks to the ex-
pectations of secularism . In practice, the arrangement has been blurrier, however, as 
illustrated by the actions of Egypt’s previous governments . For example, in the politi-
cally motivated case of Professor Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, the Egyptian Court of cassa-
tion ordered Abu Zayd, whom it had earlier declared an apostate, to divorce his wife 
against the will of the couple (see, for example, Agrama 2012) .7
In the early stages of the transitional period in 2011, the question of religion’s 
role surfaced in various public discussions in Egypt . This debate about religion’s place 
haunted the transitional period until the overthrow of President Morsi in the summer 
of 2013, which eventually led to the Muslim Brotherhood being banned . Islam’s place 
was contested: while for some the role of religion was tied to the notion of “Egyptian 
identity”, others feared an increase in religious references . The first referendum regard-
ing the Egyptian constitution, drafted and organized by a group appointed by the Su-
preme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), took place just six weeks after the SCAF 
assumed power, which had had the effect of suspending the Egyptian constitution . At 
stake in the referendum was a constitutional declaration that would substitute for the 
suspended constitution until a new parliament was in place that could be tasked with 
drafting a new constitution . However, many critics felt that the drafting committee of 
this constitutional declaration lacked legitimacy because it did not include representa-
6 Religion-based family law (also known as personal status law) grants judicial autonomy to state-rec-
ognized religious communities over family affairs, often causing dilemmas related to religious identity, 
gender and sexuality . Reform of family law is often considered an attack on the right to practise religion 
(Mahmood 2012, 56) .
7 Egypt’s personal status law defines that a non-Muslim cannot be married to a Muslim woman . Hence, 
after judging Abu Zayd to be an apostate, the court declared that he cannot be married to his Muslim 
wife . The case was initiated by a private citizen, who applied the concept of ḥisba . Agrama (2010) offers 
a longer discussion on the ḥisba concept, which technically gives citizens the duty (and ability) of “com-
manding of the good, when it has become neglected, and the forbidding of the evil, when its practice 
becomes manifest .”
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tives of all political forces .8 Nevertheless, Egyptians were hastily encouraged to vote on 
“constitutional amendments” . Although the referendum did not touch upon article 
2, those who voted “no” feared that this specific article would eventually be expanded 
to include other domains of social life in the future (Agrama 2012: 29) . Much to the 
dismay of critics, political activists and reform-minded Egyptians, the Muslim Broth-
erhood – as the best organized socio-political group in the country – campaigned with 
other Islamists in favour of the amendments . The organization advised its voters that 
it was their religious duty to vote “yes” – that is, in favour of the constitutional declara-
tion . Consequently, the constitutional amendments were approved by 79 percent of 
voters .9
After the presidential election in the summer of 2012, a new constitution was 
drafted by a constitutional committee that consisted primarily of the winners of the 
elections – i .e . representatives of the Islamist factions . What had started as an inclusive 
process turned into a homogenous drafting committee when the so-called “liberal/
secular” representatives opted out of the drafting committee in the autumn of 2012 . 
For understandable reasons, the committee’s Islamist-only composition came under 
heavy criticism from the opposition . The constitution that the committee drafted, 
and which was later approved in a new referendum, was criticized for being too “Is-
lamic” . A group of civil society organizations claimed that it was an attempt to import 
an “Iranian” type of theocracy to Egypt (Pratt and Rezk 2019: 246) . Though article 
2 did not change in the new constitution, many were worried by the introduction 
of a new article, article 219 . This article was introduced by the Al-Nour Salafi party, 
and its purpose was to complement article 2 by specifying the explicit sources of ju-
risprudence . It defined these sources as “general evidence, foundational rules, rules of 
jurisprudence, and credible sources accepted in Sunni doctrines and by the larger com-
munity” . Differing opinions exist regarding the question of the religious character of 
the 2012 constitution . Ellen McLarney (2016) explains that the 2012 constitution was 
not markedly more Islamic than the previous ones . She shows how the various clauses 
of the new constitution could in fact already be found in the previous constitutions . 
In particular, she elaborates that the contested and much-criticized legal framework 
that set parameters for gender policy did not radically differ from other governments’ 
gender guidelines . On the contrary, she concludes that the so-called “Islamist Con-
stitution” of 2012 “raised the bar on women’s equality in Egyptian constitutional 
history” (McLarney 2016) . Egyptian feminists, such as Hoda Elsadda (2015), do not 
share this opinion and point to the Islamists’ increased use of religion in legitimizing 
the lack of gender equality in Egyptian society and state practices .
The next time Egyptians went to the polls to vote on a new constitution was after 
President Morsi was overthrown and the Muslim Brotherhood was banned . Many 
8 Gianluca P . Parolin: The Ticking Referendum and a “Smarter Strategy” . Al-Masry Al-Youm (English), 
13 March 2011 (https://www .egyptindependent .com/ticking-referendum-and-smarter-strategy/) .
9 Issandr El Amrani: Sightings of the Egyptian Deep State . Middle East Report Online, 1 January 2012 
(https://merip .org/2012/01/sightings-of-the-egyptian-deep-state/) .
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members of the Muslim Brotherhood languished in prison while the drafting process 
took place without them . The new constitutional committee, consisting of ten mem-
bers, handed the constitution over to a 50-member constitutional assembly just a few 
days after Egyptian security forces had dispersed the pro-legitimacy (i .e . pro-Morsi) 
protest camps in Rabaa al-Adawyia and al-Nahda Squares, causing the death of hun-
dreds of Muslim Brotherhood supporters and sympathizers . The new constitution – 
often referred to as a secular constitution – was hastily approved, first by the assembly 
and then later in a referendum . The much-criticized article 219, which had specified 
the principles of jurisprudence, was omitted, but article 2 remained . Interestingly, 
the Salafists, who had collaborated with the Muslim Brotherhood and vehemently 
demanded that article 219 be introduced in 2012, supported not only the drafting 
process but also the new constitution itself .10 Many have argued that the post-coup 
constitution did not comprise a considerable change from the 2012 constitution .11 
With regard to gender, McLarney’s (2016) analysis of the gender-related aspects of 
the constitution illustrates that Egypt’s newest constitution took the previous Islamist 
constitution as a model and attempted to add further provisions for women’s rights .
This brief overview shows that the constitutional changes during Egypt’s recent 
transitional period did not dramatically influence the relationship between the Egyp-
tian state and its primary religion, Islam . Islam has been mentioned as the state religion 
in the Egyptian constitution since the country’s first constitution (McLarney 2016), 
and, prior to the uprising of 2011, the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood had 
existed in various relationships with the Egyptian government (Starret 1998: 80) . 
Therefore, aside from discussing the legal framework, scholars have long debated the 
causes of religious change and religious revival that took place during President Anwar 
Sadat’s era . Among others, in his recent book, Aaron Rock-Singer (2019) shows how 
the Islamic Revival did not emerge only through the channels of Islamist organiza-
tions, but was also strongly shaped by Egyptian state institutions . In particular, he 
shows how the political imperatives of the political elite influenced the religious dis-
course . It was impossible to ignore the presence of this religious discourse as it was 
prominently channelled through the mass media and compounded the Islamic Re-
vival in Egypt between 1970 and 2015 (ibid .: 6, 15–18) .
Religion and Politics Do Not Mix – Unless... 
It is evident that neither references to religion nor the Islamists’ presence were new 
phenomena in 2012 . This therefore raises the question: why did some see the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s use of religion as a new development? Despite the visibility of religious 
symbols in Egyptian society prior to the uprising in 2011, and earlier references to 
10 Bassem Sabry: 22 Key Points in Egypt’s New Draft Constitution . Al Monitor, 23 August 2013 
(https://www .al-monitor .com/pulse/originals/2013/08/egypt-draft-constitution-guide .html) .
11 McLarney (2016), Sabry (details in previous footnote) and Brown (2017) .
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sharī aʿ in Egypt’s legal framework, my informants’ primary critique of the Muslim 
Brotherhood was that the organization mixed religion with politics . They had this in 
common with Egypt’s media outlets, which were often in the hands of beneficiaries 
of the previous regime . The media claimed that the Muslim Brotherhood was “tak-
ing over” the state, aimed to sell the country to foreign powers (Qatar in particular) 
and would destroy what they saw as the true Egyptian identity (Pratt and Rezk 2019; 
Elmasry 2017) .
These fears were the product of a crisis within a group of people who understood 
themselves as more liberal than the new political leaders . They were in socio-econom-
ically privileged positions and could practise a lifestyle that resembled the lifestyle of 
the previous presidential family . Their special position in Egyptian society calls atten-
tion to the distinction between “public issues” and “personal troubles”, as outlined by 
C . Wright Mills (1999), i .e . the distinction between the structural issues of the larger 
Egyptian context and the personal troubles of the distinct group who feared for their 
position within the new political context . As Mills explained, personal troubles are a 
private matter and they transpire within individuals in their immediate environment . 
They concern the person’s “self” and “areas of social life” that are within the confines 
of an individual’s “social setting” (Mills 1999: 9) . Evidently, personal troubles do not 
always become public issues . Therefore, it is important to investigate the politics asso-
ciated with “personal troubles” . One illustrative example of such personal troubles is 
an article that was published by a Cairo-based women’s lifestyle magazine two months 
after President Morsi was elected . The article’s author declared that she was a repre-
sentative of a “minority” in Egypt, because she could not cope with the way in which 
religion was imposed on society by the new Islamist rulers . She further elaborated that 
article 2 of the Egyptian constitution (which states that Islam is the religion of the 
state) was contrary to her beliefs . And yet, the magazine, which reached a tiny number 
of Egyptians not exceeding 100,000 readers (out of a population of 90 million at the 
time), did not mention that article 2 had already been part of the Egyptian constitu-
tion before the Islamists were elected . Instead, the article presented it as a new fact 
that had been introduced by the new rulers . The author then moved on to discussing 
gender relations in Egypt under the new Islamist government . She expressed her long-
ing for the days when women and men were able to socialize in nightclubs and swim-
ming pools, a reference to the mixing of men and women in selected public spaces . 
However, it remained unsaid that most such locations in Egypt targeted the country’s 
wealthy and socio-economically privileged citizens . Alongside this critique, she also 
criticized the Islamic veil (ḥijāb), which she felt had taken over the streets of Cairo . She 
explained that she was disturbed by the fact that veiled women were now empowered 
and marched on the streets . In doing so, she ignored the social realities surrounding 
the veil that have been recorded by many scholars (Mahmood 2005; Ahmed 2011; 
McLarney 2015) . The reappearance of the veil in the 1970s in Egypt – accompanied 
by a large presence of women in public spaces (Ahmed 2011) – went unnoticed by the 
author in her criticism of the Islamists . Scholars have also noted that when women 
entered the public sphere veiled, this item of clothing gained a new and distinct mean-
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ing . For many, the veil did not represent the earlier gender segregation and hierarchy 
(ibid .: 212) . A visit to various university campuses prior to the uprising in 2011 in 
Cairo would have shown the writer that veiled women and girls were not only present 
on campus but also that they mixed with the opposite sex there, as they did in many 
other venues in Cairo . The performance of female modesty not only challenges but 
also helps to sustain mixing in Egypt’s public spaces (Rock-Singer 2019: 157) . It is 
common knowledge that the Islamic veil did not simply appear on Egyptian streets af-
ter the Islamists’ electoral victories . The author of the lifestyle magazine article ignored 
multiple social realities in order to make her critique of the new rulers more persuasive 
for her readers .
By returning to Mill’s distinction between personal troubles and public issues, we 
can see that the writing referred to the troubles of the writer’s own specific reference 
group . None of her criticisms touched upon the issues that bothered other members 
of Egyptian society . As the majority of Egyptians suffer under tough economic condi-
tions, the ability to freely mingle in nightclubs and swimming pools was not among the 
foremost demands of those who protested on Egyptian streets and started the uprising 
in 2011 . The timing of the article, just a few months after Morsi was elected, indicates 
that its purpose was to criticize the new rulers . Even though it appeared in a political 
climate in which the new draft constitution was being fiercely debated and criticism 
of the Muslim Brotherhood seemed justified, President Morsi had not been able to in-
stitutionalize any changes by that point . Cairo’s nightclubs were still running, and the 
swimming pools still opened their doors to both men and women (although in some 
places gender segregation was practised, as it had been before Morsi’s election) .
Around the same time, I recorded similar lines of critique in other locations . The 
Islamists’ mixing of religion and politics was a common issue in this discourse . In Sep-
tember 2012, a film festival brought Cairo’s cultural elite together to defend Egyptian 
civilization against assault from the ignorant Islamists . The festival’s participants did 
not shy away from showing their indignation toward the new rulers, and they vocally 
expressed critique of the new rulers’ use of religion for political ends . For example, 
one speaker at the festival explained that Egyptian artists had always been free as long 
as they did not engage in politics . This statement, expressed at the film festival by a 
prominent Egyptian cultural actor, indirectly referred to the “contempt of religion” 
charges that famous actor Adel Iman faced in 2012 for his role in an old Egyptian film . 
Above all, the statement speaks to the delicate relationship that Egyptian cultural ac-
tors had with the previous ruling establishment . The cultural actors’ critique of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamists has been well recorded by other scholars (Abu-
Lughod 2005; Winegar 2006; Abaza 2010) . The cultural actors have seen themselves 
as enlighteners of larger Egyptian society (and hence more enlightened than the Islam-
ists), while they have often presented the Islamists as violent and dumb (Abu-Lughod 
2005) . An analysis of their criticism of the new rulers should take into account these 
past histories of antagonism . The criticism must be understood against the backdrop 
of existing pre-determined positions and tensions .
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As others have shown, the number of charges based on a law in the Egyptian penal 
code that punishes “contempt of religion” did indeed increase during the short period 
of Islamist rule .12 However, the law that provides the basis for these charges has been 
present in the penal code since 1983 (Culang 2018: 446), and the high number of new 
cases since President Morsi was overthrown illustrates that the charges in 2012 were 
not merely a phenomenon related to the political rise of the Islamists . In addition, the 
Public Morality Investigation Unit has been busy and “debauchery” charges (based on 
law that dates back to 1961) have increased since Morsi was deposed (EIPR 2017; Abd 
El-Hameed 2018) . One example is the case of Ahmed Naji, an Egyptian author sen-
tenced to ten months in prison for harming public morality by publishing a chapter 
of his book “Using Life” in an Egyptian literary journal .13 The reason for the sentence 
was not his critique of the government but the sexual content of the published book 
chapter .
These recent cases have not received as much attention as the cases discussed under 
the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood . Within the context of post-2013 Egypt – the 
Muslim Brotherhood out of the political game, many of its members either dead or in 
prison, and the former general and current President el-Sisi ruling with an iron fist – 
the absence of discussion about religion’s place in Egyptian society indicates that the 
issue has lost its urgency . In the aftermath of the overthrow of President Morsi, some 
of my informants explained that it was not the right time to discuss religion’s place on 
a societal level or in the constitution .
The End of Critique
As Agrama (2012: 27) has noted, the binary of “religious” versus “secular” has a con-
stitutive force, as it provides a framework with predefined outcomes according to 
which potential futures can be predicted . It was precisely the colloquial use of this 
framework that provided the basis for critique of the Islamists while establishing an 
image of Egypt’s past in terms of the “secular” . For example, the socio-political context 
in Egypt and the interplay of Islamists and state actors prior to the uprising in 2011 
received little consideration among my interlocutors when President Morsi and the Is-
lamists were criticized for their usage of religion . Instead, the criticism focused on the 
Islamists’ use of religion, which was treated as separate from the earlier evolution of 
religiosity in Egypt . The “secular” provided an effective notion for those who had ear-
lier occupied powerful positions in Egyptian society but were pushed into opposition 
12 Culang (2018); Ben Hubbard and Mayy El Sheikh: Islamists Press Blasphemy Cases in a New Egypt . 
The New York Times, 18 June 2013 (https://www .nytimes .com/2013/06/19/world/middleeast/islam 
ists-press-blasphemy-cases-in-a-new-egypt .html) .
13 Mary Catherine Ford: In Using life Ahmed Naji Imagined a Riveting Ride across a Dystopian Cairo, 
Then He Was Arrested . Words Without Borders: The Online Magazine for International Literature, De-
cember 2017 (https://www .wordswithoutborders .org/book-review/in-using-life-ahmed-naji-imagined 
-a-riveting-ride-across-a-dystopian-cairo) .
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in 2012 . This notion was, first and foremost, related to its protagonists’ personal trou-
bles, which differed from the demands of those who initiated the uprising in 2011 . 
Instead of demanding “bread, freedom and social justice”, my informants feared for 
their lifestyle . In doing so, they spoke from their own specific class positions, as many 
of the practices in Egypt that they feared losing (such as frequenting nightclubs and 
mixed-gender swimming pools) were, and continue to be, associated with a certain 
social class . The criticism of President Morsi and the Islamists should therefore also be 
analyzed with reference to class politics and the social actors’ privileges associated with 
their previously established positions .
While some Egyptians have, to borrow from Achcar (2013), succumbed to “mel-
ancholic depression”, others have celebrated the return of an autocratic regime . The 
current political situation in Egypt is a clear reminder of how the notion of the “secu-
lar” entailed political power in 2012 and 2013 . As Rock-Singer (2019: 183) notes, the 
current President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi shares “religious references and commitments” 
with the previous rulers, but it seems that he and his regime do not pose a threat to 
the lifestyle of those who, during the Islamists’ rule, insisted that Egypt was a “secular” 
country . The silence over el-Sisi’s use of religious references further indicates that the 
critique during Morsi’s presidency was less about religion in politics than about class 
politics and social status .
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Individuality Beyond the Beaten Track:  3 
Self-Pietization, Qurʾān Circles and  
Organic Islam in Contemporary Alexandria
Lisa Maria Franke
Introduction
Islam, and its relationship to and with private space, has attracted the interest of an in-
creasing number of scholars over the last few decades . Many of the works concentrate 
on the vivacity of private religion and how it is engendered and influenced by new de-
velopments, which can include new religious phenomena or innovations and private 
religious gatherings (Cf . Gauthier 2014) . The critique is mostly centred around the 
hypothesis that privatization, or rather, individualization, leads to the weakening of 
established Islam and promotes self-centred personal development .1 In order to study 
this multifaceted context of the numerous private varieties of religion that emerge 
from new forms or even waves of religiosity, which highlight its dynamic character, I 
will explore the concept of what I call self-pietization in the realm of individual reli-
gious agency .2 This article deals with the impression that, in Egypt, there has been an 
enormous increase in the withdrawal of religion from the public space in favour of 
individually lived religiosity, particularly since the beginning of the 20th century – and 
that, moreover, religious gatherings of various types have spread throughout the coun-
try . I will analyse the ways in which different historical memories, each containing a 
1 I prefer the term “individual” rather than “private” in the context of religion and belief, as it points to 
more specific self-developments, whereas the term “private” tends to connote ideas of space and prop-
erty .
2 Cf . on how the self can develop Foucault (1988) .
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multiplicity of collective and individual religious experiences,3 are stratified according 
to age/generation and milieu in contemporary Alexandria .4
The following three spheres can be identified, of which the second will be high-
lighted in this article . First, the public space with its material and symbolical develop-
ments . Second, individual religious imaginaries with their immaterial developments, 
such as identity formation . And finally, the social realm, which encompasses both and 
which can be described by means of the simultaneity of the manifold religious deploy-
ments, even mobilizations, and terminologies as well as the increasing digitalization of 
religion and knowledge . Regarding the latter, knowledge and religion have opened up 
a whole new world for wanderers of the digital realm, referring to those who choose 
to acquire knowledge by browsing the internet and also to those who might be called 
spiritual wanderers5 searching for (religious) satisfaction and inspiration in a variety of 
forms . These developments will be discussed in this article by analysing select periodi-
cally held Qurʾān circles . Focus will be given to the gatherings and their participants 
as well as to the knowledge conveyed during the sessions and the informal discussions 
that occur . The lens applied is an anthropological one, with an element of Islamic and 
Gender Studies . These different approaches are merged together in order to acknowl-
edge the complexity of social issues that require multifaceted methodology .
I will briefly describe the political and religious situation in Egypt in the periods 
when I conducted my fieldwork, as this is important in order to understand the im-
plications of these Qurʾān circles . In 2011, political and social dynamics erupted that 
ultimately led to Egypt coming under a strict military rule that controls and defines 
all spaces of civil life, including religion (as well as social media) . Alexandria, being 
the second largest city in Egypt with approximately 5 million inhabitants, plays a 
significant role in the structure by which politics and religion influence the public 
sphere . The majority of its population is Sunni Muslim, while roughly 10% are Coptic 
Christians . Among the Muslim population are members and followers of the Muslim 
Brotherhood . However, many of these have been imprisoned, and those who are still6 
part of the Brotherhood act in secret and have gone underground . Some members 
3 I will discuss other – non-conformist, atheist and agnostic – experiences in a forthcoming publication 
(Franke forthcoming a) .
4 In the context of all those who are different and who deviate from the acceptable path within social 
limits, the other is something that allegedly does not even exist, and yet poses a threat to structures in 
society that currently form a binding social and cultural codex . Punishment is politically proclaimed and 
legally prosecuted . This phenomenon can be called “cultural flickering” . Cf . Sanyal (2009), see also Amr 
Ezzat: On the Precarious ‘Non-existence’ of Egyptian Atheists . Mada Masr, 11 December 2018 (https://
madamasr .com/en/2018/12/11/opinion/u/on-the-precarious-non-existence-of-egyptian-atheists/) .
5 This term was coined by Christoph Bochinger, Martin Engelbrecht and Winfried Gebhardt 
(2009:31ff .) .
6 I say “still” because the Muslim Brotherhood has been forbidden since the ousting of then-President 
Mursi during the military coup in 2013 which led to the presidency of Abdel Fatah al-Sisi (in power since 
2014, re-elected in 2018) . It has also been declared a terrorist organization . See “Egypt’s Police Stop Terror 
in Track, Arrest 6 Muslim Brothers in Alexandria .” Albawaba News, 16 September 2018 (https://www .
albawaba .com/news/egypts-police-stop-terror-track-arrest-6-muslim-brothers-alexandria-1186676) .
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play a role in the public sphere without being identifiable as members of the Brother-
hood . Others do not hide their membership, but still try not to attract attention . The 
current military regime’s strict control over the public sphere, and sometimes even the 
private sphere via social media, has made members tend to act in secret and be more 
careful when wearing or saying things that would make it easy for others to recognise 
them as part of the Muslim Brotherhood . Other groups include the Salafiyyīn, who 
are also not welcomed by the ruling regime, but are not as strictly prohibited as the 
Muslim Brotherhood, since they do not participate so actively in politics . By means of 
oppressive behaviour, the regime tries to control religious developments and dynamics 
in Egypt . Mosques and other public spaces are meticulously controlled, making it im-
possible for anything deviant from the ‘mainstream’ to be publicly visible or audible . 
This is intended to stem every possible act of ‘otherness’ .
From 2016 to 2019 I carried out extensive fieldwork among Muslim ‘middle-class 
milieus’ in Alexandria on the subject of individual piety, more precisely the search for 
individual (non-)religious identities . In doing so, I came across many different under-
standings of and approaches to the terms “religion” and “belief” . “Religion” shall thus 
be understood as distinct from “being religious” and from “doing being religious” . As 
the following quote by Bruno Latour suggests, belief and religion can be conflicting 
notions: “Belief has eaten up the originality of religion” (Latour 2019:31) . What they 
mean in everyday life is not necessarily what is written in books and what scholars 
might suggest . Rather, they carry emotions with them, and are subject to a wide range 
of interpretations . My aim here is not to find a definition for religion, but to discuss 
how piety, belief and religiosity are (or are not) part of individuals’ lives, and how these 
concepts and their corresponding practices shape and define identities . Moreover, I 
intend to discuss how religiosities and non-religiosities are not just an individual mat-
ter, but also a social and ‘material’ matter that manifests in many different but equally 
constitutive forms and media (e .g . in symbols, rituals, religious and other institutions 
or texts) . Abdulkader Tayob highlights that thinkers from the 19th century did not fo-
cus on the individual Believer-God relationship necessarily, but rather on the develop-
ment of society by means of religion as a new model .7 The personal was pushed to the 
background in favour of social and political issues . Today, the focus on the individual 
in terms of religion is back on the agenda, though at the same time we do not lose sight 
of society and its developments in general . In my research, it became clear that person-
al needs are prioritized when it comes to the subject of religion and religiosity and that 
the revitalization of Islam is a creative process to which the individual is dedicated .8
7 For a historical overview of the term religion and thoughts leading to its various definitions and creative 
transformations among select Muslim thinkers, see Tayob (2009) .
8 I prefer the term “revitalization” over “revival/revivalism” . Especially in the case of Islam, it is mislead-
ing to speak of a revival that can be observed since the end of the 20th century, as a revival can only take 
place if something has essentially vanished, which was not the case for Islam in Egypt or otherwise . Revi-
talization refers more concretely to the fact that Islam was on the decline, but became important again in 
daily life, albeit in a modified form . 
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In the present case of Qurʾān circles, I argue that this analysis is closely related to ne-
gotiating the self . Thus, it is not about finding out the essence of religion or the true 
meaning of Islam, but rather highlighting the different intimate perceptions and indi-
vidual interpretations of what Islam can mean for oneself, and how this understand-
ing can change according to time and space . The particular individual situation of each 
person I spoke to, including their background, upbringing, knowledge, education, age 
and social status, informed their interpretation of the notion of religion . My focus on 
these highly individual and intimate understandings of the term must be viewed in 
relation to the more public and politically informed understanding of religion – at 
least in the case of Egypt . Here, it is state Islam and the influence of authoritative 
institutions on the interpretation of religion that are decisive . While Saba Mahmood 
describes non-agency in her study on the women’s piety movement in mosques in 
Cairo (see Mahmood 2005), my research on the Qurʾān circles focuses on the oppo-
site, namely the (conscious) agency of my interview partners, who are very much aware 
of their own personal definition of what it means to be religious .
I thus contest the opinion by well-known scholars such as Pierre Bourdieu, Michel 
Foucault and Talal Asad . Individual agency is absent in their understanding of the 
term “habitus”; they might acknowledge it in relation to active processes, but they 
subordinate these under discursive orders or tradition, discourses and practices coined 
by Islamic theology (Mahmood 2005: 14; Bourdieu 1984: 466; Asad 1993: 75–76; cf . 
also Mellor and Shilling 2014) . Instead, with reference to Margaret Archer, I argue 
that the habitus cannot be enough of a category to understand individuals and their 
lives, since these individuals must inevitably participate reflexively in the current glo-
bal dynamics (Mellor and Shilling 2014 as well as Archer 2012) . However, contrary to 
Archer, I still consider habitus to be relevant in reflecting on social contexts, since it 
can shed light on behavioural patterns, though I do so without denying the agency of 
individuals (Archer 2012: 1) .
In the context of self-pietization, this is in line with Thomas Csordas, who further 
develops Irving Hallowell’s argument of the self as an object in a world of objects by 
“taking full cognizance of the constant reconstitution of the self, including the pos-
sibilities not only for creative change in […] societies, but for varying degrees of self-
objectification cross-culturally” (Csordas 1990: 6) . He continues, with reference to 
Marcel Mauss, that “all humans have a sense of spiritual and corporal individuality . 
[…] [While] the paradigm of embodiment has as a principal characteristic the collapse 
of dualities between mind and body, subject and object . […] Here again we find the 
themes of perception and practice as domains of the culturally constituted self” (Csor-
das 1990: 7) .
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The Circles
“Islam is a religion that requires constant awareness and practice, in the sense of ac-
quiring and practising knowledge . It is too complicated to just sit and read the Qurʾān 
by ourselves – the language and the content need explanation . This is why we are 
here, why I am here .”9 With this statement from one of the participants, the floor was 
opened for a vibrant group discussion . This occurred towards the end of one of the 
circles that I attended, when the participants agreed to join me in a group discussion 
about why they attended this Qurʾān circle . However, before we discuss the subject in 
its full complexity, allow me to introduce the circles in more detail .
During the years in which I carried out my fieldwork, I had the chance to regu-
larly take part in three Qurʾān circles . Two of these circles were held in the morning 
and restricted participation to women only . They were organized by my friend Nour, 
who initially hosted one of them, and hosted both of them towards the end of my last 
year .10 A female teacher, Haneen, lectured at both of them . The other circle I partici-
pated in was held in the evenings and was a mixed-gender group11 for couples . How-
ever, it was also possible to attend if one’s spouse was not able to come due to illness 
or family responsibilities . This circle was led by a male lecturer, with the participants 
taking it in turns to host each week .
Happening off the beaten track, these circles are not yet clandestine in nature, but 
are nonetheless unofficial religious gatherings in the private space . The space in which 
they occur is private, as the meetings take place in the homes of the hosts . It is closed, as 
new participants can only attend by invitation . It is semi-religious, as it is not a formal 
religious space such as a mosque . As such, these three characteristics – semi-religious, 
private, closed – can form a new category, allowing us to define these spaces as intimate 
spaces . Since definitions of the term “intimate” focus mainly on the body and sexual-
ity, or on architecture, I have tried to define it according to the phrasing used by my 
interview partners . For the participants, these intimate spaces offer a safe space where 
they can express emotions and ideas without the fear of rejection or judgement . In 
intimate spaces it can be possible to ask questions and show vulnerability (in the sense 
of ignorance, uncertainty or doubt about an issue or about oneself in ways that might 
feel have obvious answers) that might not be possible in public or semi-public spaces . 
Other categories that describe spaces outside of the private/public dichotomy and can 
be applied here are “sacred” and “secret” .12 The former because the circles deal with 
Islam and the Qurʾān, and thus turn the whole environment into a sacred space, where 
9 Statement by Sara during group discussion on 6 June 2017 .
10 My friend offered to host the other morning circle due to renovation works at the previous host’s 
house . 
11 “Groups” are understood here as processes that underlie various influences . In this sense, Islam should 
be understood as being entangled with culture: religious, social, cultural and political dynamics are in-
tertwined .
12 Regarding the development of various kinds of spaces (private, public, intimate etc .) see Madanipour 
(2003) .
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participants can also leave the lecture to pray (in the same private home) . The latter is 
because it is not publicly announced and because one can only attend upon invitation 
and recommendation . These invitations are usually expressed orally to friends and ac-
quaintances considered worthy of participating in the circles . The invitation has to be 
approved by the host . Upon approval, the host accepts the new “member” by adding 
them to the corresponding WhatsApp group . This digital “membership” allows for 
straightforward communication about the date and time of the next lesson and its 
topics . It also allows for a shared feeling of belonging to a (virtual) group . Additional 
religious knowledge (i .e . in addition to the content of the lessons) is exchanged via 
these groups, such as religious videos, videos by famous religious figures, quotes from 
the Qurʾān and ḥadīth, prayers, religious sayings and reminders, as well as religious 
wishes and congratulations related to religious feasts, etc . All of the aforementioned 
categories can be used to describe the circles, but the applicability of each label also de-
pends on who is present, who I am talking to, and what kind of meaning that person 
bestows upon the gathering (i .e . Sinnstiftung) .
A quick note on the seating arrangements in the Qurʾān circles: I call them “cir-
cles” because the attendees sit in a circle facing the teacher . This was the case for both 
morning classes . In the evening classes, the seats were arranged either in a circle or in 
lines (also facing the teacher) depending on the architecture/space of the house that 
was hosting that session . Academic literature also generally refers to these courses as 
circles . The term circle also connotes a gathering that is private and exclusive – not 
open to the public, but only to select members or participants . The Arabic term used 
by my fellow students was dars (used in the singular, although it should correctly be the 
plural durūs), and when inquiring as to whether the lesson would be taking place, they 
would ask: “andinna Qurʾān il-nahārda?” Some of the participants would (always) be 
late, which would be only remarked upon if it required the usual time allowance for 
latecomers to be extended to an excessive degree . About thirty minutes spent waiting 
for fellow participants would be accepted, which also allowed time for clarifications 
and discussions regarding this upcoming lecture, last week’s lecture, or anything off 
topic . Throughout my research I came across various understandings and concepts of 
time, carrying with them the notions of memory and generation . Everyday concepts 
of time often correlated with religiously interpreted and lived concepts of time . In the 
lectures, time would not only play a role in terms of coming late or having to leave 
early, but also in relation to prayer and fasting or when to put on the veil, and even 
in discussions about concepts of afterlife . Regarding the latter, most of my interview 
partners made mention of the questions asked upon death about what one has been 
doing during their lifetime with their health, their youth and their time .13
13 In ḥadīth these questions are posed in the passive form, indicating that everyone will be asked by God 
on the day of resurrection what one has done with his/her lifetime, with his/her knowledge, with his/
her wealth (everything one owns materially and immaterially, what one spent it on and where one got it 
from), and finally with his/her body . Regarding the concepts of afterlife see Franke (2015: 211–220) and 
Smith and Haddad (2002) . 
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The circles can be characterized in the following three dimensions . First, the social 
dimension, i .e . gathering, networking, chatting . Second, the religious dimension, i .e . 
rituals, knowledge, practice (although knowledge is at the intersection of both the so-
cial and religious dimensions) . And finally, the material dimension, i .e . food, fashion, 
religious texts, and design/architecture of the private space .
It should be highlighted that the knowledge in the written text (which was origi-
nally an oral tradition) can only be understood with the aid of oral commentaries, 
interpretations and explanations from a shaykh – someone who has gathered religious 
knowledge surrounding the Qurʾān within himself/herself, ready to share with any-
one who wants to know about the book of secrets .14 The usual method involves recita-
tion combined with conveying the knowledge afterwards, but this was not applicable 
in the Qurʾān circles I attended . There, the focus was on transmission of knowledge 
alongside recitation on a voluntary basis . Those who wanted to recite were welcome 
to, while those who did not want to, or had not practised enough, did not have to . The 
Qurʾān and ḥadīth would also be taught together, or at least one after the other . This 
was necessary, according to the teachers, because the overall context of the Qurʾān 
can only be understood if the surrounding circumstances and historical contexts are 
included . As Angelika Neuwirth puts it, it is “accessible only through the lens of tra-
ditional Islamic exegesis” (Neuwirth 2010: 143) . The written is not self-explanatory; 
it needs complementary sources, such as the oral explanations provided in the Qurʾān 
circles, to be understood . But with the oral comes interpretation, and with interpreta-
tion comes influence, leaving the door open for manipulation, doubt, fear, insecurity, 
dominance and power .15
While spaces such as these offer a platform for religious agency within and out-
side the circles, the participants themselves are subject to transformation in what I 
call self-pietization . This is in contrast to the term Sana Chavoshian uses in her article 
about female pious circles in Iran, namely “self-spiritualization”, coined by Spencer 
Trimingham (Chavoshian 2017) . All of the participants of the circles I attended were, 
according to their self-perception, spiritual – or, to be precise, religious – in one way 
or another . All of them were seeking to be “pious” or “more pious” and to be a “better 
Muslim” in general . I thus use the term self-pietization in order to highlight that the 
participants’ religious agency is consciously chosen, and that they are aware of both 
their own religious agency and their desire to improve their piousness . As a term, self-
pietization confirms this agency and the motivation for development or betterment . 
I argue in line with François Gauthier that this trend of “religious individualization is 
not narcissistic but intrinsically tied to corresponding social forms, i .e . social interac-
tions and communities .” (Cf . Gauthier 2014: 268) .
Processes of self-pietization are essentially very individual, but nonetheless we 
cannot ignore the social environment of groups, communities and families . Indeed, 
14 For more on the subject of orality and the Qurʾān see Graham (2003) .
15 Cf . on the meaning and interpretation of the Qurʾān among others Neuwirth, Marx et al . (2008) and 
Wadud (1999) .
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these should also be highlighted, as individuals serve as multipliers for other individu-
als . The knowledge and piousness that individuals acquire does not go unnoticed by 
others and can cause a reaction in them, which might take the form of approval, op-
position, imitation, ignorance or indifference . Self-pietiziation has an effect on one’s 
religious identity by either fostering or transforming it through regular religious prac-
tice and the acquisition of deeper religious knowledge . In turn, it is reflected in one’s 
love of God, oneself and the community . Equally, however, these processes reflect the 
dominant system of values in the relevant parts of society at that point in time . One’s 
own religiosity is being mirrored, reassessed and judged according to this value system 
– from the inside and the outside . Though believing is invisible in and of itself, as are 
degrees of belief or non-belief, these can become visible to others to a certain extent 
via embodied practices such as praying, fasting or veiling/dress code .16 These are sub-
jectively understood and valued, so attempting to objectively analyse the mind-body 
dualism can pose considerable problems for the researcher, i .e . in identifying and dif-
ferentiating between them .
The topics addressed differed in all three circles and were highly dependent on the 
participants and their needs . In the first morning circle in particular (the one that was 
transferred to my friend’s house due to renovation works), the level of religious knowl-
edge was very low, and the participants would often ask the teacher to clarify terms and 
explain the hidden meanings behind passages from the Qurʾān . In some cases, if the 
teacher could not make the student understand, my friend Nour would offer to ex-
plain using different words or vivid examples from everyday life . The sessions typically 
began with Qurʾān recitation, followed by Qurʾān interpretation and corresponding 
ḥadīth . The latter was often in the form of a story that led into a group discussion . 
Most of the participants told me that the Qurʾān is impossible to understand without 
clarifying interpretations, especially for those with little religious knowledge and little 
experience of practising and living Islam . The participants’ level of knowledge would 
always influence the discussions, and their everyday concerns and problems would of-
ten inspire the subject of the weekly discussion . The discussion would often focus on 
al-kabā’ir, the biggest sins . One of these is the consumption of alcohol, which in many 
families is considered ḥarām (religiously forbidden) and thus is not tolerated:
“Recently, alcohol is increasingly part of wedding ceremonies alongside the wa-
ter and juice bottles, previously the only drinks offered . I don’t approve of this . 
And I don’t drink alcohol . But I also don’t understand why this must be part of 
the weddings of young people nowadays?”17
My friend Nour is very unhappy about these “new” developments: “I only have two 
wishes for my children – to pray regularly and not to commit any of al-kabāʾir” .18 These 
16 Unless these practices are carried out in order to camouflage non-belief or different forms of belief .
17 Interview with Nour, 19 April 2017 .
18 Cf . “Kabīra” in Encyclopaedia of Islam (doi: 10 .1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_8735) . Among these 
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sins, said to be the major ones, “bring[s] down divine anger and punishment […], but 
on the other hand, [they] nevertheless remain[s] within the operative sphere of the 
divine mercy .”19 Drinking alcohol has become a fashionable trend among the upper 
middle-class milieus, and Nour considers this a sign of the devaluation of religion, 
even a sign that the world is approaching its end . Here we find ourselves in the middle 
of a heated discussion – one that grows even bigger and more emotionally intense in 
light of all the other negative developments occurring both in Egypt (President al-Sisi 
is the manifestation of bad political decision-making; the deterioration of religion is 
obvious when looking at the behaviour of people “in the street”) and worldwide (Isra-
el is continually blamed for the political situation in the wider Middle Eastern region; 
Trump is considered evil incarnate) .
Haneen, the lecturer at the women-only circles, was azharī-trained, married with 
three children and in her early 30s . She was well prepared for the lectures and flexible 
regarding the topics of discussion . Her handwritten material was copied and distrib-
uted among the participants at the beginning of each lecture . She combined quotes 
from and references to Qurʾān and ḥadīth in her handouts . During the lectures, we 
usually sat in a circle around a large dining table with and juz’ (parts, excerpts) from it 
in the centre, accessible to everyone, along with paper and pens for us to take notes .
Ḥājj Ahmed, the lecturer of the mixed-gender evening circle, was a self-made 
 shaykh with solid religious knowledge . He was a former marine officer, in his late 60s/
early 70s, and married with children . He did not provide any written or printed ma-
terial, but rather had his lectures prepared on a tablet that he put on a desk next to 
him . I never had a chance to get a glimpse at the screen of his tablet . He, like Haneen, 
would start with a qurʾānic reference and subsequently recount a related story from 
the aḥādīth, followed by a lecture about everyday issues – though sometimes it was the 
other way around, and he would start with the lecture, which was often triggered by 
a question from the audience or an unsolved issue from the previous session . There 
were usually no group discussions, but questions were allowed during the lectures . In 
these gatherings, we sat in a circle facing the lecturer . There was no Qurʾān available 
and nobody took notes . Some had difficulty staying awake after a long day of work, 
while others listened attentively . All unveiled women were asked (“out of respect”, ac-
cording to my friend Shams) to veil during the lecture – including me . Although the 
shaykh saw us unveiled before and after the lecture, we each covered our hair with a 
loose scarf prior to the lesson .
The socio-economic backgrounds of the participants placed most of them in the 
ranges of the middle- and upper middle-class milieus . The participants not only had 
sins are shirk (worshipping anything besides Allah), despairing of Allah’s mercy, not obeying one’s par-
ents, zināʾ (adultery), theft, consumption of alcohol, gambling, speaking ill of someone who is absent, not 
praying ṣalāt, black magic, killing, etc .
19 Wensinck and Gardet (2012) define khaṭīʾa as “apostasy from the faith, kufr and shirk, insults to the 
Prophet, fornication and adultery, sins against nature, murder, usury and black magic; very often, the use 
of fermented liquors, theft on a serious scale, and flight from the battle field, are added to these .”
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the motivation to come, but also the financial freedom to be able to spend two to 
three hours per week away from work . Some of the women participants did not work 
at all, while some who did could make time for the circles on their work days (due to 
being self-employed or because their work allowed for flexible hours) and others came 
on their days off . Also, the hosts of the morning circles were well-off and had spacious 
homes (Arabic: sg . bait, pl . buyūt), in most cases referring to an owned flat; renting 
properties is not very common among these milieus in Alexandria) with enough space 
to host the gatherings, and had enough money to offer delicious food (usually pre-
pared by a private cook or ordered from well-known restaurants) for all participants . 
In the evening circles, the socio-economic make-up looked slightly different . All par-
ticipants acted as hosts in turn, which meant that everyone would offer their house to 
the others and would be responsible for preparing food . These circles took place in 
the evenings to allow for the husbands to participate as well . Most of the couples had 
small children, which meant that someone had to babysit them . In this social milieu, it 
is very common to have a live-in nanny (mostly from sub-Saharan Africa or South-East 
Asia), making it possible for both parents to leave the house together . The husbands 
often worked long hours; the tendency of some of them to fall asleep during the lec-
tures showed their state of exhaustion .
The houses I saw at both the morning and evening circles had rather decorative 
interiors . We usually sat in the reception area of the house or at a large dining table . At 
many of the meetings, a maid would open the door and welcome me inside . All of the 
houses had one or more references to Islam on display . A richly ornamented Qurʾān 
was placed on a small table in the reception area for all family members and guests 
to read, or a frame on the wall held religious sayings from the prophet Muḥammad 
written in calligraphy or sūras from the Qurʾān . Prayer rugs might be casually hung 
over the armrest of a chair . These references hinted at the fact that in the private realm 
there is always a space for the religious ritual of ṣalāt . While the ṣalāt can be carried out 
anywhere in the house (except for the bathroom), usually each family/household has 
defined spaces for prayer facing towards al-Kaʿba in Mecca . These spaces are often in 
the private living room or each family member’s own bedroom . Some families often 
pray together, while in others, each family member prays alone by themselves .
Most of the houses were furnished in a decorative style that is considered “colo-
nial” and represents a French-European look from the 19th and early 20th century with 
the character of a museum . They typically had a reception area to welcome guests 
who were not part of the close circle of family and friends . Characteristic furnishings 
included antique tables, silver, couches and chairs, heavy curtains, carpets and paint-
ings in golden frames . The cutlery and the porcelain, too, looked antique, and was in 
most cases . The atmosphere could be slightly surreal, because no actual everyday life 
would take place in the reception area; this was left to the private living room and the 
bedrooms . Children were usually at school or in bed at the time of the gatherings, so 
only the host, the lecturer, the participants and the maid(s) would be present . This 
was a representative space for others; everything looked beautiful and relatively un-
touched . Regardless of how small the flat was, there would always be a welcoming area 
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for strangers, a space that is used only on special occasions . Some other houses, albeit 
only a bare handful, were furnished in a more modern late 20th century style, with 
clear lines and colours and without antique furnishings . In those houses, too, religious 
references were exhibited in a similar manner as described above, and the same atmos-
phere was present .
What each of these houses had in common was that almost all the windows were 
always covered with curtains that made it impossible to look inside from the street or 
from neighbouring houses . These also made it impossible to look outside, and as such 
the circle gatherings took place in spaces actually closed off from the outside world – 
no interaction took place . When I asked about the tendency of people to live this way 
in their private houses, one of my young Egyptian interviewees, Ismael (who did not 
attend any of these circles) related that “we all live locked up in our houses, excluding 
the sun and fresh air completely; actually we live like cave-men . It is always dark and a 
bit stuffy in our houses . Windows are always shut; curtains are always drawn . Artificial 
light is switched on and if available the A/C is also switched on . Nature and neigh-
bours, strangers are not supposed to get a glimpse of us in our own four walls .”20 Ac-
cording to Ismael, this has to do with shyness, with fear of neighbours’ gossiping, with 
religion secluding women from the view of strangers (especially of male strangers), but 
it also has to do with preventing dust and heat from entering the house .
Most of the topics covered in the discussion portion of the meeting were prompt-
ed by either the previously read qurʾānic sūra or the corresponding aḥādīth . In some 
cases, it would relate to the current political or social situation . Since these circles al-
ways included breaks to eat during or after the lecture, food and cooking were cen-
tral themes in the discussions . Other topics included the ṣalāt and the ritual washing, 
Ramaḍān/fasting, fashion/dress code, body modifications (such as beauty operations 
and tattoos), weddings, education (of the children), relationships/marriage, and gos-
sip in its broadest sense . The latter was not necessarily about specific people, but more 
about a particular habitus (which can be related to dress code or behaviour) . It also 
was not necessarily negative; it could likewise involve talking about this or that person 
in a favourable way – admiring their way of dressing, or praising how religiously active 
they are, e .g . in terms of almsgiving or putting on the veil . Veiling is understood here 
as a gendered embodied spatial practice that incorporates the entangled production of 
bodies and subjectivities .21 In these ways, current events were decisive in influencing 
the discussion .
However, my own presence in the circles also influenced the topics of discussion . 
My attendance was especially difficult in circle A (morning), which I attended from 
20 Interview with Ismael, 17 February 2017 . 
21 The discussion of the veil will be dealt with elsewhere (my forthcoming publication on the wearing 
and meanings of the veil, Franke forthcoming b) . I will only remark here that in the last few years, espe-
cially since the shift in power from the Muslim Brotherhood to Abdel-Fatah al-Sisi, many women have 
taken off the veil or begun to strongly consider taking off the veil . Thus, women who start to put on the 
veil are rare nowadays, and if it happens it is talked about extensively . 
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the beginning of my field research . Towards the end of my first year of fieldwork in 
Alexandria, I asked the participants if I could hold a group discussion with them about 
the circle, why they came, what they expected from the group and how the gather-
ings affected them . They all agreed, and they also all agreed that I could record the 
discussion for easier recollection afterwards . Despite this, and despite my assurances 
of anonymity, they did not trust me anymore, and some of the women successfully 
managed to exclude me from the circle . After the summer break, I did not attend 
circle A anymore, and instead switched to circle B, as suggested by my friend Nour, 
who was also hosting this circle . When I inquired as to why they did not want me 
to participate in the gatherings anymore, Nour said that it was related to the record-
ing, to my asking questions, and to my facial expressions showing emotions during 
the lectures . Ultimately it was a matter of trust, and I lost that trust because I am a 
researcher and because I asked questions and left the “safe space” of mere participant 
observation . This was the only occasion during my entire stay when I was obviously 
rejected and when trust became an issue that affected my work as an anthropologist .22 
Here, my presence changed the setting and made some of the women feel uncomfort-
able . Another situation that highlighted obvious discomfort of one of the women was 
when the subject of the veil was being discussed, specifically whether or not it is farḍ 
(i .e . religious duty) .23 The woman, Maha, immediately asked the teacher not to discuss 
this issue, because she was definitely not going to put on the veil and did not want to 
hear that it was farḍ . The veil was not common in Maha’s upbringing, and neither 
was it common in her husband’s family; she preferred to ignore the debate about it in 
order to avoid being put in, or putting herself in, the situation of consciously deciding 
in favour of God (and putting on the veil) or against God (and refusing to put on the 
veil) . In her case, ignorance was the best way to protect herself from making a difficult 
and potentially awkward decision (given the fear of facing rejection from both her 
family and her husband’s) .
What Do Participants Bring to the Qurʾān Circle?
Those attending Qurʾān circles do not go there as empty subjects, ready to absorb as 
much information as possible . On the contrary, they come already filled with varying 
amounts of knowledge, and with personal issues that can trigger, guide or form part of 
the discussions . Most of the participants have at least a basic religious understanding, 
which they want to expand or simply verify in order to feel more comfortable in the 
22 Trust was also an issue in many other situations, just not an issue that affected my work . The issue was 
usually that of why I work on the subject of religion, why I am interested in personal lives and opinions, 
etc . Some suspected me of being a spy (in a joking manner), but felt assured if I explained the fact that all 
data is anonymized and no real identities will be exposed .
23 “Islamic law distinguishes the individual duty (farḍ ʿayn), such as ritual prayer, fasting, etc ., and the col-
lective duty (farḍ kifāya), the fulfilment of which by a sufficient number of individuals excuses the other 
individuals from fulfilling it, such as funeral prayer, holy war, etc .”, cf . Juynboll (2012) .
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routines of religious rituals . Those with profound knowledge about Islam also attend 
the circles to deepen their understanding and for reassurance in more detailed aspects 
of and questions about the religion . In circle A (morning) and circle C (evening) the 
knowledge was usually fairly basic; in the evening circle, at least one of the married 
couples did not have a deep religious background and wanted to foster their knowl-
edge by attending . In circle B (morning), the understanding of Islam among the fe-
male participants was usually at quite a similar, substantial level . Here, the discussions 
and questions would go into great detail, with philosophical debates about particular 
topics . This especially included questions of how to improve the overall situation in 
Egypt and how everyone can participate in making the lives of the marginalized less 
precarious . Characteristic of the Qurʾān circles, all three of them, was the production 
of knowledge and the associated power relation in a Foucauldian sense . Identity for-
mation and feelings of belonging occurred within these circles as well, as did demar-
cation based on religious positions and from the teacher or other participants . Being 
part of a group of others who have the same or similar thoughts, who dress and act in 
a similar way, can induce the feeling of belonging to a group and also foster a sense of 
religious belonging to a Muslim community .
“How people choose to identify themselves is important because labeling is im-
posing a definition . One either lives up to or down to a standard when a label is used 
because the label denotes value . Some things are known about how labels emerge and 
how they work to define groups, but not much is known about how groups come to 
define themselves . Nevertheless, labeling is a process that defines ‘in groups’ and ‘out 
groups,’ the normal and the ab-normal, the legitimate and the deviant . Labeling is 
subjective . It not only reflects group values, but it also gives a framework for under-
standing . There are, however, dangers attached to labeling . One of them is stereotyp-
ing, making generalizations about a group with insufficient knowledge . The danger 
lies in the fact that there is usually a very small bit of truth that gets amplified and 
extended as reality” (Blea 1995: 5) .
Although Irene Blea in her study among Chicano communities does not account 
for the non-dichotomous aspect of these “in groups” and “out groups”, which I con-
sider highly important, not least because there are many more possibilities than simply 
belonging or not belonging to a community (such as being half-in, half-out, being in 
or out purely as a cover, etc .), I still find her point that labelling is subjective to be very 
accurate, as has been argued above .
At the same time, participating in the Qurʾān circles also evokes the atmosphere 
of being accepted by God through faith and through striving to be a better Muslim . 
Here, the notion of niyya (Wensinck 2012) should be highlighted . It has a historical 
meaning that links the notion to Islamic sharī aʿ and makes it necessary for the niyya 
to be clearly acoustically or spiritually expressed before carrying out the act of ʿibādāt 
(Bousquet 2012) . While legal opinions differ greatly regarding these acts, the only act 
that most scholars agree on necessitating niyya ex ante is the ritual prayer, the ṣalāt . 
While the niyya must be expressed before the respective act, it should also be carried 
out during the practice until its very end . “So the niyya has become a legal act of its 
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own . It is usually called obligatory, but in some cases, e .g . the washing of the dead, 
commendable” (Wensinck 2012) . Hans Wehr translates niyya as “(good) intention, 
intent, design, purpose, plan, scheme; determination, will, volition, direction of will; 
tendency, inclination, desire” (Wehr 1958: 901) . In this sense the niyya must be carried 
out by a Muslim who is in full control of their mental power; they must be familiar 
with the intended act and must have the intention to carry out this act . The notion of 
niyya is not mentioned in the Qurʾān but in canonical ḥadīth, and it has undergone 
a gradual development of its meaning that can be historically traced starting from the 
moral denotation of intention: “innamā ’l-aʿmāl bi ’l-niyya” .24 In this sense, the ritual 
act needs positive intention in order to be a morally and religiously accepted deed . 
However, the meaning has expanded to allow for a lack of evil intention to be con-
sidered niyya as well: “Good intention is taken into account by God […], refraining 
from an evil intention is reckoned as a good work […], the intention of the faithful is 
better than his work […], niyya comes near to the meaning of ikhlāṣ [q .v .] .” (Wensinck 
2012) .
This latter development of the meaning of niyya is how most of the participants of 
the circles understood it and how the lecturer Haneen explained it to us . In this con-
text, it is important to highlight the two major religious positions that I encountered 
not only during the Qurʾān circles but also in almost all other situations, conversations 
and interview meetings, and in the large quantity of literature and grey literature I 
read on the topic of how to be a good Muslim .25 There was usually a juxtaposition of 
the individual God-Believer relationship – which is untouchable – on the one hand, 
and society’s influence on this relationship on the other hand . A third component 
then comes into play, adding to this two-sided situation, namely what Nour described 
as “what you see out there in the street is not Islam .” This triangular relationship is 
complicated in itself, but other aspects complicate it still further . Most important of 
these are questions of doubt and insecurity in relation to God, society and the afterlife . 
This also ties into the collective memory and how it is negotiated in the discourse of 
individual belief systems . Here, underlying dynamics and changes depending on time 
and space play a role and reflect a process of exactly the aspects referred to above . Also 
key here is how individual religiosity can occur separately from politics or rather that 
individual religiosity does occur separately from politics . Most of the participants are 
perfectly aware of the, as Haneen put it, “original or pure” relationship, namely that 
“Islam is something between me and God” . This relationship implies that any outside 
opinion, influence, advice or doubt is not only unnecessary but actually wrong .
24 Reference to al-Bukhārī in Wensinck (2012) .
25 Examples of such book titles are: Being a Good Muslim; Educating Children in the Way of God; The 
Path to Paradise; Muslim Society; How to Fight the Evil; The Biggest Sins in Islam; Living a Good Mus-
lim Marriage; The Prayer – How to Pray as a Muslim; The Book of Manners; Blessings of Marriage; How 
to Be a Good Muslim; The Stages of Heaven, etc . Most of the books have colourful covers with paintings 
of and quotes from the Qurʾān . Those referring to paradise are depicted with heavenly iconographic 
references such as clouds or doves and even ladders or staircases .
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When I asked Nour what she does, therefore, in the case of uncertainty regarding 
something written in the Qurʾān or in the ḥadīth, or when something she heard or saw 
somewhere caught her attention but she did not know how to assess it, she replied:
I follow my heart and I consult Qurʾān and ḥadīth and I try to find matching 
references . I might also consult someone like Haneen or even listen to a TV 
preacher like Mustafa Hosni . But in the end it is important what my heart tells 
me and I will ask God in my prayers and then take a decision upon the best of 
my knowledge . You know everyone tries to influence you or interfere in your 
life and also in your religious life, but it is none of their business . God does not 
appreciate this . What he appreciates though is difference in opinion and he en-
courages discussions with the freedom of interpretation left to each and every 
single one of us .
Since this needed some further clarification, I followed up by asking her: “Tab [so], 
what about those who interpret Islam in a very different, or rather, radical way, or 
those who are trying to oppress women in the name of Islam?” Her reply was very 
emotional, though at the same time she tried to focus on her understanding of Islam:
We shall not judge what others do . I can try to show them God’s mercy and that 
he would not want any harmful acts to be carried out in his name, but in the 
end we are all free human beings responsible for ourselves and all the actions 
we do . It is upon God to judge, not upon me . So it is better to mind my own 
business and have a strong relation with God instead of finding mistakes in the 
actions of other people . What is wrong is wrong and he will correct the wrong 
on Judgement Day .
References to the afterlife and judgement day are a recurring theme in almost all the 
interviews I conducted and in almost all the gatherings of the Qurʾān circles . One can 
collect ḥasanāt through good deeds and good intention (niyya), according to Nour, 
“there is promise [of a life in paradise], we have to try and hope and believe in this” . 
I will continue discussing the subject of afterlife elsewhere .26
Silences and Absences
Regarding the Qurʾān circles, it is important to also highlight that in many situations, 
topics were underlying and present yet remained hidden – topics that are silenced or 
absent (or rather made absent, intentionally or otherwise), expressed or not expressed . 
Difficult themes/taboos are social markers that constitute powerful forms of commu-
26 See my forthcoming publication on notions of afterlife in contemporary Alexandria (Franke forth-
coming c; cf . Franke 2020) . 
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nication . In turn, voids in communication point to taboos in social relations . What, 
then, is the context for voids and taboos? They mirror grievances in society or in the 
respective community . According to Molly Andrews, it is necessary to differentiate be-
tween counter-narratives/counter-stories as opposed to master narratives . The former 
are narratives “which people tell and live, which offer resistance, either implicitly or ex-
plicitly, to dominant cultural narratives” (Andrews 2004: 1) . The latter are dominant 
cultural storylines and are the lens through which we view the stories of ourselves and 
others .
Problems occur as soon as one cannot identify with the master narrative anymore 
as one’s own experience does not harmonize with the master narrative . Consequently, 
the basis on which the dominant storyline was developed is questioned and poses a 
challenge . With the creation and circulation of (individual yet often community-
wide) counter-narratives, counter-realities are produced and validated . The relation-
ship of counter-narratives to master narratives is a close and conditional one; still, it is 
not a dichotomous relationship but rather one with blurred boundaries where the two 
can even merge . Identifying master narratives and counter-narratives as such is a fairly 
difficult task; it depends not only on the perspective of the storyteller but also on the 
researcher’s attitude towards the various narratives . Another factor which should be 
considered is the role of the reader/listener and the personal perspective from which 
they read the story . The researcher is also required to pay “attention to the interac-
tional situation in which the narrative is produced [as it] helps to explain the ways in 
which speakers perpetuate or resist dominant cultural storylines .” (Jones 2004: 169; 
cf . Franke 2015: 207–209) .
The aforementioned case of Maha serves as an example, as her counter-narrative 
remains silent – which does not disqualify it from being a counter-narrative per se, 
since narratives can also be silent, or even silences themselves be narratives . This only 
makes it more difficult to identify them . Maha does not want to speak about the veil, 
which reflects her own inner unease regarding the issue itself, but also that it is a highly 
contested issue related to religion, society, culture and tradition . She prefers not to talk 
about it in order to avoid exposing herself to critique or to encouragement to put on 
the veil . By means of the taboo – by being silent about the veil – she protects herself 
from socially and religiously based arguments . Although the community surrounding 
Maha is very much in favour of the veil and considers it to be farḍ, she does not want 
to put it on, and thus chooses to remain silent and, in fact, asks everyone around her 
to also remain silent about it . Not talking about the veil and thereby labelling it a ta-
boo – at least in the space of the Qurʾān circle – enables her to keep her own personal 
opinion without allowing other perspectives to enter her realm of interpretation and 
plant a seed of doubt in her consciousness . She uses the taboo as a barrier, as a protec-
tive shield for her own personal well-being .
In a different situation, one participant, Iman, tried to avoid the subject of alcohol . 
This explicitly does not refer to the subject of drinking alcohol, as this is something all 
of the women unanimously agreed on to be ḥarām . It rather concerns situations where 
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one is exposed to others drinking alcohol, such as the aforementioned weddings or, in 
Iman’s case, the numerous work meetings she attends .
In ALL of the work meetings I go to alcohol is being served and everyone ac-
cepts it . Even I accept it although I do not drink and although I am even veiled . 
I think it has become more common in the past years . But then again it is not 
upon me to leave a work meeting just because the other business partners drink . 
It is none of my business . I consider it wrong, ḥarām, but what they do is their 
choice .
Iman did not say this out loud in front of the other women; rather, since she was sitting 
next to me, she spoke in a lowered voice and made me understand that she disagrees 
with the others’ outrage at the presence of alcohol at various events . In her opinion, 
the motto live and let live should be applied more widely in Alexandria: “people are 
wasting a lot of time and effort and energy on focusing on the lives of others instead of 
just following God and themselves .” Both Iman and Maha prefer not to follow the ma-
jority; instead, they act differently . This difference is in line with mainstream religious 
understanding, though the degree to which it is in line remains open to debate .
Amongst the Qurʾān circle participants, three positions prevail with regard to 
their religious belief systems . First, those who seek to foster the religious knowledge 
they have acquired previously or elsewhere . Many participants attend with a thorough 
knowledge of Islam and want to be more confident in its texts and rituals . Those who 
have children, especially, want to have a deeper understanding of their religion in order 
to be able to pass it on to their offspring and answer their questions in a more nuanced 
way . Second, those who want to learn something new about Islam – aspects and un-
derstandings they were not aware of before . And third, those who attend in order to 
prove to themselves that they are different . They want to position themselves against 
the dominant knowledge and be confident about their varying, sometimes even op-
posing, position . While the first two positions are in line with the knowledge conveyed 
in the lectures, the third brings with it an awareness on the participant’s part that they 
are not going with the mainstream religious flow . In some cases, these positions are 
lived and expressed consciously, while in other cases they happen unintentionally .
As mentioned earlier, there are many reasons for someone to attend these gather-
ings . The three positions listed above are in reference to the participant’s specific reli-
gious position and its development, or potential for development, over the course of 
their attendance . It shows that most of the participants are open to change and ready 
to increase their knowledge, and to boost or “improve” themselves, in the sense of self-
pietization . The minds and opinions of the attendees are permeable, and the lecturers 
(and even the other participants) are given the power to influence their state of knowl-
edge . Thus, power is exercised here by means of knowledge .27 To a limited extent this 
is even true for the third group of participants, those who contest the lectured knowl-
27 Regarding the relationship between power and knowledge, see Foucault (1972) and Foucault (1982) .
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edge and the knowledge expressed by the other participants . This form of knowledge 
power (Wissensmacht) does not only remain within the circle, but can reach much 
further by way of the participants acting as multipliers and conveying their knowledge 
to others (e .g . family members, friends etc .) . It can have a wide coverage, and this is 
where the boundaries of the circles are contested and transcended .
Boundaries are to be understood in terms of space, referring to both actual space 
and knowledge space . Knowledge traverses the confined space of the circles, which is 
being opened up through the movement of the participants in and out of the gather-
ings . Pre-existing knowledge is being reproduced, confirmed and manifested, while 
new knowledge is being produced and shared . Both forms of knowledge are conveyed 
and repeated in discursive practices . The Foucauldian concept that discourse consists 
of knowledge and power also holds true for the Qurʾān circles . Here, religious knowl-
edge is a powerful element that also exerts power over the participants through its 
related discourse . Religious knowledge has an authoritative character in that it is di-
rectly linked to God and obedience, ḥasanāt, being a good Muslim if followed in the 
“correct” way (or what the lecturer and sometimes also the other participants consider 
as such), versus disobedience, being a bad Muslim if not followed in the suggested 
way . This “suggested” way can often turn into an enforced way, although many of my 
interviewees considered Islam to be a collection of options, where everything is pos-
sible – except for the belief in God and his prophet Muḥammad, as this is the most 
important aspect that makes one a Muslim and is undebatable . Thus, it is not only the 
lecturer and the other participants that can act as regulatory forces or correctives for 
Islam, but also Islam itself that is attributed with this power here, by depicting God as 
a punishing God and his followers as believers who are judged and put into the binary 
categories of good or bad followers . Within the lectures, freedom of belief is rather 
limited, and both the advice (spoken and unspoken) and the overall atmosphere sug-
gest that one should adhere to the knowledge of the lecturer . Thus, choice is limited, 
as explained by Nour:
Even though God is the most merciful and it is upon him to judge us, there is a 
big chance that if we try to do everything the way He and prophet Muhammed 
[…] suggested, that we will be able to enter paradise . But if we do not strive to 
do as much good as possible then we do not know what will happen and this 
makes me and many others feel uncomfortable to have this knowledge about 
our religion and to have everything written in the Qurʾān and in the ḥadīth and 
still not follow his words . Especially if this is done deliberately . Those who do 
not know better, this is another story . But those who know all this about Islam 
and ignore it, this is I do not know, problematic .
In this sense, freedom of choice does not really exist in social life; it is abandoned in the 
face of the kind of emotional pressure that is exerted in the circles in a soft and some-
times hidden way . Nonetheless, it is present and part of the discourse .
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The Psyche and the Lessons
Well-being, as Maha put it, is another mental and physical state that many of the Qurʾān 
circle participants seek, albeit not in the sense of standing out from the crowd, but by 
attending the lectures . Regarding this, another woman, Shams, said the following:
I come here because not only my body needs to exercise, which I do in the yoga 
classes, but my brain also needs to get training . The lectures are a perfect chance 
to let my mind work on something useful, something that gives me peace . This 
is my spiritual break from everyday life – very similar to praying actually . I give 
my mind spiritual input that keeps me going until the next gathering .
The reference here to “praying” needs further elaboration, as it has been mentioned 
in so many of the interviews with many different positions and intensities . People like 
Nour or Haneen who consider themselves to be “good” Muslims (as far as possible) 
told me that ṣalāt, i .e . the ritual prayer, is farḍ – a religious duty that is undebatable and 
mandatory for every Muslim; “[i]n the Qurʾānic universe in fact, there is no religion 
without prayer” .28 The times at which one prays can vary, but the total of five prayers 
per day is a must for them . This was a recurring theme during the gatherings of both 
the morning and evening circles .
In this specific topical context, one of the issues was the question of whether a 
prayer would be accepted by God if the follower was not mentally in a state of prayer 
or was not spiritually connected to God because they were otherwise occupied by eve-
ryday matters such as work, family and friends – whether to go on this night out and 
what to wear, what to cook for the in-laws, or when to make time for the kids . Nour 
and Haneen had a very similar if not identical position in this regard . For them, it 
would be ideal for the believer to be in constant and direct connection with God basi-
cally all the time . However, if this is not possible, or is not the case for reasons such as 
not being used to it or being preoccupied with everyday life, then the ṣalāt should still 
be carried out to ensure that one does not get used to not praying . And, most impor-
tantly, the connection to God might form during the ṣalāt . As such, giving up on the 
ṣalāt, whatever the reason and whatever the circumstances, must always be a last resort 
if considered at all . Both women would always advise anyone to continue praying and 
to believe in the power of God, who is almighty, and – most importantly – to leave 
the judgement to him and not assume anything . The routine of praying should, ac-
cording to them, not be interrupted unless it is for a valid reason, which may include 
the monthly break for menstruating women, as well as travel, sickness, and age-related 
difficulties . In all other situations, there is no excuse for not praying .
28 Monnot (2012): “[…] the ṣalāt, principal prayer of Islam, forms part of the ʿ ibādāt or cultic obligations . 
[…] In short, before becoming the obligatory and codified activity […] prayer is first of all, and always 
remains so in the Qurʾānic vision of the world, the fundamental fabric of religious behaviour .”
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God already made it easy for us due to the fact that he allows the prayers to take 
place within a certain time frame . He makes life easy for us, but he wants us to 
be dedicated to him and to give him this little attention . He is really not asking 
for a lot . And did you know that the five little breaks he offers to us as a present 
is a true gift? We have time to focus on him and to let go of all the worldly things 
that might annoy us . Through the routine of pre-prayer ritual washing [Arabic: 
al-wuḍūʾ] we keep ourselves clean during the day and we actually physically 
exercise five times a day like this . Many of the movements that we carry out 
during the prayer are similar to yoga positions and it is a healthy way to stay 
fit in the least of time . After the ṣalāt I am always much more attentive and if I 
was tired before, I am not tired after anymore . God knows what is best for us 
and the ṣalāt is for sure one of his most precious gifts to us . Especially in these 
fast times we are living in at the moment, where everything is dominated by the 
internet, consumerism and competition . During prayer we can go back to our 
essential selves, the one true connection between us and God . If the connection 
is not felt immediately, it will come during prayer; maybe not the same day, but 
patience will tell it will come one day .
Nour is very confident here about the ritual effect of ṣalāt and how this improves the 
God-Believer relationship . For her, not praying means not only betraying God, but 
also betraying herself, or depriving herself of something divinely ordained and, simul-
taneously, divinely offered . It makes her happy to pray and to please God . In this sense, 
she connects to what Shams suggested earlier, i .e . that praying is “me time”, a moment 
of complete closure to the outside world that allows one to open up the heart .
In this sense, the ritualized ṣalāt should not be understood as a duty that needs ef-
fort and inner conviction, but one that connotes happiness and spiritual fulfilment, 
and where one worships of one’s own free will and experiences exclusivity and one-
ness . Being one with God, in the sense of having a pure relationship with him, is also 
reflected in the confined space of ṣalāt . It takes place on a prayer rug facing towards 
al-Kaʿba in Mecca . On this rug, the ritually purified believer assumes predetermined 
prayer postures and recites particular sūras depending on the time of the prayer . They 
enter a spiritual space of connection with God with the prior niyya of carrying out 
ṣalāt . This spiritual space is also a physical space – one that is also a sacred space in the 
sense that one would not interrupt the prayer unless it is an urgent matter . (Toddlers 
might start climbing on their praying parent, but this is usually accepted .) The unity 
of the believer during the prayer ritual, spatially confined and defined by the prayer 
rug, symbolizes an ideal state of spirituality . Inside this sacred space, the believer can 
let go of all problems and everyday concerns . The God-Believer relationship offers the 
latter a separate space where they can just “be” and not think about worries . In this 
sense, the spatial sanctuary is also a spiritual sanctuary, with the possibility of opening 
a space of social and mental peace . Within this space outside of time, the believer is of-
fered new power to solve issues and to get back to everyday life with some distance and 
a fresh mind . As Haneen put it:
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This is exactly what the divine relation to God should be like in an ideal set-
ting, a revitalizing aspect in our lives, something that does not drain us but that 
refills our sources and triggers our brains and bodies to perform and to carry 
out good deeds . And this is why I tell my students and I teach my children to 
pray and to repeat this sequence of prayers five times a day, every day and not 
get lazy in praying . Actually, for me personally the ṣalāt is the most important 
thing in Islam . The ṣalāt is basically what Islam in its core is . Those who do not 
pray because they do not think it is necessary or those who are just lazy miss the 
biggest gift we received from God and I feel sorry for them .
The discussion of praying and not praying provoked an emotional debate within the 
circles that exemplified what was mentioned earlier regarding silences and absences 
in social interaction . While many religious debates are held with an assumption of 
freedom of interpretation and freedom from judgement, the perceived reality is often 
different . Participants feel too shy or even intimidated to express their real opinions, 
while those who appear to be very religious claim the power of interpreting Islam 
as their own – although they would not admit to this, as the last word is always up 
to God . Nonetheless, this creates a power hierarchy among the participants, leading 
them to remain silent or say things that do not match their own lives . For example, 
they might agree that ṣalāt is important despite not adhering to it themselves (by not 
praying at all, or praying less than the required five times) . Sentiments of shame and 
fear thus dictate the oral (non-)participation in the circles . Samira told me after one of 
the sessions that:
I do not pray the five prayers every day . It is simply too much for me with the 
work and the kids . Some days I try to pray five times and I succeed but on other 
days I just forget or I remember because of the aḏān, even the prayer time apps 
on my phone which remind me to pray, but if I skip or postpone I sometimes 
forget . I really hope that God can forgive me . But I do not want the group to 
think I am a bad Muslim and to judge me because I am not such a conscientious 
worshipper . The dynamic in the gatherings can sometimes be rather intimidat-
ing and I feel shy, even scared to say something . Especially if it is not in congru-
ence with the lecturer and the other good Muslim women there, those who do 
everything right and have nothing to fear .
Samira’s sorrowful opinion offers an insight into the Qurʾān circles from another per-
spective, namely that the meetings consist of dynamics that do not make every attend-
ee feel comfortable . Despite her reservations regarding some of the topics discussed, 
Samira still goes to the lectures regularly for social and spiritual reasons . By listening 
to the teacher, she has the feeling that her mind is enlightened and that her social posi-
tion among the other women is stabilized and promoted, since most of them know 
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each other (or of each other) outside of the circles as well .29 In these two respects she 
is empowered on both a religious and social level, with the limitation that she feels 
obliged to hide some of her sentiments from the other participants in order to avoid 
being marginalized, rejected, judged, indoctrinated or pitied .
The aforementioned notion of “me time” reflects the trend towards what I call 
an organic Islam that propagates a balanced life-work-religion/belief/practice rela-
tionship and hints at a post-conventional self-development .30 “Me time” is no longer 
about the ego, but about a careful and mindful lifestyle that is compatible with the self 
and the community . With the revitalization of individual religion comes the awareness 
of how much religion is good for me, what I can do, what I have to do, and how I can 
put all these requirements in balance . At the same time, one must not forget the needs 
of the community, which is perceived to be an essential part of living an organic Islam 
that is focused on the here and now, yet aware of the afterlife and the necessities this 
brings with it . Religion is thus not only an individual but a social matter . Similar to 
clean eating, there is “clean Islam”, “cleansed Islam”, “detox Islam”, i .e . Islam without 
“bad” influences from ordinary people or scholars and doctrines .31 Despite the fact 
that global trends have the reputation of standardizing local specificities and propagat-
ing the mainstream, according to Theodore Bestor, “Globalization doesn’t necessar-
ily homogenize cultural differences nor erase the salience of cultural labels . Quite the 
contrary, it grows the franchise” (Bestor 2000: 61) . The trend is to live and practise a 
purified version of Islam – one that glorifies its cultural specificities while still being 
flexible enough for various local practices, and that only includes the aspects that fit 
the believers’ “way of religion” – is being fed by the promise of immortality in the 
afterlife . This concept is not meant to be a “light” version of Islam, but a sustainable 
one that highlights the cleansing of polluted versions of Islam; it is about a detox of the 
soul and the spirit . Organic Islam in this sense is soul food:
Emotional fulfilment is a welcome effect of practicing an ideal version of Islam; 
it helps to compensate for all the miseries and problems around us . And pray-
ing is the most visible aspects of our ritualized religion, so the more you pray 
29 Most of Alexandria’s middle-class milieu go to and meet at the same places or have kids who attend the 
same schools and sports clubs (after-school activities) .
30 The term “post-conventional self-development” was coined by the discipline of psychology and moral 
development . Moral development happens gradually according to different levels as coined by Lawrence 
Kohlberg (cf . Kohlberg 1996) . The term “trend” concerns a spiritual topography that reflects global de-
velopments . As yoga and mindfulness seminars spread across the world, the idea of ‘organic Islam(s)’ 
is similarly becoming popular . Searching online . especially in relevant groups on Facebook, there is an 
increasing trend towards different, awareness-raising ways of being a Muslim believer, with ever increas-
ing numbers of adherents .
31 Cf . on global food trends Kearney (2010) . ”Nowadays, many people do not believe in God anymore, 
but in health . What one used to do for God – pilgrimages, fasting – one now does for one’s health .” as 
Manfred Lütz, Psychiatrist and Theologist, stated 2017 in a radio interview (https://www .domradio .de/
themen/bist%C3%BCmer/2017-08-03/us-studie-religioese-menschen-leben-laenger ; own translation) . 
See also Wilk (2006) as well as Counihan and Van Esterik (2013) and Watson and Caldwell (2004) .
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the more fulfilled you are and the more appreciation and honour you receive 
from your peers,
explained Shams during one of our numerous car journeys throughout Alexandria . 
She went on:
it’s about improving, maybe even tuning oneself and Islam in an individual-
ized perfectionist version . About being different, different from the masses, 
who around us all claim to be Muslim . But we, as middle class, we want to be 
special, better, faster, richer, more beautiful and this is also true in terms of our 
belief . It has to do with identity and it can even become an obsession . Not in 
the sense of the Salafiyyīn or the Qurʾāniyyīn but in the sense of aligning one’s 
life according to the individually believed principles .32
Religion forms identity, and the way religion is practiced – and belief is embodied – 
becomes a way of life . But this optimized version does not only focus on the things 
the believer does but also on the things they do not do, i .e . their life conforms to a 
self-proclaimed religious diet . This form of self-pietization is indicative of many of the 
conversations I had with the women participating in the Qurʾān circles . Religiosity is 
one aspect of life that can be optimized in order to get a better outcome (feel better, get 
more attention from peers, move one step closer to a higher level in paradise) . It is also 
a domain which, according to these women, they are more or less in control of; from a 
religious perspective, nobody has the right to intrude on their individual believer space 
(though male members of the family may suggest and advise e .g . to pray or put on the 
veil) . The women are in charge of designing their own God-Believer relationship and 
they are the ones holding the power in that regard .
Historicity and Trans-/Intertextuality
When religion and religiosity come into play, the question of historicity and inter-
textuality must be raised, especially in the context of social interaction and knowl-
edge production . Concerning the notion of trans-/intertextuality – namely that a text 
consists of codes and discourses thus already having a social and historical dimension 
32 This statement reflects not only the wish for self-pietization but also that being religious is a form of 
consumption, and that this consumption should be in alignment with oneself and the environment, i .e . 
a sustainable and healthy form of consumption (cf . Redden 2016) . This trend was also identified and 
coined by Thomas Luckmann: “The new, basically de-institutionalized privatized social form of religion 
seemed to be relying on an open market of diffuse, syncretistic packages of meaning, typically connected 
to low levels of transcendence and produced in a partly or fully commercialized cultic milieu . The new 
situation permitted, even encouraged individual bricolage . Relying for its essential legitimations upon the 
modern myth of the autonomous individual, it had a pronounced elective affinity for the sacralisation of 
subjectivisms” (Luckmann 1996: 73) . 
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while at the same time reflecting textual interplays within one text – Haneen explained 
this to her students:
The Qurʾān is God’s word that has been sent upon the prophet Muḥammad 
and that is universally valid . At the same time, it is a historical testimony of the 
period of his life and in combination with the ḥadīth and the Sunna we can 
understand Islam . In the Qurʾān there are also references to the Christian Bible 
and the Jewish Torah with similar stories in each of them, although we believe 
that Islam is the last and thus the most veritable version of these accounts .
Without using the terms, the lecturer here refers to the historicity and intertextuality of 
these religious sources . Haneen made a similar comment when the discussion turned 
to very modern, up-to-date topics such as fashion, specifically dress code, body modi-
fication (implants/cosmetic surgery, tattoos) and nail polish . According to Haneen 
and Nour, the best course of action should be interpretation of the relevant historical 
sources in combination with analysis of the current opinions of religious leaders (i .e . 
fatāwā), mixed with “the best of one’s knowledge and belief” . As Nour explained:
I consult different sources (aḥādīth) and religious persons and if they concur 
and my own knowledge tells me it is right, then I go with it . But if the aḥādīth 
differ and the religious persons also disagree and even argue about the issue, I 
choose to follow my heart . Mathalan, the nail polish issue that has come up 
recently: there is no corresponding religious source except that we should fulfil 
al-wuḍūʾ prior to the ṣalāt . Now, many religious official persons have issued 
fatāwā regarding the nail polish with some saying it is ok, others saying it is not 
and others again saying ḥalāl nail polish is allowed . Now, the best of my knowl-
edge and belief tells me that nail polish is wrong and my scientific knowledge 
doubts the functionality of ḥalāl nail polish . So what do I do? I consult my 
heart, I consult God and decide to be on the safe side by not using nail polish 
during ṣalāt .
Here, too, the historicity must be put in context – and again, in cases of doubt that 
are difficult to resolve clearly, consultation of one’s own heart is the last resort and the 
best possible option .
Individual Religion and Established Islam – 
A Powerful Relationship
Indeed, individual religion and its corresponding dynamics are often said to threaten 
established Islam, i .e . institutionalized Islam, the state Islam or the official Islam . In 
the case of Egypt, this would essentially be represented by al-Azhar and its religious 
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knowledge production institutions .33 These institutions function in a centralized way . 
All scholars who claim to be Azhar-trained are required to have a certificate from al-
Azhar University or one of its many branches throughout Egypt . This gives the schol-
ars credibility, as al-Azhar is one of the most trusted religious institutions in Egypt 
(this is according to the participants of the circles; others I spoke with would have 
different opinions), while at the same time these scholars spread the intellectual posi-
tion of al-Azhar and function as multipliers of its ideological perspectives . By means 
of its unique feature, al-Azhar is also interested in maintaining its exclusive position 
and making sure that its credibility is inviolable . Therefore, the standard of its reli-
gious knowledge must be guaranteed in order to maintain its position among so many 
other religious institutions, TV preachers and self-proclaimed scholars of Islam . Con-
trol is the mechanism that seems to be the most exploitable instrument for achieving 
this . In the case of Egypt, this means control in collaboration with the state and with 
the state’s interests which concur with the interests of al-Azhar . Both the state and 
al-Azhar are actors with the same interests and agendas . They represent a community 
of interests with the same goal: to influence society . And this is the point at which the 
problem of private space comes into play . Private spaces can hardly be controlled at 
all, and the dynamics therein can be unexpected . Private space thus has the potential 
and the power to influence the religious realm of a society away from established and 
state-controlled Islam .
Despite this potential, I found that the three Qurʾān circles I attended were more 
or less congruent with the religious knowledge that al-Azhar and the state of Egypt 
promote . Yet, although the gatherings are not intended to be clandestine, since they 
take place off the beaten track, the state does not have a supervising instrument to trace 
these numerous lectures that are occurring throughout the country . Thus, even if the 
lecturers claim to be Azhar-trained, it does not necessarily mean that the knowledge 
they convey is always in line with the official tone . Moreover, the dynamics within 
the groups are unpredictable and depend on who is present and on the subject being 
taught, as well as on the developments within the discussion . This means that even 
if the lecturer is a graduate from al-Azhar, the participants also inform the other par-
ticipants with their own backgrounds of knowledge that might not always be in line 
33 Cf . for a historial overview of al-Azhar: Hatina (2010) and for a contemporary analysis see Brown 
(2011) . On the dispute about moral leadership in Egypt between the president and al-Azhar see Nathan 
Brown and Cassia Bardos: Power Politics or Principle . Diwan – Middle East Insights from Carnegie Blog, 
12 December 2018 (https://carnegie-mec .org/diwan/77928) . On the ideology of al-Azhar in its teachings 
see Assem Hefny: Die islamische al-Azhar Universität in Kairo: Eine Frage der Interpretation . Qantara.
de, 3 May 2017 (https://de .qantara .de/inhalt/die-islamische-al-azhar-universitaet-in-kairo-eine-frage-der-
interpretation) as well as Ketchley and Biggs (2017) . On the position of the Ahmed al-Tayyeb see Kha-
lid El Kaoutit: Instrumentalisierter Glaube – Interview mit Al-Azhar Großscheich Ahmed al-Tayyeb . 
Qantara .de, 28 April 2015 (https://de .qantara .de/inhalt/interview-mit-al-azhar-grossscheich-ahmed-al-
tayyeb-instrumentalisierter-glaube) . On the general role of al-Azhar in Egypt see Hassan Hassan: In den 
Fängen der Politik – Rolle der Al-Azhar Universität in Ägypten . Qantara.de, 19 February 2013 (https://
de .qantara .de/content/rolle-der-al-azhar-universitat-agypten-den-fangen-der-politik) .
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with the al-Azhar ideology . It is in the interest of al-Azhar and also of the state to con-
trol the religious education landscape of Egypt as much as possible, not only for the 
promotion of their own concepts but also (primarily) in order to fight radical Islamic 
interpretations, specifically (according to them most importantly) the Muslim Broth-
erhood and salafī oriented groups . As a consequence, they train as many lecturers as 
possible and send them even to more rural areas to promote their perceived moder-
ate version of Islamic knowledge and their definition of what Islamic knowledge is, 
thereby “refashioning […] ideas and […] stabilizing […] identity narratives” (Zeghal 
2010: 107) .
This influence of religious ideals has two sides to it . The first is the educational 
aspect, i .e . spreading a mainstream, moderate form of Islam . The second is the con-
trolling aspect, i .e . preventing other forms of religious knowledge from taking root 
in the diverse social landscape of Egypt . Aware of the difficulty of gaining access to 
the confined spaces of the private space, their chosen method is to outnumber other 
lecturers and make use of the state-funded advertisement industry . Financial support 
allows for the publication of religious material that can be distributed throughout the 
country in the form of printed books, booklets, sheets and audio material (CDs and 
tapes) . It allows for the establishment of informational centres and bookstores, as well 
as for audio channels on the radio, broadcasting of TV lectures, and online webpages 
with informative content and the option of engaging in question and answer sessions . 
Thus, a whole apparatus of religious knowledge production exists that not only in-
forms the public space but tries to also enter and influence the private space .
It must be stated, however, that the Qurʾān circles I attended in Alexandria do not 
have the intention of resisting state-informed Islam; on the contrary, they consider 
themselves to swim along the same river of religious knowledge that al-Azhar and the 
state do . At the same time, this trend towards individual religiosity that takes place off 
the beaten track and outside of official influences has elements that are critical of both 
the regime and society . While power is part of this relationship, it is not necessarily ex-
erted and made use of; in some cases even the awareness of such a power relation is ab-
sent . Examples include discussions about the deterioration of the economic situation 
in Egypt and accompanying rise in social disparities . Critical comments were regularly 
made on this topic, and the regime was blamed for the current conditions . Critique 
would also be expressed towards radical/fundamental religious opinions, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Islamic State .34 I highlight here that the development and proc-
esses of rising individual religiosity do not necessarily mean approval of a current status 
quo, but rather that individual religiosity can hint towards critical dynamics of various 
spheres, be they political, social, religious, economic, etc . This does not contradict the 
34 The Salafiyyīn were usually not part of this critique; they were classified by my friend Mona “to be 
strictly religious – which is their choice, but they do not harm anyone and do not have open political in-
terest as al-ikhwān .” Especially in the cases of non-conformist religious knowledge circles, this awareness 
is very present and the relevant power relations play a decisive role . Cf . my forthcoming publication on 
religious non-conformity in Alexandria (Franke forthcoming a) .
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aspirations critical voices had post-2011; on the contrary, critique from within Mus-
lim religious perspectives can be even more influential in the long term than secularist 
tendencies that can be exposed to more headwind from various directions .
Conclusion
Most people confirm or transform their religious identities on a regular basis to vary-
ing degrees . The Qurʾān circles grant each participant a knowledge space that allows 
for exactly that negotiation of their own religious identity – to maintain and foster 
it, to value or balance it, to question it, to realize it, to share it, to hide it, to discuss 
it . Within this realm, it is possible to express to the others who one is and how one 
wishes to be recognized . Thus, people develop as a product of knowledge hierarchies . 
The social and religious processes present in the circles highlight religious ideals and 
an ideal type of religious worshipper . At the same time, these ideals are connected to 
self-confidence and self-perception in relation to the other participants . Internal ex-
pressions and needs become intertwined with external perceptions . Religiosity and its 
varying degrees can thus become codes/representations of social order . It is a valuable 
asset and a virtue in and of itself that enables demarcation from and conformity with 
others . Moreover, self-pietization in the realm of religious agency is developed and im-
proved via the circles . Most participants state that they can become “better Muslims” 
by attending the lectures and thus sculpt their own religious identity . Their individual 
development is a reflection of collective knowledge and religious interpretation . The 
setting of the Qurʾān circles is a powerful environment that can transform the individ-
ual and influence the group and the wider community through its dynamic character . 
Even though the gatherings are not intended to be clandestine, since they take place 
off the beaten track, the state does not have a supervising instrument to trace these 
numerous lectures that are occurring throughout the country .
As I have shown, the reasons for participating in such circles can be manifold, 
among them trends of individuality as demonstrated by the notion self-pietization 
– while keeping in mind that individual developments and identity transformations 
have, in this case, nothing to do with narcissistic individualization, but should rather 
be positioned in close proximity to social relations and societies . Other prominent 
motivating factors can be networking, fashion and habits, perceived peer pressure, or 
even gossip . As the intimate spaces of the lectures are closed and safe, they pave the way 
for the expression and non-expression of emotions; the said and unsaid in the Qurʾān 
circles is noteworthy, as has been highlighted above, since it reflects on the power rela-
tions and the intriguing effect of religion and religious knowledge on the body and 
mind . In the context of space, we speak of the architectural space – in the form of the 
site of the lecture – as both individual (belonging to the host) and private (as mostly 
beyond the gaze of a possible “public”), while from an emotional perspective these 
spaces are closed and safe as well . A third category would be “intimate”, which applies 
from both perspectives . If acquiring knowledge is the participant’s motivating factor 
66 Lisa Maria Franke
for attending these Qurʾān circles, then they focus on the knowledge conveyed by the 
teacher . This comprises the written and oral knowledge and the corresponding inter-
pretation . It is about the Qurʾān and ḥadīth but also about advice from the teacher 
regarding everyday issues such as education of one’s children, marriage, social interac-
tion in places where alcohol is being served, and so on . Usually the lessons include set 
topics from the Qurʾān and ḥadīth, but the teachers are open to incorporating the 
wishes of the participants; this is also the case in the discussions . In all these lectures 
and discussions, it became clear again and again that individual religiosity is closely 
linked to self-development and identity formation in the sense of self-pietization, 
while at the same time it does not focus on the ego but on a thoughtful, caring life that 
takes the community into consideration and not only the self . It is about transforming 
religiosity into a liquid that can flow like a river, meandering through spheres, spaces 
and identities .
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Religious Dissent in Iran
Ariane Sadjed
In February 2019, I was – along with a group of international researchers – invited to 
a tour marking the fortieth anniversary of the Islamic Revolution entitled “Today’s 
Iran” . Two of our female Iranian colleagues wore long, black chadors throughout 
the trip . While not obligatory in Iran, the chador suggests conformity to the pub-
lic religious demeanour encouraged by the government . During a trip to a camp in 
the desert, the two ladies joked about a camel and donkey that were waiting in front 
of a tent designated the “House of Prayer” (namaz khaneh) (see the photo below) . 
The tent had been set up to give privacy to those who wished to perform the ritual 
prayer (namaz), and I overheard the ladies amusing themselves about how the animals 
seemed to be waiting in line for it . I heard various kinds of jokes like this throughout 
the trip, and the ease with which the two women made fun of religious concepts might 
not have been evident from their outward appearance . This is just one example of the 
complicated nature of religiosity in Iran .
It is quite challenging to grasp the relationship between civil society, the state and 
religion in Iran, and even more difficult to convey these dynamics to audiences who 
tend to equate political Islam with fanaticism and presuppose an ideal of a secular 
society as an exclusive normative model . This chapter is thus not only concerned with 
the role of religion in Iran, but also with the stereotypes and blind spots inherent in 
representations of Iran in the Western world . The majority of scholarship on Iran 
since the revolution of 1979 has focused on political, legal and theological debates 
surrounding the establishment of the state . While many of these works point out the 
complexity of the clergy with its various factions, it has still not become conventional 
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wisdom to disentangle the authoritarianism of the state from Islam or the clergy . Since 
anthropological studies on state-society relations in Iran are rare, Iranian civil society 
often serves instead as a surface upon which images of rebellion against the state and 
their corollary – longing for the West – are projected .35 These perceived dichotomies 
between state and civil society, religion and politics, the religious and the secular are 
major obstacles in understanding the role of religion in Iran . Indeed, this chapter will 
not contribute to any categorization, but rather focus on the fluidity between catego-
ries and the problems that arise in defining them .
Overview of the Chapter
The chapter starts with a discussion of how we have come to think about and define 
religion and the social contexts in which these discourses have evolved . It aims to add 
a few more nuances to a discussion that is usually based on stark dichotomies between 
the religious and the secular . I will discuss conflicting positions between the Iranian 
government and the clergy regarding the role of Islam in the realm of politics, and how 
these conflicts are reflected in individual and collective religiosity .
The final part of this chapter explores the meaning of collective religious prayer, 
how such practices have transformed since the revolution, and if, or how, they are con-
35 These imaginations are related to classical modernization theory, in which democracy, a liberal market 
economy and secularisation are conceptualized as constitutive for a modern society . For a critical discus-
sion see Wohlrab-Sahr and Buchhardt (2017) and Asad (2003) .
“House of Prayer” . Photo by the author (2019) .
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nected to support for the government . I will show a variety of connections between 
religious and political positions, pointing out that the everyday lives of Iranians are 
driven by a much greater variety of positions than a binary division between the reli-
gious and the secular . This discussion is then applied to consumption practices and 
how they express one’s position in society . This angle was chosen as consumption and 
religiosity are often assumed as dividing the Iranian society along a false dichotomy 
in which consumption is equated with “liberalism” and religion with “conservativ-
ism” . Instead, I will present different forms of religiosity, and how they can assume an 
empowering, strategic or conformist stance . Examples such as women’s reading circles 
and Qurʾān lessons represent forms of religious diversification within Iranian society 
and the creation of religious spaces away from government control . I will explore how 
this diversification from “below”, and one’s choice to be pious, can be part of indi-
vidual self-development and determination without defining oneself in opposition to 
the state .
Talking Religion
The problem of authoritarianism in Iran tends to be ascribed to the alignment of re-
ligion and politics, in particular the politicization of Islam (cf . Hashemi 2013) . As a 
“topos” (Reisigl and Wodak 2001), this view has entered mainstream discourses in 
Iran and become a part of the self-perception of Iranians – be they university profes-
sors, taxi drivers or artisans . Without my asking, people from different strata of Iranian 
society conveyed this view to me, practically as an introduction . There is no doubt 
about the existence of secular and atheistic people in Iran, but I wondered whether 
this position has also become a means of distancing oneself from a government that is 
perceived as malfunctioning and oppressive, especially when engaged in conversation 
with visitors from the West . As conversations continued, it often surfaced that these 
people’s discontent was not connected so much to the intertwining of religion and 
politics, but to what they perceived as the abuse of religion for political self-interest . In 
other words, many Iranians did not necessarily understand secularism as the relegation 
of religion to the private sphere .
In recent scholarship, two aspects have contributed to a more precise understand-
ing of the role of religion in society . Firstly, “religion” is not conceptualized as a reified 
and stable category; instead, the focus has shifted to the discourses and practices that 
produce ideas of “religion” in the first place . As Adam H . Becker points out, “the cat-
egory of religion is itself a product of discursive processes (…) Ideas, practices, and af-
fects we often label ‘religious’ have existed almost anywhere we look in human history, 
but religion as a category came into being in modernity and is constituted by various 
political, legal, social, and economic discourses” (2015: 11–12) . These discourses are 
referred to as “religionization”, a process that often entails the isolation, codification, 
and naming of a “tradition”, and the spread of “religion” as a distinct social, intellec-
tual, and experiential category in human life (Becker 2015: 15) . Consequently, these 
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approaches emphasize the interconnectedness of religion with political, economic or 
cultural aspects, as religion cannot be universally and abstractly defined “except as a 
node of contestation and definition . There is no transhistorical and transcultural phe-
nomenon ‘religion’” (Asad 1993: 54) . Secondly, analyses based on a binary between 
religion and the secular have receded in favour of acknowledgment of the interdepend-
ence between religious and secular practices and discourses (Asad 2003) . In this chap-
ter, I will use the term “secularism” not only to refer to “the making of conceptual 
distinctions and the institutionalisation of differentiation between religion and other 
societal spheres and practices, but also in terms of the cultural meanings underlying 
these distinctions and differentiations” (Wohlrab-Sahr and Buchhardt 2017: 6) . This 
means that secularism is not just the abstract and neutral opposite of religion, but 
rather is analyzed in in relation to normative claims and political regulations of the 
religious sphere .
In European history, processes of the interiorization of religion as a private feeling 
have shaped our understanding of religion’s role in public life . Political or collective 
expressions of religiosity can therefore seem strange . However, in contexts where re-
ligion is significant in the public sphere, it is not automatically a relic from the past, 
but rather a different form of articulating the religious . The presupposition that a 
modern society can only be secular not only curtails Iranian history, but also reflects 
many blind spots concerning Europe’s own past . Most prominently, in European his-
toriography the Enlightenment is portrayed as the decisive force by which Europeans 
woke from the nebulous religious tradition in favour of reason and, subsequently, sec-
ularism . However, as Barnett explains, the politicization of religion is what changed 
the religious outlook and initiated change at that time . Barnett challenges the central 
Enlightenment narratives such as the anticlericalism of the philosophes, a recourse 
to reason in religious thought, and a decline in levels of belief . He suggests that the 
language of reason was the product of religious conflict and not vice versa . Conse-
quently, “ideological conflicts gradually pre-empted religion’s place in a politicized 
“public sphere” largely of religion’s own making, while continuing to bear the marks 
of various Christian origins” (Barnett 2003: 38) . Instead of understanding religion as 
a dynamic repertoire of practices and discourses, inextricably anchored within – and 
even propelling – modernization, religion tends to be regarded as an isolated set of 
beliefs that one either clung to or was able to discard in favour of a modern self .
However, the positing of an Enlightenment tradition growing from extra-Chris-
tian roots is untenable, because Europeans experienced permanent, institutionalized 
anticlericalism as part of intra-Christian conflict, not as a form of anti-religiosity . Prot-
estants and Catholics were anticlerical with regard to one another, and with regard to 
radical Protestants and Protestant-established churches – i .e . the polemics were aimed 
at religious opponents . According to Barnett, researchers have not looked sufficiently 
at this material due to their presupposition that evidence of modernity should take 
the form of secularization . After the Enlightenment, Catholicism was omitted as 
part of history and civilization . It has been constructed “as backwards, exotic, primi-
tive or barbarian, and associated with faraway places and cultures outside of Europe” 
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(Borutta 2011: 48; my translation) . Borutta has compared this interpretative frame-
work with the concept of “Orientalism”, which was coined by Edward Said as a form 
of constructing the Other in the process of establishing Western modernity .
For much of the Muslim world, secularism was long embodied in top-down ide-
ologies peculiar to authoritarian regimes . Secularism is remembered as the mission of 
the Western world to “civilize” former colonies . This was particularly the case in the 
newly established nation-states after World War I, when Muslim states adopted secu-
larism as a political tool to build a nation of highly diverse populations . It is against 
this background that we should view Reza Shah and his son Mohammad Reza Shah’s 
authoritarian secularization in Iran . In response to the top-down secularism of the 
Pahlavi era, Islam became a framework for emancipation from foreign interference 
and oppression . Religious practices and beliefs assumed a political role in the struggle 
for self-determination and thus have a rather different significance than in the history 
of Europe . The revolution of 1979 represents the peak of a historically politicized un-
derstanding of religion in Iran .1 Similar to liberation theology in South America, the 
religious discourses that led to the revolution in Iran contained emancipatory, nation-
alistic, self-determined, and anti-imperialistic elements . It was a transformation “of 
Iranian Shīʿism into a new (inter)subjective force of religiosity in opening up a new 
conception of the sacred and the profane, or as Foucault would call it, a new ‘politi-
cal spirituality’” (Rahimi 2012: 55) . The problematization of the fusion between reli-
gion and politics is therefore somewhat futile . The problems that Iranians themselves 
might describe as most pressing with regard to their government – such as economic 
mismanagement, lack of transparency, inefficiency and oppression – are not necessary 
connected to “religion” or the concept of an Islamic state .
Political and religious authorities in Iran, on the other hand, still use Iran’s past 
under a secular dictatorship to dismiss secularism as a morally corrupt model from 
the West . Contemporary Muslim scholars, however, have begun to acknowledge vary-
ing models of secularism . For example, Naser Gobadzadeh (2015) emphasizes that 
secularity in the Iranian context does not advocate the total elimination of religion 
from political practice; rather, it specifically promotes the institutional separation of 
religion and state . The main proponents of this approach are religious scholars; they 
build their demands to free religion from political obligations – and vice versa – on 
religious sources . Ghobadzadeh claims that this “Religious Secularity” is congruent 
with the Islamic context in which it developed and where there is no fundamental 
distinction between religion and the most important dimensions of the secular . Con-
sequently, secularization in Iran does not entail a comprehensive historical process 
whereby “individual belief in transcendental forces weakens, and, at the societal level, 
religion loses its influence in the public sphere through the prioritization of science, 
emphasis on worldliness, and the separation of church and state . By no means does my 
usage of the term ‘secularity’ refer to this comprehensive process of weakening religion 
1 For a history of the political implications of Shīʿism see Ghobadzadeh (2015: 32ff .) and Chehabi 
(1990) .
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in individual and public life” (Ghobadzadeh 2015: 8) . The next section will discuss 
some of the conflicts and dynamics within the religio-political establishment as well as 
the representation of opposition to the Iranian state in Western media .
The Fragmented State of Religion
The religious establishment in Iran is deeply fragmented in its stances on fundamental 
issues such as whether religious authorities should be involved in politics . After the 
revolution in 1979, members of the clergy assumed political leadership for the first 
time . This new alignment profoundly changed the character of both politics and re-
ligion in Iran . Despite claims of a return to the original traditions of Iran and Islam, 
the Islamic revolution comprised a variety of new inventions as well as a new organiza-
tion of the ulema (Chehabi 1991) . This has led to a division between a “political” and 
a “purely religious” clergy . Although the traditional clergy tends to oppose political 
involvement, many among the clergy have turned to tacit consent . While there are 
openly oppositional clergy in Iran who wage a theological battle over the legitimacy 
of political and spiritual authority, the “quietists” seek to preserve the Shīʿī seminary 
institution by keeping a degree of distance from politics (Rahimi 2012: 71) .
The latter are a “silenced majority” within the religious establishment, while the 
minority who subscribe to the clergy’s political leadership have portrayed themselves 
as the sole representatives of Islam in Iran (Ghobadzadeh 2015: 169) . Using their po-
litical power, they have silenced those within their circle who do not support their 
politico-religious ideology . Since the inception of the Islamic state, the marginalization 
of oppositional Ayatollahs has not only been justified under the banner of Islam, but 
also included unprecedented dishonourings of Ayatollahs (e .g . famous examples such 
as Ayatollahs Shariatmadari and Montazeri) . Time and again, the ruling clergy also 
intervene in the clergy’s internal procedures to promote particular political goals . This 
form of intervention has both compromised the clergy’s autonomy and undermined 
the credibility of the religious establishment by privileging like-minded clerics inde-
pendently of their qualifications . The oppression of dissenting religious authorities 
has diminished the pluralistic character of Iran’s clergy and, furthermore, jeopardized 
their spiritual potential .
This became evident during our first formal meetings in Iran, among them an in-
vitation from the director of the Institution for Hajj and Pilgrimage Affairs, a Seyyed . 
The meeting began with a beautifully sung sūra from the Qurʾān by one of the of-
ficials, after which the Seyyed commenced his speech . He started by saying that there 
was too little time to go into the details of spiritual matters relating to the ḥajj . Instead, 
he offered us a speech about the evil intentions of the “superpowers” – America and 
Israel – and their vain attempts to destroy Iran . After attending several meetings and 
conferences, I noticed an almost total absence of “religious” topics (in the sense of 
spiritual issues), while religion was frequently used to frame nationalistic and political 
discourses . Of course, given the context of proving the success of the revolution to 
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foreigners, most speeches inevitably had a formal and propagandistic character . Still, 
this faction of the clergy understands religion as formative for national identity and 
intrinsically related to populist ideas of independence and strength . This example il-
lustrates that the official use of “religion” in Iran has little to do with Islamic teachings 
or principles, but rather serves as a framework in which nationalistic and populist self-
assurance is couched, with its main basis being the distinction between “us” (peaceful 
but strong Iranians) and “them” (corrupt superpowers and their allies) .
The competing understandings of religious legitimacy became most visible after 
the presidential elections in 2009, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected and 
the Green Movement took to the streets after what was widely discussed as electoral 
fraud . The protest movement used many Islamic symbols and chants in order to make 
themselves heard, and the government prohibited one of the most popular and sacred 
religious festivities during the month of Moharram for fear of its appropriation by 
dissenting voices . However, one should be careful not to interpret the events simply 
as opposition to the state . As Fariba Adelkhah points out, the Green Movement grew 
out of a civil society that was trying to negotiate with the regime, rather than attempt-
ing a regime change (2012: 19) .
In much of the Western media, the reception of protests and more subtle forms of 
potentially rebellious behaviour are portrayed as part of a black and white categoriza-
tion of Iranian society: on the one hand the “progressive and friendly Iranians, almost 
like Europeans”2, and on the other hand the poor, possibly uneducated supporters 
of the “Islamists” .3 This common representation not only obscures the different and 
overlapping allegiances among various strata of society with the state, but also feeds 
into a perception of “us” and “them” in which the group that (at least outwardly) 
resembles “Europeans” is juxtaposed against the “Islamists”, characterized by their 
outward religiosity . Consequently, the widespread coverage of the protests in 2009 
did not include reports of the women in full black chadors who were chanting and 
beating their chests in protest against the paid pro-government demonstrators regu-
larly mobilized by the state in events designed to counter the Green Movement . Are 
these women excluded from representation because they do not qualify visually as able 
to evoke sympathy (or identification) among Western audiences? This type of cover-
age leads us to believe that opposition to the government is primarily embodied by 
the desire to consume and to look like Westerners (as was the case during the Pahlavi 
era, albeit only for a small, privileged stratum) . It is of no concern to us what is on the 
minds of people whose appearance is “Islamic” yet who oppose an undemocratic and 
corrupt government, not least because it has corrupted their understandings of Islam . 
We hardly hear of the public critique from Ayatollahs such as Sane’i or Montazeri, to 
2 Radio programme on Austria’s National Broadcasting Ö1: “Iran, die Vergangenheit die nicht ruht”, 
broadcast on 4 April 2019, position 13:20, my translation (https://oe1 .orf .at/programm/20190404) .
3 Ibid . 
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name just a few, who protested the government’s repression and violation of citizens’ 
rights .4
The Green Movement contained many different factions, including religious 
forms of protest . The latter became particularly pronounced during the month of 
Moharram, when the mourning rituals were turned into a means of contesting the 
state’s discursive power . In 1978–79, the Moharram rituals were used by the religious 
factions of the revolution to inject morality and social justice goals into politics; in 
2009, however, Moharram was used to reclaim both politics and morality from the 
clerics’ monopoly on the interpretation of Islam, which is explicitly antidemocratic 
and antirepublican (Fischer 2010: 513–14) . These forms of opposition can be seen 
as a strategy designed to reappropriate Islamic symbols for Muslims of all ideologies; 
for some, the Green Movement was a recovery of the original values of the revolution, 
while for others it was a rescue of Islam from the revolution’s coercive nature and a 
reacknowledgement of Islamic pluralism and tolerance . For others still, it signalled a 
need to move beyond constant reference to Islam . Far from being a dispute between 
religious and non-religious forces, the main protagonists in the protests represented 
divergent articulations of state-religion relations . Forty years after the revolution, it 
would thus be too simple to claim that disenchantment with the state’s control of 
religion has led to a secularization of society . Studies suggesting a decline in religiosity 
inferred from a measured decline of religion in the public sphere (i .e . Ghobadzadeh 
2004) should be assessed critically with regard to what they are actually measuring 
when dealing with concepts such as religiosity and secularism .5 As the next two sec-
tions will show, religiosity can neither be measured nor understood as an isolated phe-
nomenon in itself – it evolves in tandem with the surrounding context of political, 
social, economic and cultural elements .
4 http://saanei .org/?view=01,00,01,00,0 (accessed 4 April 2019); or Bendix Anderson (2009): Ayatollah 
Watch . Frontline, 21 July 2009, updated 22 Sept . ( http://www .pbs .org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbu-
reau/2009/09/ayatollah-watch .html) .
5 While Naser Ghobadzadeh’s article is valuable for bringing statistical data from Iran to the attention of 
academia outside of Iran, the interpretation of the results is at times imprecise . For example, when meas-
uring whether religious influence is declining, Ghobadzadeh uses data on household expenses, group-
ing them into three categories – “religious”, “personal hygiene & cosmetics” and “hobbies & entertain-
ment” – labelling the latter two as “Western influences” . The decrease in religious expenses and increase in 
the other two categories is then taken as evidence for a spread of Western influence at the cost of religion . 
This conclusion is too blunt for several reasons . Firstly, how can a wide array of practices pertaining to 
personal hygiene, cosmetics, hobbies and entertainment be assumed as simply “Western”? Secondly, this 
examination of expenditures disregards the political-economic context of the period under examination, 
which obviously shapes the purchase decisions . Consumer choices in Iran are important markers of social 
status and connected more closely to socio-economic differences than to “religious’ ones . Thirdly – and 
related to the second point – “religiosity” and “Western influences” are taken as two opposing poles, dis-
regarding the fact that they fuse or overlap on many different levels . However, the article closes as follows: 
“In fact, it must be admitted that religious values are still important in comparison with two other kinds 
of values (national and Western) and that it is still unrivalled, at least in the short term .” (Ghobadzadeh 
2004: 105) .
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Religious Politics – From Emancipation to Repression
Religiosity has many forms and “being religious on one dimension does not necessarily 
imply religiosity on other dimensions” (Glock and Stark 1965: 22) . This statement is 
relevant for the Iranian context, where within an individual, some aspects of religiosity 
can be linked to or overlap with official state-approved religiosity, while other aspects 
are oppositional to it .6 In this section I will highlight different forms of opposition 
to and support for the state, further strengthening the argument that criticism of the 
state cannot be reduced only to secular articulations .
A study by Kazemipur and Rezaei (2003) has traced different indicators of religi-
osity among Iranians such as experiential, ritualistic, ideological, intellectual, and cog-
nitive . It suggests that there are different degrees of emphasis on different factors of 
religiosity . The study was carried out with 16,000 respondents and the results were 
compared to the only available set of data from before the revolution: a survey carried 
out in 1975 . The data suggests that during the period of intense secularization in Iran 
under the Pahlavis (1925–1979), there was little change in individual religious prac-
tices . However, while 42% of respondents participated in collective prayer in 1975, in 
2001 this number had dropped to 20%, a notable change in one form of public religi-
osity . Is the reason for this that Iranians have become more secular?
I argue that we should instead shift our attention to changes in the nature of this 
particular religious practice . Since the revolution, the nature of collective prayer has 
changed profoundly . During the Pahlavi era, religious institutions provided people 
with an alternative social and political identity, in the sense that they were an alternative 
cultural resource to the pseudo-modernist drive of an authoritarian regime trying to 
impose its own version of Iranian identity . Against this background, collective prayer 
was highly integrative as a socio-religious event (Föllmer 2014) . As a ritual event, it 
brought people from all social levels together in one public place at a certain time and 
thereby fostered cohesion of the community and reaffirmed social, religious and moral 
values . At times it was also used for political propaganda . In post-revolutionary Iran, 
Friday prayers have become large public events and one of the main venues for political 
mobilization and propaganda . Participation in them is strongly correlated with politi-
cal satisfaction . Since all studies cited above point to the fact that individual religiosity 
remains high, a decline in collective religious practice is more likely connected to the 
weakening of the socio-religious functions it used to provide and the appropriation of 
religious topics by the government . The results also suggest that individual religiosity 
is relatively independent from even the most extensive changes in socio-political religi-
osity .7 In addition to the points already mentioned, lower turnouts at Friday prayers 
6 For different aspects of religiosity in Iran see Chehabi (1990) or Adelkhah (1999) .
7 According to Zooalam (2000: 408), mosque attendance and individual prayer had increased 20 years 
after the revolution compared to before the revolution, but in both periods was lower than in the period 
directly after the revolution . This data suggests a “normalization” of religious activity, rather than a de-
cline . 
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have yet another implication: political strife contributes to the diversification of at-
tendance in public religious rituals . Given that one mosque is not like another, the 
varying ideologies of Ayatollahs leading a particular mosque (and the prominent lead-
ers of the neighbouring mosques) contribute to a clear political distinction between 
the different Islamic authorities .
In his study about conservative piety in one of the urban centres of Iran, David 
Thurfjell (2006) observed that many believers of a conservative mosque community, 
along with its associated Ayatollah, would not go to the Friday prayers because the 
Imam leading them had a clear reformist profile . This was enough to keep the fol-
lowers of the mosque’s Ayatollah from saying Friday prayers in a public mosque, as 
is the usual custom . However, while the mosque in Thurfjell’s study is described as 
particularly conservative, it has links to Ayatollah Sistani, who represents a clear de-
parture from the government’s ideology . Ayatollah Sistani (born and educated in Iran, 
now operating in Najaf), is the most revered Shīʿī cleric in the world and opposes the 
idea of Velayat-e Faqih, suggesting Shīʿī clerics should not get involved in politics . This 
example shows that it is not possible to infer unrestrained support for the govern-
ment even from outright religious conservativism, since the conservative faction also 
contains many different rifts . For the most part, however, these differences exist on a 
more abstract, intellectual, political or theological level . For many believers, the most 
meaningful element of their loyalty lies in a different realm, as I will discuss in the next 
paragraph .
The people who are loyal to the Iranian leadership are strongly underrepresented 
in scholarship on Iran . What do we know about their motivations, aspirations, and 
convictions? In particular, voices of economically and socially marginalized people 
who subscribe to a strict observance of the religiosity propagated by the government 
remain unheard in Western academia . They pose something of a paradox, because – 
despite their marginalized position – they support the Supreme Leader, who repre-
sents the central political power in the country . Their marginalization stems from a 
variety of factors, such as an ethnic minority background or a lack of education, which 
again are connected to economic disadvantages . Their religiosity helps them to turn 
away from their worldly problems; it is focused on that which they see as most im-
portant, namely their own spiritual development and relationship with God . David 
Thurfjell writes: “In this way their experiences of poverty, marginalisation and loss are 
diminished for the benefit of closeness to what is believed to be the truth . Naturally, 
the positive effects on self-esteem and feelings of fulfilment are great” (2006: 129) . The 
reward for being religious is thus psychological and symbolic because it allows even 
marginalized individuals to identify with and be part of the powerful (the Supreme 
Leader, the truth, God’s will) .
While well-being and true religious conviction are interdependent, turning to a re-
ligious lifestyle should not automatically be seen as a strategic choice . Thurfjell shows 
how practised religiosity is embraced wholeheartedly . Individuals agree that turning 
to a religious lifestyle has improved their well-being, but it would diminish their devo-
tion to suggest that they are using religiosity in order to feel better . That would be an 
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abstract judgement based on a rigid understanding of “pure” religiosity, independ-
ent from the individual’s social or psychological make-up or any other constitution . 
Any distinction between a “true” or “pure” religiosity and one that is motivated by 
“outside” factors is misleading in these cases, as it does not reflect the actual experi-
ences of individuals . While there is definitely an instrumental use of religion in Iran 
(see below), I argue that the borders between a “true” form of religiosity and a “(self-)
imposed” one are fluid, and individuals do not always make a conscious distinction 
between the two . As different scholars point out, submission to a religious authority 
is not necessarily a curtailment of one’s individual freedom, but is also employed as a 
form of self-development through “disciplined knowledge and personal discipline” 
(Asad 1993: 20) .
One might argue that in the absence of alternatives, religiosity is the primary re-
maining avenue through which identity and social status are negotiated . However, in 
the process of escaping from or coping with a harsh reality, people do not only turn 
to “alternative spiritualities” but also to conservative Islam and its transcendental ele-
ments . Rather than escaping from religion, people are escaping from poverty, in some 
cases from the reality of living under a dictatorship, or from individual life crises . Ad-
ditionally, support for conservative or neoconservative authorities is not only a matter 
of religious conviction . For many among the poorer segments of society, there is great 
appeal in a faction of the conservatives that Babak Rahimi describes as “Neo-Kho-
meinists”: rejecting domestic elites, they assert militancy and egalitarianism, paired 
with nostalgia for revolution and war, martyrdom and support for the destitute . They 
are hardliners from non-clerical backgrounds, such as former president Ahmadinejad; 
“they saw political authority in the form of charismatic authority led by figures who 
were detached from worldly interests and keen on bringing about social justice . In 
their view, the pragmatism of the old guard, led by figures such as Rafsanjani, had 
only produced an increasingly corrupt state, a politics of the status quo that benefited 
the rich” (Rahimi 2012: 66) . Taking the country’s harsh economic conditions into 
account, the appeal of this neoconservative faction is not difficult to understand . This 
new revolution-oriented elite aims to manage and control the government, creating 
further division within the conservative establishment .
Individual Religiosity and Autonomy
In this section, I will discuss the relevance of socio-economic factors to individual re-
ligiosity . Most prominently, Iranian women’s outward appearance tends to be used 
in Western media as a marker of religiosity, traditionalism or progressivity (“chador 
versus lipstick”) .8 Challenging the fixation on religious motivations for one’s outward 
8 A few examples: “Lipstick Revolution: Iran’s Women Are Taking on the Mullahs .” Independent.
co.uk, 26 February 2009 (http://www .independent .co .uk/news/world/middle-east/lipstick-revolution-
irans-women-are-taking-on-the-mullahs-1632257 .html); Caroline Garnar: Iranian Woman Who Risked 
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appearance, it has been argued that socio-economic divides in Iran have a more deci-
sive impact on women’s fashion choices (Olszewska 2013; Sadjed 2012) . Severe status 
insecurity, and the struggles resulting from it, have led to different codes of outward 
appearance – certain clothes, hairstyles and habits – which are employed in order to 
display one’s symbolic capital and position in society . More specifically, when young 
people wear brands or clothes associated with “Western culture”, these choices in 
many cases express a desire for upward mobility, since brands from Western coun-
tries are expensive and represent a certain degree of wealth and access to the resources 
associated with it . Rather than being statements of rebellion against the state, these 
practices are part and parcel of the intra-Iranian negotiating hierarchies since the revo-
lution, when social strata were reshuffled and the corresponding outward appearances 
were restructured . In a context where the state aims to control one’s appearance up to 
and including small details such as lipstick, wearing make-up can become an implicit 
protest against restrictions placed on individuals by the state . However, the tendency 
to construct the use of make-up and related consumption practices as a rebellious act 
(pro-Western, anti-Islamic) adheres to a flawed polarization between the secular West 
and Islam – a binary similarly employed by the Iranian authorities .
The symbolic value of consumer goods, and their use in expressing one’s identity, 
have gained additional meaning through the post-revolutionary attempts to denounce 
Western consumerism as part of the cultural, social, political and economic exploita-
tion of Iran and to establish indigenous, Iranian-Islamic forms of appearance and con-
sumption (Sadjed 2016) . The increasing liberalization of the Iranian economy start-
ing in the 1990s brought about a growth in consumer products, as well as interest in 
wellness, health, exercise and beauty treatments . My study on consumption practices 
among Iran’s urban middle class discusses how one’s socio-economic background 
shapes social and religious attitudes and how these attitudes are expressed through 
consumption (Sadjed 2012) . The study shows that the importance given to individu-
ality was high among all respondents; however, those who wished to consume more 
indicated that individuality could best be expressed by one’s outward appearance, 
while respondents who were less inclined to consume reported that they expressed 
their individuality through meaningful social interactions and charitable activities . 
Similar responses revolved around the question of social hierarchies; the acceptance 
of a hierarchical social order was shared across all groups, but consumer-oriented re-
spondents associated social hierarchies with material factors (“rich people are high 
achievers and deserve to be the leaders of society”), while those with a less consumer-
ist outlook associated social hierarchies with more transcendental aspects . Both tran-
Arrest By Wearing Red Lipstick as a Teenager Launches Her Own Beauty Company After Moving to 
‘Liberal and Tolerant’ Britain . Mailonline, 21 December 2015 (http://www .dailymail .co .uk/femail/
article-3356449/Iranian-woman-risked-arrest-wearing-red-lipstick-teenager-launches-beauty-company-
moving-Britain .html); “Iranian Women – Before and after the Islamic Revolution .” BBC News, 8 Feb-
ruary 2019 (http://www .bbc .com/news/world-middle-east-47032829) and a response: Joshua Keating: 
Iranians Mock Netanyahu’s ‘Jeans’ Comment . Slate, 7 October 2013 (https://slate .com/news-and-poli 
tics/2013/10/netanyahu-says-if-iranians-were-free-they-could-wear-jeans .html) .
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scendental beliefs about the self and society and purely materialistic ones can thus be 
defined as worldviews that structure meaning and social order in Iran . This does not 
imply, however, that those with fewer or no religious inclinations are more prone to 
believe in egalitarianism or democracy .
The study also measured “instrumental religiosity” – the employment of religious 
behaviour in order to achieve professional and financial success .9 In Iran, open dis-
plays of religiosity can evoke sarcasm, mainly in relation to the belief that individuals 
pretend to be religious in order to gain privileges from the state . A survey carried out 
by the Iranian National Broadcasting research centre included a question about how 
one viewed the “true” religious adherence of people who “claim to be devout” . The 
results show that over 70% of respondents view the “true” religiosity of devout peo-
ple to be just 50%, or even significantly lower (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting 
(IRIB), cited in Ghobadzadeh 2004: 92) . This means that professing religiosity runs 
a high risk of being perceived as fake in order to gain social or financial advantages . In 
everyday interactions in Iran, consciousness of such “pretenders” is very high and a 
central theme of mockery .
According to Kazemipur and Rezaei (2003), access to certain social “privileges” on 
the basis of one’s degree and type of religiosity is associated with an abundance of “reli-
giopolitical” beliefs . The authors furthermore suggest that the more religious a person 
is in other regards, the less likely he or she is to subscribe to this form of politicized 
religiosity . This categorization implies that religiopolitical beliefs form a category dis-
tinct from all other forms of religiosity and are even negatively correlated with them . It 
thereby conflates a political understanding of religion with the insincere motivation of 
gaining social privileges . This pitting of one form of religiosity against others is prob-
lematic for several reasons . First, it assumes a certain form of religiosity as the right 
and pure form of religiosity (otherwordly, apolitical, pertaining to the inner sphere 
exclusively) . Second, even if a person displays religious behaviour in order to achieve 
material benefits, it does not necessarily follow that this person is devoid of other, 
more “pure” forms of religiosity . It is also assumed that the individual consciously dis-
tinguishes between true conviction and pretence . Third, in a society in which publicly 
demonstrated religiosity is highly rewarded, it has come to be taken for granted that 
one should employ it in social interactions . Religiosity is part of a social code, albeit 
one to which there is a heightened need to conform in the context of authoritarianism . 
However, those who do not support the public norms are well versed in navigating the 
circumstances and degrees of public behaviour in order to avoid getting into trouble 
with the authorities .
In my 2012 study, “instrumental religiosity” was disproportionately evident 
among the second highest income group (upper middle class) . Challenging Kazemi-
pur and Rezaei’s typology, this group also scored highly in religious values, showing 
that a strategic use of religiosity does not preclude other, more “pure” forms of piety . 
9 This parameter was measured by asking for responses to statements such as “Adherence to Islamic 
principles leads me to professional success” (Sadjed 2012) . 
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Rather than being governed by ideological motivations, this income group exemplifies 
the blending of neo-liberal values with Islamic ones such as constant self-optimization 
and discipline . It is motivated by the need to succeed in a society in which social se-
curity and welfare are increasingly undermined by deregulation and corruption . Last 
but not least, it should be mentioned that respondents who worked as civil servants 
received the lowest scores in “instrumental religiosity” . While the results cannot be 
generalized, they nonetheless suggest that government employees can have sincere 
religious convictions – an observation that challenges the stereotype of the Iranian 
government as individuals who use religion for their personal interests or as a way to 
exert power .
I will conclude this section by drawing attention to yet another form of religiosity 
in semi-public spheres and its contribution to diversifying the socio-religious land-
scape in Iran . Arzoo Osanloo (2009) has highlighted how religious meetings organ-
ized by women lead the participants to engage with religion on their own terms . In 
these gatherings, women read and discuss the Qurʾān first-hand, without authoritative 
interpretations and with the opportunity to doubt and object . Since the religious so-
cialization of women in Iran is primarily conducted by female members of the family, 
women are socialized with a wide array of diverse individual approaches to religiosity . 
In the meetings, most women bring their own Qurʾān, each in a different translation . 
After a section has been read aloud, the women compare their translations, thereby 
already engaging in a form of dialogue and heterogenization .
These types of social and religious meetings are an integral part of Iranian social 
life and have taken place since before the revolution, but their character has been 
changing due to political circumstances . Osanloo shows how the exegesis of Qurʾānic 
readings among “ordinary” women represents a new space where interpretive shifts in 
knowledge are occurring: increasingly, the Holy Writings are not mediated by a select 
group of specially trained clergy . The women at the meetings engage in their own per-
sonalized interpretation of Islam by reappropriating a community space “where they 
subvert the existing rational methodology for exegesis, and [find] the basis for it within 
the very texts of Islam itself” (2009: 84) . Religiosity in these settings is a dialogic proc-
ess; it transforms itself through the discourses and practices amongst the women and 
in tandem with the surrounding society . This is a type of religious devotion that seeks 
debates, some of which also revolve around the experience of living under a govern-
ment that identifies itself as Islamic . This form of local agency harbours a variety of 
modes of self-formation: for some, it serves as a path to spiritual growth; for others, 
the meetings represent the reorienting of Islam toward the spiritual realm and away 
from the political sphere . Negotiating these terms collectively is meaningful for the 
participants because it allows them to seek and develop a stance vis-à-vis their religion . 
The women use the means provided in their social and cultural context to actively 
change their relationship to it . In spite of the government’s control, they have created 
spaces where they imbue religious icons and symbols with their own meanings in line 
with their own concerns .
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While many of the women are critical of certain sanctioned approaches that they come 
across in the public sphere, the women themselves do not characterize their practices 
as political opposition . Neither do their readings of the Qurʾān have as an objective a 
call for or sanctioning of foreign-seeming concepts such as “individual freedom” . As 
Osanloo writes, “faith in Islam does not preempt or prohibit a notion of individual 
freedom or responsibility but actually necessitates it” (Osanloo 2009: 95) . Reflecting 
on such possibilities together is an essential element in fostering women’s mutual sup-
port and stabilization . Similarly, Niloofar Haeri (2013) has pointed out that the meet-
ings do not belong strictly to the private sphere since the participants often do not 
know each other . Taking part in debates and exchanging readings, CDs and cassettes 
in various “private” gatherings thus extends the appropriation of religious discourses 
and practices beyond the private sphere, albeit in a less visible way .
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to contribute new angles to the understanding of re-
ligiosity in Iran and to disentangle religion from authoritarianism . Religion in Iran has 
many forms and interacts with many aspects of personal and social life . In some cases, 
a religious discourse aligns with oppressive practices or is used to justify them, but it 
was my aim to shed light on some of the lesser-known expressions of Islamic religiosity 
and to show that they defy an easy classification between either submission to the state 
or opposition to it . While this complication of matters might leave some readers un-
satisfied, I hope to have contributed to an understanding of Iranian society as complex 
and lively, rather than merely governed by ideology . I also highlighted the problematic 
nature of categorizing women wearing a chador and women wearing lipstick based 
on oppositional poles such as traditional and liberal, religious and secular, Western-
ized and Islamist, conformist and rebellious . By overcoming such binaries, it will be 
possible to ascertain the motivations for specific groups to support an authoritarian 
government and the appeal of conservative politics for certain strata of society . The 
attempt to demystify some of these processes, however, is not sufficient on its own; 
as John Stewart remarked, “people won’t even really accept being ‘demystified’ unless 
they have something to put in its place . So I feel that nothing much can happen unless 
and until we start producing knowledge which is positively relevant” (1988: 73–4) . 
Religiosity, including its public, political and conservative forms, is of immediate rel-
evance for many Iranians and should therefore be included as a source of knowledge . 
Religious activism can provide a space for agency, and for both individual and col-
lective self-actualization . Far from homogenizing the people, religious discourses and 
practices provide a lively field for negotiation without necessarily challenging or op-
posing the government . Only by acknowledging these forms of agency can we extend 
our understanding of free will and individual choice in a religious context .
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Acts of Unveiling and Everyday Life:  5 
The Significance of Silence in Iran Today
Katja Föllmer
The most obvious and distinctive characteristic of Iranian society is the image of veiled 
women . For four decades, it seemed impossible to even imagine Iranian society with-
out women in hejāb (modest clothing) and, in particular, women who covered their 
head and body completely with a black chādor . Not only on the streets, but also in the 
post-1979 media, Iranian women always appear veiled . After the revolution of 1979, 
it seemed that – other than the choice of model, the colour and the manner of wearing 
the veil – the obligation of veiling for Iranian women was not a prominent issue in so-
cial discourse . Rather, it was taboo to doubt Khomeini’s decree of 1983, and women’s 
efforts were limited to challenging the gasht-e ershād (morality police) with bad-hejābi 
clothing: gradually, wisps of hair began to peek out from under their veils, while the 
overcoats became shorter and the trousers tighter . For a long time, even Iranian femi-
nists did not question the matter of veiling as a mandatory duty for women in general . 
For them, the demand for equal rights for women took priority . Recently, however, 
‘voices’ proclaiming the abolition of the mandatory veil – especially the ‘voices’ of 
young Iranian people who grew up after 1979 – began to grow louder . Eventually, 
they broke the taboo and took off the veil completely in public spaces .
In 2017, these acts of public unveiling provoked a discussion about the legal re-
quirement for women to wear the hejāb, when individual women started to take off 
their headscarf and put it on a stick like a banner while standing silently on a raised 
platform on the street . These women became well-known as “the girls of Enqelāb 
Street” . Their individual actions are characterized by silence: they did not make any 
verbal statements . Most passers-by did not react with disgust and clamour; they were 
unexcited and kept silent as well .
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I myself bore witness to this type of meaningful silence during my stay in Iran in the 
days surrounding New Year in March 2018 . It was a Wednesday, I believe, at the busi-
est crossroads in the north of Tehran . In contrast to her vibrant environment, an eld-
erly woman sat silently on a bench, as still as a statue . Her eyes were not directed at 
anyone or anything . Her head was not covered, and none of the people who passed by 
took any visible notice of her; even the guards present did not address her . With the 
background of my long experience of Iran, I can say that such an action and reaction 
were unusual and thus obviously meaningful . There were two instances of silence: 
first, the silent action of the unveiled women, and second, the reaction of the passing 
people, namely to remain silent .
According to Bayat, Iranian women resist the Islamic government via their daily 
routines such as wearing the hejāb in a ‘bad’ manner (bad-hejābi) . A non-movement 
like this is a resistance to the state-imposed enforcement of veiling and not a depar-
ture from religiosity; it is an example of women insisting on exerting individual choice 
and rejecting gender inequality (Bayat 2010: 103, 106–107) . Since most women rarely 
articulate shared demands in everyday life, they act in a dispersed collective manner 
in their mundane practices (Bayat 2010: 111) . Their daily struggles can subvert the 
conventional gender divide and enable women to become public players (Bayat 2010: 
108) . The most significant characteristic of this non-movement is the lack of a known 
leader to mobilize the masses . It is not an organized form of activism, but rather a spo-
radic, individual activism that hints at a social problem . This is visible in the actions of 
the participants as well as in the discourse . This is why the non-movement is neither 
silent nor illegal . Even though it is individualistic, it also has a collective dimension 
that can induce change (Bayat 2010: 109) .
Collective sentiments and identities are formed in public and expressed through 
fashion choices, behaviour, or discourses related to these concerns . Even though the 
women participating and those who see them do not know each other, they spontane-
ously feel empathy and affinity (Bayat 2010: 110) . With just the power of their pres-
ence, women can challenge the conventional patriarchal order without deliberate acts 
of defiance and protest . They do not need to employ extraordinary measures to com-
pel authorities to make concessions (Bayat 2010: 112) . When these acts, forming part 
of women’s daily routines, were backed up by careful argumentation and discursive 
campaigns that address the legal and theological contradictions, the non-movement 
developed into a social movement when women’s activists began to organize social 
protest and mobilize the masses, as in the One Million Signatures campaign and the 
Green Movement (Bayat 2010: 113–114) . However, is this approach sufficient to ex-
plain the recent acts of unveiling? What does it mean that the unveiling act is carried 
out silently? How significant is silence in this context?
I argue that silence in this context is not a consequence of gendered practices of 
silencing; rather, it is active and carries creative potential . To understand these actions 
and their significance, it is necessary to look at the history of the women’s movement 
after 1979, the use of social media, and the daily lives of Iranian women . Accordingly, 
the following discussion of veiling or unveiling in Iranian society, as reflected in se-
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lected journal editions in 2018, will give us an insight into the recent negotiation of 
the social, political and religious implications of the veil in Iranian society . The aim is 
to demonstrate the dynamic and ambiguous nature of individual and silent actions of 
unveiling and explain the development of a recent social non-movement with respect 
to the veil .
Veiling and the Women’s Movement After the  
Iranian Revolution in 1979
The negotiation of veiling and unveiling in Islamic society has a long history . In mod-
ern Iran, this process is strongly connected with the Iranian women’s movement, 
which began in the 19th century when the first Iranian women appeared unveiled in 
public . A few decades later, Reza Shah Pahlavi’s decree prohibiting the veil (to foster 
a modernized image) divided Iranian society . Even though the Shah had to revoke the 
prohibition, it nonetheless had the consequence of making a deep social divide visible 
on the streets: the rich and ‘modernized’ elite women in the cities walked the streets 
without a veil, while the rural, poor and traditional decided to wear a chādor .1 This 
appeared to change, however, with the protests against the Pahlavi regime beginning 
in 1978 . The Iranian people, together with the Shiite clergy, were united in their re-
sistance against the Shah, his insufficient reform programme, the repressive nature of 
the regime, and the superficial attempt at modernization . Many women wore a black 
chādor not as religious symbol, but rather as a symbol of protest . The chādor was un-
derstood, as can be seen by referring to Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari and Ali Shari’ati, 
as part of a return to their cultural roots and self-identification . For the cleric Motah-
hari, the veil was a good means of maintaining the social order between women and 
men (Zanān-e emruz, 1396 [2018], no . 31: 39) . In his view, men and women are equal 
in the eyes of God, but not equal in their rights and duties because of their biological 
differences and social roles and functions; modern sciences underpin these differences 
and are not in conflict with sharī aʿ (Islamic law) . Sharī aʿ takes account of these differ-
ences in the best way possible: men have to ensure the protection and safeguarding 
of women (Badry 2017: 92) . Shari’ati, meanwhile, explained that the veil was a cru-
cial symbol of Iranian tradition and social identity free of corruption from the west 
(Zanān-e emruz, 1396 [2018], no . 31: 39) . In addition, like Motahhari, he perceived 
women as the weaker gender . They had to be controlled and protected by men to 
maintain social norms and order (Badry 2017: 94) .
After the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the new regime wanted to express 
its separation from the former autocracy and declared the veil mandatory for every 
woman irrespective of her religious affiliation or belief . The journal Zanān-e emruz 
explains that the mandatory veil was not intended as a demand from the beginning 
1 For further information about the situation before the revolution, see Naghibi (2007) and Zahedi 
(2008) .
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of the revolution, but was rather the result of the intellectual and political develop-
ments of the anti-Shah protests (Zanān-e emruz, 1396 [2018], no . 31: 40) . The Shi-
ite gathering to remember Hosein’s martyrdom at Kerbela had become an important 
religious and cultural tool for the opposing masses of any political and religious fac-
tion to demonstrate resistance against the Shah’s tyranny (Keddie 2010: 438) . The 
use of religious language and symbols was the best means to unite the multi-factional 
opposition . When even the urban secular middle-class women joined the anti-Shah 
demonstrations by putting on the chādor, women’s religious dress became a central 
symbol of the anti-Shah and anti-imperialist protests and thus gained a political signif-
icance (Keddie 2010: 439) . This did not change after the Islamic Republic’s establish-
ment and the rise of a religious political landscape that ushered in legal restrictions for 
Iranian women such as losing their right to divorce, inheriting only half the amount 
that men inherit, and not being permitted to work as judges or in certain other jobs . 
Khomeini’s decree about the veil, announced 24 days after he came to power, caused 
discussions and a six-day protest (mainly comprising of leftist activists) with no effect 
(Daradeh and Witoszek 2013: 241) . The morality police enforced the observance of 
the veil decree . Women who refused to wear the veil were arrested and lost their jobs .
During the Gulf War of 1980–88, the issue of the mandatory veil was margin-
alized and voices against it were silenced (Zanān-e emruz, 1396 [2018], no . 31: 40) . 
However, the consequences of the war created unexpected challenges for the new re-
gime . In post-war Iran, the traditional social role of the woman as mother, spouse and 
homemaker was destroyed to a large extent, as many families lost their male breadwin-
ners . Now, many women had to provide for their families and thus entered the public 
sphere again . They demanded more rights and questioned the patriarchal system and 
the various forms of discrimination they faced . “Women activists […] challenged the 
dominant ideological discourse that considered the private sphere of the home the best 
and the most suitable place for women . They rejected their confinement at home and 
managed to occupy the public sphere through economic and social activities” (Kian 
2013: 47) . The need for legal and social reforms was obvious . In the early 1990s, under 
President Rafsanjani, a Bureau of Women’s Affairs was created to focus on women’s 
problems and concerns (Kian 2013: 47) . Women became politically and culturally ac-
tive, for instance as journalists . At that time, the established women’s press played a 
crucial role in fostering solidarity between women of different social classes and ideo-
logical and political factions . Women’s magazines such as Zanān and Hoquq-e Zanān 
became a forum for advancing women’s rights . They provided women with the op-
portunity to make private issues public . The scope of debate regarding their condition 
expanded .2
The hope of necessary reforms led women to play a large part in electing the lib-
eral President Khatami in 1997 . Even though the conservative faction tried to sup-
press liberal thinking and prevent reforms, women’s issues were still an increasing part 
of Iranian public discourse and a prominent subject in literature, film and the press . 
2 For further information see Kian (1997) .
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Women themselves entered male dominated spheres such as journalism, literature and 
film production to speak about gender-related issues .3 Films made by female directors 
Rakh shan Bani-E’temad and Tahmine Milani, for instance, concentrated on current 
social issues such as working to provide for one’s family, education, and the relation-
ship between men and women in Iranian society .4 They created a new symbolic lan-
guage, with the veil as a means of creative expression rather than a symbol of restric-
tion .5
A major change in how activism is carried out by the women’s movement has 
been the increasingly widespread use of the internet and its social communication 
platforms since 2000 . Women became a public voice in the blogging scene – a new 
medium of individual self-expression, criticism and exchange .6 Since the blogosphere 
was observed by the state and then used by it to distribute its own cultural and political 
agenda, women subsequently preferred to transfer over to the social media services of 
Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp and Telegram to build up their social networks .
Even though Sayyed Mohammad Khatami’s presidency (1997–2005) was charac-
terized by daily conflicts between liberal and conservative forces, a relatively liberal at-
mosphere prevailed, albeit without improvements in Iranian law with regard to equal 
rights for women . With the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, a 
neoconservative came to power . He let restrictive policies prevail, mobilized the mo-
rality police, and considered the women’s movement and its activists to be political . 
In spite of – or rather, because of – these restrictions, women from diverse social, 
political and religious backgrounds joined the women’s movement . They found new 
methods of interaction . In 2006, a new phase of networking started, with the online 
campaign for “One Million Signatures” . This campaign collected signatures in favour 
of repealing discriminatory laws against women . The activists not only published their 
opinion and aims on the internet, but also distributed a pamphlet and had face-to-face 
discussions with the people on the streets in twenty Iranian cities (Daradeh, Witoszek 
2013: 245) . Leading activists were persecuted and arrested (Daradeh, Witoszek 2013: 
247) . The most important aspect of the signature campaign was that it set new para-
digms for a social movement: “It was interested neither in questioning the legitimacy 
of the regime nor in contesting the principles of religion; rather its aim was to chal-
lenge laws within the legal framework of the Iranian Constitution” (Adelkhah 2012: 
22) . “Islamists along with secularists, and even monarchists, engaged in a dialog and 
cooperated with each other” (Adelkhah 2012: 33) .
3 Mention should be made of the contributions of female satirists associated with the satirical journal 
“Gol Aqa”, such as Roya Sadr and Giti Safarzadeh . One can also notice an increasing presence of female 
writers in the literary scene, for instance among short story writers; see Föllmer (2017b: 109–125) .
4 Tahmine Milanis’s film “Do zan” (Two Women) provoked widespread discussion about gender issues 
in the Iranian press between the main political factions; this is analysed in Föllmer (2004) .
5 A good example of the veil’s representation in Iranian film is Rakhshan Bani-E’temad’s film The Blue 
Veiled (Rusari-ābi) (1994), analysed in the article by Föllmer (2017a) .
6 For further reading see Alavi (2005), Sreberny and Khiabany (2010), Shakhsari (2011) .
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The discriminatory policy of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s government impeded the ac-
tivities of participants in the women’s movement . Many of the leading activists were 
accused of being political (Sadeghi 2012: 127–129) . As a result, the women’s move-
ment seemed to be silenced until the presidential elections and the “Green Move-
ment” in 2009 (Sadeghi 2012: 130) . However, women became active in other ways; 
they found space for self-expression in cultural areas such as literature, music, theatre, 
and even video games (Sreberny and Torfeh 2013) and showed more and more inter-
est in sports and male-dominated jobs like driving buses and taxis . The governmental 
programme to promote physical health supported this trend with sports equipment in 
public spaces such as parks and small green areas in cities, where women nonetheless 
had to cover their heads and bodies as usual . Occasionally, a separation between male 
and female areas for playing sports in public spaces was intended but not successfully 
established . Over time, veiling in sports became more comfortable for women through 
the advent of elastic sports models of headscarf and the use of large jumpsuits .
Even the intended gender separation in public transport was undermined by 
mixed sections in places such as the metro . The percentage of women at institutions 
of higher education increased . “… [H]igher literacy rates and better education […], 
and the active participation of women in social, cultural and economic realms …” are 
indicators of social change in the Islamic patriarchal society (Kian 2013: 44) . Even the 
conservative fraction cannot deny the important role women play in Iranian society 
today . Many of them have a high level of education, and they play a central role out-
side of the home in public life (Nasim-e bidāri, 1397 [2018], no . 80–81: 128) . This all 
promoted the self-awareness of Iranian women in public and in everyday life, and led 
to their widespread and active participation in the 2009 protests following the presi-
dential elections, known as the “Green Movement” .
The Green Movement might be understood as a reaction to the neoconservative 
and fundamentalist policies of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who failed to bring 
about social justice and economic liberalism, instead increasing the enrichment and 
corruption of the “sons of the elites” . The various religious factions and institutions 
were divided in their interests, their claims to power and their influence (Adelkhah 
2012: 24–29) . In addition, the government enacted repressive policies such as a prohi-
bition on women’s presence in sports stadiums, raids to confiscate satellite dishes, and 
the reestablishment of guards tasked with ensuring compliance with the Islamic dress 
code . All these factors and more, including social and economic insecurity, recession 
and inflation as consequences of the sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program, might 
have contributed to a decline in the importance of Islamic ideology and led to a more 
mundane orientation of the masses (Adelkhah 2012: 23) . On the other hand, one of 
the main leaders of the Green Movement, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, made references to 
Islamic principles and the example of the Islamic Revolution in his argumentation for 
maintaining peaceful protests and opposition to the unfair election process of 2009 
(Haghighatjoo 2016: 228) . The Green Movement was an urban grassroots movement 
that gave the people a stronger and more central role in a protest movement than be-
fore (Haghighatjoo 2016: 233) . General discontent and increasing criticism were exac-
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erbated by an absence of transparency and a lack of trustworthy independent media . 
The movement united people from different political, religious and social factions in 
their protest, just as the One Million Signatures campaign had before . The active par-
ticipants included a large number of women from diverse backgrounds, who protest-
ed not only against the result of the presidential election, but also against Mahmoud 
 Ahmadinejad’s discriminatory policies regarding women, which primarily aimed to 
limit the participation of women in the public sphere . Enforcement of the Islamic 
dress code was only one of the restrictive measures imposed by the government .7 From 
2005, the government also shut down a lot of women’s media blogs and websites, and, 
in 2008, the influential journal Zanān (Women) . A significant number of female pro-
testers were arrested, convicted and sentenced to prison (Sadeghi 2012: 128) .
Sadeghi concludes that the Green Movement was not a single event, but part of 
a civic process paving the way for a more egalitarian and less discriminatory society 
(Sadeghi 2012: 129) . The activists made use of the methods employed by the women’s 
movement’s signature campaign, having learned to be creative, flexible and pragmat-
ic without a hierarchical structure (Michaelsen 2013: 150) . The Green Movement 
in 2009 not only replaced other kinds of civic activism with a political movement 
( Sadeghi 2012: 130), but in fact made civic action political .
Veiling and Everyday Life
Factors other than the women’s movement and political protest movement may also 
have had implications for the women’s acts of unveiling . With the aforementioned 
social and political developments of the last few years as a backdrop, it seems necessary 
to look at the lifestyle of Iranian women: how do Iranian women manage their daily 
lives, and what role does the veil play?
Before the revolution, the image of veiled women was a traditional one, whereas 
unveiled women were the physical indicator of a modern society (Zahedi 2008: 256) . 
The black chādor was synonymous with hejāb . After the revolution, a modern out-
look and meaning for hejāb developed: manteaux or rupush (overcoats) in combina-
tion with rusari or maqna’e (headscarves) were accepted as a more practical style of 
Islamic dress code and enabled women to be active in the public sphere . Especially in 
the post-war period, even traditional housewives and mothers spent several hours a 
day in public places . They had to take their children to school and deal with the civil 
service, banking and shopping without male support and sometimes until late at night 
(Bayat 2010: 101) .
I have periodically visited Iran for 20 years now . During that time, many things have 
changed in Iranian society . Iranian people, like other people today, have to negotiate 
their individual freedom in everyday life – a process that is informed by one’s particu-
lar social, cultural, religious and political circumstances and historical background . 
7 For more details see Sadeghi (2012: 126–127) .
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Leaving regional and ethnic differences aside, we can observe differences in Iranian 
society between, for example, men and women, different social classes and different 
generations . On the one hand there is a strong division between the public and private 
sphere, but on the other hand, there are also many grey zones in between that the 
people use for their personal freedom . Their status quo and relationships with each 
other are challenged every day by hegemonic strategies . All these factors have a greater 
or lesser influence on people’s daily interactions and private and public communica-
tion . They determine the time, place and manner in which people can (or cannot) 
act and speak about certain issues . Women, in particular, have to grapple with serious 
issues such as unemployment, poverty and a general breakdown of traditional family 
structures . Society’s social and economic problems led to a gender crisis caused by the 
vast gap between the state’s gender ideology and the reality of women’s lives (Barlow 
and Akbarzadeh 2008: 26) . In that context, veiling was an issue of minor importance; 
“most activists in Iran are more concerned with matters from women’s unemploy-
ment to domestic violence .”8 Indeed, Iranian women apparently have come to terms 
with the veil accompanying their daily activities in public, from their jobs and house-
hold tasks to their leisure time . This does not mean that all Iranian women always wear 
a black chādor everywhere they go, as is still a widespread image in Western media . It 
simply means that the female body is completely covered except for the face and hands; 
the head is covered with a headscarf in one of any number of different styles and col-
ours, while the body is hidden under a typically knee-length or calf-length overcoat . 
Only some Iranian women additionally wrap themselves in a black chādor .
Over the years, the preferred styles of veiling changed and became more and more 
fashionable . For example, women were inspired by tribal and ethnic head coverings 
and ways of wearing them (Zahedi 2008: 260) . Veiling was not necessarily linked with 
morality, chastity and Islamic virtue anymore, but with individual self-expression: 
“The dark color, shape-concealing manteau was transformed into a shorter, colorful, 
shape-revealing garment . Gone were the long dark pants, replaced by three-quarter-
length trousers that hint at shapely ankles . The big dark rusary was discarded in fa-
vor of small, brightly patterned, and transparent head scarves” (Zahedi 2008: 261) . In 
addition, women increasingly used make-up, and facial plastic surgery became very 
popular . Attempts to limit the improper or bad-hejābi look have generally failed .
A woman’s manner of veiling is not only a matter of self-expression; it also depends 
on the type of activity she is engaging in, her social environment, the social milieu she 
comes from, and her age . The manner and style of veiling differ in general between 
rural and urban women, for example .9 They are determined by place and time, and can 
8 Suzanne Maloney and Eliora Katz: Iran and the Headscarf Protests . Brookings.edu, 24 January 2019 
(https://www .brookings .edu/opinions/iran-and-the-headscarf-protests/) .
9 Alavi mentions that even in 2003 some tribal women did not respect the mandatory veil but suffered 
no consequences, while urban women had to fear punishments . Rural women were freer in public and in 
communication with men than urban women, as pointed out by a commentary in a blog; see Alavi (2005: 
164–174) . In 2006, more than 70% of the Iranian population resided in urban areas . This led to a general 
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be used to express one’s political affiliation . For instance, Iranian women do not neces-
sarily wear the veil at home among family members, though some do in the presence of 
unrelated male guests . When a woman leaves her private home for a short time while 
remaining in her local area – whether it be to buy groceries, talk with her neighbours 
or simply to take out the trash – she at least covers her head with a scarf . When she 
wants to play sports in public she has to wear an overcoat and headscarf, even though 
this may be uncomfortable for her . If a woman works in a government institution, 
she usually wears a maqna’e (a special kind of headscarf) and an overcoat in a dark 
colour . Sometimes she additionally wears a black chādor, particularly when she wants 
to enter religious and holy places such as a mosque . If so, the chādor may be black or 
colourful . During her daily prayers at home or – less commonly – in the mosque or 
the  Hosseiniye, the woman is also usually covered with a chādor .
Meanwhile, the veil has become a major part of the Iranian fashion industry . 
Wealthy women can wear the latest models of veil and overcoat, which can also easily 
transgress the border between the allowed and the disallowed . Women from lower 
social strata prefer a more old-fashioned covering, not only because of their financial 
limitations, but also for security reasons . A young woman who wants to go shopping 
wears a small-sized, thigh-length and more colourful overcoat and a headscarf that does 
not hide the hair completely . Women from older generations are veiled more conven-
tionally in a typically larger-sized, dark-coloured overcoat and a colourful headscarf .
Other aspects of behaviour must also harmonize with the different variants of veil-
ing, such as how, when and where women move their bodies in public spaces and 
whether or not they avoid eye contact with men . For example, if a woman is wearing 
a lot of make-up or strikingly coloured clothes, or if she’s wearing an open, short and 
tight overcoat paired with trousers, or is wearing her scarf too casually – all still within 
the limits of the mandatory veiling law – she can send certain messages to the public 
and hint at certain hidden aims and intentions . A woman who is accompanied by a 
man behaves differently in public than a single woman, and has a different status . A 
single woman cannot spend her time in public doing nothing other than sitting and 
talking to other people . She must demonstrate that she is busy to ensure that others 
don’t object to her presence (Zanān-e emruz, 1396 [2018], no . 31: 24–26) .
Some spaces situated in the grey zone between public and private, such as a private 
car or shared taxi, allow people to elude the gender separation . Similarly, in the closed 
private quarters of holiday cottages in the Caspian Sea region, with their own private 
beaches, people can move and act privately . There, the veil and gender separation are 
not necessarily an obligation . Recently, the sphere where people can move less conven-
tionally has grown to include time spent in nature engaging in leisure activities such as 
walking, picnics and sports .
Issues of security, social pressure and control also have an impact on one’s manner 
of veiling, but, with the exception of the six-day protests shortly after the revolution, 
change in lifestyle, and in people’s demands and expectations, even though regional disparities – depend-
ing also on ethnic background and religious affiliation – still persist; Kian (2013: 44) .
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veiling itself has not been questioned and not been a subject of public discussion until 
recently . Instead, the type of veil and manner of wearing it, along with the radius of 
women’s daily actions and activities, were always negotiated by the women themselves . 
Young woman, in particular, neglected ‘proper’ veiling . They showed several inches of 
their hair in public despite the threat of penalties from the morality police . From the 
late 1990s, bad-hejābi became an established practice (Bayat 2010: 103) . However, this 
does not necessarily mean that these women departed from religiosity, because the veil 
on its own was and is not an indication of a more moral, religious and secure society; 
it rather demonstrates a growing self-awareness of women and their consciousness of 
their importance to Iranian society .
In 2017, when the tense economic situation became evident, social unrest was ac-
companied by acts of unveiling . The mandatory veil was questioned, while at the same 
time, voices argued for a more religious and moral society . They disapproved of the 
increasing prevalence of bad-hejābi and the supposed departure from religion in Ira-
nian society .
Recent Acts of Unveiling and the Importance of Social Media
The internet and social media enabled women from all over the country to join the 
women’s movement, drawing attention to women outside of the capital Tehran, and 
also widened the scope of the movement’s activities . The journalists of the women’s 
movement learned to manoeuvre through the media, press, websites and blogs . They 
created a counter public sphere, where the abolition of the veil was discussed in a blog 
as early as 2005, provoking the conservatives (Michaelsen 2013: 287–88) . After the 
government, under the presidency of Ahmadinejad, destroyed the organizational 
structure of the women’s movement, the internet remained the best means of com-
munication for women . The enforcement of the Islamic dress code under his presi-
dency in 2007 even caused some women who “believed in the hejāb” to comment 
on and criticize it on their blogs (Akhavan 2013: 40–42) . Though still existent, the 
blogosphere has lost its importance for women’s activism since late 2007, when so-
cial media began to take precedence and the state had already begun to influence the 
blogosphere with its own proactive participatory campaigns to minimize the role of 
dissenting blogs (Akhavan 2013: 45, 49–57) . After that, the digital community in-
creased and diversified, but a physical gathering of the activists was impossible until 
the Green Movement arose (Michaelsen 2013: 293–313) . The movement took advan-
tage of the expansion of social media in order to mobilize people (Haghighatjoo 2016: 
237) . The social media site Friendfeed was of primary importance for the movement 
in 2009 . This online communication platform was where the symbolic colour “green” 
was agreed upon (Akhavan 2013: 90) . During the movement, social media facilitated 
the sharing of information . New media practices enabled political activists to circum-
vent state control . Since the decline of the post-election movement, a “soft war” has 
begun, with the state also using social media to promote its ideas (Akhavan 2013: 84, 
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100–104) . Despite governmental efforts to control and interfere with online commu-
nication, social media did not lose its importance for Iranians – only its character and 
function changed . With such a plurality of opinions in the social network community, 
dissenting voices could easily get lost . Thus, again, new forms of action were necessary 
in order to be heard .
In the past few years, a new trend has become visible in Iranian society via the 
internet: women, primarily young women, removed their veil and took a photo or 
video of themselves without a scarf, then shared it with their community using social 
media . This trend was called ‘My Stealthy Freedom’ . The initiator, Masih Alinejad, an 
Iranian journalist who emigrated in 2009, launched a campaign entitled “The Wind 
in My Hair” in which she posted photos of herself with loose hair . Unexpectedly, this 
caused a widespread reaction in Iran; a lot of women imitated her and posted photos 
of themselves without hejāb on the “My Stealthy Freedom” Facebook page . Within a 
month, the page already had 500,000 “likes” .10 To take these photos, women exploit-
ed the grey zones between the private and public spheres during their private leisure 
activities . Urban middle-class women, in particular, have the possibility of spending 
their leisure time outside of their private homes . Their lives are not restricted to the 
home and taking care of household affairs . They can play sports, go for a walk in the 
mountains or parks, or travel to the Caspian Sea in the North or to the Persian Gulf in 
the South . They can then take photos of these activities during short windows of time 
when the veil is removed (intentionally or by accident) and share it with their social 
media communities . The dissemination of these private photos and videos via social 
media transfers it into the public sphere but eludes legal oversight .
This trend went further with the hashtag campaigns ‘Girls of Enqelāb Street’ and 
‘White Wednesday’ . These are silent acts of unveiling performed on the street by many 
individual women of every age group . These acts started in December 2017 during the 
protests over economic issues, when a young woman, Vida Movahed, climbed to the 
top of a utility box and silently waved her white scarf like a flag . Her quiet performance 
was recorded and shared over social media . A few weeks later, another young woman 
repeated that act, and many other Iranians followed her and shared the images under 
the hashtag ‘Girls of Enqelāb Street’ . Many of the earliest activists were arrested on 
the charge of “inciting corruption and prostitution” . Some of them were sentenced to 
prison .11 After that it became a regular occurrence on Wednesdays for (mainly young) 
women to take off their headscarf, usually white in colour, in any public place, then 
wave it on a stick above their head . In addition, even elderly women in chādor showed 
solidarity with them, remaining covered but silently wielding a veil . Videos and photos 
were distributed and shared under the hashtag ‘White Wednesday’ . What do these 
silent acts mean, and what do the women demand? Is it really a simple protest against 
the mandatory veil, or are there further implications?
10 Suzanne Maloney and Eliora Katz: Iran and the Headscarf Protests . Brookings.edu, 24 January 2019 
(https://www .brookings .edu/opinions/iran-and-the-headscarf-protests/) .
11 Ibid .
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It is obvious that the silent acts of unveiling, and the numerous subsequent expres-
sions of sympathy and tolerance, caused a broad echo in social media and the press in 
Iran and abroad . The individual acts of unveiling, as acts of silence, became part of a 
public discourse reflected in the public print media that I will explore in the next sec-
tion .
Public Discussion on Veiling and Unveiling
What happens when women operate without words? What do they demand? What 
does a discourse of this variety look like? An analysis of the contributions of three 
Iranian journals will shed some light .
The journals in question are the liberal journals Irān-e fardā (Iran of Tomorrow) 
and Zanān-e emruz (Women of Today), and the religious reform-oriented but more 
conservative publication Nasim-e bidāri (Breeze of the Awakening/Enlightenment) . 
In their March 2018 editions, each of these commented on the issue of veiling and un-
veiling in several articles and interviews . Only Irān-e fardā used a cover photo related to 
this subject: a historical photo of a mass demonstration during the revolution of 1979, 
with a focus on unveiled women standing side by side with men . Five contributions 
to the journal refer to the subject .12 Zanān-e emruz does not refer to the debate about 
the veil on its cover . However, five articles refer to the veiling-unveiling discourse .13 
The most thorough contribution to the discourse, with 15 articles and interviews, 
is found in Nasim-e bidāri.14 This journal refers to the subject with a short headline 
on the cover: Bi-parde az hejāb – barresi-ye hodud-e hejāb-e zanān az manzar-e shar’ 
wa qānun (Revealing the hejāb – a study on the female veil from the perspective of 
Islamic law) . The edition in question is primarily dedicated to historical subjects: the 
time of Pahlavi rule and the revolution of 1979 .
The hejāb discussion in Irān-e fardā begins with an interview with three female 
activists involved in the women’s movement in Iran and the recent protests against 
the mandatory veil .15 According to them, the women’s movement and the acts of un-
veiling of the women in Enqelāb Street should be considered separately . Whereas the 
women’s movement is defined as movement, they refer to the “girls of Enqelāb Street” 
as single acts and not as a movement . They conclude that the current women’s move-
12 Irān-e fardā was a religious reform-oriented monthly journal that was published from 1371–1379 
(1992–2000) and resumed publication in 1393 (2014) .
13 Zanān-e emruz is a monthly journal published since 1393 (2014) . It followed the banned journal 
Zanān and exclusively covers social, cultural, scientific and artistic issues relevant to women . 
14 Nasim-e bidāri is a religious reform-oriented monthly journal published since 1388 (2009) .
15 Marziye (Minu) Mortazi Langarudi is a member of the Council of Nationalist-Religious Activists 
(shura-ye fa’alan-e melli madhhabi) and director of the Society of the Mothers of Peace (anjoman-e 
mādarān-e solh) . Shahla E’zazi is a social scientist with a focus on women and family affairs . Fateme 
 Sadeqi is a well-known opponent of the mandatory veil and had already criticized it in an article on Radio 
Zamane in 2008 (1387) .
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ment is a result of historical development since the beginning of the 20th century, but 
that recently it is in a sad situation (Irān-e fardā, 1396 [2018], no . 38: 52–65) . In con-
trast to Irān-e fardā, the journal Zanān-e emruz maintains that the women’s move-
ment still exists and is growing with the help of digital media (Zanān-e emruz, 1396 
[2018], no . 31: 21–23) . Nasim-e bidāri does not refer to the movement at all . The 
journal instead problematizes recent tendencies of bad-hejābi, departure from religion, 
and a general decline of morals and ethics in Iranian society . In Irān-e fardā, violence 
against women in Iranian society is part of a religious-philosophical contribution that 
discusses the different meaning of nafs and ruh (soul, spirit, self)16 in the Qurʾān . The 
author comes to the conclusion that every human has a male and a female side . Those 
who reject this would, it is argued, show more violence against the other gender (Irān-e 
fardā, 1396 [2018], no . 38: 66–67) .
The journals analysed reflect different notions of the parts of society demanding 
abolition of the mandatory veil . Like Irān-e fardā, Zanān-e emruz has a positive at-
titude toward those who fight for equal rights for women and against the mandatory 
veil . The journal points to the restrictions the women face in everyday life despite their 
influence on the public sphere and the economy . In contrast to men, women must 
show that they are busy in public . Their activities must not be aimless even when they 
spend their leisure time in parks, sport centres and shopping malls (Zanān-e emruz, 
1396 [2018], no . 31: 24–26) . The journals Irān-e fardā and Zanān-e emruz both re-
fer to the recent acts of unveiling . Whereas Irān-e fardā argues that these actions are 
the consequence of a long tradition of veiling (Zanān-e emruz, 1396 [2018], no . 31: 
68–73), Zanān-e emruz discusses the sentencing of women who appear unveiled in 
public . In that context, the journal considers the meaning of being unveiled (bi-hejābi) 
and badly veiled (bad-hejābi) . Only the complete lack of an Islamic hejāb may be called 
bi-hejābi, and in those circumstances the journal accepts that security forces or the 
morality police have the right to intervene . In the case of bad-hejābi, the type of veil 
and manner of veiling vary considerably . Bad-hejābi is the result of an individual’s 
decision and part of that person’s private life . The author concludes that neither bad-
hejābi nor even bi-hejābi are a danger for national security or against the regime . They 
are merely the expression of an individual’s opinion and cause nobody to suffer any 
disadvantage (Zanān-e emruz, 1396 [2018], no . 31: 30–31) . The acts of unveiling are 
– according to the author in Zanān-e emruz – not representative of Iranian society as a 
whole . They are merely the expressions of a few individuals, and as such the issue does 
not necessarily have priority for the women’s fraction of the Iranian parliament . An-
other article discusses the reasons behind the acts of unveiling and points to interna-
tional sporting competitions and music performances held in Iran . The author notes 
that non-Iranian female participants are not familiar with how to wear the veil, and 
that sometimes their veils slide down, arguing that this is why Iranian sportswomen 
16   The meaning of both terms, nafs and ruh, is part of various theological and philosophical discourses 
and debates in Islamic history until today . A short overview of the different meanings of the terms is given 
by Macdonald ([1931] 1932) .
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were among the first activists of the unveiling campaign (Zanān-e emruz, 1396 [2018], 
no . 31: 37–40) .
Nasim-e bidāri, in contrast, notes that in educational and cultural institutions, 
the focus has always been on people’s external aspects and not on their inner condi-
tion . Thus, the journal takes a general look at Iranian society and the recent situation 
of women and asks several experts about possible solutions to resistance against the 
mandatory veil and ways to improve moral behaviour . Here, the term hejāb is used 
alongside the term aʿfāf, which means chastity . The experts interviewed all agree in 
their attitude that opposition to the obligation of wearing the veil is an expression of 
the insufficiency of Iranian politics and educational institutions . Security forces and 
morality police (gasht-e ershād) might not be the solution; rather, they feel that more 
profound and effective measures and reforms would be needed to re-establish a moral 
order .
All three journals are unanimous that the veil is not merely a religious symbol 
that was introduced in early Islam and became obligatory for every woman since that 
time . They rather recognize that the veil also has social and, more recently, political 
dimensions, and that all these aspects overlap . They see no basis for the obligation 
of veiling in the Islamic textual tradition or Islamic law . The author in Irān-e fardā 
even contends, with reference to Shahid Beheshti, that it is un-Islamic (Irān-e fardā, 
1396 [2018], no . 38: 75) . Nasim-e bidāri accepts that today, wearing the veil is con-
sidered an element of one’s individual freedom . The obligation of veiling has no cul-
tural background and cannot be indicative of the culture of chastity (Nasim-e bidāri, 
1397 [2018], no . 80–81: 131) . It rather goes back to a decree made by Ayatollah Sayyed 
Ruhollah Khomeini in 1983 (Nasim-e bidāri, 1397 [2018], no . 80–81: 124) . Today, 
the hejāb has become political, just like other social and cultural issues (Nasim-e bidāri, 
1397 [2018], no . 80–81: 148) . Nonetheless, there are also (political) voices in Nasim-e 
bidāri who consider veiling the most important value of the Islamic religion and a reli-
gious duty for a society with a political system whose tradition and national culture is 
also based on Islam . Fateme Rahbar, a former member of parliament, claims that the 
majority of Iranian people accept the veil, and that the participation of Iranian wom-
en in social and political affairs can be traced back to veiling (Nasim-e bidāri, 1397 
[2018], no . 80–81: 126) . Such neoconservative voices admit that, even though the veil 
and chastity are the basic expressions of religious values and should not be questioned, 
there is a need for reforms . Such reforms, according to parliamentary cleric Hojjat al-
Islam Hossein Pezhmanfar, should more strongly enshrine veiling in Iranian society as 
a cultural characteristic, and thus diminish the influence of foreign enemies (Nasim-e 
bidāri, 1397 [2018], no . 80–81: 127) . Another politician, law expert Shahindokht 
Mulawardi, adds that there should be a law that expresses the aim of veiling . Since the 
hejāb is not entirely religious or cultural, but always political, the law of veiling must 
be combined with cultural aspects of each individual’s thoughts and actions (Nasim-e 
bidāri, 1397 [2018], no . 80–81: 131) .
The moderate cleric Sayyed Mostafa Mohaqqeqdamad acknowledges in an inter-
view that veiling is neither a guarantee for chastity nor the result of Western influence . 
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The people should instead recognize that modest clothing is not only limited to religi-
osity (imān) but also to chastity and dignity (ʿeffat wa waqār) (Nasim-e bidāri, 1397 
[2018], no . 80–81: 129) . The daughter of Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani (1911/14–
1979) is interviewed as well; she argues for a positive, mild and respectful view of the 
young people who oppose the veil and an appropriate education that teaches them 
to accept Islamic values and the veil (Nasim-e bidāri, 1397 [2018], no . 80–81: 135–
137) .
The social dimension of veiling is discussed by sociologist Ebrahim Fayyaz, who 
points to a lack of gender competence in Iranian society . From a regional and historical 
perspective, veiling was not an obligation for all women in Iranian society . The chādor 
was not practical for female rural workers; it was a covering only worn by wealthy ur-
ban women who did not work and had enough money for the cloth . Veiling thus has 
an economic and social dimension and is strongly connected to the family (Nasim-e 
bidāri, 1397 [2018], no . 80–81: 133) . Fayyaz maintains that prevailing genderphobia 
has contributed to many problems such as prostitution, Aids and sexual abuse, and 
that in addition, the religion of today has nothing to do with Islam anymore . Instead, 
it has become a religion of censure, of boycott and of populism . Only the support 
and strengthening of the family can contribute to economic and social security and a 
strong political unit (Nasim-e bidāri, 1397 [2018], no . 80–81: 134) .
The lengthiest contribution in Nasim-e bidāri is an interview with the historical 
scientist Amir Tarkashwand, who wrote a book on the history of early Islam and the 
question of veiling (Hejāb-e shar’i dar aʿsr-e payāmbar – The religious hejāb in the 
time of the Prophet) . His main argument is that the meaning of veiling has changed 
throughout the long history of Islam . In the time of the Prophet Mohammad, the 
meaning of the veil was dependent on the local, environmental, political and cultur-
al context of the era and differs from the more recent understanding . The book was 
criticized and delayed before it was published, and it provoked widespread discussion, 
especially among specialists of Islamic law, because it differs from the official interpre-
tation of the hejāb (Nasim-e bidāri, 1397 [2018], no . 80–81: 143) . It becomes obvious 
that the journal has a particular interest in the promotion of the book and asks for the 
author’s advice for young girls today . He did not answer the question, just as the other 
interviewees did not when the journalist wanted to know their personal attitudes to-
wards the practice of veiling . It seems they all considered it a private affair that should 
not be published in the mass media .
The question of whether veiling is a private affair is answered by Parwane Solhshu-
ri, the acting parliamentary women’s leader . She argues that the law always takes prior-
ity . When the law makes veiling an obligation, individual freedom of choice is subor-
dinated to it (Nasim-e bidāri, 1397 [2018], no . 80–81: 148) .
To summarize, a tendency to accept the veil becomes obvious in Nasim-e bidāri 
even though the journal recognizes the need for reforms . The recommended reforms 
should encourage veiling and chastity in Iranian society without restricting women’s 
activities . In contrast, Zanān-e emruz and Irān-e fardā both support individual free-
dom of choice without reference to other problems in Iranian society, and without 
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discussion of any consequences . The three journals generally recognize a broad re-
sistance against the obligation of veiling and a flight from religion, especially among 
young people . The political voices in Nasim-e bidāri seem to downplay the problem 
and focus on other issues of Iranian society such as a decline in moral behaviour, a lack 
of respect for religious values and reforms that could stop the decline .
Conclusion and Questions
Curiously, the silent acts of unveiling occurred at the same time as social unrest arose 
in multiple Iranian cities in winter 2017/18 . It was not clearly expressed why these acts 
occurred at this exact this time, and what the women involved wished to demand and 
demonstrate through them . Not all of these women referred to the women’s move-
ment or the online campaigns, even though these may have given important impulses 
to the silent activists . After the end of the Green Movement of 2009, the government 
pushed ahead with efforts to control and to disrupt online communication . Social 
networking did not lose its importance for Iranians, or for the formation of a plurality 
of opinions, but it is likely that its character and function changed .
It is clear that these acts gained attention and provoked a broad discourse with vari-
ous focuses . As Bayat notes: “The women’s incremental practices needed to be backed 
up by careful argumentation and discursive campaign” mainly drawn from alterna-
tive legal and theological interpretations (Bayat 2010: 113) . The discursive negotia-
tion process in Iranian society seems to occur mainly amongst the liberal and reform-
oriented factions . The journal Nasim-e bidāri referred to the meaning of the hejāb in 
Islamic history, in Islamic law, and in Iranian society today . Because of its proximity to 
the religious faction, it is not surprising that this journal supports the notion of a mor-
al and Islamic society . However, it still does not deny the necessity of reforms . Thus, it 
criticizes the work of state institutions and theological centres and also questions the 
role of the morality police and the interpretation of the law in the past . Nonetheless, it 
remains unclear whether the journal in general supports the obligation of wearing the 
veil or not . Those interviewed avoid answering questions about their own private at-
titudes toward the mandatory veil . Here, again, we feel a meaningful silence and must 
assume: not only religion, but also the hejāb is a private matter .
In Irān-e fardā and Zanān-e emruz, there is no particular religious or secular 
position that both journals identify with . We also cannot observe discussion of any 
particular generational or regional problem . The issues discussed in both journals are 
related to the whole of society, with no differentiation between rural and urban citi-
zens, or between different ethnic and religious groups . The veil and the social position 
of women are only discussed in a national Islamic Shiite context . The main problems 
that were identified within this context are the recent economic and social changes, a 
perceived visible moral decline, and the increased influence of social media fostering 
perceptions and attitudes that can no longer be controlled by governmental institutes 
and forces .
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While liberals stress the freedom of individual choice, religious voices take into con-
sideration the morality of society as a whole, which they feel is in decline . Equal rights 
– in particular for women, who are crucial to Iranian society – are important for both 
sides . Even the religious voices acknowledge that the role of women cannot be reduced 
to that of housewives and mothers . They are, on the contrary, a very important re-
source, playing an active role in the development of Iranian society .
The recent debate surrounding the obligation of veiling demonstrates that only 
specialists of both the liberal and religious-conservative factions refer to religious argu-
ments . While the specialists of the liberals emphasize legislative and theosophical issues, 
the religious-conservative voices stress the moral standards that should be maintained 
in society . For them, the religious meaning of the veil is strongly associated with the 
ideas of correct moral behaviour and chastity ( aʿfāf) . Their duty is to simultaneously 
defend both the wearing of the hejāb and chastity ( aʿfāf) in society . The discourse pri-
marily consists of discussion regarding the social circumstances, conflicts, and histori-
cal political background surrounding the veil, and how this impacts on considerations 
of the necessity or abolition of veiling .
In contrast to the prevailing opinions that the acts of unveiling are a result of either 
the online campaigns initiated by Masih Alinejad or part of the history of the women’s 
rights movement in Iran, one cannot deny the impact of recent social developments 
and the increasing need for self-determination by the individual in everyday life . My 
own observations of everyday life highlighted aspects related to the types of activity, 
time and place when women appeared without a veil . I witnessed four cases of unveil-
ing in the days surrounding New Year in 2018 . In the first case, a young woman was 
playing table tennis with a male relative in a small sports ground in a city quarter main-
ly inhabited by wealthy people . As she played, the veil fell off her head . She noticed it, 
but did not cover her head again, nor did anybody insist that she do so . In the second 
case, a middle-aged woman in a museum in the centre of the city did not keep her veil 
on while visiting the museum, despite the presence of the museum’s guards . Nobody 
seemed to be bothered by it or ask her to cover her head . In the third instance, a group 
of young women enjoyed a picnic in a big park during sizdah-be-dar, a tradition held 
during the New Year festivities 13 days after the beginning of the New Year . Some of 
them did not wear the veil, and neither the morality police nor the other people in the 
park took any notice of it . The last case I observed is the one I described in the article’s 
introduction . The silence of the passers-by might be interpreted as a silence of toler-
ance, and only a few examples on YouTube demonstrate open rejection, mainly from 
clerics and civilians .17
17 “Iranian Slaps Brave Woman for Not Wearing a Hijab on Revolution Street”, published on Youtube 
on 19 March 2018 (https://www .youtube .com/watch?v=A09H_cIAjhw, accessed 18 May 2020); “Ira-
nian Woman Attacks Women for not Wearing Hijab”, published on Youtube on 2 August 2018 (https://
www .youtube .com/watch?v=uvygtdD9y6A, accessed 18 May 2020); “Mullah/Islamic Cleric Harasses 
Iranian Woman Who Is Refusing To Wear Hijab”, published on Youtube by ‘Democratic Iran Channel’ 
2 January 2019 (https://www .youtube .com/watch?v=XAbIMm78Rxc, accessed 18 May 2020) .
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It becomes clear that these acts of unveiling occurred in public, in places where women 
spend their spare time: playing sports, visiting a museum, having a picnic with friends 
or going shopping . They pursued their private activities in the public sphere and the 
morality police did not intervene . As the examples demonstrate, the public discourse 
reflected in some journals represents only one side of the coin, with the daily routines 
of individual women on the other side .
After one year, the silent unveiling protests have not yet stopped . On certain days, 
such as International Women’s Day, the protests have become louder, while the silent 
activities in daily life continue unabated . Recent reports from visitors to Iran include 
accounts of silent acts of unveiling even a year later . Meanwhile, unveiled women are 
an ever more common part of everyday life, at least in the capital city of Tehran – in 
restaurants, in taxis, on the streets and in shopping malls .18 Even officials have realized 
that they cannot arrest every woman without a veil .19
Before the acts of unveiling, women’s public presence enabled them to circumvent 
constraints, and to use what already existed to discover new spaces to make themselves 
heard, seen and felt . The recent silent acts of unveiling developed from dispersed indi-
vidual acts of civil disobedience, which broke a taboo and led to a collective solidarity 
among women in everyday life . They transgressed the conventional norms via a mul-
titude of tactics in everyday life and created a culture of defiance .20 What became the 
new mode of self-expression for women from a variety of social, political and religious 
backgrounds was neither public gatherings nor online communication, nor even al-
ternative spaces and discourses, but dispersed, individual, silent unveiling . An act of 
silence grants each individual woman visibility, substantial power and a “voice” . The 
economic crisis faced by Iran as a result of international sanctions might have been the 
major cause of frustration for many people – and women in particular – and thus the 
impetus for their acts of unveiling .
I conclude that the growing self-awareness of Iranian women in everyday life, the 
economic crisis, and the limitations of the women’s movement and online campaigns 
may have led to a new and individual form of activism based on acts of ambiguous 
silence . This does not entail passive subordination, but rather an expression of discon-
tent with a unifying force in a context where speech can be dangerous . Silence is a new 
means of wielding power that has the potential for societal change .21 The silent acts 
of unveiling have thus made the veil a symbol of a larger process of negotiation: the 
negotiation of public and private, the individual and society, what is allowed and what 
is forbidden, social imbalances, and – last but not least – the veil itself in its political, 
social, cultural, and religious meaning .
18 Jörg-Christian Schillmöller (2019): Der wachsende Mut, zu widersprechen . Deutschlandfunk.de, 1 May 
2019 . https://www .deutschlandfunk .de/nachgefragt-iran-der-wachsende-mut-zu-widersprechen .2852 .
de .html?dram:article_id=447621 .
19 Ina Rogg (2019): Revolution? Nein danke! In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 26 March 2019, 5 .
20 For details, see Khosravi (2008), in particular chapter 6, pp . 138–168 .
21 This concept is based on the idea from Hoegaerts and Verstraete’s edited volume in DiGeSt . Journal of 
Diversity and Gender Studies (Hoegaerts and Verstraete 2016) .
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Voiles, statuts du regard et évolutions  6 
des modalités de religiosité  
chez les femmes tunisiennes
Khaoula Matri
La question du voile dit islamique continue d’occuper le devant de la scène publique 
et médiatique internationale . Contrairement au voilement masculin comme celui des 
Touaregs, le voilement des femmes fait l’objet de législations et de politiques dans les 
pays à majorité musulmane ou ailleurs (voir Ferjani 2005) . Entre l’interdiction, la to-
lérance et l’imposition, l’apparence des femmes continue de mettre au défiles régimes 
politiques démocratiques, théocratiques comme autoritaires, et à interpeller les valeurs 
universelles relatives à la liberté de conscience et de confession et à la gouvernance du 
corps . En même temps, la question du voile incite à redéfinir le rapport à l’Autre, en 
soulevant des concepts comme l’universalisme et le relativisme (voir Kilani 1993) . Le 
voilement des femmes musulmanes nous fait aussi réfléchir aux nouvelles formes d’ex-
pression de l’islam (voir Göle 2007) . Mais cette question n’est-elle pas l’arbre qui cache 
la forêt ? En France, par exemple, un pays fortement politisé, cette question ne ren-
voie-t-elle pas à d’autres problématiques qui s’y rattachent, comme l’immigration, la 
laïcité et les valeurs républicaines ? La question du port du voile touche aux questions 
de la liberté individuelle, de l’engagement politique, de la quête identitaire comme 
marqueur culturel . Les significations accordées au corps féminin voilé se traduisent en 
termes d’appartenances, d’idéologies religieuses, d’enjeux politiques et du regard porté 
sur Soi ou sur l’Autre (voir Matri 2015) . Cet objet fluctuant change de sens selon les 
circonstances, les conditions et les usages .
Sociologues, anthropologues et historien-ne-s ont examiné la question du hijab à 
partir de divers approches, mentionnant selon le contexte les causes et les circonstan-
ces des révélations du Coran, la conceptualisation des termes utilisés et les modalités 
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de son interprétation . Selon la vision méthodologique de L . Lakhdar, les versets de la 
Sourate 33 sont sous-tendues par trois contextes importants : « celui de la guerre et de 
l’agression extérieure ; celui du harcèlement des Hypocrites, cette lutte est interne per-
manente ; et celui des quelques problèmes complexes liés à la vie intime du prophète, 
comme les retombées de son mariage avec Zaynab sur les relations entre le Prophète 
et son environnement proche » (Lakhdar 2007 : 127) . Le hijab/sitar porte une di-
mension spatiale et abstraite séparant deux hommes (Mernissi 1992) . En dressant les 
dimensions historique, sociale, linguistique et conceptuelle de ce terme dans la civili-
sation islamique, F . Mernissi revient sur le contexte moderne pour expliquer l’usage 
insensé de ce terme pour séparer les hommes et les femmes : « il est, de nos jours, 
revendiqué comme un symbole de l’identité musulmane, une manne pour la femme 
musulmane » (Mernissi 1992 : 124) . D’autres part, Lakhdhar précise que :
La scène originelle dans laquelle s’est jouée la question du hijâb était une scène 
dynamique, peuplée d’acteurs multiples, d’enjeux interférents . Le sens que l’on 
doit tenir compte de l’interaction de tous ces facteurs, et non de chaque facteur 
isolément . Le contexte polymorphe de l’avènement du hijâb était celui d’une 
guerre qui ne pouvait que renforcer les valeurs rétrogrades régissant les rapports 
hommes-femmes ; celui du péril et de la dissidence politico-religieuse des Hy-
pocrites qui n’hésitaient pas à s’en prendre à la vie intime du Prophète en vue 
de briser son charisme ; celui de l’urgence pour les Musulmans et pour leur 
chef de faire face au péril sans, pour autant, bousculer le fragile équilibre médi-
nois… En un mot, c’était l’avenir de la Prédication qui était en jeu . L’imposition 
du hijâb est inséparable de cette conjoncture complexe travaillée par la dialecti-
que de l’immédiat et de l’à venir . Elle n’a pas de « vérité » hors de ce contexte . 
( Lakhdhar 2007 : 139)
Les diktats des religions monothéistes sur la condition des femmes touchent des ères 
culturelles diverses et remontent à des périodes historiques lointaines . En outre, le voi-
le dit islamique n’est pas une tenue uniforme, il prend des formes esthétiques variant 
selon le contexte socio-politique (voile saoudien, voile afghan, voile iranien, voile turc, 
etc .) et socio-culturel (voile traditionnel de différentes régions du monde : tunisien, 
algérien, moyen-oriental, asiatique, etc .) . Il représente également un signe de distinc-
tion entre générations (grand-mère, jeunes femmes, adolescentes) et entre confessions 
religieuses (chiite, sunnite, druze) . Enfin, il peut marquer des spécificités relatives à 
l’engagement sectaire ou politique .
En comparaison avec d’autres sociétés arabes et musulmanes, la Tunisie, comme la 
Turquie, a vécu une rupture par rapport au voilement religieux des femmes, au nom 
de la modernisation de la société et de l’égalité des sexes . L’usage du voile traditionnel 
(safsarî) a progressivement disparu notamment pour les femmes actives . En outre et 
pour contrecarrer la montée des islamistes, les régimes politiques (du premier président 
H . Bourguiba et du deuxième président Z .A . Ben Ali) ont opprimé cette pratique . Le 
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voile est considéré comme un habit confessionnel1 opposé à une stratégie politique op-
tant pour la modernisation de la société et l’émancipation des femmes . Selon Boukrâa 
(2008 : 270), cette modernisation volontariste assimilait dévoilement des femmes et 
libération . C’est ainsi que le voile traditionnel (safsarî) et le voile dit religieux a été exclu 
de l’espace public tunisien durant une bonne décennie .
Toutefois les nouvelles formes de religiosité mettent en question ce processus de 
modernisation volontariste depuis l’indépendance et l’oppression contre certaines 
pratiques religieuses . Les expressions cultuelles s’inscrivent dans une perspective du 
retour à l’islam, et de la quête identitaire des musulmans dans sa dimension la plus 
pure, profonde, étroitement rattachée à un islam globalisé amplifié dans les chaines 
satellitaires et propagé par les nouvelles techniques de communication au plus large 
public . Une partie de la jeune génération, instruite et urbanisée, s’investit dans cette 
nouvelle forme de religiosité du début du 21e siècle . Pour les initiatrices, celles qui ont 
transgressé la prohibition de ladite tenue confessionnelle, porter le voile constitue une 
résistance passive et une mise à l’épreuve de leur courage face à la persécution de l’État 
(Ben Salem 2010) . Au bout de quelles années, le recours au voilement se transforme en 
une pratique courante suite à une rémission du contrôle des autorités et une permissi-
vité politique . Une normalité de la pratique s’installe même avant la défaite du régime 
autoritaire et donne lieu à l’émergence d’une dimension religieuse non politisée, visible 
dans l’apparence des femmes dans l’espace public .
Je m’intéresse dans le présent article aux perceptions religieuses et sociales du voile 
et aux dimensions sacralisée et profane de cette pratique . Car l’adhésion à une tenue 
dite religieuse témoigne d’une diversité de choix qui révèle la capacité de l’individu à se 
définir en tant que sujet, entre une multitude d’identités hiérarchisées et de pratiques 
multiples telles que la manière d’identifier le Soi/Nous et l’Autre . J’examine le voile 
comme objet polysémique dans la vie ordinaire et les frontières qu’il installe entre les 
sexes, les identités et les catégories dans une dimension qui combine le traditionnel et 
le moderne, le religieux et le profane .
A partir d’un travail de terrain mené en Tunisie, j’essaie de situer la question du 
port du voile dans trois épisodes politiques différents, au cours desquels un change-
ment de contexte a été un marqueur d’évolution au niveau de la perception comme au 
niveau de la pratique . Sur la base d’une relation inscrite dans la durée, mon enquête 
de terrain qui combine observation et entretiens prolongés, m’a permis d’établir une 
comparaison entre le discours et les pratiques des femmes qui portent le voile dit is-
lamique, couvre-chef, hijab, hijab charʿi ou niqab, et qui le vivent (selon le type de la 
tenue adoptée) comme une expérience ancrée dans le quotidien et les gestes les plus 
1 Trois circulaires sont venues interdire le voile considéré comme « tenue confessionnelle » : « N° 108 
du 18 septembre 1981 pour les établissements scolaires publics, n°77 du 7 septembre 1987 pour les éta-
blissements primaires et secondaires, le 21 septembre 1987 pour les écoles supérieures d’enseignement, 
les cités et les foyers universitaires . Une quatrième datant du 12 août 1987 s’adresse aux agents de l’admi-
nistration et des établissements publics des deux sexes . La prohibition du port du voile a été élargie aux 
établissements privés par une autre circulaire datée de décembre 1991, portant sur la tenue des agents de 
l’administration et des institutions publiques et privée . » (voir Maryem Ben Salem 2010) .
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ordinaires . La population cible est composée de jeunes filles et de jeunes femmes, qui 
représentent la « nouvelle » génération des femmes voilées, mais aussi de jeunes hom-
mes .
Nous nous concentrons uniquement sur les manières de penser le corps voilé et 
de négocier les normes morales et religieuses relatives à cette pratique . Les apparte-
nances idéologiques ne sont pas abordées dans notre analyse parce que nous voulons 
nous concentrer sur le port du voile en tant que pratique ordinaire, et sur les discours 
des acteurs sociaux en se limitant à ce qu’elles/ils disent d’elles-mêmes/d’eux-mêmes, 
des femmes et de leur vécu . Cet article propose de s’interroger sur la façon dont le 
voile est perçu, sur l’image de la femme musulmane idéale et sur les normes morales de 
conduite décrites par les pratiquantes, indépendamment des mouvances idéologiques 
de références à travers les récits de femmes qui portent le voile et témoignent de leurs 
expériences dans toute la diversité de cette pratique religieuse .
Je réalise mon observation à l’échelle microsociale pour appréhender le voile dans 
des situations vécues témoignant d’une pluralité de pratique aux niveaux de la manière 
de faire individuelle (habit adopté)et la manière de vivre (comportements) en société . 
On entend par voilement dit « islamique » les différentes manières de pratiquer le 
voilement au nom de l’islam . La problématique du voile est traitée d’un point de vue 
de la pratique sociale au quotidien, indépendamment des dimensions théologique et 
politique . Je questionne le voile en tant que norme régie par des conduites, des croyan-
ces, des idées qui reflètent les attitudes des individus avec leur entourage social le plus 
proche, avec la communauté musulmane réelle ou imaginée . La conversion au voile 
dit « islamique » englobe toute pratique vestimentaire guidée par une intention reli-
gieuse de couvrir le corps féminin . La norme du port du voile n’est pas rigide et laisse 
une marge de liberté aux femmes qui l’adoptent à partir de leur histoire personnelle, 
de leur entourage social et de divers référents d’appartenance et d’identification (voir 
Matri 2015) . Les convergences et les divergences entre les différents modèles seront 
développées au travers des actions adoptées relatives au sacré et au profane, des percep-
tions de soi et du regard d’autrui .
A l’origine de l’interprétation : de quel aʿwra et fitna parle-t-on ?
F . Mernissi s’arrête sur le verset 53 de la sourate 33 (objet polysémique entre islamolo-
gues ou scientifiques et prédicateurs) pour s’interroger sur la méthode de lecture du 
Coran et de la révélation prophétique, et pour analyser les interprétations du contexte 
sacré par les commentateurs : « le hijab est le dénouement de tout un réseau de conflits 
et de tensions » (Mernissi 1992 : 118) . D’où le conflit entre « la tradition scientifique 
inaugurée par les Fuqahā[qui]nous encourage à pousser l’investigation aussi loin que 
possible » (ibid . : 119), et les interprétations des commentateurs (ceux qui expliquent 
le Coran), qui rejettent toutes formes de contextualisation ainsi que les causes multi-
ples d’une sourate . Pour M . Enejji, « Du temps du Prophète, le verset décrétant l’adop-
tion du voile à l’occasion de son mariage avec son ancienne belle-fille vient tracer les 
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frontières entre deux espaces, celui de la vie courante et celui de l’invisible dont seuls 
les êtres extraordinaires ont les clefs » (Enejji 2018 : 62) . Dans d’autres interprétations, 
« le concept de hijab est tridimensionnel, et les trois dimensions se recoupent très 
souvent .» (Mernissi 1992 : 119) . Elles sont d’ordre visuel, spatial et éthique (ibid . : 
119–120) .
L’exégèse relative à l’imposition du voile aux femmes musulmanes se fonde sur les 
versets 31 de la sourate 24, verset 59 de la sourate 33 . C’est ainsi que les théologiens 
musulmans (imams, prédicateurs) ont développé à partir de ces versets une perception 
du corps de la femme fondée sur les notions de aʿwra et fitna . Je rappellerai ici deux dé-
finitions simples de ces notions . Présente dans le Coran (XXIV, 31), la notion d’ aʿwra 
relève selon E . Chaumont (2006) de « la question des statuts du regard » : « La aʿwra 
d’une personne désigne de manière générale les parties de son corps qu’elle ne peut 
dévoiler, qu’elle ne peut laisser apparaître et qu’autrui ne peut regarder » . Figurant 
fréquemment dans le Coran au sens d’« épreuve, tentation », la notion de fitna si-
gnifie plus généralement discorde, désordre (voir J . et D . Sourdel 2004) . Ces notions 
constituent la pierre angulaire autour desquelles se fonde l’image de la femme musul-
mane dans l’imaginaire collectif, selon les contextes socio-culturels à travers le temps 
jusqu’aux prédicateurs récents (21e siècle) qui ont renforcé cette rhétorique (voir Göle 
2007) .
Longtemps cantonnées à l’espace privé à cause de l’oppression politique, les ex-
pressions religieuses des jeunes et des moins jeunes émergent et commencent à s’af-
ficher progressivement, témoignant d’une nouvelle forme de socialisation religieuse 
qui s’inscrit dans un islam globalisé . En Tunisie, en début de la première décennie du 
21esiècle (les premières femmes voilées sont apparues à partir de 2001/2002) et à l’ère 
d’internet, la pratique du voile se dissémine et s’installe en tant que norme (voir Matri 
2015) . Sur la scène politique et au bout d’une décennie (entre 2001/2011), la pratique 
du voile dit religieux passe d’une dépréciation avant la révolution, à une survalorisa-
tion depuis la montée au pouvoir du parti politique islamiste Ennahdha, en 2011 .
Dans sa perception générique, le voile symbolise la piété et témoigne de la foi . 
Toutes les femmes interviewées affirment que, relevant de l’ensemble des « droits » 
(haqq) et « devoirs » (wâjib), le voile est un devoir religieux (fardh) . Elles le présen-
tent comme une reconnaissance de la suprématie d’Allah . Certaines citent le verset 
coranique considéré comme imposant le voilement des femmes, tandis que d’autres se 
contentent de dire qu’il s’agit d’une obligation prescrite par l’islam sans arriver à dire 
les sourates relatives à son imposition . Le terme « voile » symbolise le respect féminin 
du religieux . Le porter ressemble à une concrétisation de la foi et une obéissance à la 
divinité . L’évidence de son caractère incontestablement obligatoire et religieux revient 
dans le récit des femmes avec une tonalité variée et un discours nuancé . Cette percep-
tion se fonde sur trois constituants du noyau central du voilement féminin . Le premier 
correspond à l’identification du voile comme un pilier de l’islam : « le hijab a la même 
valeur que la prière » . Le deuxième est une manifestation de la glorification distinctive 
des musulmanes : « Dieu tout-puissant a honoré (akrama) la femme musulmane par 
son voile » . Le troisième renvoie à l’adoration divine : « on porte le voile pour satisfaire 
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Dieu (ʿalâ khâtîr rabbî) » . La représentation du voile dit islamique reproduit la tridi-
mensionnalité de cet objet en termes de fondement culturel, identitaire et sacrificiel 
propre aux femmes musulmanes . Porter le voile pour gagner la vie éternelle ou avoir 
une place au paradis ; tels sont les objectifs poursuivis par les femmes interviewées . 
L’observation des obligations prescrites dans les versets coraniques est une manière 
de garantir la paix dans les « deux vies », « ici-bas et dans l’au-delà » (fî al-dunyâ wa 
fî al-âkhira) . Cependant la conversion au voile n’est pas à la portée de toutes les fem-
mes ; d’après certains récits, seules les vraies croyantes ont l’honneur de pouvoir le faire . 
Quelques femmes expriment leur fierté d’être choisies par Dieu parmi d’autres . Dans 
ce sens, le voile en tant que vêtement est perçu comme une spiritualité et un sacrifice 
qui distingue les femmes converties de celles qui ne le sont pas . La croyance en la parole 
de Dieu est strictement liée au sens de la gratification (thawâb) et du châtiment (ʿiqâb) . 
Cependant, la peur de la pénitence vient après le désir de satisfaire Dieu et de mériter 
sa récompense . Les significations centrales du voile relèvent de la chasteté et de la vertu 
de la femme convertie . Ainsi, l’adoption du voile est un travail sur soi par lequel la 
femme espère atteindre un état supérieur . Idéalement, parce qu’il constitue un acte 
volontaire et un motif de fierté, la conversion au port du voile amène sur la voie du 
salut . Sa dimension spirituelle est traduite comme un lien entre le fidèle et la divinité, 
ce qui explique le sentiment d’apaisement intérieur et la réconciliation du fidèle avec 
sa foi . Le voile est aussi perçu comme une passerelle qui restaure le lien d’une société 
à sa religion, après une période de rupture imposée par le politique . Les significations 
rattachées au hijab comme signe de culte intrinsèquement lié aux femmes musulma-
nes sont fondées sur les mouvances islamiques wahabites et salafistes diffusées comme 
évidence historique, liturgiques et identitaires . Ainsi, la construction des croyances 
autour du voile renvoie à ce que les femmes intériorisent du discours des prédicateurs 
médiatisés ou par ce qui est transmis dans les échanges intergroupe . Ces voies de so-
cialisation contournent les structures sociales traditionnelles (famille, institutions re-
ligieuses nationales) pour défier la politique hostile avant le renversement du régime 
dictatorial en Tunisie .
Néanmoins, le sentiment de devoir religieux d’une part diffère d’une femme à 
l’autre, et d’autre part se présente sous des symboliques variées . En outre, la dimen-
sion profane et le vécu révèlent l’importance d’une pratique liée aux normes sociales 
et culturelles, mais aussi l’importance des perceptions et des conduites correspon-
dant à une vision individualisée du culte . Les motifs subjectifs, sociaux et sociétaux 
constituent la couche latente de l’implication dans les pratiques religieuses : déception 
amoureuse, deuil, pression sociale plus ou moins forte, bien des motivations peuvent 
conduire les femmes à se convertir au port du voile . La « zone muette du voile », pour 
reprendre les termes de D . Jodelet (2003), témoigne de sa dimension profane, utile et, 
parfois, libératrice . Au-delà de sa dimension religieuse, le voile est une matrice d’ordre 
moral qui réorganise les codes normatifs entre les sexes dans la vie quotidienne . Il est 
signe de respect de l’ordre social sexué et des codes de conduite des femmes censées 
passer inaperçues dans la sphère publique . Particulièrement après la révolution tuni-
sienne, les prédicateurs locaux, dont la liberté de la parole est garantie dans les lieux 
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publics et sur les canaux médiatiques, prennent leur revanche et présentent un dis-
cours moralisateur sur la conduite des femmes . S’alignant sur le discours de leur pairs 
à l’étranger, ils mettent en avant le modèle de la femme musulmane voilée parfaite . Le 
voilement du corps de la femme se transforme en un retour à la religion, incitant les 
hommes à préserver leur honneur et à soumettre les filles à cette pratique dès le plus 
jeune âge .
Au quotidien, porter le voile permet aux femmes d’éviter l’embarras dans les trans-
ports en commun ou dans la rue à des heures tardives, mais c’est aussi pour « faire 
comme les autres » : le sens de l’imitation prend plus d’essor . Le voile est alors perçu 
comme régulateur de tensions, un compromis visant à réactiver la normalité des rap-
ports sociaux sexués . Il propose de traduire la conformité féminine à l’ordre social, 
traçant les seuils entre le féminin et le masculin et redéfinissant les codes de commu-
nication par la religion . Néanmoins, la conduite de la majorité des femmes voilées est 
souvent en contradiction aux dictats religieux selon le discours moralisateur . Elles sont 
souvent jugées plus sévèrement puisqu’elles arborent un signe ostentatoire de piété .
L’exigence de maintenir une image positive des muhajabet/des femmes voilées in-
cite les un-e-s et les autres à limiter les choix individuels, en comparant leur conduite 
à celles qui ne sont pas converties . En effet, leur rejet d’une attitude laxiste révèle leur 
souci d’un contrôle social plus strict pour elles-mêmes qui, du même coup, les surex-
posent aux critiques . Pour certaines femmes voilées, l’autocontrôle en public est un 
réflexe permanent servant à promouvoir l’exemple de la femme pieuse . Ainsi, les « pro-
moteur-trices de la morale » se considèrent comme les gardien-nes de la norme reli-
gieuse et infligent aux autres leurs propres conceptions (sur le vêtement, la conduite) 
même en public . Ces personnes sont motivées par une volonté de purification du mo-
dèle de la femme voilée . Certaines décident alors soit d’y recourir soit de l’abandonner 
provisoirement au gré des circonstances .
La femme voilée est représentée comme responsable de l’ordre social et de l’ordre 
moral de la société . En lui accordant un rôle prédéterminé dans les interactions socia-
les entre les sexes même dans les situations les plus banales et quotidiennes, la femme 
voilée est censée orienter et canaliser le regard porté sur elle, les réactions des autres et 
la maîtrise de soi . L’intériorisation de cette image exemplaire se traduit dans des expres-
sions comme « la dignité de la femme », « la chasteté », « la vertu », « le respect de 
soi », « le respect du foulard qu’elle porte », « la prise en considération de l’habit », 
« la peur de Dieu », « elle doit honorer ce qu’elle met sur sa tête», « elle doit donner 
l’exemple », « quelle est la différence entre celle qui porte le voile et la non-voilée ?», 
« qu’elle l’enlève si elle n’est pas capable de l’assumer !», «les voilées ne sont pas toutes 
voilées », et plus encore . Le voile comme expression corporelle est une glorification qui 
doit être méritée . C’est ainsi que les premières années de l’installation de cette norme, 
en Tunisie, furent marquées par l’exigence du respect des codes moraux et des rituels 
religieux . Néanmoins, celles qui regrettent leur engagement, continuent à le porter par 
courtoisie ou pour éviter les critiques de leur entourage .
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La finalité de la notion de fitna
La notion de fitna est liée à l’ordre social . Éviter la fitna signifie maintenir l’ordre so-
cial entre les hommes et les femmes dans l’espace public . Par ordre, on entend aussi la 
gestion de la sexualité « licite » et « illicite » mentionnée dans le Coran pour tout/
toute croyant-e . Cette conception religieuse est réduite dans l’imaginaire collectif des 
Tunisiens et des musulmans à la prohibition de la sexualité féminine en dehors du 
cadre marital en générale et le tabou de la virginité en particulier (Matri 2013) . Le 
voile est appelé, dans ce cas de figure, à « consolider » la conduite morale des femmes 
et à les prémunir contre toute tentative de transgression des normes liées à la sexualité . 
Pour certaines, le port du voile permet aux femmes converties de mieux contrôler les 
relations conjugales et extraconjugales . Sa sacralité contribue à suivre la bonne ligne 
de conduite pour les fidèles tentées par la séduction des hommes et ainsi appelées à la 
fitna . « Le Hijab, c’est entre autres le rideau derrière lequel se tenaient les khalifes et les 
rois pour se soustraire aux regards de leurs familiers, (selon l’encyclopédie de l’Islam) », 
(Mernissi 1992 : 120) . Contrairement au sens accordé pour les soufis, « on accède aux 
horizons sans fin des aspirations spirituelles auxquelles le musulman doit prétendre, 
où le Hijab est un phénomène essentiellement négatif, une perturbation, une incapa-
cité » (Mernissi 1992 : 121) .
De nos jours, la finalité du voile est donc de créer une sorte d’auto-gouvernance du 
corps permettant de se protéger d’une sexualité considérée illicite en dehors du cadre 
de mariage . Le voile facilite le respect de la prohibition sexuelle en agissant comme 
garde-fou contre les tentations et les pulsions masculines . La conformité aux normes 
sexuelles incomberait ainsi à la femme, estimée responsable de sa propre sexualité et de 
celle de l’homme, dont elle doit maitriser le désir en maintenant une attitude pudique 
en public . Une femme mariée, portant le niqab (avant la révolution tunisienne) expli-
que : « [la femme musulmane] doit penser à la vie de tous les jours […] . Elle peut être 
la responsable du péché d’un homme qui peut la rencontrer par hasard […] . Il peut 
l’admirer […] . Et ce pauvre homme va la regarder, non ? Et si cet homme n’a pas les 
moyens pour se marier ? […] Cela veut dire qu’elle commet un double péché : d’une 
part, parce qu’elle est dénudée ( aʿriâna) et, d’autre part, parce qu’elle est la cause d’un 
péché commis par un musulman ! »Pour d’autres, porter le voile adoucit les angois-
ses des familles relatives à la sexualité préconjugale de leurs filles . Les femmes mariées 
trouvent dans le voile un tranquillisant face à la jalousie de leur époux, même pour un 
époux opposé à son port . De plus en plus présent dans l’espace public, le voile permet 
d’échapper au contrôle familial en apaisant les hommes chargés de surveiller la mobilité 
des femmes sous leur tutelle . Le voile remplace l’autorité masculine directe en accor-
dant aux femmes une visibilité conditionnée .
Les variations structurelles marquées par le recul de l’âge du premier mariage, l’aug-
mentation du taux de chômage, le coût élevé du mariage ; les difficultés économiques 
des ménages à subvenir aux besoins essentiels autrefois assurés par le chef de famille, 
d’une part, et la scolarisation massive et l’accès des femmes au travail salarial, d’autre 
part expliquent pourquoi les femmes sont amenées à préserver leur corps . Les nou-
Voiles, statuts du regard et évolutions des modalités de religiosité  115
veaux rôles et statuts des femmes, fruit d’un processus de modernisation de la société 
par l’éducation, le travail et l’urbanisation, et qui se traduisent entre autres par une mo-
bilité et une visibilité accrue des femmes dans l’espace public, perturbent les mentalités 
conservatrices . La féminisation croissante des métiers et l’augmentation du taux de 
femmes diplômées mettent en péril le pouvoir masculin . En effet, le voile n’est qu’un 
élément du code de conduite féminin . Il est une forme de résistance de la hiérarchie 
de genre dans l’espace public, relevant des performativités sexuées, dans le sens où l’or-
ganisation sociale communautaire teintée de religiosité cherche à maintenir symbo-
liquement les statuts dits « traditionnels » des hommes et des femmes, sous l’égide 
de la religion et des spécificités culturelles . Néanmoins, cette dimension s’interpose à 
la dynamique sociale marquée par une présence active et concurrentielle des femmes 
dans la vie publique et une égalité judiciaire consolidée par la nouvelle constitution de 
2014 . Ce rappel sert à ralentir les glissements possibles des Tunisiens et des Tunisien-
nes vers des modèles dits occidentaux, ou récupérer les personnes que l’on voit s’aligner 
avec la culture occidentale .
Dans cette logique, la femme se pense comme acteur pernicieux dans le rapport 
sexuel, émotionnel et social . Elle est source de séduction et dispose par là d’un pouvoir 
important incarné par son corps dévoilé/diabolisé . Cette image intériorisée rappelle le 
mythe d’Adam et Eve, d’après lequel la femme a séduit l’homme et l’a poussé au péché 
originel . Elle est associée au diable qui a trompé l’homme en l’incitant à désobéir à 
Dieu, qui se déresponsabilise dans le mythe et dans l’imaginaire collectif . Le mythe de 
l’origine de l’humanité (dans l’anthropogonie biblico-coranique) est ainsi reproduit 
par la diabolisation de la femme en tant que source de séduction et de tentation . D’une 
part, l’homme ne peut pas maîtriser son désir sexuel et est représenté comme victime de 
la provocation/fitna féminine, que ce soit par ses gestes ou par son maintien . D’autre 
part, la femme est considérée comme un vecteur du mal par son corps séducteur . Au 
terme de ce raisonnement, les hommes sont appelés à contrôler les corps des femmes 
pour maintenir l’ordre social et accomplir le devoir religieux, conformément aux dis-
cours des prédicateurs . Ce constat est confirmé par plusieurs sociologues comme Fa-
tima Mernissi et a été éprouvé dans plusieurs recherches récentes, en Tunisie comme 
ailleurs . « C’est […]l’histoire, soit l’action des fondamentalistes de toutes nuances, qui 
l’a emporté en imposant sa vérité officielle au détriment de la « vérité vraie » et a sou-
mis le discours coranique à une lecture simplificatrice dont on connaît les terribles 
conséquences » (Lakhdhar 2007 : 140)
Le corps aʿwra : une notion à relativiser
Selon la religion, le corps est une création divine . Les femmes perçoivent le corps 
comme un instrument à mettre au service de l’adoration de Dieu . Il est signe de Son 
pouvoir, l’illustration d’un miracle où s’incarne Sa puissance et Sa sagesse, et un objet 
fonctionnel pour l’existence humaine . En même temps, il est parfait puisqu’il est à Son 
image . « C’est un chef-d’œuvre de Dieu qui dans Sa générosité et Sa perfection, nous 
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a créés dans la plus belle forme […] . Porter le voile, c’est la moindre des choses pour le 
remercier ! […] C’est une manière de lui manifester notre reconnaissance ! » . La chair 
humaine est une propriété divine que chacun est appelé à préserver du péché et de 
tout ce qui peut la souiller ou la dénaturer . En somme, équivalent physique de l’âme, 
le corps est le premier à témoigner de la personne, le jour du jugement dernier : « Tout 
membre du corps avec lequel on a commis un péché ou un acte illicite (harām) va té-
moigner contre nous le jour du jugement dernier », explique une femme interrogée .
Dans le discours des femmes interrogées se combinent trois niveaux : une vision 
sociale en termes de jugement(le regard de l’entourage proche), une représentation 
personnelle individuelle (des rapports entre le physique et la moral, des mobiles utili-
taires ou pragmatiques) et des motivations spirituelles ou religieuses . Le lien entre le 
corps et sa représentation est inséparable de la conception que l’imaginaire collectif 
entretient au sujet du divin : le corps est « image de Dieu », « un don du ciel », « la 
création de Dieu » . S’ajoutent au corps féminin des normes physiques de beauté, « un 
don précieux » qui engendre des enjeux moraux . L’apparence physique est la base du 
charme de la femme et fait partie de son capital social . Les principaux critères de beauté 
énumérés dans les récits femmes interrogées se centrent sur les traits de la féminité 
(cheveux, seins, fesses, silhouette, etc .), qui sont source de trouble, de tentation, et 
peuvent donc provoquer le désir sexuel . C’est pourquoi cette apparence doit toujours 
faire l’objet d’une surveillance et d’un contrôle social . « Le corps de la femme est un 
danger, un vrai danger surtout pour les hommes, je ne sais pas pourquoi ! [silence] Il 
séduit vraiment ! Le moindre geste, la moindre partie du corps de la femme peut sé-
duire ! » Ce propos constitue le noyau dur de la représentation du corps féminin qui 
symbolise la séduction et le désir sexuel . En effet, les femmes voilées se représentent 
comme supérieures aux femmes non-voilées à travers la neutralisation et la purifica-
tion du corps . La dialectique entre corps et esprit est souvent présente dans le discours 
des femmes interrogées . Celles qui se déclarent engagées religieusement, maintiennent 
une image du corps comme un « présent d’Allah », un « don » à préserver contre tout 
abus et à protéger contre les désirs et l’âme « al-nafs al- aʿmmara bi’l- sû’ » et les tenta-
tions du diable comme chez les « mécréant-e-s » . La préservation de la chair vise une 
spiritualisation et un bien-être personnel en rapport avec le devoir religieux .
Les prédicateurs et les imams, héritiers de fuqahâ et muhadithûn associent le port 
du voile à une déontologie islamique du regard et du vestimentaire . On peut com-
pléter ici la définition de la aʿwra faite par E . Chaumont et précédemment rappelée 
(début de la 1re section) par celle donnée par A . Bouhdiba (1986 : 52) selon laquelle 
la aʿwra « signifie d’abord la perte d’un œil . La qualification aʿwra a fini par signifier la 
parole ou l’acte car, précise le Lisan al-ʿArab, tout se passe comme si la parole ou l’acte 
obscène crevaient l’œil et l’empêchaient de porter le regard très loin et avec vivacité » . 
Inscrivant la position de la personne regardée et de la personne regardante dans une 
conception religieuse du corps, la notion de aʿwra s’interprète en fait de différentes 
manières . Certaines considèrent que le corps entier est aʿwra, d’autres estiment que la 
notion concerne en particulier la chair, les formes, et les cheveux, tandis que d’autres 
limitent la aʿwra à la chevelure et la peau .
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Selon le sociologue D . Le Breton (2004 : 29–30), « le corps est une fausse évidence, 
il n’est pas une donnée sans équivoque, mais l’effet d’une élaboration sociale et cultu-
relle » . Le corps est pris dans un jeu de rôles et constitue un enjeu de l’organisation 
sociale . Ajoutée à sa beauté physique, et amplifiée par ses mouvements et les manières 
de se présenter ou de paraître, l’abstinence sexuelle imposée aux femmes musulmanes 
par la charia et les traditions culturelles ouvre la voie à tous les fantasmes masculins . Le 
corps est le socle central de la construction mentale et culturelle de l’homme et de la 
femme . Les règles sociales se confondent dès lors parfois avec les prescriptions religieu-
ses, mais dans d’autres cas elles sont dissociées et même contradictoires . La concordan-
ce et la discordance entre règles religieuses et pratiques profanes se construisent dans 
une recherche combinant l’estime de soi, les liens d’appartenance, le regard de l’autre, 
la reconnaissance sociale et les normes sociales adoptées en rapport avec les attributs 
sociaux de chaque femme . Le corps voilé reste un corps tiraillé entre volonté indivi-
duelle, conditionnement collectif (des groupes d’appartenance ou d’identification) et 
« volonté divine » incarnée par les valeurs sacrées .
Quand elles se présentent, certaines femmes interrogées avancent l’aspect religieux 
comme composante « figée », exprimé dans une langue chaste et pudique Ainsi, la 
femme doit être discrète, prudente dans ses mouvements, ses actions et son discours . 
D’autres ajoutent à cette image un aspect « dynamique », celui de femmes sociables, 
tolérantes, ouvertes et joyeuses qui, selon elles, ne se privent de rien . L’estime de soi se 
définit en termes d’équilibre et de comparaison sociale (Doran et Parot 1991 : 263) . 
Chez les femmes voilées, l’estime de soi se repère par l’image qu’elles se renvoient et les 
obligations religieuses et sociales auxquelles elles obéissent . Certaines parlent du corps 
comme de quelque chose qui est approprié : « mon corps, c’est moi » . D’autres insis-
tent sur l’importance du regard social porté sur leur corps et leur statut . Par ailleurs, la 
dimension religieuse n’est pas envisagée comme un obstacle à une perception indivi-
dualisée de son corps ou de l’autonomie sociale dans les activités ordinaires . La repré-
sentation subjective du corps est partagée entre une partie rationnelle dans ses activités 
ordinaires et une partie métaphysique où le sujet fait face à des questionnements exis-
tentiels au regard de ses croyances . D’autres vont plus loin en traitant le corps comme 
un objet dont chaque partie non recouverte (les bras et les jambes, les cheveux dévoilés, 
le cou et autre) alourdira la peine de la femme le jour du jugement dernier .
Le port du voile sert à renforcer l’estime de soi, mais peut aussi engendrer un mal-
être provoqué par l’écart qui existe entre l’image de soi et les obligations sociales et 
religieuses . Certes, l’engagement dans cette pratique change la perception de soi ou 
du moins la modifie, selon l’histoire individuelle de chaque femme et la quête de sens 
permanente, surtout chez les plus jeunes . Pour les femmes qui renoncent à leur an-
cienne façon d’être, décider de porter le voile constitue un moment de bien-être et un 
soulagement . Dans une société qui accepte le voile, la femme voilée se sent bien dans 
sa peau, valorisée, respectée, proche de la femme idéale . D’autres éprouvent plus de 
difficulté à s’habituer au voile et à admettre leur nouvelle image . Précédée par la rituali-
sation des journées par les prières, la période préparatrice se prolonge selon les histoires 
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individuelles . Le regard d’autrui (surtout celui des proches) est pris en compte dans 
l’acceptation ou le refus de la nouvelle image .
Le voile comme tenue « pratique » ?
En tant que tenue, le voile est une invention individuelle qui s’inscrit dans la mode 
contemporaine . L’esthétique du voile dit islamique s’oppose aux habits portés tradi-
tionnellement dans les différentes régions du monde et standardise la fonction sociale 
des autres types de vêtement . Le voile dit islamique s’inscrit dans la modernité et té-
moigne des identités religieuses variées et des formes de religiosité contrastées . Le port 
d’un voile est loin d’être univoque ; les critères de choix du voile traduisent le statut 
social assumé, les expressions et les expériences corporelles ainsi que l’image recher-
chée . Pour certaines femmes, le voile dit islamique est éminemment déterminé par la 
longueur, la forme, la couleur ou encore la qualité de tissu . En règle générale, le voile 
ne doit pas être transparent ni dévoiler les formes du corps . Une jeune étudiante le 
décrit comme suit : « Le hijab chârʿi est tout habit qui ne montre pas les formes et qui 
ne dévoile rien du corps […], absolument rien […] . Ni les formes ni la peau (lâ yaçifu 
wa lâ yachuffu) ; sinon, on ne peut pas dire que c’est un voile » . Celles qui appliquent 
à la lettre les exégètes considèrent que la tenue ne relève pas du libre choix, des envies 
ou du statut social, mais plutôt d’une obéissance à un devoir fondamental de l’islam . 
L’habit doit être esthétiquement neutre, et dénué de tout accessoire, parfum ou or-
nement . Ce voile uniforme est un costume liturgique comprenant le voilement du 
corps et de la tête . Il couvre tout le corps et ne laisse paraître qu’une partie du visage 
(entre les yeux et la bouche) et les mains . Les femmes qui se disent ressembler aux ni-
sâa es-sahaba (les femmes des compagnons du prophète), couvrent leur visage et leurs 
mains aussi . Ce qui signifie aussi se dérober à tout regard et neutraliser voire effacer au 
maximum la présence féminine dans une époque dite de désordre ( aʿsr el-fitna) . Selon 
les femmes qui l’adoptent, ce genre de voile répond à un ordre moral de lutte contre le 
désenchantement du monde . D’ailleurs, dans la tradition des sociétés maghrébines, les 
femmes ne s’embellissent qu’après leur mariage et uniquement pour leur époux . Ainsi, 
« la parure n’est pas un innocent embellissement, mais de véritables charmes d’amour, 
chargés d’un sens érotique » (Naamane-Guessous 1991 : 212–213) .
En outre, si leur accès à l’espace public est inévitable, les femmes doivent éviter 
d’attirer l’attention des hommes en provoquant leur sens que ce soit par l’odeur du 
parfum, le son provoqué par des chaussures ou des bijoux, ou des ornements de l’habit 
ou tout autre accessoire . Il faut aussi porter des gants pour éviter de saluer et esquiver 
tout contact physique . Les adeptes de ce type de tenues en Tunisie sont souvent des 
jeunes femmes qui l’ont adopté après la révolution et qui ont des convictions fonda-
mentalistes . Bien qu’elles représentent une minorité, leur forte visibilité est liée à des 
événements socio-politiques particuliers . Leurs habits affichent une attitude particu-
lière face à l’islam et un rejet du mode de vie sociétal en général . Ces femmes, qui re-
présentent une minorité, placent au quotidien des barrières avec le monde social et les 
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règles de communication des sociétés contemporaines, concrétisant ainsi l’idéologie 
fondamentaliste qui interdit la mixité et qui cherche à éviter la promiscuité des corps 
dans les lieux publics . « Personne n’ose te serrer la main ou t’aborder d’une manière 
non respectueuse, si tu portes un libâs charʿi », raconte une jeune étudiante . Le hijab 
charʿi est un symbole de vertu et un signe de moralité publique, s’agissant particuliè-
rement des hommes muhrim . Dans les interactions les plus ordinaires, il impose des 
barrières entre les sexes et instaure un rapport d’évitement du face à face, pour repren-
dre E . Goffman . Pour les femmes qui ont choisi de poursuivre leurs études, leur habit 
les protège de tout contact indésirable ou illicite, selon les adeptes de cette idéologie . 
Cellier (2008 : 111) a ainsi écrit : « Les représentations du corps standardisé, observées 
sur la grande scène du sport international ou, au contraire, dissimulées comme dans 
les pratiques confidentielles des arts martiaux et certaines coutumes confessionnelles, 
n’ont d’autre signification que d’assurer une protection contre l’angoisse » . Une dou-
ble séparation s’effectue lors des rencontres/miâd ludiques ou religieuses par la sépa-
ration entre les sexes dans n’importe quel espace réel ou virtuel . Une mère de 29 ans 
raconte ainsi que s’agissant de leçons (dourous) de religion suivies sur un forum des-
tiné aux femmes, elle vérifie d’abord le sexe du conférencier avant de se lancer dans la 
conversation . Elle s’abstenait de parler lorsque le cheikh était présent sur la plate-forme 
et préférait lui écrire pour des questions relatives à la chari aʿ . Pour les femmes qui assis-
tent aux cours à la mosquée ou dans les écoles coraniques pour femmes, la séparation 
avec les hommes est garantie par le cloisonnement de l’espace et l’interdiction d’accès 
à l’espace masculin .
Un autre modèle d’habillement plus commun est apparu sur la scène vestimentaire 
et dans l’espace public . Il s’agit d’une tenue intermédiaire entre pudeur et religiosité . 
Plus répandu dans les régions du Sud du pays, ce voile s’inspire de la morale tradition-
nelle relative aux tenues vestimentaires féminines et s’adapte à une piété semblable . 
Le changement de la façon de s’habiller n’est pas indissociable de celui qui s’opère au 
niveau des comportements et de la perception que les femmes ont d’elles-mêmes et 
du monde dans lequel elles vivent . Il s’agit de tenues mettant en valeur la féminité : les 
tailleurs en jupes et vestes, les robes longues assorties au foulard porté, etc . L’harmoni-
sation entre les couleurs portées et les accessoires n’est pas moins importante . Cepen-
dant ce type d’habit n’adopte pas les couleurs éclatantes et attirantes pour des raisons 
esthétiques liées au prestige, au statut ou à la classe sociale . Il s’adapte également aux 
occasions dans lesquelles il est porté . Pour les femmes qui optent pour cette tenue, 
l’usage du jilbâb est courant dans quelques cérémonies ou sorties, mais différent de 
celui du voile dit char’i : il est plus étroit, orné de motifs, de couleurs contrastées et 
de broderies, selon l’offre du marché et la mode . En même temps, le foulard qui l’ac-
compagne peut se porter en couvre-chef, avec des motifs contrastés . Habituellement, 
ce type de vêtement n’exclut pas un ornement discret combinant ainsi prescriptions 
religieuses et traditions sociales et culturelles .
Le troisième modèle de tenue s’inscrit dans l’innovation . C’est ainsi que les tenues 
bricolées renforcent la mise en scène du corps et l’importance accordée à la beauté et à 
l’apparence . Ces voiles individualisés, métissant le sacré et le profane, jouent entre dis-
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simulation de la chair et de la chevelure et mise en valeur des formes et de la silhouette . 
Différents du voile dit islamique des années 1990, ils révèlent une certaine appropria-
tion du corps et proposent une religiosité alternative distante . En ce sens, l’esthétique 
du vêtement adopté concerne les formes, les couleurs, l’ornement et le style . C’est un 
voile en couleur et en harmonie avec les vêtements et les accessoires portés . Il peut être 
remplacé par un bonnet ou bien par un chapeau de toute sorte, à condition qu’il cou-
vre la chevelure . Cependant, la jeune femme peut tolérer le dévoilement de quelques 
mèches « rebelles » . Les oreilles peuvent être mises en valeur avec des boucles de toutes 
sortes . L’habit de la jeune femme voilée n’est pas défini . Il n’a pas de spécificité . Il peut 
changer avec le temps et selon les personnes et les circonstances ; il dépend de la mode 
vestimentaire en vogue comme le jean, les pulls ajustés, les vêtements serrés, les mini-
jupes portées au-dessus du pantalon .
Dans l’espace public, la variété de couleurs et de forme, les accessoires et l’ornement 
témoignent d’une attention particulière au paraître . Le voile/couvre-chef est étroite-
ment lié à la tenue portée . Dans ce cas, le voile supposé neutraliser la visibilité de la 
personne et la dérober au regard n’assure pas sa fonction, c’est l’inverse qui se produit . 
L’importance accordée à la chevelure, comme signe de féminité, est remplacé par l’in-
géniosité à nouer le foulard . Les jeunes femmes voilées tiennent compte de l’attention 
réservée à leur présentation de soi par le biais de la beauté du visage . Le choix des cou-
leurs est attentif et se fait en rapport avec la couleur de la peau . « Je ne porte pas de 
couleurs […] . Je n’aime pas les couleurs foncées, ça ne me va pas du tout », disait une 
jeune fille voilée qui considère que les couleurs foncées sont tristes . En outre, les cou-
leurs comme le noir et le marron sont considérées comme des couleurs de vieilles fem-
mes, comme le précise une jeune femme voilée de 20 ans : « Alors là ! Pas de couleurs 
foncées […], ça fait moche ! Comme les vieilles » . Le jilbâb ou la jibba (robe ample qui 
couvre le corps jusqu’aux pieds) ne répond plus aux exigences de la circulation quo-
tidienne et à la mutation de l’image des femmes voilées, en particulier les plus jeunes 
d’entre elles . Il n’est plus commode pour les femmes actives qui travaillent dans les bu-
reaux, les étudiantes et les ouvrières qui se déplacent partout et utilisent les transports 
en commun .
L’invention du costume n’est pas le fait d’une évolution propre à la dynamique 
de la société tunisienne comme en Europe . Apparue comme mode dans l’Europe de 
l’entre-deux-guerres, la mise en avant de la ligne de silhouette des femmes est due au 
changement des normes de beauté féminine dont a résulté une « réforme du vête-
ment féminin » . Cette réforme relevait d’un changement de statut de la femme, qui 
émergeait alors dans l’espace public comme acteur social . Or, en Tunisie, l’histoire du 
nouveau voile et l’invention du costume discret et moderne sont liées à des femmes 
déjà familiarisées avec l’espace public, au même moment où émergeait une réforme de 
la norme religieuse tant sur la scène nationale qu’au niveau international .
Les habitudes vestimentaires adoptées par ces jeunes femmes voilées mettent en 
correspondances les choix personnels et la consommation de masse . Une majorité des 
femmes qui ont toujours porté des pantalons et des jeans continuent de le faire . La plu-
part d’entre elles sont des étudiantes, des fonctionnaires ou bien appartiennent à des 
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professions libérales . Ce sont des femmes actives qui se déplacent et communiquent 
tous les jours dans l’espace public . Désormais, ces nouvelles femmes voilées propagent 
une nouvelle image de la femme voilée qui quitte l’enfermement de l’espace privé et 
exerce une activité dans la sphère publique . Une femme interrogée qui a porté le voile 
avant la révolution raconte : « Je n’ai pas changé mon style jusqu’à présent ! Je porte un 
jeans, avec un vêtement long en haut, je me trouve plus à l’aise » . La manière dont le 
voile est noué et les accessoires qui l’accompagnent montrent la créativité de la person-
ne qui porte « le voile comme si [c’était] une broche » . L’attention portée au design du 
voile renvoie à l’estime de soi de la personne . Elle exprime la manière dont la personne 
cherche à se présenter . Ce couvre-chef représente l’image de la jeune femme voilée qui 
transmet et communique sa modernisation . L’image de la femme voilée n’est pas figée ; 
celle-ci cherche à exprimer une beauté active qui témoigne de son statut de femme 
moderne . Une femme interrogée précise : « Je change de foulard ! Parfois je mets mon 
foulard à la manière traditionnelle et la plupart du temps, je l’attache à l’arrière ! En 
hiver, je mets un bonnet et un cache-col […] Je n’aime pas la routine […] Je change 
toujours de look ! »
En outre, la mode importée du Moyen-Orient et des pays du Golfe offre des ten-
dances variées selon les goûts et les choix, notamment au début de l’adoption de cette 
pratique . Indépendamment du style d’habit (traditionnel relooké pour les fêtes ou 
moderne au quotidien), les professionnels locaux et internationaux proposent aux 
femmes une variété de choix, de motifs, de couleurs et de coupes, répondant à tous les 
goûts, et présentent chaque année, voire chaque saison, de nouveaux articles . Le style 
de foulard répond aussi à un « islam de marché » (voir Haenni 2005) et à la fétichi-
sation de la religion . La diffusion des modèles vestimentaires s’effectue par plusieurs 
moyens pour mettre sur le marché des créations dernier cri et de nouveaux looks afin 
d’attirer les consommatrices et répondre aux demandes . La commercialisation sur les 
sites internet (les réseaux sociaux comme Facebook, mais aussi les magazines en ligne, 
etc .), concurrence la commercialisation classique (magasins, boutiques et marchés 
spécialisés dans la vente de marchandises importées, etc .) pour offrir un vaste choix 
aux femmes converties comme pour celles susceptibles de se lancer dans cette pratique . 
En effet, les tenues de plages, de soirées, de cérémonies ou encore de sport sont de plus 
en plus disponibles sur le marché, y compris les robes de mariée ou les costumes tradi-
tionnels revisités . S’ajoutent à cela les centres de soin et de coiffure qui s’ouvrent à une 
clientèle juvénile soucieuse de son apparence . La pudeur qu’implique le port du voile 
n’efface pas l’importance de l’apparence affichée en public . La mode révèle la capacité 
du voile islamique à se réinventer selon le contexte et les circonstances .
En effet, la commercialisation du vêtement dit religieux est en rapport avec les cir-
constances socio-politiques liées à la période de son interdiction . Au début des an-
nées 2000, les premières femmes à porter le voile font face à une double contrainte : 
la première est en rapport avec son interdiction et au difficile accès à la vie active ; la 
deuxième est liée à l’indisponibilité sur le marché d’habits religieux . Ceci a retardé la 
conversion de plusieurs femmes à cause du manque de choix vestimentaire correspon-
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dant à leur statut . Autrement dit, la conversion au voile est un projet qui répond à une 
planification et dans lequel les femmes s’investissent avant de s’engager .
Après 2006, le commerce des tenues mouhajabât est devenu rentable, vendues au 
début dans les petites boutiques spécialisées et chez quelques artisanes, envahissant les 
grands magasins de vêtements, le marché populaire et les boutiques haut de gamme . 
En particulier pour le voile charʿi ou niqab, le recours à la couture non industrielle était 
la seule possibilité de se vêtir d’une manière dite conforme à l’islam avant le 14 janvier 
2011 . Ce costume liturgique s’est depuis largement commercialisé, désormais vendu 
même devant certaines mosquées et à bas prix . C’est ainsi que le marché tunisien s’ali-
gne sur les demandes et concourt à un marketing religieux global développé .
La Tunisie n’a pas tardé à se connecter au marché international de marchandisation 
dite islamique . Le port du voile dit religieux s’inscrit, simultanément, dans le contexte 
de la globalisation et de la réislamisation . En effet, « le foulard oblige à de nouveaux 
compromis entre revendications identitaires et dynamiques d’extraversion culturelle » 
(Haenni 2005 : p .28–29) . Les différents modèles de voile adoptés s’inspirent des ha-
bitudes vestimentaires des autres sociétés dépassant donc la spécificité d’une commu-
nauté musulmane dans les différentes aires géographiques . Les nouveaux voiles,
dénotant un bricolage juvénile continu, ne sont pas spécifiques à un espace pu-
blic national particulier, mais agissent dans un contexte d’acculturation et de 
mondialisation, affectant, selon des rythmes différenciés, toutes les sociétés mu-
sulmanes ainsi que les pays occidentaux où vitune communauté musulmane 
immigrée (Kerrou 2005 : 40) .
Les mutations de la norme du port du voile :  
le religieux face au social
Indépendamment du style d’habit adopté, la manière de s’afficher dans les lieux publics 
constitue une définition de soi . Le souci de projeter une image fidèle à leur personne 
et à leurs opinions est un souci commun à la quasi-totalité des femmes interrogées . 
Les femmes qui jouissent d’une position sociale importante sont particulièrement mé-
ticuleuses par rapport à tout ce qui concerne leur allure . Pour une femme pieuse, la 
manière de s’habiller ne prend pas uniquement en compte la pudeur mais répond à 
d’autres motivations et d’autres impératifs . En effet, la piété est associée à la beauté, 
au goût de l’esthétisme et à la mise en valeur de la jeunesse . Cette contradiction est à 
l’origine de nouvelles définitions du statut de la femme convertie au port du voile, et 
de nouvelles perceptions du voile dit religieux . Les nouveaux voiles, riches en signifi-
cations, servent à se distinguer, à se démarquer de l’environnement communautaire et 
du discours religieux .
Le voile personnalisé se distingue du hijab et de ce qu’on appelle le « foulard des 
grand-mères » . Les jeunes filles défendent leur manière de se voiler en disant : « Je ne 
suis pas une mamie […] Je mets le voile et, en même temps, je prends soin de moi et de 
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mon élégance […] Je reste toujours coquette ! » . Les femmes interrogées mettent l’ac-
cent sur leur statut de femmes modernes en rejetant l’image stéréotypée infériorisant la 
femme voilée, comme femme au foyer, ignorante et arriérée . Les tendances actuelles en 
matière de voile reflètent les nuances de religiosité, le changement social qui traverse la 
société et la hiérarchisation des identités intersubjectives (de statut social, de religion, 
de féminité, de génération, de communauté, etc .) . Les nouvelles tendances révèlent 
les écarts et les conflits intergénérationnels, le rapport au religieux, la diversité du sens 
de l’islam contemporain et les rapports de genres . Le port du voile est une expérience, 
un processus de quête de sens où se cristallise l’approfondissement de soi à travers les 
tentations multiples et des tentatives de réalisation d’une individualité désirée . Ce tra-
vail sur soi combine le souci permanent de reconnaissance sociale et d’appartenance 
personnelle .
Les normes relationnelles des genres dans l’espace public définissent aussi le sens ac-
cordé au voile . Le comportement des femmes voilées dans l’espace public a transformé 
la signification du voile . Sa pratique au quotidien banalise sa dimension confessionnel-
le et le place dans le champ de l’ordinaire et du normal . Par ailleurs, l’accès des femmes 
aux différents lieux publics modernes et même masculinisés affaiblit la spiritualité du 
vêtement . En plus, la posture décontractée des femmes voilées désacralise la dimension 
symbolique de l’habit . Les visages maquillés et l’élégance affichée, qui échappent aux 
contraintes religieuses et sociales, remettent en question les significations d’antan . Les 
techniques de séduction perturbent encore plus les mentalités conservatrices .
Par ailleurs, le recours à une morale religieuse soucieuse des apparences vestimen-
taires protège à un certain degré ses adeptes contre le harcèlement moral et sexuel . En 
même temps, il facilite la mobilité de certaines femmes jouant sur la symbolique du 
voile . L’usage de ce symbole contribue à établir de nouveaux rapports avec les hom-
mes selon les circonstances : le voile est tantôt porté contre la volonté de l’homme, 
tantôt pour le satisfaire ou pour lui plaire . En effet, certaines jeunes filles enlèvent leur 
foulard en sortant du cadre du foyer familial et le remettent en rentrant . C’est dans les 
milieux conservateurs, en particulier, que les jeunes étudiantes décident par exemple 
de l’abandonner loin du contrôle social communautaire . Dans leurs petites villes, elles 
se trouvent obligées de le remettre pour ne pas susciter la colère et les soupçons de 
leurs proches . Le foulard peut ainsi aussi être utilisé comme ruse pour se libérer de la 
surveillance familiale et communautaire .
En public, le voile peut réprimer les désirs . Car le regard est sexué et relève d’une 
normativité élevée . Le regard de la femme n’est pas le même que celui de l’hom-
me .« L’homme est toujours celui qui regarde la femme », affirme une jeune étudiante . 
Le regard des hommes porté sur les corps des femmes est chargé de désir . Il est plus 
audacieux, moins discret ; le regard se pose longuement sur ce qu’il voit . Par contre, le 
regard de la femme s’oppose à celui de l’homme . Selon les codes normatifs, la présence 
féminine doit répondre aux impératifs sociaux de la discrétion, en ayant un regard 
rapide et mobile . Les femmes voilées considèrent que les regards insistants et concu-
piscents des hommes sont provoqués par les parties exposées du corps de la femme . 
En même temps, elles leur trouvent des justifications . Ceci est illustré par le propos 
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d’une jeune fille qui explique : « Les hommes n’ont pas froid aux yeux ; ils ne peu-
vent pas s’empêcher de vous déshabiller du regard ; c’est malgré eux ! Dieu les a créés 
ainsi ! » . D’autres justifient les agressions morales et sexuelles contre les femmes qui ne 
respectent pas les codes moraux . Ainsi, l’usage du voile sert à atténuer toutes formes de 
violence, surtout dans les villes . La présence des femmes voilées dans les lieux de diver-
tissement occidentalisés, cafés mixtes, espaces culturels, cites balnéaires, bars d’hôtels 
et piscines, accentue la finalité profane du voile (Matri : 2015) . La vie sociale empiétant 
sur la foi, l’univers religieux et le monde ordinaire n’ont pas de frontières étanches . 
C’est à travers la réadaptation des normes religieuses que certaines femmes gagnent 
plus de visibilité et échappent au contrôle social exercé sur leur corps .
D’un habit confessionnel dérobant le corps à un habit exhibant la féminité, la per-
ception du voile comme symbole religieux devient suspecte pour certains Tunisiens 
et Tunisiennes . D’après les témoignages des hommes, les pratiques des femmes par 
rapport au voile ne relèvent plus d’une moralité particulière ni d’un statut distinctif . 
Les histoires racontées et les expériences vécues dans les relations amoureuses, amicales 
et même professionnelles avec les femmes voilées déplacent les croyances et dépouillent 
le vêtement de sa signification confessionnelle . Alors qu’ils le voyaient hier comme 
un retour à la morale de l’islam, les hommes en particulier critiquent aujourd’hui le 
comportement des jeunes femmes voilées : « Elles ressemblent aux non voilées… Je 
ne vois aucune différence » ; « le voile est une fausse vérité » ; « elles cherchent un 
époux, elles cachent leurs cheveux raides » ; « elles font du cinéma pour satisfaire leur 
famille » . Le déplacement du regard sur l’usage du voile s’est construit à la lumière des 
comportements des femmes voilées au fil des années . Les mouhajabât ne se privent 
de rien et utilisent le voile de façon pragmatique et profane, sans égard aux préceptes 
religieux . Avoir des relations sexuelles avec des jeunes femmes voilées ou observer les 
frôlements amoureux des corps dans les lieux publics ne choque plus les hommes . 
Certains voient dans cette attitude une hypocrisie sociale et une fourberie envers la 
divinité . D’autres distinguent les vraies religieuses des fausses : « Comment veux-tu 
que je crois à une voilée qui ne prie pas et qui prononce des injures… Le voile n’est plus 
qu’affaire de mœurs ! » . En somme, la pratique du voile ne relève plus uniquement du 
sacré et du religieux mais plutôt du profane et du social, même selon les partisans de 
cette norme .
Les femmes qui ont adopté le voile par pression sociale ou pour raison psychologi-
que ne gardent pas sur la durée les mêmes convictions et les mêmes pratiques . Le sen-
timent initial qui accompagne la conversion s’estompe au fil du temps en laissant place 
aux gestes ordinaires et répétitifs de la vie de tous les jours . Même le rythme des prati-
ques religieuses décline et s’affaiblit . Dans certains cas, le voile ne représente plus qu’un 
accessoire accompagnant une tenue de ville, dont on ne peut se débarrasser, surtout 
dans les lieux d’interconnaissance . Pour les femmes interrogées se présentant comme 
les plus religieuses, les choses évoluent vers la banalisation . Celles qui utilisent le voile 
comme uniforme religieux et marqueur de séparation entre les hommes et les femmes 
n’arrivent plus à maintenir leurs convictions au quotidien, particulièrement celles qui 
s’accrochent à leur statut social . Une jeune femme médecin dentiste stagiaire à l’hô-
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pital universitaire continue de porter son niqab et de soigner ses patients en même 
temps . Elle s’est convertie au voile intégral en 2012 contre la volonté de ses parents, et 
s’est mariée deux ans plus tard . Malgré son attitude réservée vis-à-vis de son entourage 
professionnel, elle ne renonce ni à son maintien vestimentaire ni à sa position profes-
sionnelle . Du fait de l’émergence d’une radicalité religieuse recrutant des femmes pour 
les instrumentaliser au profit de revendications identitaires et politiques, ce type de 
voilement connaît une mutation considérable . Indépendamment de leur endoctrine-
ment, les adeptes du voile charʿi et du niqab ne renoncent pas à l’accès à l’espace public 
ni au statut social acquis . Les codes vestimentaires ont légèrement changé, en couleur, 
accessoires et broderies . De plus, elles ne se privent ni de divertissement ni de sorties 
dans des lieux publics . Certaines renoncent au voilement du visage pour préserver une 
position sociale et échapper à toute de stigmatisation associant le niqab à l’extrémisme 
religieux, et considèrent ce type de voile comme étranger à l’islam tunisien .
Conclusions
Se (re-)présenter comme une femme voilée implique plusieurs dimensions d’une iden-
tité affichée de manière à la fois consciente et inconsciente . Le port du voile est une ex-
pression corporelle où s’impriment les rapports complexes à soi et à autrui . Il est aussi 
un engagement subjectif et interactif face à une religion considérée comme absolue par 
ses fidèles . En outre, l’obéissance aux croyances perçues comme divines n’exclut pas la 
marge de manœuvre dont disposent les sujets selon les situations auxquelles elles doi-
vent réagir . En effet, les appartenances communautaires, religieuses, culturelles, sexua-
lisées ou sociales renvoient à une perception du voile où interfèrent plusieurs dimen-
sions de la définition de soi . Ces dernières sont ordonnées ou classifiées différemment 
selon la position de l’acteur . En effet, la hiérarchie de sens attribuée à la pratique du 
voilement féminin dévoile son ancrage dans les habitudes culturelles et sociales .
Chez les jeunes, le paraître se construit au quotidien, une expérience qui s’élabore 
au fil du temps en imitant et en innovant selon les dispositifs possibles et où se croisent 
les communications intersubjectives, entre attraction et rejet . Les modèles propagés 
comprennent une concordance entre neutralisation et valorisation, entre intime et 
spectaculaire, en cherchant à établir à la fois un islam intemporel et un corps pieux et 
moderne (Matri 2015) . En outre, le port du voile s’inscrit dans une logique de repré-
sentations et d’usages divers où la définition du modèle corporel est en permanente 
négociation .
L’usage du vêtement « répond à deux motivations essentielles : la parure et la pro-
tection […] . Sa dialectique est d’ailleurs singulière, le vêtement cache en même temps 
qu’il désigne » (Le Breton 1991 : 112) . La parure du voile est liée aux rapports du 
particulier et du général, du personnel et de l’impersonnel, du subjectif et de l’inter-
subjectif . Cette parure moderne se situe dans une vision intermédiaire de l’islam et de 
la femme . Les enjeux entre proximité et altérité sont aussi illustrés dans la manière de 
s’approprier et de négocier les espaces communs entre visibilité et invisibilité, mixité et 
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séparation de sexes . Le voile permet aux femmes qui l’adoptent, à travers les couleurs et 
les formes, de jouer sur les contrastes de la dissimulation et de la révélation, de l’intime 
et du public, de l’individuel et du communautaire .
En tant que norme et pratique, le voile s’inscrit dans une dynamique permanente 
en perpétuel changement . Il est un phénomène aussi complexe que ses usages et ses 
contextes . Il est la fois une remise en cause d’un modèle social considéré comme al-
logène, et une remise en question de la division de l’espace en fonction des sexes . Par 
ailleurs, habiter un corps voilé ne va pas de soi ; cela exige un apprentissage et un long 
processus d’adaptation . Le port du voile est à la fois une soumission aux normes d’un 
ordre social patriarcal qui remonte à la nuit des temps, et une remise en cause de l’ex-
clusion des femmes de l’espace public, qui est considéré comme un domaine réservé 
aux hommes (Matri 2015) . Reprendre le voile ne veut pas dire renoncer au statut so-
cial et aux droits d’ascension sociale acquis par l’éducation ou le travail . Cela exprime 
les difficultés des femmes de se réaliser en tant qu’individu autonome et indépendant . 
L’abandon du voile, c’est à dire tourner le dos à une pratique historique traversant les 
religions monothéistes et les aires géographiques, ne va pas de soi . Le renoncement à la 
pratique est une expérience assez pénible pour les femmes qui l’ont vécue . Car l’indi-
vidu se trouve face au social et au collectif qui sacralise le voile et le corps des femmes . 
La rupture avec le voile, pour quel que motif que ce soit, se fait en plusieurs phases . Le 
port du voile est une expérience corporelle qui peut être durable ou momentanée : on 
peut le considérer comme un signe corporel et identitaire (au niveau de l’engagement) 
comparable au tatouage . Cette expérience peut s’accompagner de sentiments qui os-
cillent entre la gêne, la peur, l’insatisfaction et la frustration, d’un côté, et la fierté, la 
quiétude, la confiance en soi, de l’autre . Il marque l’histoire corporelle, entre l’émo-
tionnel, le social et sociétal . La gestion du corps féminin voilé s’inscrit entre autres 
dans le rapport de pouvoir des genres, où le désir de s’approprier le corps se confronte 
à sa gouvernance communautaire . Le corps de la femme continue à incarner l’objet de 
désir et de culpabilisation féminine, qui traverse les époques et les cultures . C’est ce 
qui explique, entre autres, le rapport de force perpétuel entre les sexes, au niveau des 
rôles et des représentations . Par ailleurs, la gouvernance du corps constitue l’un des 
marqueurs culturels d’opposition dans le cas du voile, entre le monde musulman et 
l’Occident, par rapport au statut des femmes dans la religion, à la performativité des 
genres et à l’espace public .
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“My Religiosity is Not in My Hijab”:  7 
Ethics and Aesthetics among Salafis in Niger
Abdoulaye Sounaye
In the study of contemporary Islam, once we have exhausted the arguments revolving 
around bid aʿ, mawlid, shirk and kufr, the politics as I would put it, what else is left to 
be discussed? What about ethics? Or aesthetics? Most importantly, how are these two 
dimensions bridged and connected? Scholars of Islamic reform in West Africa have 
rarely examined the relationship between these two dimensions of reform religiosities 
– and even when they have, their attempts have remained mostly cursory .
Building on my fieldwork among the Izala1 and the Sunnance2 in Niger, mainly 
in Niamey, I offer in this contribution to examine the connection between ethics and 
aesthetics, focusing on how Muslims navigate the structures of morality and aesthet-
ics that their groups, communities, associations, etc . have set up . As a discourse on 
religiosity and being a good Muslim, Izala, for example, has set up a code of conduct, 
an aesthetic of conduct one might call it, and certain standards that Muslim subjects 
strive to follow in their daily lives and interactions . These standards, norms and codes 
are what I call structures of morality and aesthetics, as they define ways of treating 
one’s body while shaping conduct . While I do not claim that each human action is 
always ‘principled’ in the sense that it is based on clear and conscious rules and norms, 
human behaviour is constantly shaped by both the agency of actors and the structures 
1 Izala is a Salafi-Wahhābi trend that emerged in northern Nigeria in the 1970s and spread to Niger, be-
coming a major player in the 1990s . It was strongly anti-Sufi . It aimed at reforming Islam and correcting 
Muslim practices to be in line with the Qurʾān and the tradition of the Prophet Muḥammad .
2 Sunnance are also Izala, though mostly a second generation .
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within which acts and actions occur . The interaction between these two dimensions 
has been central to my focus as I try to make sense of what many scholars, especially in 
the Francophone literature, have referred to in terms of fait religieux – the religious, as 
I would simplify it here .
Promoting religiosity based on notions of authenticity, appropriateness and good-
ness, Izala and Sunnance call for particular aesthetics that involve the body, dress code, 
choice of colour, etc . in order to achieve fairness, goodness and truthfulness, three val-
ues Salafi Muslims want to prioritize in daily practice and interactions . However, as we 
know, people are not just subjects that accept and adopt the injunctions and models 
they receive . It may happen that they reject whatever is offered to them out of hand . Or, 
even when they take it, they may affect it, tweak it, stylize it . And, while making it their 
own, they may take it into social interactions and modes of identification that could 
both challenge and upset established frames of reference, official norms and expected 
attitudes . Thus, when lived and experienced, the structures prescribed, promoted and 
even imposed have in fact rarely remained untouched and unchallenged . How are in-
dividuals navigating and privatizing those structures? What touches and spins are they 
adding? These are questions that we need to reflect on as we try to make sense of the 
historicity of religiosity and the anthropological factors in religious practice .
Take the case of the hijabi,3 whose appearance in various social contexts has 
prompted a major debate on (im)morality . What is the appropriate form of hijabi? 
How is the personal touch affecting the value of the veil as a marker of religiosity? 
How do individuals combine the quest for beauty with that of being a good Muslim? 
This is a key question, especially when, as one young woman notes, “my religiosity is 
not in my veil”, or when the hijabi is linked to sexuality and used to conceal misdeeds, 
for example . Because veiling could be deceiving, and be strategically used and misin-
terpreted, the colour of the hijabi, as well as its design, its size and the way it is donned, 
all matter . Forming part of a dress code, the hijabi doesn’t stand alone; it has both an 
aesthetic function and ethical significance . In the broad religious context, it is comple-
mented with moral assumptions and principles, and ethical behaviour, which build 
on concepts and perceptions of dignity and goodness (mutunci, in Hausa) . What else 
can one unearth in those and similar sites of encounter between ethics and aesthetics? 
How does the quest for beauty that has taken over the use of the hijabi affect morality 
and ethics? I-hanno, in Zarma, connotes both the morally good and the aesthetically 
beautiful, linking two domains that we tend to keep separate and even exclusive from 
one another .
Emphasizing the personal and interpersonal dimensions, this contribution will 
also use the examples of the beards and shin-length trousers worn by Izala men to 
show that looks and appearances are important forms when it comes to expectations 
and assertions of religiosity, but also when it comes to actual interactions . They are 
sites of ethical expressions and moral agency . Similar to donning the hijabi, wearing 
3 The term hijabi (hausa and zarma, Arabic ḥijāb) here refers to women’s veils and to veiling practices 
introduced at the end of the 1980s by the Islamic reform movement Izala .
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the beard is important for a young man and his customers because his appearance af-
fects his trade and commerce, for example . The aesthetics of wearing a beard could be 
decisive because it could be read as a sign of moral disposition and ethical business . As 
I show below, belonging to the same group or religious community can also influence 
trade . However, trade is also influenced by fairness and concern about riba (excessive 
interest), further illustrating the fact that not only are aesthetics and ethics intricately 
linked, but they might both find their origins in the same understanding of religiosi-
ty .4
I will contend that while particular aesthetics tend to relate to particular ethics, the 
defining factor rests with the individual, personal and private appropriation, use and 
experience of those structures and frameworks . This chapter is intended to link my in-
terests in religious aesthetics and ethics, two domains that I myself have, until recently, 
engaged with separately . Theoretically, it contributes to my attempt at conceptual-
izing la religion à la première personne (Sounaye 2016) and echoes the long-standing 
anthropological debate on the category of person (Carrithers, Collins and Lukes 1985; 
Mcintosh 2009) .
I also view this chapter as an examination of alternative formulations of religios-
ity . While we continue to locate religiosity primarily in religious institutions (texts, 
scriptures, rituals, etc .), I draw attention to the process through which religiosity is 
produced via social relations and interactions . The individual, the self and the person 
are all largely socially produced . To borrow a Maussian expression, I would argue that 
they are total social products (cf . fait social total) and yet highly individualized and 
personalized .
The perspective I am outlining is not only important to our understanding of a 
key dimension of religiosity, but also brings to the fore the central issue of the aesthet-
ics of virtue . What do goodness and morality look like? In that regard, I would like to 
draw attention to the fact that virtue has a face in the social and cultural contexts of my 
discussion . That is what Islamic reform, in particular Izala, offers us a glimpse of .
In the Beginning Were the Hijabi and the Izala Trousers
When the Islamic reform movement known as Izala (Umar 1993; Loimeier 1997; 
Masquelier 1999; Kane 2003; Zakari 2007; Masquelier 2009) made its way into the 
public arena in Niamey, physical appearance, and one’s appropriate dress and outfit, 
became matters of concern . “Men started wearing pants that hardly went beyond the 
tibia, and women started wearing hijabi as a way to mark their difference and practice 
authentic Islam . That was really new here and nobody was doing it before” (Sambo in 
2011) . The genealogy of Izala as a religious trend and a social movement in Niger and 
Nigeria is tied to both sartorial practices and aesthetic forms, to borrow Meyer’s con-
4 Islamic banking, which picked up in Niger only in the last 10 years, is a case that further illustrates 
these connections .
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cept (Meyer 2010b) . What came to be the Izala dress code was then decisive, because 
it helped followers of Izala to be visibly different, asserting their identity and conse-
quently introducing a particular sartorial culture, as represented by veiling in particu-
lar . Though veiling is a common practice that predates this movement and transcends 
religious domains, with Izala it acquired a new significance and a definitively religious 
connotation, becoming the marker of a self-proclaimed corrective religiosity . Sudden-
ly, the hijabi was displayed, seen and voiced as a sign of piety and virtue and as part of 
being a better Muslim .
As one might expect, the Izala dress code was dragged into Muslim politics and 
became central to Muslim sectarianism . Unsurprisingly, veiling in particular became 
a topic of heated debates that mobilized fellow Muslims to argue over the meaning of 
Islam, the performance of the tradition, and appropriate conduct . Particularly in the 
1990s, the hijabi was instrumental to Izala’s conquest of the public sphere and its poli-
tics of presence in an already structured but also continuously changing religious land-
scape . Up to that point, press articles in and about Islam in the country pointed to the 
high visibility of the hijabi and its disruptive effect . Regularly, the hijabi was equated 
with the rise of intolerance in a country where Islam was more readily associated with 
peaceful coexistence, good morality and everything but unrest . Often alarmist, these 
articles joined a body of voices worried that the country was under threat from “inté-
grisme” (fundamentalism) or, as Izala men were referred to in many circles, les barbus 
(the bearded men, in French) . Putting their bodies on display was part of their being 
Izala and their performance of its reform agenda .
Most of these accounts saw in the hijabi the influence of a militant, disruptive 
Middle Eastern Islam which they contrasted with a local and tolerant one (cf . Rosand-
er and Westerlund 1997) . Additionally, as in many other contexts, feminist accounts 
insisted on the hijabi as a sign of an abuse of both women and religion, even when the 
agents of these sartorial practices pointed to their own choice and personal decision . 
In the broader sociopolitical context, it is fair to say that the appearance of the hijabi 
marked the beginning of an era of alternative norms, of arguments about authentic 
Islam and of a new formulation of virtue .
In sermons I have collected and conversations I have had, the hijabi is frequently 
discussed as a mark of distinction that signals piety and good morality . It is part of the 
aesthetic of a good Muslim and a marker of Muslim femininity . A clear statement of a 
reformed religiosity, it was intended, for example, to discourage an unrelated man from 
expecting to shake hands with a woman wearing it . At the same time, the hijabeuse, 
as a woman wearing a hijabi would be referred to in Niamey’s small talk, expects to 
receive proper treatment in her interactions with people . By separating gender and 
differentiating forms of devotion, it keeps men at bay and helps the hijabeuse avoid un-
wanted physical contact and attention . In most contexts in Niger, the popularization 
of the hijabi was viewed and experienced as an act restricting private space and inscrib-
ing new rules and norms of social engagement (cf . Avison, McLeod and Pescosolido 
2007) . As such, and in the new dispensation of Muslim morality, it was described and 
understood not only as part of a dress code, but more importantly as moral progress . 
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The hijabi was then drawn into the aesthetic formulation of virtue and good manners 
(cf . Elias 2000; Bourdieu 2010) .
Historically, it must be said that, more than anything, women’s veiling practices 
were tied to respectability and marital status (Cooper 1997; Alidou 2005; Masquelier 
2009) . With the rise of Izala practices and aesthetic prescriptions, the hijabi veiling 
was quickly imported into Muslim politics of presence, with a particular intent to 
demarcate themselves from all other Muslim groups including the ṭuruq (Sufi orders, 
sg . ṭarīqa), whose dominance in the sphere of organized Islam they sought to upend . 
Hijabi thus became a sign of a new era, a differentiating factor, while additionally sym-
bolizing a proper and authentic attire . In fact, until Izala emerged and became estab-
lished in the 1990s, girls in Niamey rarely veiled . Hair extensions (mèches, in French), 
braiding (rasta, tera tera), hair dressing (coiffure) and other treatments for the body 
were not only common, they were also the rule, as women cultivated beauty (kolliya 
in Hausa, nyalawaytarrey in Zarma) and fully displayed their arms and hair for that 
purpose . In other words, girls and unmarried women were rather relaxed with veiling 
or covering their hair . When they carried a kallabi or musoro (light veil), it was usually 
to protect themselves against the dust or the sun, or for special occasions such as wed-
dings, funerals or naming ceremonies .
Today, however, even in formal secular school settings where one might think it to 
be exceptional and counter-normative, hijabi has become so common and naturalized 
that those who are not wearing it seem to stand out the most . A more detailed and 
eventful account of the way the hijabi became an established norm should be told and 
socially historicized, but it will suffice here to note that in the last two decades, this 
sartorial practice has had a lasting impact on the aesthetics of religion and morality in 
urban Niger within and beyond Salafi circles . Along the way, veiling itself was stylized 
to include new shapes and colours, illustrating both the aesthetic creativity of girls and 
women and the way in which fashion trends were combined with social and religious 
modes of distinction .
Hijabi appeared and gained currency as a term of the Muslim lexicon of religios-
ity around the beginning of the 1990s as women embraced Izala aesthetic norms and 
suggestions . Within that context, it became a sign of religiosity and a marker of femi-
ninity that the new dispensations of Islam and being Muslim sought to impose . In the 
Izala networks I researched at the beginning of the 2000s, mostly in Maradi, Niamey 
and Zinder, the hijabi culture was tied to families’ desire to transmit good values and 
norms to their daughters . It derived also from individual and personal decisions wom-
en made to craft an image for themselves in a context where displaying identity and 
being seen had become important . The hijabi thus marked and differentiated ways of 
being Muslim while stressing the importance of conduct .
Concerns about the female body in the public sphere favoured the development 
of what may be called an Izala veiling culture . The late Ahmad Yahya, the leader of the 
first Izala organization in Niger (Adin Islam) and also a popular figure of the move-
ment, repeatedly called on his fellow Izala followers to “distance themselves from oth-
ers, not let their wives go out without the hijabi” (Yahya in 1994) . According to some 
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of my interlocutors who place importance on the cultural element of Izala, Yahya was 
at the forefront of the effort to make “our women dress properly and as recommended 
by the Sunna” (Issaka in 2014) . In her caricature of the pre-Izala era, a young Sun-
nance woman I heard preaching on TV Dounia, one of the main media outlets in 
Niger, claims that before Izala, “people dressed improperly and were walking almost 
naked” and “one can hardly distinguish women from men, boys from girls . I followed 
Izala suggestions and I started donning hijabi” (Saude in 2015) .
Ahmed Yahya pointed the way for the Izala, representing a good example to many 
of his followers in Niamey and also across the country . Before the hijabi became a sign 
of distinction for and among Izala women, “he [Yahya] was the first to require his 
women and all [other women] in his household to wear it .” Hijabi and virtue reso-
nated with each other and were finally equated in a context where Izala were slowly 
but surely affecting moral norms and the perceptions of a virtuous woman . As Renne 
(2018) shows in her recent book on veiling and turban culture in Northern Nigeria, 
appearance and clothing serve both religious and gender ideologies . This is even more 
important to note with regard to the current Salafi culture in Niger, where the Izala 
effect has been instrumental in the rise of new religious aesthetics (Sounaye 2017a) .
For the Izala discourse on masculinity, the matter corresponding to the female 
hijabi revolved around the shin-length trousers, often ridiculed by their critics as 
“pantalon sauté” or “masu guntun wando” (those who wear short trousers) . While 
followers of Izala saw the simplicity of the Sunna in these sartorial items, and consid-
ered them conducive to cleanliness, their critics judged the followers wearing them as 
being slovenly, too pretentious and lacking in good manners . Izala men’s aesthetics 
also included keeping one’s facial hair, particularly the beard . Ahmed Yahya, too, had 
a reputation of maintaining a beard5 in order to convey both his Izala affiliation and 
his commitment to the prophetic look . In fact, for Izala men – who were keen on 
following the prophetic model – the beard and the shin-length trousers were impor-
tant markers . They were viewed as ‘the prophetic way’, so adherents drew on practices 
that tapped into this association to produce an Izala style . This element of religiosity 
conveyed via aesthetic forms has remained significant among the young Sunnance of 
Niamey, the Izala’s second generation .
How a specific veiling practice is made possible is worth investigating . In the case 
of Izala, and as Bourdieu would argue, faith transpires in a state of the body . For a 
number of years, hijabi was primarily an Izala signifier more than anything else . How-
ever, it is important to note that, while Izala imposed the hijabi norm and triggered 
new veiling practices in most of its sphere of influence, today hijabi can no longer 
be reduced to its association with Izala . Since that breakthrough, the hijabi has lost 
its exclusive association and has been appropriated by various discourses and groups 
beyond Izala .
Certainly, at the origin of the current veiling culture, especially in Niamey, lies 
Izala’s intent to reorder norms and inscribe a discipline onto the woman’s body . Both 
5 For example, I have never seen him shaved even in his pictures .
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the discipline and the intent to inscribe it derived from prescriptions that created first 
a structure of aesthetics within which the female body was perceived and reordered, 
then a structure of morality that saw virtue in the hijabi and therefore an imperative to 
prescribe it . Obviously, for those sharing this perspective on being Muslim, adopting 
the hijabi translates as a key gesture of religiosity that grants the subject respect, trust 
and good reputation . The rise of the Izala hijabi culture in the 1990s speaks to those 
considerations, but also to a discourse on the female body which, as we can see today, 
has managed to produce specific images and performances of being a Muslim, a hus-
band, a wife, or simply a trustworthy person .
But Both the Hijabi and the Trousers Could be Deceptive...
The systematic connection that Izala established between the hijabi and Islamic good 
morality eroded as the hijabi became popular and was gradually questioned as a sign 
of piety and an indication of moral disposition . Semantics is not enough to grasp the 
significance of the hijabi and its investment into the moral economy and the produc-
tion of norms today . One must also be aware of its transgressiveness .
A few weeks ago, an assistant of mine – struck by the ambivalence of a particular 
variety of social conduct – opened up to me as follows: “I was surprised to see self-pro-
claimed Izala young women in Maradi wearing heavy make-up along with their veil . I 
wasn’t sure what to make of that . Isn’t Izala condemning that?” (Baki in 2019) . What 
my assistant points to is part of the overall problematic of being Izala . While Izala has 
cultivated an austere or dark aesthetic, as I call it (Sounaye 2017a), it is important to 
keep in mind that Izala as a discourse is subject to evolution and appropriation . In 
that process, Izala norms have certainly been adopted, but also affected, tweaked, and 
invested into personal and individual agendas . In other words, usage takes over and 
one must focus in particular on the pragmatics of embracing Izala, its code of conduct, 
and its values and norms, beyond mere claims and prescriptions .
As wearing the hijabi became a popular social practice, it followed fashion trends 
and, most importantly, rose to a practice of good manners (cf . Elias 2000; Bender 
2011) and became part of the perceptions of good looks and appearance . Practice and 
uses thus need to be given priority, as they shape the trajectories of the hijabi in a social 
context, but also in individual lives .6 It is not enough to say that the hijabi is a sign of 
morality, though that probably is the case in most situations where we encounter it . 
We must also pay attention to the moral environment it appears in and the intent it 
serves, for it is often used to navigate social realms, spaces and expectations . In these 
ways, the Izala look may be used and diverted . Thus, by focusing on their social life, 
one can better understand the ambivalence of both the hijabi – and the Izala look in 
general – and the various social spaces in which it appears . Indeed, the social life of the 
hijabi, an expansion of the body, should thus be analysed while keeping in mind the 
6 We should not overlook the example of the many women who have donned the hijabi but later dropped it .
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cultural production of the hijabi as a signifier and marker of both individual religiosity 
and the politics of religion . As such, a discussion of the hijabi in light of the perplexity 
of my assistant cannot overlook the case of the alternative uses of the hijabi7 such as 
that of the female sex workers in Niamey or Maradi .8
(Im)morality can hide behind the hijabi . That is the main message of a discourse 
that has been pointing to the fact that many women use the hijabi to go unnoticed . 
Prostitutes in urban centres like Niamey, in particular, have been at the core of this dis-
course . I first came across this discourse of the hijabi hiding immorality in 2004 while 
conducting fieldwork in Maradi, a town in the south-central part of Niger . The town’s 
inhabitants complained about the inability of the local authorities to quell the “wave 
of prostitutes” that was affecting Maradi even as Nigerian authorities on the other side 
of the border were implementing a strict moral code following the adoption of sharī aʿ 
as state law . Several of my interlocutors then pointed to the “new strategies” (nouvelles 
strategies) sex workers were using to escape the wrath of the inhabitants and the atten-
tion of local authorities . In the wake of these “strategies” of concealment and revela-
tion, hijabi proved central to the moral economy of the town, but also to the aesthetic 
modes of appearance and presence of the subjects . What we should be concerned with 
in this instance is not so much what is religious . On the contrary, we should focus on 
how the hijabi, as a statutory object of religiosity, is appropriated and invested in the 
moral economy of the town, producing specific images of women (cf . Barré 2018) .
Whether aware of the moral connotations of the hijabi or not, the act of the female 
sex worker who wears it merely illustrates that the device is part of a moral discourse 
that bridges personal use and social expectations . Not many would expect a woman 
wearing a hijabi to be a sex worker, in the same way that my assistant was not expect-
ing to see a hijabi accompanied by heavy make-up . That doesn’t mean, however, that 
the hijabi remains under the same ethical principles forever and is therefore fixed to 
a unique moral space . Its moral value depends on its use and the context in which it 
finds itself .
In this specific case, I would argue that the meaning of the hijabi is not only chang-
ing, but also transforming as it moves from one space to another and relocates in a web 
of meanings, significations and uses . The same object enters different fields and can 
have diverse trajectories and lives . When a sex worker wears the hijabi in Niamey or 
Maradi, it is likely that she acknowledges the importance of the sign and both follows 
and challenges expectations at the same time, allowing the possibility for radically dif-
ferent hermeneutics and even contradictory interpretations to emerge .
In this situation, I could readily understand the anger of many of my interlocutors 
who insult and “pray Allah damn those culprits of the kind of the prostitute”, and 
who declare them to have “injured Islam”, “soiled the reputation of Muslim women”, 
7 Perhaps what we need to attend to is not the hijabi and heavy make-up per se, but my assistant’s reac-
tion .
8 I personally witnessed such practices of concealment via the hijabi on several occasions during field-
work in those two urban areas .
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and exposed each woman wearing hijabi if not to suspicion, then at least to scepticism . 
This affective rendering of the sex worker’s gesture thus appears to be a disturbing 
sign that uncovers the dark side of the hijabi and unveils the possibility of this sign 
meaning something quite contrary to most expectations . One learns not only about 
the (im) morality of the hijabi, but also about the anxiety of the defender of public 
morality who is challenged by the sex worker’s relocation of the hijabi . The sex worker 
validates a contradictory code and draws attention to the (im)morality of concealment 
and veiling, a situation that unsettles the Izala moralism and code of conduct .
However, all this happens because the hijabi is taken for granted and reduced to a 
specific moral space where it is perceived and lived as a protective device . Many Sun-
nance refer to the hijabi not only as a protective sartorial practice, but also as an em-
powering one in a context where women feel too exposed, ignored, victimized and 
even subject to aggression . Thus, as many scholars in other contexts have pointed out, 
and as applies also to the context I am concerned with, piety was not the only reason 
for the hijabi veiling practice; many women donning the hijabi are also anxious and 
wary about how they are perceived .
Fair Trading and Trust
In urban contexts in Niger, trading is perhaps one of the most important sites for the 
examination of the connection between ethics and aesthetics . In its formative years in 
Niamey, the Izala movement was dominated by petty traders who formed the social 
base of a reform discourse that they rapidly embraced, as it emphasized entrepreneur-
ship, prosperity and therefore economic independence . The success stories of Izala 
businessmen in Maradi and Niamey further contributed to the mobilization of young 
men eager to build up wealth . Echoing Weber’s thesis of a religion-inspired ethic, 
scholars have pointed to the ways in which Izala groups, and traders in particular, pro-
duced an ethic of productivity and self-making (Grégoire 1993; Sounaye 2009) . Early 
on, larger-scale Izala traders (alhazai) sponsored the younger ones, creating an intra-
communal chain of solidarity and self-help which in many ways helped Izala to gain 
visibility and establish its social base in urban contexts . In some of my conversations 
in Maradi in the early 2000s, my interlocutors were quick to point to how rapidly 
“petty traders [mostly seasonal migrants] grow as soon as they join the [Izala] move-
ment . And once they become established, they pass it on to others” (Isia in 2004) . “We 
knew each other and we were part of the same community”, confirmed Sale (in 2004) . 
At the time, a popular criticism of the young men who joined the Izala was that they 
lack sincerity and “hide behind Islam” to acquire wealth and money . Unethical and 
un-Islamic, as their critics insisted, these “seekers of money” (Filo in 2005) supposedly 
reduced religiosity to material gains, turning into agents of corruption and unlawful 
practice . According to these critics of Izala, their pursuit of wealth not only burdens 
their religiosity, but actually runs counter any true Islamic reform agenda .
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It is worth noting that whether in its self-assertion as a revolutionary ethos of good 
practice or its rejection by critics who see in it nothing but a bluff, the Izala movement 
is understood as a moral agent, whose discourses and acts are judged and assessed based 
on the ethical principles of its followers and their impact on the local moral economy . 
What moral norms and spaces emerge, and how these norms affect the structures of 
morality, are major issues for a critical examination of this process .
Izala followers, perhaps even the most committed ones I have encountered, have 
vehemently countered this criticism, arguing that in a country of ignorance (jahilci, 
in Hausa) and poverty (talawci, in Hausa), one serves Islam better with one’s own 
pockets (Sale in 2004), an image that suggests the role of economic capital . Both Izala 
and their Niamey offshoot, the Sunnance, pride themselves on being good business-
men and at the same time “men of the Sunna” (Alfari in 2014) . “Wealth, money and 
economic prosperity are no harm to my religiosity” (adina, in Zarma) and “can only fa-
cilitate my good deeds” (aikin adini, in Hausa), as Musa, an Izala shop owner, argued .
He made this point on a day when he felt compelled to preach “common sense” 
(lakkal, in Zarma) in the mosque where he serves as Imam, next to his shop in the 
Terminus quarter in Niamey . In this somewhat middle-class neighbourhood where 
he is now well established, Musa started trading in 2014 because he “was looking for 
something to do .” From a tablier (stall owner, in local French), he grew into a bouti-
quier (shop owner, in local French) selling various items from soap to mobile phone 
top-up cards . From a makeshift stall, his business grew into a metallic kiosk offered to 
him by Airtel, one of the major mobile phone networks in the country . I witnessed 
the development of this Sunnance business as its owner became a major player in the 
daily life of his street . Many Sunnance turn, like him, to the example of the Caliph to 
justify their search for wealth and prosperity: “We have good examples to learn from 
in the history of Islam [tarihin Islam] . The Caliph Umar was a wealthy man, and he 
was able to contribute all those deeds because he wasn’t poor . Wealth makes one [a] 
good Muslim, but being a good Muslim also brings wealth and albarka (blessings) .”9 
He went on to claim that “piety doesn’t despise wealth; on the contrary, it needs it to 
expand and prosper . I just need to do it right .” Similar narratives abound within Salafi 
circles as the Caliph Umar inspires religious entrepreneurship and an ethic that opens 
the way to prosperity .
The chain of prosperity that shaped Izala socio-economic practices has instituted 
something of a regime of accountability, or – to put another way – an expectation of 
counting on each other, and certainly on fellow adherents of Izala . In this context, a 
major concern is trust . How does one trust traders not only with the quality of their 
products, but with their pricing? For example, while halal food is not a preoccupation 
in Niamey, as it is assumed that food is necessarily halal in a Muslim majority context, 
other commercial practices such as overpricing and selling expired food products are 
common . These practices create anxiety about the quality of market products and the 
unfairness of transactions as traders rush to achieve prosperity and wealth .
9 Musa has the reputation of not being cheap .
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Izala’s rapid emergence and social success should be read against the backdrop of its 
claims of ethical practices . Indeed, Izala’s criticism of socioeconomic practices that it 
views as un-Islamic (such as riba) and its promise of fair trade, for example, have drawn 
many to its business model, so to speak . In fact, its rejection of riba served Izala’s image 
and gave its traders and businessmen the reputation of trustworthy partners and fair 
traders . In a highly competitive trade centre such as Niamey, most customers would 
expect traders to carry those values . At the same time, traders need a good reputation 
in order to be successful . The fear of being duped (zamba, in Hausa and Zarma) drew 
many Izala I interacted with toward their fellow Izala traders . “They charge [a] fair 
price” but “we also trade good and authentic products”, as Musa argued . For both the 
traders and their customers, fair trade were important because “nobody wants to be 
cheated on” . But, as he added later, “we all know that [cheating] is part of the [eco-
nomic] practice in Niamey . Would you tell me how all those traders amassed their 
fortunes? Would you swear that they lawfully acquired their wealth? I don’t think so . 
I will not wear a beard and do what they are doing” (Musa) .
Young Sunnance at the Grand Marché, the main market of Niamey, have built on 
those ethical expectations and moral aspirations by showing off their identity . Because, 
as Musa claimed, it would be a sacrilege to wear the Izala beard and engage in zamba, 
they keep their beards, wear Izala trousers and do not speak much, in line with the 
Izala code and manners . They build their businesses on the trust and reputation they 
cultivate: “Trust me, I buy my goods from the Sunnance of Grand Marché” is a phrase 
I have heard many times in the Medina neighbourhood of Niamey, where I witnessed 
another boutiquier become, in a span of three years, a key player in the daily lives of 
most households on his street . Initially a seasonal migrant, the young man came from 
Loga, about 170 km north east of Niamey . Particularly critical of the youth culture 
and practices of his hometown and its surrounding area, he embraced Izala, a rather 
courageous and exceptional move for an inhabitant of a region known for its drug use 
and abuse . The Logayze10 stereotype runs deep in Niamey, where identifying as Loga 
boro (coming from Loga, in Zarma) could be socially devaluating for young men . So, 
when Hima, the boutiquier, embraced the Sunna and became the most prominent 
Sunnance of his family, he challenged this stereotype and the traditional trajectory 
of youth in the region . “It is not that I don’t know tramol;11 I tried it, but found no 
benefit in it . It is not good for my body and harms my religiosity . I want to live hon-
estly .” Both assertive and reflexive, Hima stresses his rupture with his previous social 
environment and the moral commitment that led to his new life . As I can tell from 
daily conversations I had with him and the interactions I observed, he is not shy of 
reminding his customers of his choice .
Like Musa, Hima inspires trust (nanay) and fairness in his neighbourhood, and in 
particular amongst his Sunnance fellows . His case exemplifies attitudes, expectations, 
10 Literally “from Loga”, in Zarma .
11 Tramol is the term people in Niamey use to refer to Tramadol, a popular narcotic pain reliever easily 
accessible across Niger and West Africa .
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trajectories and performances of religiosity that have influenced and shaped the moral 
universe of interactions in Niamey . Displaying their beards and Izala trousers, both 
Musa and Hima personify the Sunnance narrative of a moral transformation through 
migration to Niamey, where many young people have found wealth and piety .
What impact are these practices and relationships having on trade and commerce? 
In a context where bargaining is the norm and an important act/ritual of trading, Izala 
traders have gained the reputation of not looking for riba and therefore price tagging 
their goods: “the price we tell people is the price we sell it” (Hima) . I have heard this 
claim, for example, from many Izala young men involved in the used tyre business in 
Niamey’s Katako market . An important social base of the Izala movement in the city, 
these young men illustrate both the aesthetics and the ethics of Izala .
Over the years, I have seen these traders build up wealth and expand their busi-
nesses, establishing their trades in a moral space where one expects to find trust and 
fair treatment all based on the fear of God (tsoron Allah, in Hausa) . “They may not be 
cheap; at least they have good products,” said Seyni, a housekeeper whom I asked to 
get me a toothbrush from the tablier in the street where I was staying . When I asked 
Seyni why the brush was so expensive (800 Fcfa/$1 .80), he responded: “Izalaize no 
[He follows Izala]! You know, he is Izala, and has already warned me that people might 
find him too expensive .”12 As a matter of fact, according to Seyni, while some people 
prefer to skip him and go a few minutes farther to another shop, many others have 
built up good relationships with him because he is reliable (Seyni in 2018) .
While this moral model is important to mention, I must point out that the moral 
universe within which it emerges has usually been aligned with a particular sense of the 
body . That said, I will not use the concept of embodiment to characterize the transla-
tion of Izala values into bodily expressions and performances . Embodiment conveys 
a sense of externality and importation that may not help us grasp the process through 
which the values and moral norms emerge and shape life, creating a mirror effect and 
interdependency between aesthetics and ethics . The beard and trousers are important 
markers for the trader, but also for the customer . Both are concerned with the way 
they are treated and the way they are affected .
My Hijabi and My Religiosity
I have argued elsewhere that Salafism has achieved a revolution in West Africa (Sou-
naye 2017b) . It has introduced new moral and knowledge economies, produced new 
political concepts and ideologies, and taken unprecedented cultural forms that have 
become normative . This development has relied on the privatization of religion as re-
ligious practice insists on the subject and its self-awareness in everyday practice (Sou-
naye 2016 and 2017a) . This reflexive turn toward the subject as the one to assert and 
ascertain religiosity has proved particularly efficient in Niamey, where – as the previ-
12 I personally checked the price of the toothbrush .
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ous sections have shown – Salafi moral discourse has been usually tied to one’s dress, 
and both men and women’s bodies, looks and tastes . One does not inherit religious 
status, as the Izala claim goes, but earns it . This emphasis on self-making, common 
among Salafi youth and women, is actually a critique that targeted traditional modes 
of devolution of power and acquisition of authority .
For many women in Niamey, donning the hijabi was one of their first acts of taking 
charge and asserting that they are Sunnance and therefore breaking with, or renegoti-
ating their relationships to, the structures that had been shaping their lives, religious 
or otherwise . Much like other attitudes that cultivate religiosity, Sunnance attire and 
aesthetics were intended to be unmistakable statements . The hijabi and the Izala trou-
sers thus appeared to be signs attesting a subjective quality of goodness; contrary to 
many readings, their attire is not accessory but deep-seated in the substantive side of 
the matter . Appearance thus becomes significant, and aesthetics central .
Often, the popularization of the hijabi, a process that has, as I have already pointed 
out, gone beyond Salafi (Izala and Sunnance), has given way to a private space of religi-
osity (Sounaye forthcoming)13 marked by a stylization of the hijabi, its fabric, colours, 
shapes and models .14 In some instances, this attention to the sensory and forms has 
taken inspiration from the Prophet Muhammad . In public and private pronounce-
ments, Sunnance have insisted on the beauty of the Prophet .15 I have heard references 
to the physical beauty of the Prophet and how this makes him even more lovable and 
therefore a model to emulate (cf . shaving like the Prophet) . The evocation of love here 
is important, as love affects and shapes both relationships and interactions . Love can 
trigger association (with the community of the Sunnance, for example) and desire to 
be with the Prophet, be like him or be on his side, and therefore celebrate his beauty .16 
The Prophet symbolizes and represents the perfection of beauty,17 which is emulated 
by the servants of the Sunna, as the Sunnance usually self-identify .
What does this concept of beauty encompass? In most cases, the evident answer is 
moral goodness . However, in many instances it has an aesthetic connotation, drawing 
attention to the physical features of the Prophet: “Alboro sogante no” (he is a hand-
13 In an upcoming publication, I use the concept of “fabrique d’une sphere privée de religiosité” to cap-
ture the significance of the individual’s construction and experience of religiosity .
14 It is within this context that, in a discussion during a seminar I taught at Abdou Moumouni University 
in 2017, a student claimed while entangled in a heated argument with her classmate, “my religiosity is not 
in my hijabi” . The statement was informed by current uses of the hijabi, in particular by the sex workers 
I mentioned above .
15 The concept of the beauty of the Prophet is not specific to the Sunnance . Various groups have also 
built on this narrative to establish the legitimacy of their practices . The Tidjaniyya is one of those groups . 
See their Mawlid celebrations .
16 The evocation of love here points to another dimension this paper does not deal with, namely inti-
macy . Though an important dimension of the discussion here, I engage with it in another publication 
which provides a more systematic discussion of the topic beyond theological divides . For now, it suffices 
to flag it up and recognize its significance .
17 This is not specific to Sunnance, but across the region and regardless of theological orientations, I have 
observed many inspiring evocations of the beauty of the Prophet .
142 Abdoulaye Sounaye
some man), as the phrase goes in Zarma . For a young woman I met at a preaching rally 
(wazu in Zarma) in Maradi, “that explains why nobody can draw his picture” (Ilia in 
2015) . As an extraordinary being, he also had an exceptional physique . This image of 
the Prophet has resulted in a trend of imitation, as his sartorial and bodily practices 
and postures are emulated by many who strive to follow in his footsteps . This has 
resulted in lifestyles, bodily postures, and methods of care and hygiene that have sig-
nificantly contributed to the repertoire of distinctive gestures, acts and attitudes of the 
Sunnance . In other words, as one may see in circles in Niamey, the beauty (moral and 
aesthetic) of the Prophet is at the centre of the Sunnance’s quest (cf . Stokes 2016) .
Though deeply private and personal, the domains of ethics and aesthetics have 
greatly contributed to building publics and communities . Among the Sunnance, it is 
evident that the aesthetic of their sartorial practices is at the heart of their forming and 
being a community . Both the internal and external perceptions of their dress code, 
especially when it comes to women, have contributed to their identity . They may not 
claim that identity, and even when they do, it is generally not in a straightforward way . 
Regardless, their Sunnance identity clearly transpires in the clothing they wear . Their 
individual styles and tastes may vary, but they still contribute to a broader scheme 
which they claim and which shapes their belonging .
Conclusion
A major point I wanted to make in this paper is that the ideas of public and audience 
do not exclude the possibility of an individually carved out and reflected sense of reli-
gion . On the contrary, religiosity operates in many ways by combining the individual 
side – style and taste – with the framework provided by the group and the collective 
(Marie 1997) . This is illustrated by the shared sense of being part of an ensemble or 
unit . This has been a missing perspective in the study of Izala, as scholars have usually 
preferred its conceptualization as a trend or a movement, an approach that has usually 
silenced the minute and messy details of the idiosyncratic side that disturbs or even 
unsettles generalizing accounts . And yet, what makes Salafism an agent of social trans-
formation are also the various ways in which individuals appropriate its ideals, sense 
of self and norms . The significance of this way of being Sunnance or Izala, or more 
precisely privately religious, has revolutionized how people conceptualize, experience 
and practise Islam . One has to look at ethics and aesthetics, and the developments in 
these domains and at their intersection, to grasp the significance of the dynamics I 
have discussed here .
Of course, ethics and aesthetics do not develop in a vacuum (Meyer 2015, 2010a, 
2010b; De Witte 2003, 2011; Lambek et al . 2015; Lambek 2010; Stokes 2016; Renne 
2018; Schulz 2011; Sounaye 2017a); they are produced through our engagement with 
the world . They are part of our lifeworld (cf . Meyer 2015; Meyer and Pels 2003; Mac-
Intyre 2007; Jackson and Piette 2015; Marsden 2007; James 2003) in that they mani-
fest both the sociality and relatedness of both the collective and the individual, a reality 
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that not all individuals will always be aware of . Note that I mean sociality in the sense 
that people translate individual or communal ways of interacting or desire to relate 
to each other, and relatedness in the sense that aesthetics and ethics are evidence that 
individuals and collectives have neighbours to whom they pay attention in one way or 
another (association, participation, opposition, conflict, etc .) .
The drama of the hijabi that consisted of equating it to extremism or “integrisme”, 
as the lexicon of the 1990s would have it, no longer holds, in part because the critics 
of the hijabi have, over time, started wearing it . Without even having converted, they 
have also embraced a social trend that has transformed the conditions and terms of 
the presence and appearance of the female body in public . The culture of hijabi and 
short trousers I have referred to here is certainly a way for many Muslims to embrace 
a code (aesthetic or ethical), but it is also the way in which many have handled their 
presence in a social space . Again, the hijabi and the Izala trousers exist in a context . In 
that presence and act of being, they have gone beyond official representation and the 
normative framework to define or redefine, sometimes in an egocentric manner, what 
being Muslim means and entails . In my own research, I have attempted to show how a 
particular community, namely the Sunnance, has taken religiosity beyond the official 
terms, representations or norms that come with the definition of a structure, and pro-
duced ego-centred practices, disciplines, norms and values .
The notion of ego-centrism refers here not only to the way religiosity is experi-
enced and talked about by the individual, but also the way we as scholars attend to 
that individual expression through what we may term the private, the personal and 
the intimate . Obviously, what I have offered here has yet to take onboard the intimate 
in a satisfactory manner . Perhaps we can leave that for another opportunity to revisit 
la religion à la première personne .
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Photographic Essay:  8 
Everyday Religious and Non-Religious Gestures 
in Senegal
Élise Fitte-Duval
I have always intended to address intimacy, especially how we live our bodies, through 
my photography . When I moved to Senegal, my approach evolved into one of docu-
menting aspects of everyday life in an attempt to address the intimacy of people as they 
show themselves .
The position from which I intervened in their lives was to make people look at 
themselves in images that were not posed, but extracted from reality . I switched focus 
from the image of the individual face to the one that is positioned within the society . 
This invites the viewer to accept a part of today’s reality that I am depicting through 
photography as it occurs, by telling a story through images that override the fact that 
this reality is unspoken . It is a matter of understanding how society works, and how it 
is unable to question itself – of showing people as I see them, each of them accounting 
for the situation in which society finds itself . This form of documentary photography, 
which may be akin to taking an inventory, allows one to think about and build the 
future .
For the Private Pieties project, I proposed to catch parts of the body engaged in 
daily activities that suggest intimacy – the things that people are doing every day but 
don’t want to talk about, because this society is quite modest and leaves little room for 
investigative photography, which is perceived as inquisitorial . The point was to deter-
mine what can be shown and what cannot amongst daily religious and non-religious 
gestures .
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For instance, we have chosen to illustrate that special moment of womanhood, ma-
ternity, because it crystallizes a dichotomy between the outside (what can be shown) 
and the inside (what is hidden) . It is a moment where a woman’s intimacy is specially 
protected, so the very fact of being pregnant is not disclosed outside of her close fam-
ily . In this moment, too, the religious coexists with other customs . How women treat 
their hair is another of these moments . The crux of this is that in Senegal, women are 
keen to wear artificial hair designs in public and natural ones at home in private . The 
time when a woman uncovers her hair in preparation for prayer is an intimate mo-
ment . Natural hair means authenticity . I have previously explored this theme through 
a social documentary project by taking portraits of those who dare to wear their natu-
ral hair uncovered in Dakar . For this study, the approach was to shoot close up and 
to show as few of the subjects’ faces as possible in order to focus on the appearance 
of their bodies . Photos of artists are prominent in the collection I am presenting here 
because they gave us the opportunity to access moments that others would either have 
hidden from us or not allowed us to publish .
Collaborating with Élise Fitte-Duval 
Nadine Sieveking
Born in Martinique in 1967, Élise Fitte-Duval was trained as a photographer and vis-
ual artist (in Martinique and France) before settling in Dakar, Senegal, where she has 
lived and worked since 2001 . She describes the common theme of her photographic 
projects as an effort to portray people in their environment, encompassing both its 
physical and social dimensions . Through her work, she has actively engaged in peo-
ple’s everyday lives, following civic movements (such as the protest movement Y’en 
a marre: “Fed up”) with the goal of understanding the ways in which people join to-
gether in collective action while also allowing individuals to express their personalities 
through portraiture, which she conceives of as a social commentary rather than an 
aesthetic representation of someone . Her art is characterized by the desire to capture 
movement and to reflect on the language of the body as a perspective on life in society, 
as her work on “Dancing Hope” and her “Wrestlers Series” illustrate . 
Élise Fitte-Duval has accompanied many artists and activists in Senegal over a long 
period of time, and her intimate personal knowledge of her subjects’ lives is an extreme-
ly rich resource for a social researcher . Collaborating with Élise Fitte-Duval as part of 
my ethnographic fieldwork in Senegal for the ERC-project “Private Pieties” has been 
a highly rewarding professional and personal experience . On the one hand, the visual 
exploration of our research topic required us to be very sensitive and confidential con-
cerning matters of privacy in relation to the people who agreed to be portrayed . On 
the other hand, the topic of “Private Pieties” implied a constant questioning of how 
to draw the boundaries between a private and a public situation, how to distinguish 
between religious and non-religious aspects, and how to assess the actual relevance 
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of each of these aspects for people’s everyday lives . Our questions about what was to 
be depicted in the images soon turned into a continually enriching mutual exchange 
regarding what can be shown in terms of visibility and invisibility – a question deeply 
imbued with religious meanings in the Senegalese Sufi context . It also raised the ques-
tion of what should be shown, in terms of the ethics and aesthetics of those portrayed, 
but also our own respective standards as an artist and an ethnographer . 
In her photographic essay, Élise Fitte-Duval demonstrates her resolution to these 
fundamental questions as an artist, even if her ‘visual story’ has to remain partial, leav-
ing out many elements that could not be reproduced in this publication . To ensure 
that consent could be given to the publication of personal images, and to respect peo-
ple’s right to privacy, some images were partly anonymized,1 while others reveal an 
identity that is part of the subjects’ public self-representation (for example as an artist, 
an imam, or a restaurant owner) or show aspects of their privacy that they deliberately 
wanted to be seen and publicized . The photographer’s choices of how to deal with 
these self-representations are part of her own social commentary about private pieties 
in Senegal . Her special focus on women’s hair reminds us that behind a simple veil or 
an artfully arranged mussor (Wolof expression for the headscarf used by adult women, 
from French: mouchoir de tête) there is a lot to discover . In Senegalese society, the 
symbolic potential of hair includes complex gendered notions of wealth and beauty, 
of care, protection and (self-)cultivation that are needed to demarcate the individual 
from society’s ‘other’ and make a person recognizable as a valuable part of society . An 
individual hairstyle can affirm, or even challenge, current norms of embodied cultural 
identity, and as a symbolic marker its meanings go far beyond the distinction between 
religious and non-religious or public and private domains .
Élise Fitte-Duval does not prescribe how her images should be interpreted and in-
vites the audience to engage in the open hermeneutic process of understanding them 
– according to each spectator’s own knowledge and curiosity – and ultimately appre-
ciating them as an inspiration that allows for resonance between ‘us’ and ‘them’ . As an 
ethnographer, this process deeply resonates with my own research experiences . More 
concretely, some of the questions that might be raised by the images remind me of mo-
ments during my fieldwork in Senegal . Questions such as: Where is this person going? 
Is her attire a religious marker? How to interpret the body language of a person read-
ing the Qur’ān? Which parts of a prayer are considered to be public and for whom? Is 
ritual ablution for women a more intimate moment than for men? Why is the non-
religiosity of “women’s business” (l’affaire des femmes) during naming ceremonies so 
vehemently denounced in public discourse? How to assess the power of bureaucratic 
organization of religious practice as compared to aesthetic expressions of religious feel-
ings? Élise Fitte-Duval’s photographic essay includes an image of a silhouette reflected 
in a display case that is at once both very vague and very concrete – just like many of 
the answers we can give to these questions .
1   This also applies to the names indicated (or omitted) in the texts or subtitles .
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These images of religiosity in every-
day life contain public and private 
aspects . Some of them appear with 
the subjects’ identities revealed, 
while others must remain anony-
mous .
In everyday life in Senegal, religios-
ity is negotiated between public and 
private domains, continually switch-
ing between what can be shown and 
what has to be hidden .
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Normally women wear large dresses 
during pregnancy in order to hide 
their state in public .
Giving Birth
Pregnancy in Private
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Mané, artist manager
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The namegiving – ngénte in Wolof – 
is a public event divided into the 
religious ceremony and “women’s 
business” (l’affaire des femmes) .
Namegiving
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Women’s Ngénte
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Mother and child
After that, mother and child hide 
from public view for 40 days .
Marème and her firstborn
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The Layenne Brotherhood is a local 
Sufi organization based on the Cap 
Vert peninsula . 
Every year, the Layenne Brother-
hood followers celebrate “the call” 
of their founder, Seydina Limamou 
Laye (1843–1909), at places in 
Dakar where he lived and preached .
This is a time of meditation and 
family reunion, an opportunity to 
wear beautiful white clothes and to 
take souvenir photos .
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Saly decided to wear the veil at the 
age of 18 .
In her search for a guide she first be-
came Mouride, then Tidiane, before 
becoming Layenne .
On Sundays she meets the members 
of her prayer group – dahira – and 
reads the Qurʾān at the beach of 
Ngor .
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Living With Faith on a Daily Basis
Haddiatou, journalist
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Dasso, restaurant owner





During Ramadan, religious remem-
brances and meditations – zikr – are 
abundant .
The Festival Salam, organized in 
May 2018 by Youssou N’Dour, 
music star and media entrepreneur, 
at the time also presidential advisor 
with the rank of a minister, puts on 
stage zikr performances by various 
Sufi brotherhoods . 
Participants joyfully engage by sing-
ing, dancing and snapping their fin-
gers .
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Religious singer Saida Binta Thiam
178 Élise Fitte-Duval





Everyday Religious and Non-Religious Gestures in Senegal 181
At home
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Artists Chakrour and Fayad at a special Ramadan Vendredi Slam Dakar event
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Gallery reception

Fitness and the ‘Bracketing’ of Religiosity  9 
in Senegal
Nadine Sieveking
Introduction: Fitness – What is That?
“Fitness – moy lan?” (Wolof: Fitness – what is that?) the young Imam asked my com-
panion, who was acting as an interpreter for an interview regarding a contested bodily 
practice introduced to the village of Toubab Diallaw a few years ago . The issue con-
cerned the project Danse à l’école, which had prompted negative reactions on the part 
of the Imam Ratib, the Grand Imam of the village, shortly after some dance classes 
had been held with children at the public school . Since the Grand Imam had spoken, 
the dance courses had stopped, even though the same pupils had already been tak-
ing classes at the nearby international dance school École des Sables for quite a while 
without any objections . Relocating these classes to the grounds of the public school 
and leaving the private domain of the dance centre had made them an issue of public 
concern . Hence, the Imam Ratib felt entitled to intervene and condemn them, on the 
basis of religious criteria, as ḥarām – an illicit practice .
A lot of people involved with the Danse à l’école project were unhappy with this 
turn of events . This included Aliou*1, the man who had agreed to interpret and ar-
range interviews with local authorities for me . He had played a central role in finding 
a consensus for establishing the dance project at the public school, and he was very 
1 All names of my interlocutors are anonymised (and marked with *), apart from public figures or per-
sons who are referred to in terms of an official public position that they occupy .
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disappointed when the Imam Ratib stepped in with his veto . According to Aliou*, 
younger and more open-minded Islamic scholars in the village had been more sup-
portive of the dance project, and he suggested talking to one of them . The young 
Imam with whom we then met didn’t explicitly contradict the statement issued by the 
Grand Imam, but he did propose an interpretation of dancing as a kind of “play” that 
was more open to negotiation . This encouraged me to dig deeper with my questions . 
Would he consider all kinds of dance as problematic from an Islamic perspective, and 
where would he draw the line between dance and other forms of bodily practice, such 
as “fitness” for example?
I was speaking French but used the English term, which is fairly well established 
among francophone speakers in Dakar and other urban areas in Senegal . The Imam in 
Toubab Diallaw, who was speaking Wolof2 because his French was not fluent, seemed 
not to be acquainted with the English notion of ‘fitness’ . However, when Aliou* ex-
plained that it meant the movements carried out to the sound of music in a gym (salle 
de gymnastique, salle de sport),3 the Imam was immediately reminded of a gym he 
knew, owned by a certain Habib Sy – probably a fellow Tijani .4 With a sense of pride, 
he told us: “if you go to Habib Sy, you would say that it is dance because he does 
everything!”5 The Imam made this comment with an expression of admiration very 
current among Muslims in Senegal (and elsewhere), who also signal their own piety in 
using it: “Machala!”
In the remainder of our interview, the Imam elaborated on the need to adjust reli-
gion in accordance with the real world – diine ak jamono6 – in order to adapt to current 
circumstances and be able to “live with your generation” . Evidently, he saw the bodily 
practices carried out in a gym as a perfectly appropriate way to do so . His admiring 
2 While French is the only official language, Wolof is the most widely spoken vernacular in Senegal .
3 My interpreter started to explain fitness like this: “Mooy comme salle de gymnastique, salle de sport yi, 
andak mouvement ak dañuy teg musique” . The English term “gym”, which has no equivalent in French, 
is derived from the Ancient Greek notion “gymnasion”, which designated a place of physical and intellec-
tual education, but the English term only retains the aspect of physical training . I use it interchangeably 
with the French notions salle de gymnastique and salle de sport .
4 The young Imam in Toubab Diallaw, like most of the inhabitants of this village, is a member of the 
Tijaniyya Sufi order . Sy is the family name of an important Tijani dynasty in Senegal .
5 My translation is based on the French translation of the Wolof transcript by Mamadou Gueye . In the 
original Wolof phrasing (danga naan fecc la parce que lu nekk lay def) the Imam uses the Wolof concept 
fecc, which refers to popular dances and has a distinctively female connotation (Neveu Kringelbach and 
Skinner 2012: 3) .
6 Mamadou Gueye explained this notion in French using the phrase “la religion par rapport à la géné-
ration actuelle” . Diine, adapted from Arab, is the current Wolof term for (Muslim) religion . Jamono is 
a more ambivalent and context-specific term for time, age/era/epoch or generation . According to the 
translation by Gueye, the meaning of jamono also refers to “the world of today” (le monde d’aujourd’hui) 
or even to practices diverging from religious dogma (pratique différente de la théorie) . Aliou* gave the 
following explanation, referring to a popular Senegalese TV show in Wolof called Diine ak Jamono: “Ja-
mono, cela veut dire le monde . Il y a une télévision qui fait ça, Walfadjiri, il dit diné et diamono, cela veut 
dire la religion et la culture .”
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comment regarding gym fitness highlights what appears to be a paradox – one that in-
spired me to write this chapter . Although there are a lot of similarities between dance 
and fitness practices in terms of their physical movement patterns, Senegalese Muslims 
perceive and depict them very differently from a religious point of view . Throughout 
my research in Senegal, I have consistently been confronted with positions confirming 
the status of dance as inherently immoral, illicit (haram) or at least somewhat prob-
lematic from the point of view of Islam, and therefore “not recommended” for a pious 
Muslim . In contrast, I have never heard any similar statements concerning fitness, and 
this began to intrigue me .
What is the significance of these divergent attitudes? What does it tell us about 
the social position of the respective practices? If we take up Mary Douglas’s (1970) 
claim that there is a correspondence between the “two bodies”, the physical body and 
the social body, what can we learn about contemporary Senegalese society from the 
recent introduction and rapid expansion of gym fitness among Senegalese urbanites? 
How does the current fitness boom relate to other trends and the larger dynamics of 
social change in Senegal? And, more specifically, how can we understand the increas-
ing popularity of fitness practices against the background of a growing pressure on 
individuals to embody some form of religiosity and a ‘saturation’ of public space with 
performances of Muslim piety?
Since the mandate of President Abdoulaye Wade (2000–2012), the amplification 
and diversification of religious (especially Muslim) practices and modes of belonging,7 
although discernible since the late 1980s (Seck 2010: 24), have become ever more evi-
dent, notably through the public display of piety and realignments of the relationships 
between the spheres of political and religious power (Dahou and Foucher 2004; Diouf 
and Leichtman 2009; Diouf 2013; Seck et al . 2015) . This indicates a trend of long-
term changes within Senegalese society whereby, in spite of a certain disenchantment 
concerning political Islam (Loimeier 2000), political and economic liberalization since 
the 1980s has been accompanied by an ongoing process of Islamization ‘from below’ . 
The interlocking political, cultural and religious patterns and glocal dynamics of these 
transformations have been subsumed by Mamadou Diouf (2013: 12) under the con-
cept of an “Islamo-Wolof Model” . The results of these changes have been analysed by 
Abdourahmane Seck (2010) under the heading of an “Islamo-Nationalism” – a term 
he coined in order to depict the way in which Senegalese society is inventing its own 
political and religious modernity (ibid .: 224ff .) .
Focusing on bodily practices, we can ask how this new “religious modernity” is 
embodied and what kind of “correspondences” between physical and social body 
(Douglas 1970) are characteristic of it . Interestingly, in stark contrast to my parallel 
research on professional dancers (Sieveking 2017: 238), from the point of view of my 
enquiries into fitness practices and the career trajectories of fitness entrepreneurs and 
7 An estimated 95% of the Senegalese population is Muslim, mostly belonging to one of the locally es-
tablished Sufi brotherhoods (Tijaniyya, Muridiyya, Qadiriyya or the comparatively small community of 
Layennes, locally rooted in the region of Dakar) .
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coaches, the issue of religiosity seemed rather irrelevant . As Abdoulaye*, a graduate 
student in computer science and regular customer of a fitness gym in Dakar, clarified 
in an interview, his physical training and his religious practice are “in no way interfer-
ing” with one another (ca n’interfère en rien!) . So why incorporate the study of fitness 
practices into a research project focused on ‘private pieties’ and the articulations of 
individual religiosity within Senegalese society?8
I had initially started to develop an interest in fitness practices in Dakar in order 
to gain access to and explore the lifeworld of the new middle-class milieus that have 
evolved and visibly expanded in this city over the last two decades .9 In following this 
research avenue together with a small team,10 I realized that those practising fitness 
in a gym are usually not especially inclined to communicate and open up for discus-
sion with an anthropologist . As I will explain in more detail below, there is a kind 
of gym etiquette that limits communication . Engaging fitness practitioners in discus-
sions that went beyond gym small talk, let alone raising the topic of religiosity, turned 
out to be difficult and contradictory to the informal laws structuring the social space 
constituted by this practice . In general, gym etiquette excludes symbolic references to 
religion . The particular type of “aesthetic formation” (Meyer 2009) constituted by fit-
ness practices seems completely disconnected from the realm of religious experience .
In order to engage with fitness practitioners in conversations that would eventu-
ally allow us to address the topic of religion, we resorted to experimental methods that 
created a communicative space separate from the fitness gym .11 In doing so, we main-
tained the separation of different experiential spheres that was claimed by fitness prac-
titioners – implicitly through their reluctance to discuss religiosity, as well as explicitly . 
In fact, between the two realms “il n’y a rien” (there is nothing), as Fatou* put it when 
asked to describe the relationship between her fitness training and her religious prac-
tice . For this young pious Muslim woman, manager of a small restaurant, retail trader 
and regular gym practitioner, practising her religion, specifically by carrying out the 
8 My empirical research on fitness gyms in Dakar was carried out between March 2017 and December 
2018, on the basis of qualitative methods including participant observation in various gyms, formal in-
terviews with professionals such as gym managers, coaches and state officials, and informal conversations 
with gym clients .
9 The ERC project Private Pieties explores the tendencies in various contemporary Muslim social forma-
tions to insist on individual religiosities (and non-religiosities) and “to privilege an individual approach to 
the faith” (Loimeier forthcoming) . My research within this framework started with a focus on “new social 
groups”, often described as “middle class” and located “between the utterly rich and powerful as well as 
the utterly poor and weak” (Loimeier 2016: 3ff .) .
10 From January 2018, part of my research on fitness in Dakar was carried out in collaboration with 
Mbanga Diallo, who helped me significantly in providing documents and carrying out interviews with 
professionals and state officials, and with Anais Cadillon, who carried out qualitative interviews and par-
ticipant observation in fitness classes . I thank both of them for their inspiration, commitment, diligence 
and endurance during this study .
11 Anais Cadillon set up a photographic project with the aim of visualizing particularly valuable aspects 
of everyday life from the perspective of fitness practitioners . In the context of this project she was able to 
carry out interviews touching on the aspect of private religiosity .
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five daily prayers, is a “duty” – something that is “diametrically opposed” to her (al-
most) daily physical practice in a gym, because the latter is “facultative” .12 She had 
started to practice fitness based on medical recommendation, and she maintains that if 
she stops she gets sick, but she considers this motivation to be a concern for health in 
a purely physical sense .13 In a similar manner, Abdoulaye* explained that he frequents 
his fitness gym on a daily basis purely to obtain “certain physical objectives” and “liber-
ate” himself from stress, doubts and social constraints, but “in no way” does this influ-
ence his perception of religion: “Ça n’a aucune, aucune, aucune interférence .”14
How should we interpret this disconnect between and strict separation of spheres? 
Should we understand fitness practice in Senegal as the manifestation of a kind of 
“secular body” in the sense of “a particular configuration of the human sensorium 
– of sensibilities, affects, embodied dispositions – specific to secular subjects” (Hir-
schkind 2011: 633)? Or, if we don’t want to adhere to the notion of “secular subjects” 
or a secular body, should we at least concede that fitness practice contributes to “the 
sensibilities and corporeal formations through which secularism is realized” (Scheer, 
Johansen, Fadil 2019: 7)? Fitness culture in Western countries has indeed been ana-
lysed as a secular “body project”, materializing “the idea that in late-modernity the self 
becomes a reflexive and secular project which works on an ever refined level of body 
presentations” (Giddens, cited in Sassatelli 2010: 2) . However, on empirical grounds it 
seems obvious that “religious subjects often poke about” in places that they themselves 
conceive of as “secular”, such as gyms, engaging in the body project of fitness train-
ing without thereby automatically engaging in “God-bashing” (Engelke 2019: 204) . 
People training in a gym rather seem to be temporarily ‘bracketing’ their particular 
religiosity and religious identity .15 However, is it therefore appropriate to interpret the 
boom of fitness practices in Dakar and other Senegalese cities as an indicator of proc-
esses of conscious self-fashioning of modern subjects, who are, at times, free to simply 
be and act non-religious? And what are the conditions for the embodiment of such a 
(temporarily) “liberated” modern subjectivity in a Senegalese context?
12 “… pour le sport et ma religion, il n’y a rien […] c’est mon devoir de prier parce que je suis musulmane . 
C’est diamétralement [opposé] au sport . Parce que le sport c’est facultatif . Je peux le faire ou je peux ne pas 
le faire . Pour la prière, c’est obligatoire . Je dois toujours le faire .” (Fatou*, 24 May 2018)
13 “C’est juste la santé . Et si je pratique le sport, je ne suis jamais malade . Si j’arrête, je suis malade .” 
(Fatou*, 24 May 2018)
14 “… je veux continuer à faire du sport pour atteindre certains objectifs physiques . Mais ça n’influence 
en aucun cas sur ma perception de la religion, de la prière ainsi de suite . Ça n’a aucune, aucune, aucune 
interférence […] le sport, je le fais juste comme ça, dans le but d’atteindre certains objectifs physiques, de 
me libérer …” (Abdoulaye*, 8 May 2018); “… la première des motivations […] être un peu souple avec ma 
personne et essayer de me libérer un peu du stress, des doutes […], des contraintes sociales” (Abdoulaye*, 
5 March 2018) .
15 Whereas Engelke (2019: 204) refers to bodybuilders who simply “don’t do what they do as Christians”, 
Kühn (2020) shows that the ‘bracketing’ of religious identities during ‘spiritual’ meditation courses in 
Beirut, Lebanon includes dimensions of experience that practitioners privately link up with their own 
religiosity while insisting on the separation of their ‘spirituality’ from the domain of official religious 
institutions . 
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In his analysis of the “new Senegalese modernity”, Seck (2010: 229) cautions that the 
“classical contradiction” between modernity and religion (and its corollary notion of 
the secular) is misleading as a tool for understanding the dynamics in contemporary 
Senegalese society . Accordingly, we should probably see the claims by pious fitness 
practitioners that “there is nothing” between their religiosity and their fitness practice 
and that “in no way is this influencing my perception of religion” as evidence that fit-
ness practice can stand “outside that division between the secular and the religious” 
(During 2010 cited in Engelke 2015: 91) . However, should we therefore consider gym 
fitness a “mundane” practice in the sense of “those forms of life and experience that 
are not available for our moral or political or philosophical or religious or social aspira-
tions and projects” (ibid .)? Although the “physical objectives” of fitness practitioners 
appear, at first glance to be “mundane” in this sense, a deeper analysis of fitness culture 
(Sassatelli 2010) reveals its inherent morality that is intimately linked with the experi-
ence of body transformation on the physical level .
While it could certainly be fruitful to analyse the various forms of fitness prac-
tice in Senegal in their own right, in this chapter I focus on the way this bodily prac-
tice has acquired meaning within social formations that can be described as part of 
middle-class milieus .16 I have been inspired in my approach by Birgit Meyer’s concept 
of “aesthetic formations” . With this concept she underlines the “forming power of 
a shared “aesthetic style”” within a community that “evolves around shared images 
and other mediated cultural forms” (Meyer 2009: 9) . An important aspect of Meyer’s 
idea of aesthetic formations is her emphasis on the bodily dimension . She insists that 
“the emergence and sustenance of social formations depends on styles that form and 
bind subjects not only through cognitive imaginations, but also through moulding 
the senses and building bodies” (ibid .: 22) . In my analysis of the social spaces of fitness 
practice, I build on Meyer’s understanding of social formations and their coming into 
being through particular forms of “building bodies” .
However, instead of studying social or aesthetic formations that are (pre)conceived 
as religious, I have focused on the aspect of bodily practice and methodologically 
‘bracketed’ the aspect of religiosity . In doing so, I want to foreground the question of 
how particular modes of embodiment are related to specific social formations, taking 
into account that particular social aspirations might prevail over concerns about reli-
gious style (Schielke 2012: 35) . While bracketing the religious, I also bracket the secu-
lar, in order to concentrate on the practical meanings of emic notions . This includes 
an analysis of the term fitness and its local translations, as well as the notion of a “new 
body” that is associated with legitimate body transformation and “body ownership” .
In the first part I introduce the globalized concept of fitness, which originated in 
the USA but rapidly spread worldwide . I explain that fitness practice is part of con-
16 In the outline of her comprehensive ethnographic project on fitness in Mozambique, Julie Soleil Ar-
chambault particularly highlights questions concerning the intersections between local manifestations 
of a globalized “fitness revolution” and a “rise of middle class” (https://sweatyethnography .com/) – an 
aspect that has also been central to my own case study on fitness .
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sumer culture and essentially determined by the institution of the gym, where gender 
mixing is the norm . Tracing the history of fitness gyms in Dakar, which goes back to 
the 1970s, I show that the idea of the unisex gym only materialized in the 1990s . In 
the meantime, the social dynamics of gym fitness in Dakar are strongly shaped by the 
principle of gender mixing, which seems to remain morally unproblematic because 
gym etiquette entails an “official body de-sexualisation” (Sassatelli 2010: 74) of the 
body . This aspect is part of a more encompassing process of disconnecting the body 
symbolism of fitness training from the embodied norms and values of local culture 
and society . Going to the gym does not only symbolize active participation in global 
consumer culture, a form of “doing being middle class” (Lentz 2016),17 a materialized 
“aspiration for world” (Schielke 2012), and an embodiment of urban modernity . It 
also provides the moral legitimacy of a kind of individual body ownership that seems 
disconnected from the “spaces of reciprocal obligations” and their inherent logic of 
teranga – a Wolof term usually translated as hospitality and denoting a cultural ideal 
that has become a symbol of national identity, enacted in private or public on the level 
of families, communities and constituencies in a compulsory manner (Seck 2010: 229, 
Riley 2016) .
In the conclusion, I reflect upon the possibilities of gaining a better understanding 
of the “new Senegalese modernity” through an analysis of its modes of embodiment . 
Bodily practices illustrate the ways in which divergent and partly contradictory so-
ciocultural norms and values are enacted and experienced on a daily basis . The study 
of fitness in contemporary Senegal illustrates that the body is always a site of moral 
projects, where concrete, situationally defined negotiations of embodied gendered 
morality occur . They are articulated in different ‘languages’ that do not easily fit with-
in categorical dichotomies between religion and modernity or between the religious 
and the secular .
Introducing Fitness
In answering to my question of why negative associations and moral critique tended 
to prevail in public discourses about dance in Senegal, my interlocutor responded with 
a smile: “The first immoral gesture is to mix what cannot be mixed; […] men, women 
– you must not mix them” (Babakar*, 19 December 2018) .18
This slightly ironic citation goes back to a lively discussion I had with a trained lin-
guist who happens to be one of the many Muslims I encountered in Senegal that pro-
claimed themselves as pious yet tolerant and self-critical, and who were ready to prove 
their rhetorical skills by critically commenting, in a cheerful manner, upon the typical 
17 See also Julie Soleil Archambault’s paper for ECAS 2019 on “Class, conspicuous perspiration and the 
pursuit of fitness in Mozambique” (https://www .nomadit .co .uk/conference/ecas2019/paper/49434) .
18 “Le premier geste immoral, c’est de mélanger ce qui n’est pas mélangeable ; […] hommes – femmes, il 
ne faut pas les mélanger .”
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aspects of Senegalese Muslims’ everyday religiosity . In my discussions with Muslims of 
various walks of life regarding bodily practices in Senegal, two main moral problems 
were raised explicitly and recurrently, sometimes with joyful irony, sometimes with 
serious anger . First and foremost, exposure of the body, especially the female body, 
was considered counter to Islamic principles . Second, as categorically stated in the ci-
tation above, the mixing of men and women raised concerns about the (external as 
well as internal) control of sexuality . Both aspects are combined in public discourses 
on dance, and especially in the critique of immoral dancing, as Diop (2018) shows 
with respect to “scandalous” media stars and their strategies of indirectly countering 
accusations of sexually permissive behaviour and a lack of bodily control by referring 
to their personal allegiance to a Sufi authority who is supposed to provide internal 
spiritual protection .
Considering the prominence of arguments that are in one way or another related 
to religiosity, constantly mobilized in moralizing discourses about dance,19 it is quite 
striking that fitness practices are themselves generally not considered a problem by 
Muslims in Senegal . As we will see, both exposure of the body and gender mixing are 
rather salient features of fitness culture in Dakar today . As such, we might assume that 
if people were more acquainted with these aspects of fitness, its practitioners would 
no longer be exempted from moral reprobation . However, it seems that this is not 
the case . I suggest that the way in which people in Senegal have become acquainted 
with the notion of fitness, and how they have come to know – discursively as well 
as experientially – what it is meant to be, prevents them from a moral judgement on 
the basis of religious principles . Fitness culture in Senegal entails a specific morality 
and legitimacy that is “in no way interfering” with religiosity, as Abdoulaye* put it . 
This non-interference of religiosity with fitness practice on the individual level could 
be understood in terms of a moral economy that has become rather globalized and 
relatively disconnected from the “thickness of local culture and moralities”, including 
local norms and codes of religious belonging (Smith 2013: 156) .
However, the field of fitness practices is only relatively disconnected from its local 
environment, since the dynamics of global and local transformations are inextricably 
intertwined in globalization processes . Moreover, the inherent moralities of fitness as 
a social formation have also changed in the course of its evolution . As Andreasson and 
Johansson (2014: 96–97) show in their analysis of the historical development of global 
gym and fitness culture, during the first phase of this development (until the 1970s) 
in the USA, the values of the “physical culture” of bodybuilding, which later became 
part of a larger “fitness culture”, were still exclusively associated with masculinity and 
strongly related to both nation-building and (Christian) religion .20 The transforma-
tion of this movement into a globalized mass cultural practice involving both men and 
19 It seems that the issue of dance is often used as a kind of ‘pretext’ to discuss public or private, individual 
or collective aspects of aspects of religiosity and its embodiment .
20 These aspects are also highlighted in Bromber’s (2017) analysis of fitness and the cultivation of “new 
bodies” in Ethiopia under the reign of Haile Selassie .
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women occurred only later (from the 1980s onwards), when “working out became 
part of an urban middle-class and single lifestyle” (ibid .: 102) . The massive develop-
ment of gym fitness in the 1990s, depicted by Andreasson and Johansson as “the fit-
ness revolution”, crossed social as well as territorial boundaries, because the techniques 
and concept of the fitness workout started to circulate on a global scale . This led in 
one sense to a more uniform and homogeneous global gym and fitness culture, and 
in another sense “to glocal variations in the adaptation of this global ‘culture’ .” (ibid .: 
104) .
The same dynamics, although mediated by the particularities of local and national 
economic developments, also characterize the evolution of fitness culture in Senegal . 
Moreover, ever since fitness has become part of the cultural landscape of Senegalese 
society, there has been an intermingling with local moralities, which are not perma-
nently fixed orders or immutable entities, but continually negotiated, shifting and 
transforming as society changes .21 As we will see later, bodily practices play an effec-
tive role in these changes . In order to understand the role of fitness practices in these 
transformations, it is useful to examine where and how this intermingling started . 
Therefore, we must take account of when and how the English notion of “fitness” was 
introduced into local discourses and into which local terms it has been translated . First 
of all, though, I should explain what I mean by fitness .
Fitness – A Globalized Concept and its Local Translations
In contrast to dance, which can be considered to have been a feature of humanity since 
its origins (Hanna 1977), the concept of fitness has a rather short history . As men-
tioned above, Andreasson and Johansson situate “the fitness revolution” in the 1990s, 
pointing out that in the 1980s the notion was still not yet popular (the term used 
then for what became known as fitness was “workout”) . In the meantime, however, 
“most people just use the term fitness when talking about fitness gyms, characterized 
by a mixture of training styles and methods” (Andreasson and Johansson 2014: 103) . 
In my own use of the term I follow Sassatelli’s (2010) more critical conceptualization 
of fitness as a commercialized practice that she analyses in terms of a “lived culture” 
centred on the individual body and, more fundamentally, on the subject (ibid .: 168) .22 
Although its origins in the USA in the late 1970s and early 1980s reveal specific fea-
tures of post-industrial consumer culture (Featherstone 1982, Sassatelli 2010: 22), fit-
21 In her outline of an “anthropology of sweat” based on an ethnography of fitness in Mozambique, Julie 
Soleil Archambault (forthcoming) systematically analyses the interrelated local and global dynamics of 
socio-economic, bodily and moral transformations . 
22 This concept of fitness as a leisure activity practised by consumers capable of acting as responsible 
subjects (Sassatelli 2010: 206) is different from much older and more widespread notions of physical edu-
cation and gymnastics that are (in principle) addressing the masses, who are called upon to serve a nation 
or imperium (as in Bromber’s (2017) analyses of “fitness” and its fascistic connotations in the context of 
imperial Ethiopia) .
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ness practice has also spread out into regions of the world that have not undergone 
similar industrialization processes . As Sassatelli (2010: 8) points out, the negotiation 
and active “re-working” of gender identities is an important feature of the continu-
ally globalizing fitness culture . The introduction of a new brand of physical exercise 
promoted by Jane Fonda under the label “Aerobics” was very influential in that regard . 
Aerobics was conceived as a form of gymnastics “largely designed for women aspiring 
to have a harmonious slender appearance” (ibid .: 22) .23 Aerobics strongly contributed 
to the “opening” of the formerly male-dominated space of gyms to women, by intro-
ducing popular music and effectively combining physical education with pop culture 
and dance (ibid .: 21–22) . Conversely, the institution of the fitness gym has been cru-
cial in providing the conditions under which gender identities are reworked in specific 
ways .
Building on Sassatelli, I consider the gym an essential element for the diffusion of 
fitness practices, including those that take place outside of a gym . I argue that the way 
in which such practices are interpreted and symbolically charged is determined by the 
cultural location of the fitness gym . According to Sassatelli, fitness gyms constitute (in 
principle) “non-competitive environments aimed at providing recreational exercise to 
boost physical form and well-being; and as such, they are at the core of a much broader 
fitness culture” (ibid .: 6) . This broader fitness culture overlaps with sports, but also 
differs from sports in many ways; the latter usually include an element of competition 
as part of the ‘rules of the game’ and/or consist of a type of bodily performance that 
is seen as an end in itself . Gym fitness, by contrast, “is all training” with the prospect 
of modelling one’s own body (ibid .: 99–100) . Moreover, fitness has become the over-
all concept for a “folk movement” centred on practices that are “a highly individual-
ized and personal task” (Andreasson and Johansson 2014: 105) . The fitness gym is an 
important institution for the development of this form of collective individualized 
training, framing specific practices as an effective and rational way of getting “a better 
body” (Sassatelli 2010: 101) . It is important to remind ourselves that this ideal applies 
to both sexes . In general, fitness gyms “present themselves as unisex and appeal to an 
as wide as possible public of consumers”, which reflects the fact that “[t]he fitness 
phenomenon is commercial at its core .” (ibid .: 5) .
According to the findings of my research, this characterization is also valid for fit-
ness gyms in Dakar . Nonetheless, in current public discourses around fitness, largely 
diffused through social media, its commercial aspect is virtually eclipsed, remaining 
mostly hidden behind the framework of concerns surrounding public health, includ-
ing national policies and discourses that focus on this problem . These public health 
concerns are reflected in the concept of activités de remise en forme (activities of get-
23 Aerobic workouts go back to a specific kind of aerobic training developed in the USA in the 1960s to 
improve the fitness of astronauts and pilots (Sassatelli 2010: 209, FN 2; République du Sénégal 2014: 13) . 
Jane Fonda was also inspired by the medically trained pioneer of functional gymnastics, Bess Mensen-
dieck, who had developed a system of training especially designed for (educated) women in order to en-
able them to fulfil their duties as “healthy mothers of a healthy nation” (Klein 1992: 151–152) .
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ting back into shape), which was introduced as an official translation of the English 
term fitness (see below) . This concept suggests that there is already a deviance from 
the ideal norm of physical shape . From a government perspective, this norm is not 
related to aesthetic appearance, but to the functionality of a healthy body . However, 
the centrality of the public health problem to the evolution of fitness culture in Dakar 
as expressed in official public discourse does not entail the existence of effective public 
policies in this domain . Rather, it has become an engine of private entrepreneurship . 
Its commercial aspect was expressed as follows in an informal interview with a private 
fitness entrepreneur: “Ma salle est comme une pharmacie – on soigne les gens […] c’est 
comme un hôpital!” (Karim*, 27 January 2018) .
This citation confirms the economic impact of the health problem, since “il y a de 
l’argent dedans!” (ibid .) . At the same time, it points to the centrality of the gym in un-
derstanding the institutional and economic basis of fitness culture in Senegal . Moreo-
ver, the gym is also the converging point of popular images of fitness . This was illus-
trated in my introductory vignette, where I reported that my interpreter in  Toubab 
Diallaw used the term salle de sport to explain the meaning of fitness in Wolof . In fact, 
the French term salle de sport (often abbreviated to salle, as in the citation above) is the 
most current translation of the term “gym” into French (and into Wolof) .
The Evolution of Fitness Gyms:  
From the Association Sénégalaise de Culture Physique (1970s)  
to the Olympic Club (1990s)
Considering the centrality of the commercial gym to the diffusion of globalized con-
cepts of fitness, it is worthwhile to ask when and how the first professionally managed 
fitness centres were locally established . Interestingly, the example of what can be con-
sidered the precursor to the contemporary fitness gym reveals that when the first local 
appropriations and adaptations of globalized fitness practices took shape in Dakar in 
the 1970s and 1980s, it was not only commercial strategies that were important for 
their success, but also the use of state-based moral and social resources . This element of 
(masculine) nationalism corresponds to the characteristics of the first phase of the de-
velopment of global fitness culture as analysed by Andreasson and Johansson (2014) . 
In Senegal, where the development of commercial gyms was temporarily dampened 
by the economic crisis that became generalized in the course of the 1980s (Antoine et 
al . 1995; Dimé and Calvès 2006), the second phase in the development of fitness cul-
ture only started in the 1990s, when the idea of the unisex fitness centre began to be 
popularized . At their outset, fitness practices in Dakar were not gender-mixed .
According to my interlocutors, the most influential precursor of professionally 
organized gym fitness in Dakar is Jean Baptiste Laberry . Born in Dakar in 1937 to a 
French father (who was already born in Senegal) and a Cape Verdean mother, Laberry 
is a Franco-Senegalese whose training in sports administration goes back to his mili-
tary service during the late colonial period . Another important element of Laberry’s 
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professional career as a gym founder and manager was his participation in competi-
tive bodybuilding . From the 1960s he was a member of the International Federation 
of Bodybuilding and Fitness (IFBB), founded in 1946 by Joe Weider, a Canadian of 
Polish origin who is himself one of the people most influential in the development of a 
globalized fitness industry (Andreasson and Johansson 2014: 98ff .) . Laberry, who was 
also trained as a sales agent and has always combined his activities in the bodybuild-
ing and fitness sector with entrepreneurial activities in various domains, acted as the 
Senegalese representative for the Olympic Committee in the domain of bodybuilding . 
Before opening his own bodybuilding and fitness gym, he had been employed by a 
Lebanese who owned a studio that was called the “Weider”, because it was equipped 
with Joe Weider machines and marketed Joe Weider products (including nutritional 
supplements such as proteins for bodybuilders) .
In the early 1970s, Laberry took over the “Weider”, which was located en ville, 
in the old centre of Dakar on the plateau, where the French colonists had once con-
structed ‘their’ European city .24 He reorganized and formalized the gym, which was of-
ficially registered in 1975 as the Association Sénégalaise de Culture Physique (ASCP) . 
On the basis of this registration, Laberry proudly claims – not only in our interview 
but also on promotional leaflets for his gym – that it is “the only gym recognized by 
the state” (la seule salle reconnue par l’état) . Given the commercial aspect of the fitness 
training delivered by the ASCP, its status as an “association” could be questioned, but 
Laberry has worked hard to ensure the acknowledgement of his work as a kind of com-
mon good that contributes to the development of the nation . Since the era of Senghor 
(1960–1980), Laberry has always maintained good and direct relationships with the 
government of the day . He has received official distinctions from each of Senegal’s 
presidents, including the highest symbolic award, the National Order of the Lion 
(Ordre National du Lion) . In our conversations, he nostalgically recalled his close 
relationship with Senghor, who had been a friend of Laberry’s father since the days 
when both of them attended a Catholic missionary school in Ngasobil, not far from 
Senghor’s birthplace in Joal . Laberry’s father remained a fervent Christian and raised 
his children accordingly . Despite his efforts to push his son Jean Baptiste into a career 
as pastor, the latter has never actively engaged in pious religious practice . Nevertheless, 
as Jean Baptiste Laberry confirms with a smile, he has retained his faith in God .
In 1980, Laberry expanded his fitness business by opening two other salles, this 
time in Soumbédioune, a location situated at the coastal border of the former ‘African’ 
quarter of Médina, adjacent to the plateau . Soumbédioune is best known for its huge 
fish market and for the beach where the fishing boats are harboured and where fresh 
fish is grilled on the spot in the evenings . Close to the fishermen’s beach and the lively 
market area of Médina, the newly opened gyms appealed to a more diverse set of cus-
24 The construction of the “white city” of Dakar on the plateau by the French colonial power involved 
the displacement of the indigenous Lebu population in order to create an exclusively European habitat 
(Faye 2017: 48ff .) .
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tomers than the predominantly white elite,25 composed mainly of expatriates or Leba-
nese, that had constituted the clientele of the “Weider” . The gyms in Soumbédioune 
attracted a lot of wrestlers (lutteurs), whose usual training spots in Dakar are beaches, 
where they can build up their strength and endurance through special techniques 
practised in the deep sand . Laberry’s new gyms opened at a time when traditional 
local wrestling practices had already fused into a nationalized and extremely popular 
sport that was rapidly expanding, commercializing and professionalizing (Faye 2002) . 
With these two gyms, officially inaugurated by the then sports minister, Laberry sig-
nificantly contributed to both a popularization and nationalization of fitness prac-
tice in Senegal . He was able to establish personal and professional relationships with a 
number of leading state representatives, who not only came to these gyms themselves 
to train with the help of “competent experts” and the support of “ultra-modern” tech-
nical equipment, but also brought about an integration of fitness practices into the 
training of the police and military forces (Laberry, 11 May 2018) .
Hence, with his gyms, Laberry was not only catering to customers who came to 
train and shape their bodies as a leisure activity, but also to diverse groups of – predom-
inantly male – professionals, including various categories of state officials . Against this 
background, his decision to organize gym fitness in a gender-segregated manner was, 
at that time (the late 1970s and 1980s), certainly a way to appeal to the widest pos-
sible range of public consumers willing and able to pay for access to an environment 
where they could train and shape their bodies according to globalized norms trans-
mitted by scientifically underpinned expert knowledge . It is significant that Laberry 
didn’t attribute his decision in favour of gender-segregation to the religious norms of 
his mainly Muslim environment, but rather to a kind of general patriarchal social con-
servatism: “Most husbands don’t want their wives to work out with men” (La plupart 
des maris ne veulent pas que leurs femmes travaillent avec des hommes; 11 May 2018) . 
Given that Laberry combined his own passion for bodybuilding with a keen entre-
preneurial spirit, I assume that his choice to divide the week into gender-segregated 
training days worked out well in both social and economic terms – at least for the first 
two decades .26
The rather unique and avantgarde position that Laberry assumed with his fit-
ness gyms in the Senegalese capital was challenged in 1992 when a new fitness centre 
opened in Dakar, the Olympic Club, where the Western model of unisex fitness train-
ing was embraced and put into practice on a professional level . This club, located on 
the Corniche in a district called Mermoz, was initially established in the late 1980s as 
a tennis club and constitutes a comparatively upper-class venue . Its founder, Cheikh 
25 I use the term white in order to refer to a privileged position in a power hierarchy underpinned by race 
politics .
26 In 2010, aged 73, Laberry decided to sell the gyms in Soumbédioune, but kept the ASCP en ville, where 
the gender-segregated arrangement is still maintained: the gym is open for men on Mondays, Wednesdays 
and Fridays, and for women on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays (after 4 pm on Saturdays the training 
is gender-mixed) .
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Berté, was a former state official who had directed the administration of social services 
at the Cheikh Anta Diop University of Dakar, including its sports facilities . After con-
centrating on tennis for several years,27 he decided to open up the club to various other 
physical disciplines, starting with the introduction of a fitness gym in 1992 . Step by 
step, the idea of a club multisport materialized, as befitting the notion of ‘Olympic’, 
which deliberately evokes the famous international multisport event . Nowadays the 
club encompasses a large area and includes a whole complex of venues for different 
forms of fitness practice (two halls with machines for individual training and several 
halls for group fitness), sports (tennis, martial arts, basketball), and leisure activities, 
including a swimming pool, a wellness centre, a bar, and two shops selling high-priced 
sports and leisure outfits .
Set up as a family enterprise, the club is currently directed by one of Cheikh Berté’s 
daughters and her French husband . After a stay in France where both of them received 
professional training in managerial and pedagogical skills, Cheikh Berté entrusted 
them with the task of introducing and then continually expanding the gym fitness 
segment of the club . In doing so, they resolutely maintained the conscious decision 
of its founder to refrain from separating men and women in the context of sporting 
activities – as long as said activities did not require gender segregation as part of the 
‘rules of the game’ . In this respect the Olympic Club was an innovation, deliberately 
contradicting the way that fitness training was organized in existing gyms at that time, 
namely in the salles managed by Jean Baptiste Laberry, who still maintains the gender-
segregated organization of his gyms .
Today, however, the ASCP’s formerly “ultra-modern” environment for remodel-
ling one’s own body appears somehow outdated and more of a throwback to times 
past than an up-to-date venue for the city’s ever-growing clientele of fitness consum-
ers . The Olympic Club, in contrast, has managed to maintain its position as one of the 
most ‘classy’ fitness centres in Dakar, catering to a cosmopolitan upper middle-class 
and elite clientele . Moreover, it is an important reference point for professionals in the 
field of fitness practices and has been influential in shaping Dakarois fitness culture 
far beyond the social milieu of its clients . This is due in no small part to the Olym-
pic Club’s role as a training ground for fitness coaches, many of whom work there 
for a while before continuing on elsewhere . The directors of the club are continually 
expanding their offering of new training formats, including for example some of the 
globally standardized courses of the branded Les Mills Body Training System .28 They 
also provide the conditions for certifying as a Les Mills coach . In this way, the bodily 
techniques transmitted and the way that fitness culture is embodied in the Olympic 
Club develop a multiplier effect .
27 Cheikh Berté continued promoting tennis in Senegal, in particular by supporting the professionaliza-
tion of women – starting with his own daughters, who played tennis at an international level . 
28 Les Mills International is a New Zealand company that has launched several exercise-to-music formats 
under the Body Training System brand name since the early 1990s (cf . Andreasson and Johansson 2014: 
106; Sassatelli 2010: 90) .
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The most important multiplier effect, however, is probably the economic success of 
the ideal of the unisex fitness gym and the way it is put into practice via the principle 
of gender mixing . The impact of this principle on the evolution of popular fitness cul-
ture in Senegal is depicted in a government report that was commissioned to provide 
data on the current state of gym fitness in Dakar roughly 20 years after its introduction 
by the Olympic Club in 1992 .
Fitness Culture in Dakar – A Government Perspective
A study carried out by the Ministry of Sports in 2014 accounts for the current fitness 
boom in Senegalese cities by referring to an increasing popularity of activités de remise 
en forme (République du Sénégal 2014) .29 At the time of our research, the concept of 
activités de remise en forme was current among professionals in the domain of physi-
cal education, including representatives of the Ministry of Sports and the National 
Physical and Sports Education Institute (Institut National Supérieur de l’Education 
Populaire et du Sport: INSEPS) . The notion had been coined to define a particular 
subset of physical activities considered in need of public policies . Encompassing the 
idea of shaping the body, the notion also reflects a concern with public health, which 
was perceived as under threat from an increasing incidence of cerebrovascular acci-
dents and other effects of lifestyle diseases related to “sedentarism”, such as diabetes, 
obesity and hypertension .30
According to the government report, activités de remise en forme could be ob-
served in a variety of outdoor activities as well as in a growing number of gyms (salles 
de sport) .31 Although the study notes the strong growth of the latter, it also explicitly 
recognizes that this phenomenon completely escapes state control . It hence refers to 
gym fitness as being an “individual” practice (pratique sportive individuelle), in the 
sense that is not collectively organized in federal structures such as the various officially 
recognized forms of sport . Moreover, the study points to the fact that there is still no 
coherent national legal framework for establishing a formally recognized salle de sport 
and that most gyms do not have adequate papers . A first attempt in 1996 by the Min-
29 The document of the study to which I refer here is an unpublished draft that was provided in 2018 
to Mbanga Diallo by a representative of the Ministry of Sports . We could not verify whether a published 
version exists . 
30 In Senegal, cerebrovascular accidents (French acronym: AVC) constitute 30% of hospitalised cases . Two 
thirds of mortalities in the neurological services in Dakar are attributed to AVC (Mboup et al . 2015) .
31 I treat the term “gym” as synonymous with the French notion salle de sport, which is most current 
among Senegalese (francophone as well as Wolof) speakers . Some of my interlocutors also referred to salle 
de gymnastique, but this term is much less widely used . The term salle de sport is used throughout the 
Ministry’s study, although the activities that are carried out there are explicitly distinguished from sports 
and summarized as encompassing la musculation et le fitness . The English term fitness is used to refer 
to practices that derive from Aerobics, characterized as a kind of gymnastique modelant le corps par des 
mouvements effectués en musique (République du Sénégal 2014: 13) .
200 Nadine Sieveking
istry of Sports and Youth to regulate the creation of what were then identified as sports 
and leisure centres (salles de sport and centres de loisirs sportifs) has so far been ineffec-
tive, but it clearly indicates that the existence of such centres was already quantitatively 
remarkable in the 1990s .
Interestingly, the study from 2014 points out three main motives of gym clients 
which are assumed to contribute to the increasing numbers of salles de sport in the 
cities: firstly, a medical prescription issued to counter the effects of urban lifestyle dis-
eases; secondly, the aim of “feeling in shape”, augmenting one’s muscular strength or 
“just staying young”; and thirdly, the search for a partner for a sentimental relation-
ship or a lifelong partnership, since salles de sport are also said to serve as places for 
men and women to meet (République du Sénégal 2014: 5) . It is worth noting that the 
explicit reference to gendered interactions as a motive for gym clients appears only in 
the introductory section of the study . In the section where the results of the empiri-
cal research based on qualitative methods (participant observation and interviews) are 
summarized, the reasons given by gym clients themselves are specified as: recherche de 
la performance physique, besoin d’amélioration de sa santé physique, raisons esthéti-
ques and, last but not least, le loisir et la détente .
Some gender-specific aspects are added in relation to health issues and body aes-
thetics, but it seems that interactions between men and women were not explicitly 
mentioned in the interviews . Instead, the study states that gyms are described as places 
where people go to make friends and find pleasure (les salles sont aussi des lieux pour 
se faire des amis, pour se faire plaisir) . Some specific pleasures that clients derive from 
gym fitness are described in more detail, albeit in a gender-neutral manner . These 
include meeting people (rencontrer des gens), but refer also to the purely individual 
aspects of a physical workout, such as sweating and expending energy while doing ex-
ercise or dancing (suer et dépenser de l’énergie en faisant des exercices ou de la dance) 
(ibid .: 12) .
The fact that the study nonetheless refers to gyms as “places for men and women 
to meet” is remarkable because it indicates the existence of a public discourse in which 
fitness gyms are depicted in that manner .32 It also points to the fact that nowadays, 
most fitness gyms in Dakar are gender-mixed . Last but not least, the study clearly indi-
cates that the notion of fitness practice includes elements of musculation, but is none-
theless viewed as different (in principle) from all-male forms of training for wrestling, 
boxing and bodybuilding – practices that precede and coexist with the introduction 
of fitness in Senegal .
32 The relevant sentence in the study is de facto formulated in indirect speech, indicating a reference to 
an “on dit”: “Les salles de sport seraient aussi un lieu de rencontre pour des hommes et des femmes à la 
recherche de relation sentimentale ou de partenaire pour la vie” (République du Sénégal 2014: 5) .
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Caricature from the journal Le soleil, 22 . October 2017, p . 14 (courtesy of Le soleil) .
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The Social Formation of Gym Fitness
In the meantime, fitness gyms of various categories, catering to customers from dif-
ferent socio-economic milieus, can be found all over Dakar . The government report 
referred to above is based on a study of gyms in Guédiawaye, a large suburb of Dakar 
with a population consisting primarily of less privileged and comparatively lower-class 
inhabitants and it is important to point out that fitness gyms are also popular in these 
milieus . My own explorations of the field of fitness gyms, however, were motivated 
by an interest in the lifeworld of new middle-class milieus in the city . Therefore, my 
research (partly carried out in a small team with two locally based research partners) 
concentrated on gyms that fall into a more elevated economic category . The average 
fees required by gyms in Guédiawaye (10,000 CFA for registration) marked the lower 
end of our sample . Compared to upper-class gyms that exist in Dakar, the upper end 
of our sample (30,000 CFA to register at the Olympic Club) can still be considered as 
situated within a middle-class category .33 However, in terms of numbers it is impor-
tant to note that no statistics exist . In my own research I have focused on a few venues 
that represent contrasting cases with regard to the degree of formal establishment and 
professional management .
In general, the level of formality tends to increase in accordance with the economic 
standard of a gym . The small gym established at the Maison des Jeunes in Ouakam, 
where a fee of only 500 CFA was enough for a single entry, marked the lower end of 
the economic spectrum of our sample .34 It was the only fitness centre I visited where 
registration was not officially required, but in many gyms the relevant fees could be 
negotiated . In contrast, the fees at the Olympic Club are fixed and part of a technologi-
cally sophisticated system of access management (including an electronic membership 
card and an identification system based on digital fingerprints) . The payments at the 
club are unlikely to be affordable for people with an economic background compara-
ble to the income of the ‘old’ middle-class categories, such as teachers, employees in the 
public health or public administration sectors, or members of the police or military 
forces . In the less formally established gyms, meanwhile, registration fees vary greatly 
and payments for membership or single entry tend to be open to all kinds of situ-
ational adaptations . In fact, many gyms do not have a formalized administration sys-
tem and literally cannot register their clients because they keep their records of regular 
participants on the basis of oral agreement and memory .
In Dakar, fitness practices have become an omnipresent feature of ordinary urban 
life . They are not only carried out in gyms, but also in various (semi-)public open-
33 When I started my research in 2017, the club’s registration fee was 30,000 CFA, and the monthly 
membership fee allowing use of the machines and participation in all group fitness activities was 30,000 
(raised to 35,000 CFA in 2018) . Alternatively, a single-use entry could be purchased for 5,000 CFA . Most 
of the gyms we visited officially required between 1,000 and 2,000 CFA per session/per single entry or 
between 10,000 and 20,000 per month for unlimited participation .
34 In a gym at the foyer des Jeunes in Yoff, a single session was only 200 CFA .
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air spaces, most prominently on the Corniche (the road along the cliff-lined coast of 
Dakar) . Here, and in many other places (including beaches, but also small parks and 
traffic islands), fitness training intermingles with other sporting practices and with a 
broad range of activities carried out by members of associations that do not follow a 
commercial agenda . Even so, commercial venues for fitness practices are definitely still 
on the rise .
This trend is important because it contributes to the evolution and diffusion of a 
kind of “aesthetic formation” that is specific to the fitness gym . Embodying local ap-
propriations of a globalized culture of consumption, the aesthetics of gym fitness also 
enable the celebration of body-centred forms of “doing-being middle class” (Lentz 
2016: 42) . This aspect of fitness culture in Dakar was clearly expressed by Djibril Seck, 
a leading cadre at the INSEPS (Institut National Supérieur de l’Education Populaire 
et du Sport), who conceived of fitness practice as the manifestation of a “new body” .
Forming “the New Body”
Djibril Seck’s perspective on fitness practices is particularly interesting, because he is 
familiar with the logic of private fitness entrepreneurs, with the needs and expectations 
of trainers and gym clients, and with public politics and discourses . He teaches and co-
ordinates scientific research at the INSEPS, but also collaborates with the directors of 
the Olympic Club in the training of professional fitness coaches while giving courses 
for amateurs at the club . In his capacity as a state official, Djibril Seck has played an 
important role in national commissions intended to expand public sports and physi-
cal education programmes . The resulting public policies range from the promotion 
of professional competitive athletics to national initiatives aimed at preventing the ef-
fects of lifestyle diseases and age-related health problems . Since 2001, Djibril Seck has 
been involved in organizing seminars and empirical studies on the effects of changing 
bodily practices and consumption patterns . For example, he organized the first official 
workshop on “fitness” in 2002, to which professional experts from France were in-
vited .35 Since then, these ‘imported’ concepts have been locally appropriated and put 
into practice by a “new category” of actors that Djibril Seck locates somewhere in the 
middle of society, where this emerging social formation is collectively moulding and 
forming the “new body”:
“On vient maintenant au nouveau corps, le fitness . […] Il y a l’émergence d’une 
nouvelle catégorie de personnes de niveau moyen qui donne une importance au 
corps selon le code social …” (19 December 2018)
35 The main motivation for this workshop was a concern for public health: “… parce que déjà on voyait 
l’avènement des maladies chroniques non transmissibles liés aux modes de vie, au changement de compor-
tement : manger trop gras, trop salé, trop sucré, être de plus en plus sédentaire, se déplacer en car rapide, 
en auto …” (Djibril Seck, 19 December 2018) .
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Interestingly, in Djibril Seck’s account of fitness practices in Dakar, he points out that 
the physical body and the social body are always corresponding (Douglas 1970) accord-
ing to a “social code” that is specific to each category of people, confirming, thereby, 
Douglas’s assumption that the body is a “highly restricted medium of expression” . His 
description of the motivations of people practising fitness not only confirms the gov-
ernment report, where both health concerns and the possibility of “encounters” in a 
gym are mentioned, but also highlights the aspect of social status that can be conveyed 
through a particular image of the self, as represented by a healthy body that can be 
obtained through working out according to global technical standards: “Il y en a qui 
viennent pour l’expression de leur statut : tu viens, il y a plein de machines, tu fais des 
selfies, tu te présentes, etc . … et tu partages, pour montrer que tu es ‘in’, tu es en bonne 
santé, et que ce qui se fait partout dans le monde, se fait ici .” (19 December 2018) .
Djibril Seck’s descriptions contain an illuminating analysis of a new social forma-
tion that is made up of a comparatively privileged category of urbanites with the means 
to engage in the practice of gym fitness . He points out the particular symbolic value 
ascribed to this practice, related to a social status that is allegedly de niveau moyen 
and sustained by a healthy physical condition . This condition has de facto become an 
ideal that is increasingly difficult to attain and maintain, and not only for the parts of 
the population who lack the means to pay for medical treatments . As many Dakarois 
complain, the city’s growing population, its unavoidable traffic jams and mushroom-
ing construction sites have contributed to living conditions that have become “un-
bearable” for all categories of inhabitants . The challenge of putting one’s body into a 
healthy condition hence also concerns people with well paid jobs that are forcing (even 
enticing and enabling) them to submit their bodies to the constraints of an increas-
ingly “sedentary” lifestyle .
The “new body" promoted by fashionable, well equipped fitness gyms like the Ol-
ympic Club is a symbol of globalization and its effective appropriation by local society . 
In contrast to the frustrating experience of ‘waithood’ (and the immobility endured in 
the daily traffic jam), it represents active participation in global culture and constitutes 
a medium that locates the self in a here-and-now that could be anywhere in the world . 
In the context of globalized consumer culture, fitness training symbolizes the (antic-
ipated) success of a new generation of “digital natives”, socialized as cosmopolitans 
and oriented towards upward social mobility . According to Djibril Seck, these social 
groups are particularly sensitive to the symbolic potential of fitness culture in terms of 
a self-affirmation based on body appropriation: “leur corps devient leur nouvel objet 
et leur possession pour s’affirmer” (Djibril Seck, 19 December 2018) .
Body appropriation, in the context of fitness practice, has a particular logic that 
must be understood on both an economic level and a technical one . Both levels are 
intertwined with the specific rationality and ‘objectivity’ of fitness practices that will 
be explained below in relation to the idea of the body as a machine and the concept 
of energy that is produced by fitness training . However, the economic aspect of fit-
ness training also plays out in relation to the symbolic capital and prestige that can be 
achieved by training in a gym . Reflecting on the circumstances of the rather well-off 
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middle- and upper-class categories of fitness practitioners who frequent the Olympic 
Club (couche moyenne à élite), Djibril Seck concedes that their social profile is far 
from the average Senegalese: “c’est pas le Sénégalais lamda qui vient ici” (19 December 
2018) . Compared to the Sénégalais lamda, the Olympic Club’s customers – who pay 
between 30,000 and 50,000 CFA per month just for their fitness gym36 – represent an 
economically highly privileged elite, encompassing expatriates as well as members of 
the upper social strata, among whom many have been abroad, work for multination-
al companies and occupy leading positions in Senegal’s highly globalized economy, 
where liberalization has led to an expanding private sector: “C’est des cadres de haut 
niveau, ils travaillent dans le business” . That said, fitness training at the Olympic Club 
is also based on some fundamental principles and mechanisms that do not differ very 
much from the training offered by more modest and easily accessible gyms that cater 
to a clientele with a comparatively lower middle-class lifestyle . Some of these principles 
are part of informal gym etiquette – a set of implicit rules shaping the embodied ethics 
of fitness practice that seem to be ‘universal’ . However, another set of principles and 
mechanisms is structuring fitness practice on a more technical level, apparently inde-
pendent of social behaviour and its culturally determined morality .
Legitimate Appropriation of Body Transformation
Fitness training techniques rely heavily on the idea of the body as a “machine” – an 
idea that was “essential to calculate and rationalize individuals’ energy as productive 
potential” in the context of the industrializing Western countries from the nineteenth 
century onwards (Sassatelli 2010: 187) . Moreover, fitness training also addresses the 
‘natural’ body, referring to its organic rationality – for example by taking individual 
physical limits or anatomical specificities into account – to optimize the results of 
training . Much like the disciplinary power that enabled industrial capitalism to rule 
over the bodies of the working population in the most effective manner (Foucault 
1975), discipline in the context of fitness practice combines principles of both me-
chanical and organic rationality .
In a gym, the stress of everyday working and living conditions is transformed into 
productive energy that can be used and consumed by its legitimate owner – the fitness 
practitioner . This is accompanied by a particular temporal structuring of training, in 
order to guarantee that time spent in the gym is not ‘wasted’ . Moreover, the discipline 
of fitness practitioners who concentrate solely on their workout (instead of on social-
izing with others) provides them with a particular morality . As Sassatelli (2010: 193) 
remarks, fitness clients “seem convinced of the moral stance of fitness training, on the 
grounds that it allows for a legitimate appropriation of body transformation” . This 
idea contradicts conceptions of the body as something that a human person can only 
36 These fees correspond to roughly half of the average wage (estimated as below 100,000 CFA in 2019: 
https://tradingeconomics .com/senegal/wages, accessed 15 May 2020) .
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partly own, inhabit and control . As Djibril Seck maintained during our interview, lo-
cal concepts of the body that are transmitted in everyday practices within ‘traditional’ 
Senegalese communities remind us that the individual body is always partly “owned” 
by the community: “Tout ton corps ne t’appartient pas . On dit [en Wolof] : Sa genn 
wala nga mom – le restant appartient à la communauté” (19 December 2018) . Fitness 
practitioners, by contrast, fully “own their bodies”: “leur corps devient leur nouvel 
objet et leur possession pour s’affirmer” (ibid .) .
This combined effect of body ownership and self-affirmation can be compared 
to the forms of cultural appreciation and increasing valorization of the body that are 
described by Diouf (2002) in his study of the urban youth culture that took shape 
in Dakar in the course of the generalized crisis of the 1980s and 1990s . As an effect 
of this crisis, large parts of the younger population – especially from less privileged 
social milieus and from the peripheries of the city – lost any prospects of a decent 
livelihood, let alone of upward social mobility in the future . According to Diouf 
(2002: 278), for these socially and economically marginalized groups, the body be-
came “their only good” (l’unique marchandise don’t ils disposent) . In contrast to the 
body-centred youth culture depicted by Diouf, contemporary fitness culture in Dakar 
is neither restricted to the youth, nor is it a protest movement, a rebellion against an 
older generation that refrains from sharing its power and resources . On the contrary: 
fitness practices are increasingly popular among the middle aged and (parts of) the 
older population .
Fitness gyms are commercial venues, and in order to reach as broad a range of 
potential customers as possible, they “typically play on variety” (Sassatelli 2010: 40) 
regarding the social background of their clientele . As already explained above, there is 
also a wide variety of gyms in terms of their economic access conditions . In principle, 
one’s level of education does not matter in terms of access . Conversely, fitness gyms 
constitute institutions that provide prospects for jobs and upward social mobility to 
individuals without much educational capital . Although a lot of coaches in Dakar 
have inadequate training, are badly paid and are working under precarious conditions, 
the opportunities to obtain professional qualifications that exist in the fitness domain 
are quite varied and far more flexible than in the sector of professional sports . On the 
practitioners’ part, fitness training entails the adoption of a particular “fitness habitus” 
(Sassatelli 2010: 38) that is not only implicitly reworking gender identities, but also 
‘officially’ reframing and temporarily replacing social distinctions .
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Gym Etiquette:  
“De-sexualisation” and “Filtering” of Social Attributes
Gym etiquette requires that clients learn “to distance themselves, at least partially, 
from their external roles and social obligations” as soon as they enter a fitness cen-
tre (Sassatelli 2010: 61) . “This may entail a partial, official filtering of those social at-
tributes which should not interfere with training – including class, gender, sexuality 
and ethnicity” (ibid .) . Not all gyms in Dakar have changing rooms, and some don’t 
even have a proper toilet, let alone a room to take a shower . Where such facilities exist, 
they constitute liminal spaces that mark the transition between an ‘ordinary’ person 
and a fitness practitioner . Usually, such spaces strictly separate men and women . In 
contrast, gender segregation in the rooms where fitness training is actually practised 
is generally completely informal . As in the formal context of mixed working environ-
ments, in a gym, “training operates on official body de-sexualisation and its surrepti-
tious sexualisation” (ibid .: 74) .
As such, to speak of “official body de-sexualisation” does not seek to deny that 
gyms have become places of encounter between men and women who are searching 
for a partner “for a sentimental relationship or a lifelong partnership” or a less perma-
nent sexual relationship . The “surreptitious sexualisation” of the body may be very 
effective in attracting people to a gym, as the government report cited above suggests . 
Equally, it is a factor that can lead fitness practitioners to quit a particular gym or 
to stop practising gym fitness altogether . Importantly, sexualised behaviour is viewed 
as something that is not the aim of fitness training per se and should therefore not 
become too evident or predominant in its social organization . It is often morally con-
demned by (female) gym clients (or their husbands) and also seen as something im-
proper on the part of gym managers: “il y a de la saleté dedans” (Karim*, 27 January 
2018) . A powerful mechanism for implementing the rules of de-sexualisation is the 
individual management of the gaze and the practice of a kind of “civil inattention” 
that is mutually expressed and recognized among fitness practitioners (Goffman 1963, 
cited in Sassatelli 2010: 58) .
The concept of gyms “as places where the body should lose its sexual connota-
tions” (ibid .) is part of a broader logic of de-contextualization also operating in Dakar . 
Gym etiquette compels practitioners to adopt a habitus that systematically separates 
the body from the “thickness of local culture and moralities”, including norms and 
codes of ethnic or religious belonging (Smith 2013: 156) . Although some female fit-
ness practitioners carry a veil and long-sleeved training suits, other expressions of indi-
vidual religiosity are largely suppressed and remain almost hidden . There is a striking 
absence of religious symbols in the space of the gym (compared to their omnipresence 
in many public spaces and private ones such as houses, shops, offices, etc . – and in 
public transportation, where they are very prominent) . Aside from these more vis-
ible aspects of “filtering”, there is also a gym-specific time management that effects 
a temporal separation and ‘purification’ of the gym space from religious symbolism . 
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Fitness exercise “demands not only that time is subdivided into exact and infinitesimal 
units, but that each movement should be assigned a length of time which matches its 
effectiveness” (ibid .: 101) . The precise temporal structuring of fitness exercises, along 
with the rigorous counting and measuring that underpins the economic rationality 
of training in a gym, excludes pauses for the regular prayers that are often respected in 
other sporting contexts .37
Regarding the social position of the gym fitness phenomenon as it appears in Sen-
egal, it is helpful to remind ourselves of Sassatelli’s observation that “the fitness centre 
is at the crossroads of differently positioned social formations” (ibid .: 21) . In fact, just 
as it did elsewhere, the emergence of fitness gyms in Senegal draws upon a pre-existing 
tradition of typically male, relatively informal gyms, where bodybuilding as a specifi-
cally male activity is practised . This tradition of the bodybuilding gym contrasts with 
the elitist “upper middle class athletic or executive clubs”, as well as with the “more 
low to middle-class sports associations” (Sassatelli 2010: 21), which also have a very 
strong tradition in Senegal, specifically in conjunction with state efforts to organize the 
youth . Compared to these three types of social formation, the fitness gym introduces 
different “forms of engagement with the body” again, as well as a new logic of ration-
alization . These new forms of physical exercise are supposed to guarantee “a time of 
good quality” by effectively combining discipline and fun as important “experiential 
moments in fitness” in the context of a commercialized leisure activity (ibid .: 121) .
In the meantime, the boom of fitness practices seems to have reached even as far as 
smaller cities and more rural environments . The comment by the Imam in the village 
of Toubab Diallaw, for example, indicates that even if a proper fitness gym does not ex-
ist in the village itself, he is aware that, in some specially equipped salles de sport, new 
kinds of bodily practice are carried out . His appreciation of practices that “resemble” 
dance was related to the unique framework of a gym – a space that separates these 
bodily activities from the local environment and frames them as a specific kind of 
physical training . In the context of our conversation, it was clear that his appreciation 
did not refer to the dance aspect of the practices carried out in the gym, but rather to 
their aspect of bodily work and the impressive variety of their new and sophisticated 
technical equipment .
However, a neat distinction of fitness from dance is not always evident . If fitness 
practice is not adequately framed, it can easily be interpreted as a kind of dance, as 
shown by the example of Lamine*, a sports teacher and coach at the Olympic Club . 
Lamine* only works part-time in Dakar because he is officially employed as a sports 
teacher at a high school in a small town in the Fouta Toro,38 located in the northern 
37 I observed prayer pauses in the context of dance rehearsals or martial arts training and heard about it 
in relation to boxing training .
38 The name of the Fouta Toro region, located in the northern part of Senegal along the border to Mau-
retania, goes back to the Pulaar-speaking group of Toucouleurs, who mainly inhabit this region and who 
are known for their early Islamization (since the 11th century) and the influence they had on other parts 
of the country through their empires and the theocracies established by their Muslim leaders .
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region of Senegal . In the Fouta, he told me, cultural values are strongly related to the 
specific Muslim identities of local communities, especially among the Toucouleur . 
Some of his female pupils initially refrained from exercising together with the boys, 
because they had been educated by their parents not to “mix with the boys” – an ar-
gument that he refuted by pointing out that among their parents’ generation, most 
girls were not sent to school anyway . If they were attending school now, this was part 
of the changes to which their bodily behaviour had to adapt: “il y a un changement . 
Donc, adaptez-vous à ce changement!” (25 May 2018) . Nevertheless, some people in 
town perceived his teaching as problematic from a religious perspective and started 
to spread rumours that he was a teacher who made his pupils dance in school . In our 
interview, Lamine* recalled how he dealt with this problem, which he considered to be 
caused by a “misunderstanding”, as he was actually just doing “fitness exercises” with 
his pupils . In order to prevent the misinterpretation of the bodily practices in ques-
tion, he had to engage in a process of ‘translation’ on various levels, because – as in the 
case of the Imam in Toubab Diallaw – people were not acquainted with the concept 
of fitness: “Là-bas, ils ne connaissaient pas ce que ça veut dire, fitness . […] C’est après 
que je leur ai expliqué . J’ai dit que les mouvements qu’on fait là, c’est des mouvements 
naturels .” (Lamine*, 25 May 2018)
While recalling his own explanations of fitness training as based on “natural move-
ments”, Lamine* showed me how he used his pedagogical skills and anatomical knowl-
edge to make people understand the logic of the “new body” of fitness by literally 
embodying it in his demonstrations of a sequence of “step” movements, a very popu-
lar Aerobics-style type of fitness training that resembles some kind of dance: “Main-
tenant, vous, si vous faites élévation genoux – comment vous faites? […] Maintenant, 
si tu intègres les bras, avec élévation genoux, ça donne comme ça [he shows the mo-
vements] . Voilà, maintenant, quand tu veux faire à un rythme un peu élevé, tu peux 
faire des sauts, tu as vu? // Nadine : Ah, ça ressemble la danse! // Voilà, ça ressemble la 
danse !” (Lamine*, 25 May 2018)
In this way, he introduced the naturalizing logic of globalized fitness practices and 
translated it into local discourse . The idea of “natural” movements that are purely 
physically motivated and mechanically structured excludes possible expressive inten-
tions and thereby holds the moral connotations of dance (as sexually suggestive) at bay . 
Lamine*’s explanation of fitness was meant to clarify that the intention to move one’s 
body while performing a fitness exercise is fundamentally different from dance: it is 
about moving bones and muscles, limbs and articulations, in a purely functional man-
ner that can be analysed and controlled even if the speed of the rhythm is accelerated 
– it is not about producing the excitement and pleasure of transgression . Moreover, by 
introducing an anatomically defined notion of the “natural” body, he underlined his 
scientifically legitimized expert knowledge as a trained sports teacher .
According to Lamine*, the reason for the parents’ critical reactions was their lack 
of knowledge about fitness practice . Because of this lack, they had to fall back on their 
notions of dance as an activity that contradicts their ideas about the disciplinary func-
tion of public school education as well as their sense of religious restrictions of bodily 
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behaviour . Lamine* knows very well that as a teacher, he is not supposed to make his 
pupils dance . The Fouta is not the only place where dancing is not regarded as an activ-
ity of appropriate educational value in the context of public schools, as shown by the 
controversies in the village of Toubab Diallaw referred to in the introduction . Within 
the framework of local norms and values, dancing could compromise girls’ and boys’ 
moral integrity and embodied religiosity, and Lamine* recognized these restrictions: 
“il y a des interdits” . At the same time, he is well aware that fitness practice is an em-
bodied element of an ongoing cultural change that can no longer be denied: “il y a un 
changement . Donc, adaptez-vous à ce changement!” (Lamine*, 25 May 2018) .
Conclusion: Embodiment “Prêt-à-Porter”
Before getting the job in the Fouta, Lamine* had gained his first experiences with 
teaching at a public school in Dakar . Here, the situation had been different, and he 
had never encountered any similar problems with his pupils . It seems that in Dakar, 
and probably in many other places in Senegal, people have become acquainted with 
the aesthetic formation of fitness culture and grown used to its “sensational forms” 
(Meyer 2009) . This is also due to the fact that fitness exercises are increasingly prac-
tised outside the framework of a gym, even if this implies bodily behaviour that could 
be interpreted as utterly inappropriate if it was not framed as fitness . A good example 
is a video that was posted in the WhatsApp group of a Qur’ānic reading course, which 
showed elderly women wearing large and casual versions of traditional women’s at-
tire while training on a beach following the instructions of a young fitness coach .39 
Presenting their physical abilities and explaining the concrete positive health effects of 
what they are doing in Wolof in the highly playful and good-humoured manner that 
is characteristic of local rhetoric and performance styles, the women on the beach give 
an account of their successful body transformation: “Machala!”
These women’s explanations have a similar function to Lamine*’s ‘translation’ of 
the symbolic meanings of fitness exercises in the Fouta . They establish a particular 
“natural” and bio-medical rationality as the framework in which the meaning and ef-
fectiveness of fitness practice – in terms of purely “physical objectives” – should be 
interpreted . This framework suggests scientifically grounded objectivity and excludes 
ambivalence . On the level of individual practitioners, it “filters” markers of cultural 
difference, social distinctions and hierarchies, and it symbolically excludes any mark-
ers of religiosity . At the same time, the official de-sexualisation of the “new body” that 
is engaging in fitness exercises allows for a reworking of gender, or, more generally, of 
the patriarchal social order as part of a broader process of social and cultural change, 
without “interfering” with religion . The kind of physical education transmitted by 
 Lamine* to his pupils in the Fouta resembles a course in modern citizenship corre-
39 The video was uploaded to YouTube by BBC Afrique on 3 April 2019 under the title “Au sport, quel 
que soit l’âge” (https://www .youtube .com/watch?v=8Xqp8xidQeg) .
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sponding to the “imported” Western ideal described by Seck (2010: 227) as the op-
portunity for an emancipation from “traditional tutelage” .
Lamine*’s account of his own teaching experience suggests that fitness can func-
tion as a practice whereby a “conversion of the communitarian subject into the citi-
zen” (Seck 2010: 227) is performed on the level of the body . The gym is a place where 
“misunderstandings” in this process are avoided – it provides an individualistic and 
universalistic environment for self-controlled body transformation . Thus, it allows 
for an enactment of modern citizenship under the conditions of consumer capital-
ism in a way that “is in line with the received view of modern subjectivity: the self as 
a body-owner who chooses to discipline the body in order to obtain happiness, free-
dom, dignity or more simply to realise subjectivity” (Sassatelli 2010: 14) . I suggest that 
the particular moral economy of gym fitness, along with its social prestige and its con-
notation with the promotion of public health (underpinned by modern science), has 
helped to integrate it into the Senegalese cultural landscape as an element that enables 
the individual to “adapt” to change without inciting (religious) contestation .
Meanwhile, fitness practices have been popularized in many domains of public 
and private bodily practice . They have become part of associative structures and are 
also strongly promoted via new media . What the video of the women training in their 
traditional female attire on the beach and the reported scenes at the public school in 
the Fouta also illustrate, alongside many other similar sights of culturally hybrid bod-
ily practices, is the “extraordinary mix” that characterizes cultural dynamics in Senegal 
and which Djibril Seck proudly referred to in our interview . Accepting this “mix” al-
lows people to “live with their generation” without abandoning their religion, to be 
part of change and at the same time retain the basis upon which the distinctive Sen-
egalese culture of tolerant pluralism, with its exceptional peacefulness (as compared to 
other countries of the region), has developed – in both religious and “ethnocultural” 
terms (Diouf 2013: 29) .
An assessment of Senegalese notions of citizenship that goes beyond its discursive 
expressions should take into account the particular modes of articulation and embodi-
ment of this “ethnocultural” dimension . As Seck (2010: 228f .) suggests, shared no-
tions of citizenship and “being together” (être-ensemble) in contemporary Senegal are 
sustained by “the fact of teranga” . By this he means the complex system of locally root-
ed socio-economic relations and moral values that is pertinent not only in expressing a 
common ideal of national culture, but also in effectively binding together individuals 
and groups through norms of generalized reciprocities . Seck’s suggestion corresponds 
with Smith’s (2013: 149) findings concerning the particular “sociability ethos” that 
is shared by many ethnic groups and cuts across religious divides in Senegal . Smith 
confirms Seck’s analysis by conceding that in emic discourse, “the religious sphere or 
the political culture is not the most distinctive feature of Senegal’s exceptionalism . 
Sociocultural practices and values come first” (2013: 151) .40
40 Both of them build their arguments on an analysis of discourses and political practices, without tak-
ing into account how sociocultural practices and values are enacted through bodily practices in various 
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As a central node in this cultural web of symbols and practices, the value complex of 
teranga encompasses partly contradictory and conflicting “social codes” and modes 
of sociability, framed by gendered ideologies and embodied by a range of practices 
including life cycle rituals, religious ceremonies and even political rallies (Riley 2016) . 
Embodying teranga through acts of generosity and generalized reciprocity not only 
crosses social boundaries but also effectively illustrates that the individual does not 
completely “own” its own body (tout ton corps ne t’appartient pas) . This also accounts 
for popular sports or dance forms, where “ethnic, gender and class identities are tied 
together” (Castaldi 2006: 13) .
It remains to be seen to what extent the local appropriations and adaptations of 
gym fitness can develop similar connective dynamics, or if the practice’s inherent in-
dividualism and symbolic disconnection of the body from its sociocultural environ-
ment are paramount . Taking the social formations of this increasingly popularized 
bodily practice into account helps us to understand its socially inclusive dynamics 
without neglecting the practice’s potentially conflicting or contradictory gendered di-
mensions and moral implications . Conversely, studying the gendered aspects of bodily 
practices, and the moral discourses surrounding them, provides insights into everyday 
lived experience in terms of “vivre au monde concret” (Mbembe 2000, cited in Seck 
2010: 226) .
In doing so, it can help us to ascertain how “the pursuit of body efficiency and 
secular moral salvation” (Sassatelli 2010: 18) might become part of the “new Senega-
lese modernity” (Seck 2010: 229) in which the social and physical body’s relation-
ship with religion is constantly being reconstructed and reinvented . In Djibril Seck’s 
words, this is a process of “incarnation” whereby traditions are inevitably re-enacted 
and performed as “acts of re-presentation with critical difference” (Drewal 1991: 38) . 
Thus, predetermined “prêt-à-porter” models are individually adapted and become 
“made to measure” in processes of transformation that concern all kinds of everyday 
social practices, including religiosity:
“On ne s’approprie pas son corps, ses traditions à l’identique, on se les appro-
prie en les incarnant . On les met dans sa chair . Et donc, toute incarnation sort 
du prêt-à-porter pour être sur-mesure . […] Et, la religiosité c’est sur mesure .” 
(Djibril Seck, 19 December 2018) .
domains . This accompanies a neglect of the gendered dimensions of the teranga complex .
Fitness and the ‘Bracketing’ of Religiosity in Senegal  213
Literature
Andreasson, Jesper and Thomas Johansson (2014) . The Fitness Revolution . Histori-
cal Transformations in the Global Gym and Fitness Culture, in: Sport Science 
Review 23, 3–4, 91–112 .
Antoine, Philippe, Philippe Boucquier, Abdou Salam Fall, Youssouf M . Guisse and 
Jeanne Nanitelamio (1995) . Les familles dakaroises face à la crise, Dakar .
Archambault, Julie Soleil (forthcoming) . Sweat and the New Workout Ethic in Mo-
zambique.
Bromber, Katrin (2017) . Von „Neuen Zeiten“ und „Neuen Körpern“: Fitness im 
kaiserlichen Äthiopien (1940er–1970er), in: Stichproben. Wiener Zeitschrift für 
kritische Afrikastudien 17, 32, 1–33 .
Castaldi, Francesca (2006) . Choreographies of African Identities. Négritude, Dance, 
and the National Ballet of Senegal . Urbana .
Dahou, Tarik and Vincent Foucher (2004) . Le Sénégal, entre changement politique 
et révolution passive . “Sopi” or not “sopi”? Politique africaine, 96, 5–21 .
Dimé, Mamadou and Anne-Emmanuèle Calvès (2006) . Du “jamonoy twist” au 
“jamonoy xoslu” . Le basculement dans la précarité de ménages de la classe moy-
enne à Dakar, in: Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue canadienne des 
études africaines, 40, 3, 401–425 .
Diop, Awa (2018) . Des figure féminines “scandaleuses” au Sénégal: une tension entre 
subjectivation transgressive et conformisme aux valeurs culturelles fondamen-
tales, in: Fatou Sow (ed .) . Genre et Fondamentalismes / Gender and Fundamen-
talisms . Dakar, 213–231 .
Diouf, Mamadou (2002) . Des cultures urbaines entre traditions et mondialisation, 
in: Momar-Coumba Diop (ed .) . Le Sénégal contemporain. Paris, 261–288 .
Diouf, Mamadou (2013) . Introduction: The Public Role of the “Good Islam”: Sufi 
Islam and the Administration of Pluralism, in: Mamadou Diouf (ed .) .  
Tolerance, Democracy, and Sufis in Senegal . New York, 1–35 .
Diouf, Mamadou and Mara A . Leichtman (eds) (2009) . New Perspectives on Islam  
in Senegal. Conversion, Migration, Wealth, Power, and Femininity . New York .
Douglas, Mary (1970) . Natural Symbols. Explorations in Cosmology . London .
Drewal, Margaret Thompson (1991) . The State of Research on Performance in 
Africa, in: African Studies Review, 34, 3, 1–64 .
Engelke, Matthew (2015) . Secular Shadows . African, Immanent, Post-colonial, in: 
Critical Research on Religion, 3, 1, 86–100 .
Engelke, Matthew (2019) . Afterword: Getting Hold of the Secular, in: Monique 
Scheer, Nadia Fadil and Brigitte Schepelern Johansen (eds) . Secular Bodies,  
Affects and Emotions. European Configurations. London, 199–207 .
Faye, Ousseynou (2002) . Sport, argent et politique: la lutte libre à Dakar (1800–
2000), in: Momar-Coumba Diop (ed .) . Le Sénégal contemporain . Paris, 309–
340 .
― (2017) . Dakar et ses cultures. Un siècle de changement d’une ville coloniale . Paris .
214 Nadine Sieveking
Featherstone, Mike (1982) . The Body in Consumer Culture, in: Theory, Culture & 
Society, 1, 2, 18–33 .
Foucault, Michel (1975) . Surveiller et punir, naissance de la prison . Paris .
Hanna, Judith Lynne (1977) . To Dance is Human, in: John Blacking (ed .) .  
The Anthropology of the Body . London, 211–232 .
Hirschkind, Charles (2011) . Is there a Secular Body? In: Cultural Anthropology, 26, 
4, 633–647 .
Klein, Gabriele (1992) . FrauenKörperTanz: Eine Zivilisationsgeschichte des Tanzes . 
Weinheim and Berlin .
Kühn, Johanna (2020) . Über Religiositäten sprechen? Forschungserfahrungen in 
Beirut, in: Nadine Sieveking (ed .) . Dimensionen des Religiösen und Nicht-Re-
ligiösen . Empirische Forschungen im ERC-Projekt: “Private Pieties . Mundane 
Islam and New Forms of Muslim Religiosity: Impact on Contemporary Social 
and Political Dynamics”, GISCA Occasional Paper Series, 26 .  
https://doi .org/10 .3249/2363-894X-gisca-26 . Göttingen, 30–36 .
Lentz, Carola (2016) . African Middle Classes: Lessons from Transnational Studies 
and a Research Agenda, in: Henning Melber (ed .) . The Rise of Africa’s Middle 
Class . London, 17–53 .
Loimeier, Roman (2000) . L’Islam ne se vend plus . The Islamic Reform Movement 
and the State in Senegal, in: Journal of Religion in Africa, 30, 2, 168–190 .
― (2016) . Islamic Reform in Twentieth-Century Africa . Edinburgh .
― (forthcoming) . Individual Pieties (and Non-Pieties): Dynamics of (Religious) 
Change in the “Islamic World” . Göttingen .
Mboup, Mouhamed Cherif et al . (2015) . Aspects étiologiques des accidents vascu-
laires cérébraux ischémiques au Sénégal . Pan African Medical Journal, 22, 201 . 
Doi: 10 .11604/pamj .2015 .22 .201 .6078 .
Meyer, Birgit (2009) . From Imagined Communities to Aesthetic Formations: Reli-
gious Mediations, Sensational Forms, and Styles of Binding, in: Birgit Meyer 
(ed .) . Aesthetic Formations. Media, Religion, and the Senses . New York, 1–28 .
Neveu Kringelbach, Hélène and Jonathan Skinner (2012) . Introduction . The 
Movement of Dancing Cultures, in: Hélène Neveu Kringelbach and Jonathan 
Skinner (eds) . Dancing Cultures. Globalization, Tourism and Identity in the 
Anthropology of Dance. New York and Oxford, 1–25 .
République du Sénégal (2014) . Les Salles de Sport . Une Étude pour Comprendre les 
Besoins de Formation . Ministère des Sports, Direction de la Formation et du 
Développement Sportif, August 2014 (unpublished draft) .
Riley, Emily Jenan (2016) . Teranga and the Art of Hospitality. Engendering the 
Nation, Politics, and Religion in Dakar, Senegal . Dissertation, Michigan State 
University .
Sassatelli, Roberta (2010) . Fitness Culture. Gyms and the Commercialisation of Disci-
pline and Fun . New York .
Scheer, Monique, Brigitte Schepelern Johansen and Nadia Fadil (2019) . Secular 
Embodiments: Mapping an Emergent Field, in: Monique Scheer, Nadia Fadil 
Fitness and the ‘Bracketing’ of Religiosity in Senegal  215
and Brigitte Schepelern Johansen (eds) . Secular Bodies, Affects and Emotions. 
European Configurations. London, 1–14 .
Schielke, Samuli (2012) . Living in the Future Tense: Aspiring for World and Class in 
Provincial Egypt, in: Rachel Heiman, Carla Freeman and Mark Liechty (eds) . 
The Global Middle Classes. Theorizing through Ethnography . Santa Fe, 31–56 .
Seck, Abdourahmane (2010) . La question musulmane au Sénégal. Essai 
d’anthropologie d’une nouvelle modernité . Paris .
Seck, Abdourahmane, Mayke Kaag, Cheikh Guèye and Abdou Salam Fall (eds) 
(2015) . État, sociétés et Islam au Sénégal. Un air de nouveau temps? Paris .
Sieveking, Nadine (2017) . ‘C’est d’abord moi’: Performing the Identity of a Profes-
sional Female Choreographer, in: Journal of African Cultural Studies, 29, 2, 
227–243 .
Smith, Etienne (2013) . Religious and Cultural Pluralism in Senegal . Accommoda-
tion Through “Proportional Equidistance”? In: Mamadou Diouf (ed .) . Toler-
ance, Democracy, and Sufis in Senegal . New York, 147–179 .

Rapports privés – silence public :  10 
le cas du Sénégal
Au nom de l’islam et des valeurs culturelles
Awa Diop
L’islam, en tant que pratique religieuse et socioculturelle au Sénégal, occupe une place 
privilégiée dans la vie quotidienne des Sénégalais . Sa présence peut en effet s’observer 
dans son incursion systématique dans les pratiques sociales, sous la forme de mobili-
sation de référents religieux . Par ces derniers, nous désignons par exemple la maîtrise 
du Coran ou encore la revendication par des personnages publics ou des Sénégalais-e-s 
ordinaires d’une proximité à un marabout, à une famille religieuse/confrérique (voir 
Jean François Havard 2009) .
La pratique religieuse est par ailleurs constamment mise sous projecteur dans les 
récits médiatiques, surtout à des moments précis tels que le mois de ramadan, pendant 
lequel toutes les télévisions et radios islamisent leurs programmes, les espaces publi-
ques deviennent sobres et religieux (des conférences religieuses sont tenues sur les pla-
ces publiques), une « désérotisation » de l’habillement des jeunes femmes est presque 
imposée, etc . En d’autres termes, on assiste à une forme de retour momentané vers les 
fondamentaux de l’islam : les tenues modernes et sexy sont remplacées par un habille-
ment traditionnel perçu comme plus correct et répondant aux normes islamiques en 
termes de décence, les boîtes de nuit sont fermées les défilés de mode suspendus et ainsi 
de suite . Au niveau des chaines de télévisions privées, les émissions sont retravaillées 
pour arborer une coloration religieuse, et les animateurs et présentateurs de program-
mes de divertissement se transforment en prédicateurs religieux .
Ces éléments sont par ailleurs des schémas que les Sénégalais-e-s utilisent pour se 
définir et se singulariser par rapport à autrui . Cependant, en dépit d’une présence du 
discours religieux et la mobilisation de référents religieux voire confrériques (montrer 
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son affiliation à un marabout, une confrérie, justification de la croyance, de la maitrise 
du Coran) comme code de conduite, on note une certaine ambivalence dans la façon 
dont les pratiques sociales se rapportent à l’islam . Il semble en effet exister une dissocia-
tion entre les fondamentaux de l’islam et la façon dont les individus se l’approprient et 
les mettent en jeu . Une telle ambivalence s’observe par exemple de façon caractéristique 
lorsque des personnages publics parfois controversés pour leurs pratiques contraires 
aux normes sociales et à la morale publique parlent d’acteurs maraboutiques dans un 
contexte de silence public de ces derniers . En d’autres termes, ces personnages contro-
versés font référence aux marabouts dans une stratégie de légitimation de leurs actions 
et de fuite de la critique . En effet, les figures publiques controversées dont nous par-
lons sont souvent à l’origine de scandales publics qui touchent à des pratiques perçues 
comme problématiques concernant des questions de mœurs (décence vestimentaire et 
corporelle) ou de travestissements de versets coraniques (utilisation douteuse de l’is-
lam dans le sport de la lutte)1 . Pourtant, dans leurs discours publics, ils font référence 
à des acteurs maraboutiques qui sont vus et perçus par l’imaginaire collectif comme 
des représentants de l’islam et de ses préceptes . La référence faite à la lutte nous semble 
importante dans un contexte national où ce sport connait un véritable engouement . 
D’abord sport traditionnel, la lutte s’est par la suite transformée et attire beaucoup de 
jeunes qui voient en ce sport un moyen de gagner de l’argent rapidement, d’acquérir 
un certain statut social et de devenir célèbre . L’engouement que connaît ce sport a été 
observé avec l’arrivée de la génération « bul faale »2 représentée par le lutteur Moha-
med Ndao Tyson . Ce dernier est décrit comme étant à l’origine de la surenchère qui 
s’est construite autour des cachets, ou encore de la transformation de ce sport en tant 
qu’entreprise générant des salaires considérables . Les lutteurs sont également à l’ori-
gine d’un argot et de styles de danses qui ont fini par devenir des produits de masse 
consommés par la société sénégalaise . Par exemple des termes comme « dem ardo »3, 
« quatre appuis »4, « tax ci ripp »5, « dem ci ginaaw saakuyi »6 ou « cumbukaay »7 se 
sont imposés dans le langage populaire sénégalais . Ce sport mobilise considérablement 
1 La lutte sénégalaise qui est un sport traditionnel a fait l’objet de divers publications scientifiques (voir 
Havard 2001 et Faye 2002) .
2 Expression tirée de la langue wolof qui signifie « t’occupe pas », ou « t’en fais pas » . Elle a aussi été, dans 
les années 90, le slogan d’une jeunesse, porteuse d’une certaine révolte urbaine, à la recherche d’émancipa-
tion notamment par rapport aux acteurs politiques .
3   Expression utilisée dans l’arène pour qualifier de manière caricaturale un lutteur mal au point, blessé ou 
encore qui est sur le point d’être vaincu . Notons que « Ardo » est le dimunitif d’Abdourahmane Dia qui 
est le médecin du Comité National de Gestion de la lutte sénégalaise . 
4   Dans le règlement de la lutte sénégalaise, un lutteur qui a les deux bras et les deux jambes à terre est 
considéré comme vaincu . L’expression « quatre appuis » fait donc référence aux deux bras et aux deux 
jambes .
5 Terme pouvant signifier « se donner à fond »
6 Littéralement, ce terme veut dire « être derrière les sacs servant de limites à l’enceinte de l’arène » .
7 Expression pour désigner l’arsenal mystique utilisé par les lutteurs .
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un côté mystique (recours au Coran et d’autres savoirs traditionnels) dans lequel les 
marabouts occupent une place importante .
Pendant que les marabouts restent silencieux (concernant la lutte et d’autres su-
jets), les auteurs de faits perçus comme transgressifs tels que danseurs(-seuses), chan-
teurs (-euses), mannequins et lutteurs parlent publiquement de ces acteurs religieux, 
revendiquant même via les médias locaux leur relation voire leur proximité avec ces 
derniers . On observe alors une forme de communication où les destinataires identifiés 
de messages n’y répondent pas, ou du moins ne le font pas publiquement . Cela amène 
à nous interroger sur les dynamiques qui poussent les acteurs religieux à rester silen-
cieux . Pourquoi assiste-t-on à une telle « fuite », à un tel refus de communication ? En 
quoi ce silence dans le discours publics constitue une forme de communication ? Les 
figures transgressives (voir Diop 2012) contribuent-elles à une perte de légitimité des 
figures religieuses ? Et si c’est le cas, à qui profite-t-elle (parmi les citoyens) ? Quel est 
l’objet de leurs négociations, en privé et en public ?
Les relations entre personnalités religieuses et figures transgressives donnent d’em-
blée à voir une instrumentalisation en faveur de ces dernières . Cependant, il s’agit aussi 
de s’interroger sur la signification du silence des marabouts . Le fait que des figures 
marginales fassent référence à eux publiquement est-il important pour leur popula-
rité ? Et d’un autre côté, le rôle social et spirituel du marabout comme protecteur et 
sauveur est-il susceptible de donner du sens au rapport que ces figures transgressives 
tentent d’établir entre eux et les religieux ?
Nous soulignons que le silence publique dont nous parlons concerne plus les fi-
gures maraboutiques de l’islam confrérique sénégalais que d’autres acteurs qui se dé-
finissent et sont perçus comme des défenseurs publiques de l’islam8 (ceux-là même 
qui portent souvent les dénonciations en cas de transgression réelle ou supposée de 
normes religieuses voire sociales ou culturelles) . En effet, ces défenseurs, que nous dif-
férencions ici des marabouts, parlent des acteurs transgressifs dans la sphère publique 
sur fond de condamnation et de dénonciation de leurs pratiques . A chaque fois qu’une 
pratique transgressive traverse la sphère publique, les défenseurs publics de l’islam sol-
licitent une condamnation sur la base d’instructions morales et éthiques tirées de l’is-
lam et des normes locales . La mobilisation de tels acteurs s’effectue par voie médiatique 
(conférence, communiqué de presse, etc .) débouchant parfois sur une mise en marche 
de la machine judiciaire9 (plainte auprès du procureur de la République, saisie de la 
brigade des mœurs) . Leur posture critique dépasse même l’univers de ses acteurs et des 
faits qu’ils dénoncent, et trahit une stratégie de moralisation de la société sénégalaise, 
d’une rapide association entre le corps des femmes et la moralité publique . Une telle 
association montre d’ailleurs que leur regard dénonciateur est souvent biaisé en termes 
8   Référence aux associations islamiques sénégalaises telles que Jamra, le comité de défense des valeurs 
morales, l’association des maitres coraniques, etc .
9 Ces acteurs se fondent souvent sur le code pénal relatif à « l’outrage public à la pudeur » (article 318) et 
« l’attentat aux bonnes mœurs » (article 324) .
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de genre et prend la forme d’un jugement moral qui devient plus pressant et pertinent 
dès qu’il s’agit d’une femme . Analysons l’association qui est faite entre le corps féminin 
et la moralité publique à l’aide des quelques exemples ci-dessous :
Fin janvier 2019, un téléfilm intitulé Maitresse d’un homme marié, mettant en  –
scène l’infidélité d’un homme marié n’hésitant pas à coucher avec sa maitresse dans 
son lit conjugal, est diffusé sur une chaine privée du pays, la 2STV . Le téléfilm est 
dénoncé l’ONG islamique Jamra10 et le Comité de défense des valeurs morales du 
Sénégal auprès du Conseil National de Régulation de l’Audiovisuel (CNRA11) . Les 
dénonciateurs estiment que le téléfilm ne reflète pas la réalité du Sénégal musulman 
car il prône la fornication, l’indécence verbale et la revendication de relations sexuel-
les extra-conjugales : « Cette série fait la promotion de l’adultère et de la fornication . 
C’est une dérive audiovisuelle qui, à travers le scénario, propose un mimétisme dé-
plorable des cultures occidentales », a déclaré un représentant de l’ONG Jamra sur 
une chaîne privée, 7TV . Ainsi, dans la logique des pourfendeurs de la série, en ma-
tière de modèle féminin, le personnage incarné par l’une des actrices (Marième Dial, 
qui joue le rôle de la maitresse) ne peut pas représenter la femme sénégalaise car 
elle assume sa sexualité hors mariage, vit dans son appartement et revendique une 
certaine émancipation par rapport à des normes sociales qui prônent la virginité et 
la vie sous tutelle des parents pour les filles célibataires . Pendant ces réactions of-
fusquées, les défenseurs de la série parlent, quant à eux, d’une mise à nue de choses 
qui se passent réellement au Sénégal, ils estiment que la série ne fait que montrer 
un quotidien des Sénégalais-e-s différent de celui qui est toujours montré par les 
médias . Ainsi, selon ces défenseurs les thématiques que la série aborde (relations 
extra-conjugales, sexualité, mariage forcé, polygamie, violences physiques et psycho-
logiques dans la sphère domestique, etc .) reflètent bien le Sénégal contemporain . 
Après délibération, le CNRA a demandé à la production de la série d’apporter des 
mesures correctives par rapport à certains contenus pouvant heurter les Sénégalais . 
10 Jamra intervient sur les questions de défense des valeurs islamiques et de morale publique . L’ONG 
tient une place centrale dans les stratégies d’activation des actions judiciaires, notamment en cas de scan-
dale de mœurs . Selly Ba précise l’historique de Jamra en notant que : « le mot ‹ Jamra › signifie ‹ braise › 
pour lapider Satan . L’idée de Jamra est née en 1982 . Des jeunes intellectuels, de diverses disciplines, se 
sont regroupés autour d’une Revue intitulée Jamra, la première publication sénégalaise spécialisée sur les 
problèmes sociaux : drogue, prostitution, délinquance juvénile, pauvreté, etc . Les idées contenues dans la 
revue sont prises en charge par les jeunes du lycée Maurice De la Fosse qui créent l’Association des Jeunes 
Amis de Diamra (AJAD) . Cette dernière s’implante dans les quartiers populaires et mobilise davantage 
de jeunes . […] A la suite d’une augmentation croissante des adhérents, en même année 1982, l’association 
devient l’Organisation Islamique Jamra, et installe des cellules dans toutes les régions du Sénégal . » (Ba 
2015 : 148)
11 Le CNRA a été mis en place à travers la loi 2006–04 du 4 janvier 2006 . Il a un rôle de régulation 
sur tous les médias audiovisuels . Il exerce des fonctions de contrôle sur le contenu et les modalités de 
programmation des émissions . Il veille au respect de la loi, à la préservation des identités culturelles, à 
l’objectivité et au respect de l’équilibre dans le traitement de l’information .
Rapports privés – silence public : le cas du Sénégal  221
Ce qui ressemble ici à de la censure est aussi une négociation mise en place par deux 
catégories d’acteurs ne qualifiant pas les faits de la même façon : le CNRA apparaît 
ici plutôt conformiste par rapport à des valeurs locales, tandis que les producteurs 
de la série raisonnent davantage sur des logiques d’innovation dans un contexte 
marqué par une grande compétition au sein de l’audiovisuel sénégalais . Les seconds 
acteurs sont alors obligés, en se censurant, de corriger leur posture afin de recons-
truire leur image et de revenir dans les rangs .
L’affaire Déesse Major : Déjà pointée du doigt en 2014 par le Comité de défense des  –
valeurs morales à cause de sa tenue vestimentaire lors d’un concert jugé obscène, la 
rappeuse est ensuite emprisonnée en 2016 suite à une plainte de ce même comité 
concernant la diffusion d’une de ses vidéos sur Snapchat . Le motif de la dénoncia-
tion reste le même : l’exhibition publique d’un corps féminin érotisé . Les poursuites 
ont été finalement abandonnées après plusieurs heures de garde à vue, sans qu’une 
explication soit donnée . Le Comité de défense des valeurs morales au Sénégal, qui 
est à l’origine de la mise en accusation, s’estime être l’instigateur de l’arrêt des pour-
suites : « Si nous n’avions pas [donné notre accord pour lever] notre plainte, je 
pense qu’elle serait dans de sales draps . La liberté d’expression totale n’est permise 
nulle part, n’existe nulle part, à part [dans] les sociétés qui ont vraiment vocation à 
sacrifier leur culture et leurs enfants » (Par Rfi le 21 juin 2016) .
Comment les rapports entre personnalités religieuses et figures 
transgressives se matérialisent-ils ?
Les personnages publics qui communiquent avec les religieux sont principalement 
des danseurs (-seuses), des chanteurs (-euses), des mannequins, des lutteurs, etc . Ces 
personnages s’illustrent dans des pratiques perçues comme déconstruisant les codes 
normatifs en termes de décence dans l’habillement, la façon de danser, les paroles des 
chansons et d’usage du Coran dans le champ du sport de la lutte . De tels personnages 
font parfois l’objet de perceptions négatives mais celles-ci ne sont jamais définitives ou 
totalement durables, et montrent ainsi que la société sénégalaise fonctionne sur un 
va-et-vient constant entre ce qui doit être visibilisé ou non, ce qui est acceptable ou 
inacceptable, ce qui est permis ou interdit . Les moments d’arrangement et de tolérance 
dans l’accusation sont possibles à chaque situation de tension dans la sphère publique 
(voir Diop 2012) .
Nous appréhendons les rapports que les acteurs cités plus haut entretiennent avec 
les figures religieuses à plusieurs niveaux : tout d’abord les chefs religieux sont toujours 
cités dans les productions musicales des chanteurs . Il n’est pas rare d’entendre le nom 
d’un guide religieux être cité dans une chanson . Pourtant, la norme religieuse défen-
due par de tels marabouts peut condamner la pratique musicale . Dans le sport de la 
lutte aussi, les lutteurs convoquent les marabouts comme des soutiens mystiques, l’af-
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filiation maraboutique incarnée serait pour certains un gage de victoire . Cependant, 
la façon dont les référents islamiques sont utilisés dans cette sphère est controversée au 
même titre que la pratique de ce sport que d’aucuns n’hésitent pas à décrire comme 
proscrit par l’islam en raison de la nudité partielle des combattants . L’utilisation de 
l’image des acteurs religieux dans l’univers artistique, musical ou sportif semble répon-
dre à une stratégie de prévention contre la condamnation possible, face à l’interdit . En 
effet, les acteurs religieux savent qu’ils sont cités dans des productions (qu’ils critiquent 
de manière générale pour des raisons d’obscénité et d’incorrection), mais l’accent n’est 
jamais mis sur l’association faite entre l’image religieuse qu’ils représentent et les sphè-
res dans lesquelles les figures artistiques et sportives évoluent . Ensuite, certains artistes 
font le choix de porter l’affiliation confrérique sur leurs noms (en ajoutant à leur état 
civil le nom de leur marabout, dans un rapport de propriété, par exemple  Fatou bu 
Serigne Fallou12) . Selon certaines représentations sociales ambiantes, montrer de cette 
façon son affiliation (en l’occurrence à la confrérie mouride) ouvrirait la porte vers le 
succès, la célébrité et la richesse .
De ce fait, on peut légitimement se demander si les rapports privés qui existent 
entre les acteurs religieux et les figures transgressives – que ces rapports soient par-
tiellement dévoilés au public ou totalement invisibles – ne servent pas davantage des 
intérêts individuels que ceux de la collectivité ou des préceptes islamiques . Le fait que 
de tels rapports soient mis en jeu subtilement ne témoigne pas pour autant d’un carac-
tère scandaleux ou transgressif . Soulignons que le public pourrait le percevoir comme 
tel, mais que l’affaire serait vite diluée par l’importante du marabout dans la vie des 
Sénégalais .
Enfin, se réclamer d’un marabout publiquement via les médias est une chose cou-
rante . L’identification à un marabout constitue un rempart face à la critique sociale et 
même un moyen efficace de plaire et de s’assurer une certaine popularité auprès de l’opi-
nion publique . Ces références aux acteurs religieux peuvent être considérées comme 
relevant d’une stratégie ; on fait appel à eux pour s’excuser, (re)construire sa réputation 
et valider son statut social . Intéressons-nous à la façon dont s’opère réellement cette 
utilisation stratégique des acteurs religieux et de la rhétorique religieuse . Pour assurer 
une légitimité, ou encore se dédouaner et revenir dans les rangs après avoir violé par 
exemple une norme religieuse, une référence au fait religieux s’effectue typiquement 
par une mise en scène de l’affiliation confrérique (« je suis disciple de tel marabout », 
« tel est mon marabout », « tel marabout a prié pour moi », « j’ai la bénédiction de 
tel marabout », etc .) .
Le fait d’afficher une appartenance supposée ou réelle à un marabout apparaît 
donc comme une plus-value utilisable dans diverses circonstances . En janvier 2011, 
une jeune chanteuse sénégalaise (convertie à l’islam en 1996 et qui porte désormais le 
nom de la mère du fondateur de la confrérie mouride), prétendit avoir été témoin de 
l’apparition miraculeuse de Serigne Fallou (un fils du fondateur de la confrérie mou-
12 Fatou de Serigne Fallou
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ride13 et figure adulée au Sénégal) sous forme de photo sur son téléphone portable . 
Elle annonça rapidement qu’après ce qu’elle décrit comme un miracle, elle allait revoir 
sa façon de s’habiller et abandonner certaines pratiques . L’époux et producteur de la 
chanteuse annonça simultanément faire preuve de volonté dans le contrôle de l’ha-
billement de la chanteuse ; « Maintenant on va rigoureusement veiller sur son port 
vestimentaire, car après le miracle qu’elle a vécu, il y’a un certain comportement qu’elle 
doit adopter dorénavant »14 .
Bien sûr, une expertise a montré que la photo était truquée . Ce qui est intéressant 
ici, c’est la tentative de construction d’une nouvelle image, une image de sainte, de 
miraculée, diamétralement opposée à celle, moderne et sexy, renvoyée par la chanteuse 
jusqu’alors . Ce passage d’une féminité à une autre constitue aussi une façon de renaître 
autrement dans les représentations sociales, et sans doute de rentrer dans la catégorie 
de « fille bien » (Clair 2008 : 38) . Le changement opéré trahit une ruse consistant à 
modifier la façon dont on est perçu par rapport à l’étiquette religieuse . Par exemple, 
pendant l’épisode de la photo truquée, à l’occasion d’une conférence de presse organi-
sée par les époux pour expliquer les circonstances de l’apparition, la chanteuse est appa-
rue portant une longue robe couvrant les jambes et la poitrine ainsi qu’un foulard sur 
la tête, une tenue très éloignée de la sexualisation habituelle de son corps . Toute cette 
affaire s’est déroulée dans la sphère publique avec toute l’attention des médias, mais les 
acteurs religieux, et notamment la famille confrérique concernée, n’ont pas réagi face à 
ce qui était qualifié de blasphème .
Si au Sénégal l’islam semble constituer une force publique, on observe aussi ces 
vingt dernières années plusieurs changements qui mettent en question le statut et 
les fonctions des marabouts : il s’est produit un déploiement d’acteurs religieux dans 
d’autres espaces (politique, économique, etc .) hors de la logique spirituelle . Cela s’ap-
parente à une distanciation vis-à-vis des dimensions spirituelles au bénéfice de considé-
rations politiques, matérielles et mondaines (voir Bayart 2010) . L’immixtion de figures 
religieuses dans la sphère politique ces vingt dernières années est problématique dans 
un contexte où, dans l’imaginaire populaire sénégalais, « faire de la politique » est da-
vantage synonyme de poursuite d’intérêts individuels (souvent économiques) que des 
préoccupations collectives . Aussi, les rapports que les acteurs religieux entretiennent 
avec le politique est souvent perçu comme subjectif, tendancieux, et leurs interven-
tions souterraines participent même parfois au dénouement de certaines affaires publi-
ques . En outre, leur absence du débat public, y compris sur des questions de société ou 
de violation de codes moraux et des préceptes islamiques, les font paraître déconnectés 
des réalités nationales quotidiennes .
13 Le mouridisme est une confrérie soufie fondée par Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba Mbacké à la fin du XIXe 
siècle . 
14 « Apparition de Serigne Fallou : Viviane va changer de port vestimentaire et de comportement », 
xalima.com, 03 février 2011 (http://xalimasn .com/apparition-de-serigne-fallou-viviane-va-changer-de- 
port-vestimentaire-et-de-comportement/) .
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La logique du silence des religieux
Ne pas parler publiquement de telles affaires constitue une stratégie visant à sauvegar-
der une réputation et, notamment en préservant autant que possible l’image de sérieux 
qu’on les marabouts dans l’opinion publique .
Leur silence témoigne par ailleurs d’une ambivalence : ils ne parlent pas publique-
ment avec les figures transgressives, mais la communication que ces dernières établissent 
publiquement avec eux trahissent l’existence de rapports privés . En effet, en instaurant 
une communication publique avec ces personnalités, les marabouts risqueraient de se 
discréditer aux yeux des Sénégalais en se mêlant aux affaires sensationnelles . En même 
temps, les personnalités transgressives ont besoin de parler d’elles publiquement, car 
il s’agit pour elles de se construire une image positive en s’associant au fait religieux . 
Montrer son affiliation à une figure maraboutique serait ainsi un gage d’honorabilité 
et de reconnaissance publique .
Ces situations se déroulent dans un contexte où les Sénégalais-e-s ont quotidien-
nement affaire à des normes religieuses contredites et contournées . Le contournement 
des normes islamiques est bien une réalité symbolisée en l’occurrence par les personna-
lités transgressives, mais les marabouts mourides, par exemple, expriment à travers leurs 
discours publics non pas leur désapprobation par rapport à ce qui est perçu comme 
dérive, mais davantage leur effort général de protéger la ville de Touba (ville-capitale de 
la confrérie mouride) . Les marabouts opèrent donc de telles stratégies en restant tou-
jours silencieux sur les pratiques transgressives en question, Touba étant la cause à dé-
fendre . La circulaire datant du 24 juin 2019 et relative aux orientations et directives ve-
nant du khalife général des mourides Serigne Mountakha Mbacké confirme bien cette 
mise en évidence de Touba et pas forcément des pratiques à un niveau plus collectif : 
«[…] considérant le fondamental du principe islamique d’adoration sans condition au 
Souverain Absolu Allah SWT, en observant ses recommandations et en s’éloignant de 
ses interdits ; ce qui fut la principale raison de la création de la ville sainte de Touba 
masquée à ses mêmes principes qui s’appliquent à tous ses habitants et invités pour 
s’y conformer absolument […] . A cet effet, le khalife général des mourides, Serigne 
Mountakha réitère son engagement à faire respecter strictement tous les interdits et 
pratiques prohibées dans la ville sainte de Touba dont la liste est la suivante : « […] les 
jeux de hasard, la musique, la chanson, la danse et tout autre spectacle de divertisse-
ment illicite en islam utilisant les instruments musicaux y inclus la lutte, le football, les 
concerts, etc .[…] » (Fait à Touba le 24 juin 2019, Serigne Mountakha Mbacké, Khalife 
général des mourides)
Soulignons qu’au niveau des rapports entre les « grands marabouts » et d’autres 
marabouts dont la légitimité est parfois contestée car incarnant une autre vision des 
textes religieux ou des bases confrériques, nous observons aussi une communication 
particulière . En effet, ceux que nous appelons les « les grands marabouts » sont sou-
vent, comme nous l’avons vu, assez réservés par rapport aux affaires publiques et aux 
situations qui sortent du cadre religieux . Ils adoptent par ailleurs le même silence avec 
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les marabouts controversés qui parlent parfois d’eux publiquement . Prenons ici le cas 
du marabout Cheikh Béthio Thioune, qui ne jouit pas d’une reconnaissance totale 
au niveau de la confrérie mouride du fait de son rapport avec des normes islamiques 
que d’aucuns perçoivent comme problématiques, comme la mixité des sexes, la dif-
fusion de musique au cours de ses activités religieuses ou encore sa posture critique 
vis-à-vis du port du voile . Cheikh Béthio Thioune se réclame disciple de la confrérie 
mouride, notamment de l’un des fils du fondateur du mouridisme, et revendique une 
telle affiliation à chacune de ses interventions publiques . Les marabouts qu’il évoque 
ne parlent presque jamais de lui, y compris dans des contextes de scandales le concer-
nant explicitement . Par exemple, sur une chaine de télévision publique, il soutenait 
publiquement incarner la voie d’un islam mouride qui n’impose pas aux femmes un 
foulard sur la tête . D’après sa (re-)lecture, les xassaïd (poèmes religieux du fondateur 
du mouridisme) de Serigne Touba l’emportent sur tous les autres préceptes . Cette dé-
marche constitue un des motifs de sa « disqualification » du champ religieux .
En somme, nous indiquons que le fait que l’islam, et plus spécifiquement la confré-
rie mouride, constitue des référents sur lesquels les Sénégalais s’appuient pour se déter-
miner et se faire bien voir dans des situations problématiques, est toujours d’actualité . 
Nous faisons une telle observation pourtant dans un contexte où les gens qui repré-
sentent les valeurs islamiques sont parfois disqualifiés, surtout dans des moments où 
on attend d’eau une prise de position ou une réponse . Les rapports entretenus par les 
figures transgressives avec les personnalités religieuses indiquent un chevauchement 
d’acteurs dont les logiques d’actions sont souvent contradictoires . De telles contradic-
tions montrent aussi que la sphère publique sénégalaise fonctionne sur un dispositif 
de négociation où les divergences s’accordent finalement et les « pressions et contre-
pressions finissent par s’équilibrer .» (Seck 2010 : 13) .
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l’odyssée d’un disciple indiscipliné
Mouhamed Abdallah Ly et Abdourahmane Seck
Introduction
Entre juillet et novembre 2017, un migrant sénégalais, entré illégalement aux États-
Unis avant d’en être expulsé, s’est fait bruyamment connaître de la part de ses conci-
toyens et des autorités américaines et sénégalaises en devenant le « webactiviste » sé-
négalais le plus populaire1 . Un succès qu’il doit à des vidéos violemment injurieuses 
à l’encontre de figures politiques et religieuses, ainsi que de personnalités issues du 
1 Le paysage des réseaux sociaux au Sénégal fourmille de figures dont la popularité est certaine dans le 
milieu des initiés ou des publics qui ont un intérêt plus ou moins réel ou sporadique pour ce type de 
médias . Le passage, en tant que sujet de curiosité ou d’intérêt public, aux médias classiques est souvent 
une consécration recherchée ou involontaire . C’est un critère parmi d’autres pour statuer sur cette notion 
de « popularité » . Assane Diouf est l’un des rares – sinon le seul – à avoir attiré de manière aussi forte 
l’attention aussi bien des médias nationaux qu’internationaux . Ses diatribes contre le pouvoir de Macky 
Sall, son succès populaire, les péripéties de son expulsion des États-Unis ou encore son retour au Sénégal 
et ses démêlés avec la justice ont épisodiquement été suivis et couverts par des médias comme BBC Afri-
que ou Jeune Afrique, pour ne citer que ces deux exemples . BBC lui consacre un post sous le titre « Sé-
négal : un YouTubeur controversé expulsé des USA », le 30 août 2017 (https://www .bbc .com/afrique/
region-41095727) . Le magazine Jeune Afrique, sous la plume d’Olivier Liffran, lui consacre un article au 
titre évocateur, « Sénégal : retour sur la rocambolesque affaire Assane Diouf », publié le 05 septembre 
2017 . Dans cet article, le journaliste revient avec une très bonne analyse sur le contexte politique local qui 
a permis à Assane Diouf d’émerger comme figure de curiosité . Il revient également sur le traitement dont 
Diouf a fait l’objet de la part des autorités politiques et judiciaires sénégalaises (Olivier Liffran : Sénégal : 
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monde des affaires et de la culture, qu’il a réalisées et diffusées sur Facebook et YouTu-
be .2 Ces productions ont reçu un accueil viral, tant dans les communautés sénégalaises 
vivant à l’étranger qu’au Sénégal même, faisant le bonheur des uns et suscitant l’indi-
gnation des autres .
Le 23 novembre 2017, Assane Diouf est la victime d’une brutale agression physi-
que . L’attaque a été perpétrée, selon le témoignage des assaillants, dans sa maison fami-
liale, dans la banlieue de Dakar, alors qu’il était en train de réaliser une énième vidéo 
injurieuse . Le motif de l’« expédition punitive » est décliné, avec fierté et passion, par 
ses agresseurs . Ils accusent leur victime d’avoir proféré « des insultes »3 à l’encontre du 
porte-parole du khalif général des mourides, Serigne Bassirou Abdou Khadre Mbac-
ké4 . L’incident, rapidement médiatisé, est suivi de l’interpellation  d’Assane Diouf par 
les forces de l’ordre, puis de son placement en détention par la justice . Il ne sera toute-
fois jugé que le 26 décembre 2018, soit un peu plus d’un an après son arrestation . Le 
tribunal le reconnaîtra « coupable d’insulte par le biais d’un système informatique, 
d’outrages à agents dans l’exercice de leur fonction et de diffusions de fausses nouvel-
les » . Il est condamné à 2 ans de prison, dont 9 mois de probation et 3 mois de mise 
à l’épreuve . La peine est assortie d’une interdiction d’émettre un avis ou une opinion 
publique quelconque via les médias ou de participer à des rassemblements publics, 
ainsi que de l’exigence de se soumettre à un suivi psychologique et psychiatrique5 .
Les avocats du mis en cause voient dans cette décision une volonté de mise à « mort 
civile » de leur client, privé d’après eux « du droit d’association, du droit de parole, du 
droit d’expression, du droit d’avoir une opinion » et saisissent la Cour de justice de la 
CEDEAO . Celle-ci estimera, en février 2019, que les droits d’Assane Diouf à être jugé 
retour sur la rocambolesque affaire Assane Diouf . Jeuneafrique, le 5 septembre 2017 . https://www .jeu 
neafrique .com/471739/societe/senegal-retour-sur-la-rocambolesque-affaire-assane-diouf/) .
2 Les vidéos insultantes étant susceptibles de faire l’objet de signalements et de censures, certaines vidéos 
mentionnées ici ne sont plus consultables au moment de la parution de cette contribution ou ne le seront 
probablement plus à l’avenir .
3 Dans un montage vidéo de 11 minutes et 27 secondes, posté le 23 novembre 2017, sur une chaine You-
Tube, Wise TV Sénégal, trois éléments sont disposés : une prise de parole d’un homme qui justifie l’agres-
sion en semblant en être un commanditaire dans un média privé, Zik FM, relativement bien écouté en 
milieu urbain ; une prise de parole filmée de deux individus qui déclarent avoir participé à l’attaque ; enfin 
une prise de parole audio d’Assane Diouf en conversion avec une autre webactiviste (à l’époque des faits, 
son soutien) . Nous reviendrons plus loin sur cette conversation d’Assane Diouf (https://www .youtube .
com/watch?v=tYgXfwbsQqA, dernière consultation le 27 mars 2019) .Sur les propos d’Assane Diouf 
qui sont incriminés, voir la vidéo à l’adresse suivante : https://www .youtube .com/watch?v=c3pxXL-72f8 
(Dernière consultation le samedi 31 août 2017) .
4 Serigne Bassirou Abdou Khadre Mbacké est né en 1976, selon le magazine La Gazette . Il n’est âgé que 
de 33 ans lorsqu’entre 2009 et 2010, la majorité de ses concitoyens le découvrent, d’abord comme orga-
nisateur du Grand Magal de Touba, puis porte-parole du khalif Serigne Bara Mbacké (m . 2010) . Il est 
reconduit dans cette fonction par Serigne Sidy el Moctar Mbacké (m . 2018) . L’actuel Khalif, Serigne 
Mountakha Bassirou Mbacké le reconduit également dans cette fonction . En 2016, le journal Le Quoti-
dien a consacré au marabout une présentation largement reprise par plusieurs sites internet .
5 Ces termes du jugement sont partout repris et commentés durant des jours dans les médias en ligne . La 
presse fera aussi un large écho des réactions de ses avocats .
L’affaire Assane Diouf 229
dans un délai raisonnable et à bénéficier d’un procès équitable ont été bafoués par 
l’État du Sénégal . La Cour a d’ailleurs condamné l’État sénégalais à dédommager le 
plaignant pour un montant de 20 millions F CFA . La question que pose cet article est 
la suivante : l’affaire Assane Diouf est-elle juste un incident anecdotique ou s’inscrit-
elle dans la dynamique des glissements sociopolitiques et socioreligieux qui mettent à 
l’épreuve l’état du contrat social sénégalais ainsi que Donal Cruise O’Brien en a posé 
l’hypothèse, il y a 27 ans déjà (voir Cruise O’Brien 1992) ?
Le corpus de notre étude s’appuie largement (mais de façon non exhaustive) sur des 
vidéos d’Assane Diouf, mais aussi sur les commentaires des internautes dans la presse 
en ligne, de même que sur des vidéos diffusées pour le contredire, le désavouer ou le 
soutenir . Nous nous sommes intéressés aux thématiques qu’Assane Diouf a mobilisées 
dans la construction de son ascension médiatique, tout en prêtant une grande atten-
tion aux opinions « politiques » et « religieuses » qu’il n’a cessées de véhiculer dans 
la formulation de ses insultes . Nous nous sommes également intéressés aux personnes 
qu’il a attaquées en mettant en contraste leurs positions sociales et institutionnelles 
avec des éléments épars de la biographie d’Assane Diouf . Dans la démarche, enfin, cet 
article est le fait d’un sociolinguiste et anthropologue du langage et d’un historien-
anthropologue . Ils ont cherché, ici, à allier l’analyse de la violence verbale à une mise 
en perspective historique et anthropologique des questions que pose l’affaire Assane 
Diouf dans le contexte de la problématique subsidiaire à celle du contrat social énon-
cée plus haut : « Où va l’islam sénégalais 6 » ?
Assane Diouf : éléments de biographie fragmentaire
Cette section revient sur divers moments qui nous semblent importants dans la bio-
graphie fragmentée d’Assane Diouf, qu’il convient d’envisager à l’intérieur de la tra-
jectoire plus large du Sénégal contemporain7 . L’échelle du fragment s’impose d’elle-
même tant le parcours d’Assane Diouf reste opaque, notamment du fait de l’absence 
de références claires et solides qui a pour conséquence une multiplication de narratifs, 
faisant ainsi apparaître l’ « insulteur public n°1 » tel un « météore » ayant subitement 
fendu l’horizon des conversations publiques au Sénégal . Ce que l’on sait de lui pro-
vient donc essentiellement de ce qu’il dit de lui-même, notamment dans certaines de 
ses vidéos, et de ce que les gens en disent à travers la rumeur8 .
6 Détournant ainsi le titre de l’ouvrage de P . Fougeyrollas : Où va le Sénégal ? (1970)
7 Sur ce processus de production du Sénégal contemporain, voir la série d’ouvrages dirigés par Momar-
Coumba Diop, dans le cadre du programme de recherche Sénégal 2000 . Se référer aussi aux publications 
qu’il a éditées à la suite de ce programme, notamment les deux volumes dédiés à la gouvernance de Wade 
et parus en 2013 aux éditions Karthala . On rajoutera à cette somme, Le Sénégal sous Abdou Diouf, paru 
en 1990 aux éditions Karthala et L’histoire du Sénégal . Le modèle islamo-wolof et ses périphéries, paru en 
2001, aux éditions Maisonneuve & Larose .
8 Nous revenons plus loin sur cette notion et sa portée heuristique dans le cas d’Assane Diouf . 
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Assane Diouf dit être né en 1971 . Il affirme avoir vécu 16 années à l’étranger . Ces in-
formations sont glanées à partir des récits qu’il élabore, depuis Dakar où il a repris 
ses activités de « webactiviste » à la suite de son expulsion des États-Unis . À partir de 
divers recoupements, on peut retenir, grossièrement, qu’Assane Diouf aurait quitté 
le Sénégal entre 2001 et 2002, date qui n’est pas sans intérêt . En effet, une abondante 
littérature s’est attardée sur ce point, cherchant à démêler les raisons pour lesquelles, 
beaucoup de jeunes qui ont été massivement à l’origine de l’alternance politique inter-
venue en 2000, et à qui Abdoulaye Wade avait semblé vouloir consacrer son magistère, 
se sont mis à défier déserts et mers (dans les cas extrêmes) pour sortir du Sénégal et 
embrasser la vie de clandestins en Europe ou ailleurs . Chose encore plus remarquable, 
c’est la clientèle du parti au pouvoir (le Parti démocratique sénégalais – PDS) qui allait, 
dans une large mesure, être la principale bénéficiaire des accords de migrations tempo-
raires que le régime de Wade allait signer pour freiner le phénomène de la migration 
clandestine . C’est ce qui ressort du travail de Hannah Cross (2013) qui a mené, dans la 
banlieue de Dakar, une enquête auprès de plusieurs associations de jeunes, de femmes 
et de migrants refoulés ou expulsés . On sait qu’Assane Diouf, s’est présenté, à plusieurs 
reprises, comme un wadiste ; mais il ne nous a pas été possible, cependant, d’établir un 
lien entre les offres de mobilité que le PDS a utilisées comme appât pour fidéliser sa 
jeune clientèle et les ressources qu’Assane Diouf a déployées en propre pour migrer9 .
Ce que l’on sait, par contre, de façon plus sûre, c’est qu’Assane Diouf était revenu 
auparavant sur les raisons sociales et personnelles qui l’ont poussé à migrer . Ce fut 
à l’occasion d’une émission de télévision, Enquête exclusive, produite par la chaîne 
privée française M6, dans un numéro titré « La multinationale des vendeurs à la sau-
vette » . Dans ce reportage, paru initialement le 24 mai 2009 et remis au goût du jour 
en 2017 par la presse sénégalaise en ligne, soit huit années plus tard, Assane Diouf n’est 
alors qu’un illustre inconnu pour la plupart de ses concitoyens . Et, de fait, son appa-
rition en 2009 dans le reportage de M6 n’aura rien changé à son anonymat10 . Mais le 
chargé de casting de M6 n’avait pas manqué de flair . Assane Diouf incarnait déjà à cette 
9 Le seul moment de militantisme que nous avons pu retrouver concernant Assane Diouf est son passage 
bref et tardif en 2008 au mouvement politique de jeunesse (Union des jeunesses travaillistes libérales) 
du parti présidentiel de l’époque (Parti Démocratique Sénégalais) . Au plus fort de son combat contre le 
régime de Sall, on l’a vu aussi donner des consignes de vote en faveur d’une coalition menée par le Parti 
démocratique sénégalais . Il peut être utile d’ajouter à cette phase militante deux autres moments qu’As-
sane Diouf revendique lui-même : sa participation à la première élection de Barack Obama et une soirée 
« F… Trump » qu’il aurait organisée juste après la victoire du 45e président des États-Unis . 
10 Certes, le documentaire a reçu un accueil polémique au Sénégal . Cependant, l’objet de la querelle fut 
loin d’être Assane Diouf, mais surtout la note d’intention du programme que nous citons ici et l’image 
suspicieuse qu’il semblait véhiculer à propos de la communauté mouride . « Paris, Rome, New York, 
les grandes villes touristiques voient tous les abords des monuments investis de vendeurs à la sauvette 
proposant des gadgets en tout genre, Tours Eiffel, porte-clefs ou masques exotiques . La plupart d’entre 
eux sont Sénégalais et font partie d’un véritable réseau qui, depuis plus de trente ans, organise leur venue 
en Europe, sélectionne les produits et les emplacements les plus rentables . Il semble que cette étonnante 
organisation soit aux mains d’individus mystérieux et fortunés qui, grâce aux bénéfices récupérés, font 
construire au Sénégal des écoles religieuses et des mosquées » . Pour la note et pour le reportage se référer 
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époque le parfait client du storytelling qui met à l’honneur le cliché du self-made man 
africain, « immigré » dans une grande métropole occidentale (New-York), démarrant 
comme « vendeur à la sauvette » et qui, à force de sacrifices quotidiens et de ferveur 
morale et religieuse, réussit à sortir de l’ornière sa famille et sa communauté restées 
au pays . En effet, l’histoire d’Assane Diouf dans ce reportage est avant tout celle d’un 
jeune Sénégalais qui a choisi de migrer pour aider sa famille et prendre la place de son 
père, décédé en 1987 . Mais c’est aussi l’histoire d’un homme qui rêve de construire de 
belles maisons et conduire de jolies voitures . Le reportage comporte en effet une scène 
où le jeune homme exhibe sa réussite en posant à côté d’une belle voiture, jouant ainsi 
sur le stéréotype du migrant « qui a réussi » .
Ce qui va sortir Assane Diouf de l’anonymat et le propulser du statut de produc-
teur de vidéos en direct sur Facebook et YouTube destinées à une audience plutôt 
limitée, à celui de phénomène d’intérêt public, c’est le contexte de consolidation hé-
gémonique du pouvoir de Macky Sall . Celui-ci est marqué par une amplification des 
accusations, contre lui et son régime, de népotisme et surtout de favoritisme clanique 
et de promotion d’une justice à deux vitesses . Un climat vicié et délétère règne alors et 
qui va favoriser une certaine violence verbale . Les jeunes qui avaient combattu le projet 
de Wade d’obtenir un troisième mandat se montrent plus exigeants encore vis-à-vis du 
régime de Sall et font désormais des réseaux sociaux l’espace privilégié de leurs critiques 
des différents establishments politiques et religieux, mais aussi de leurs propres querel-
les internes . À ce titre, comme l’a souligné Olivier Liffran, le procès intenté à une cer-
taine Penda Ba pour insultes contre un groupe ethnique, durant le mois d’août 2017, 
a constitué un incident déclencheur de la soudaine popularité d’Assane Diouf11 . Tou-
tefois, il importe de noter aussi qu’au moment de l’arrestation et du procès de Penda 
Ba, Assane Diouf était déjà relativement bien connu des Sénégalais qui s’intéressaient 
de façon croissante à cet intriguant personnage qui attaquait les peoples, les marabouts 
et les politiciens . C’est dans ce contexte aussi mixte que flou que l’on voit que le fait 
de prendre du recul et de s’interroger sur une rumeur et son statut constitue une dé-
marche heuristique à bien des égards . On peut emprunter à Philippe Aldrin, dans 
Penser la rumeur . Une question discutée des sciences sociales, sa synthèse de l’appro-
che classique de cette notion telle qu’elle a été élaborée par G . Allport et L . Postman . 
Chez ces deux auteurs, rapporte Aldrin (2003 : 129), « la rumeur fonctionne comme 
un mécanisme collectif de ‹ transfert d’agressivité › par lequel le corps social projette 
une ‹ angoisse collective › sur un groupe minoritaire (élite politique ou sociale, ad-
ministration, communautés étrangères, etc .) . Les rumeurs surgiraient lorsque, autour 
d’un événement, se rencontrent deux facteurs : l’ambiguïté (incapacité du corps social 
à l’adresse suivante : « Enquête Exclusive : La face cachée d’Assane Diouf » Senescoop, le 16 août 2017 
(https://www .senescoop .net/enquete-exclusive-la-face-cachee-dassane-diouf/) .
11 L’accusée avait, en effet, invité le grand public et ses juges à comprendre que ses insultes dirigées contre 
le groupe ethnique des Wolofs, n’étaient, selon elle, qu’une réaction colérique et excessive, en réponse aux 
insultes récurrentes qu’Assane Diouf dirigeait contre les Peulhs en prenant le prétexte de s’attaquer au 
président de la République . Voir l’article de Olivier Liffran du magazine Jeune Afrique mentionné plus 
haut .
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à interpréter la signification de l’événement) et l’implication (haut degré d’intérêt des 
membres du corps social pour l’événement et son interprétation) » .
Précisément dans le contexte social et politique délétère détaillé ci-dessus, le succès 
d’Assane Diouf s’explique en grande partie par l’existence d’individus et de groupes 
qui ont pensé qu’ils n’avaient plus que l’insulte à opposer à un régime politique qui 
n’était plus capable de les entendre autrement (voir Ly et Seck 2012) . Ces individus 
et groupes ont alors organisé, de façon paradoxalement consciente et inconsciente, la 
diffusion de la rumeur et donc le « transfert d’agressivité » contre des segments spéci-
fiques de la population sénégalaise au cœur de l’appareil central d’État, mais aussi des 
institutions sociales, culturelles et religieuses qu’Assane Diouf va identifier et attaquer 
nommément par un commérage injurieux et le colportage de rumeurs salissantes .
Toutefois, on ne comprendrait pas pourquoi Assane Diouf a semblé penser qu’il 
était prédestiné à revendiquer et à incarner le rôle de porte-parole le plus téméraire de 
son camp12 si on ne mettait pas cela en lien avec l’arrière-plan sociologique qui est le 
sien . Et celui-ci, dans la biographie fragmentée d’Assane Diouf, se décline en termes de 
« géographies symboliques » qu’il évoque régulièrement pour s’autosignaler . En effet, 
lorsqu’il raconte qu’il est un « habitant de la banlieue de Guédiawaye » où il aurait 
grandi, ou encore un « natif de la Médina », Assane Diouf construit un personnage 
enraciné au cœur d’une imagerie sociale qui lui permet de revendiquer une légitimité 
de nàndite, mot wolof qui renvoie à « quelqu’un à qui on ne le fait pas », « quelqu’un 
qui est qui est branché », « qui n’est pas un looser »13 . Et l’homme rajoute à ces mar-
queurs déjà forts deux autres traits qui ne sont ni moins significatifs ni moins enracinés 
dans des géographies particulières . Le premier est sa socialisation « en pays mouride » . 
Le second est son statut d’émigré14 . Dans le premier cas, toutes ses vidéos le montrent, 
il met un trait d’honneur à se présenter comme un fervent disciple mouride et un Baay 
Fall15 sans concession . Dans le second cas, on le voit bien aussi dans ses vidéos, Assane 
Diouf aime sur-jouer sa qualité de Sénégalais expatrié . Il prend un réel plaisir à s’ex-
poser et faire étalage de son quotidien, de son environnement et des lieux où il fait ses 
courses et n’hésite pas, à l’occasion, à tourner la caméra sur les liasses de dollars de son 
12 Assane Diouf a d’abord affirmé être dans le camp du peuple, avant d’expliquer, au sommet de son 
conflit avec les institutions de l’État et ses soutiens sociaux, défendre la cause de Cheikh Ahmadou Bam-
ba, fondateur de l’ordre des mourides .
13 Sur l’importance symbolique et sociologique de ces deux espaces dans les mutations de la production 
des modes juvéniles, en passant par les quartiers du Grand Dakar, comme ceux des SICAP, on peut se réfé-
rer aux travaux d’Abdourahmane Seck dont La Question musulmane au Sénégal (2010), La ‹ production › 
du Sénégal postcolonial (2013) et Les migrations au Sénégal (2014) .
14 Voir notre chapitre commun : Le migrant de la chanson sénégalaise : aperçu thématique et enjeux 
socioculturels des années 80 à nos jours (Seck et Ly 2015) .  . 
15 Les Baay Fall sont une sous-branche de la confrérie mouride liée à un ancêtre fondateur, Cheikh Ibra-
hima Fall (1858–1930), compagnon et disciple de Cheikh Amadou Bamba (1853–1927), figure tutélaire 
de la mouriddiya . Sur les Baay Fall, on se référera à toute fin utile à l’ouvrage de Charlotte Pezeril, Islam, 
mysticisme et marginalité (2008) .
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portefeuille ou filmer des plans extérieurs ou intérieurs de sa maison, et se met alors à 
s’exclamer : « C’est là où j’habite », « C’est là, ma maison »16 .
Mais, au-delà de ces identifications proclamées avec démesure, Assane Diouf in-
carne, en outre, le parfait profil de « l’homme aux douze métiers » . Des banlieues 
dakaroises à la Nouvelle-Orléans, en passant par le célèbre marché Sandaga de Dakar 
aux trottoirs de New-York, il affirme avoir été tôlier, mécanicien, vendeur ambulant, 
ouvrier, agent de sécurité, promoteur de spectacles, et plus encore . Ce que l’on ne voit 
pas assez, par contre, sous le portrait de cet homme débrouillard et de ses lieux, identi-
tés et poses photogéniques de prédilection, c’est l’orphelin de la République et de son 
école nationale, le laissé-pour-compte qui perçoit une opportunité d’ascension sociale . 
Dans ses autoportraits, Assane Diouf est, en effet, souvent revenu sur la revanche de 
l’écolier éconduit . L’homme utilise souvent le sobriquet de « nullard » dont il s’af-
fuble en le retournant comme une ressource discursive, dans une forme d’autodéri-
sion, pour mieux montrer que son échec scolaire n’a pas eu raison de ce qu’il présente 
comme sa réussite sociale et économique . Les occurrences de cette préoccupation sont 
multiples dans son discours : « le nullard parle français », « vous verrez avec le nullard 
», « vous saurez que le nullard a bien appris » . Dans une vidéo encore disponible sur 
YouTube17, après avoir montré son habileté à faire des recherches sur son smart phone, 
Assane Diouf affirme : « Nullard amatul, there is no nullard in this world »18 . Et de 
poser une question à ses suiveurs : « Comment un téléphone peut être intelligent sans 
que la personne qui le manipule ne le soit pas ? »
La carrière de webactiviste ou la fabrique de la vidéo virale
Cette partie traite de la « carrière » proprement dite de webactiviste d’Assane Diouf, 
en s’intéressant particulièrement aux traits de style qui ont fait le succès de ses inter-
ventions . Dans ses vidéos, Assane Diouf combine des principes moraux, des ressources 
culturelles et symboliques, des arts oratoires et des techniques de mises en scène, qui 
relèvent de plusieurs genres . Cependant, cette démarche éclectique peut faire l’ob-
jet d’une saisie d’ensemble, à partir de deux principales considérations . D’une part, 
il emprunte à l’influenceur créateur de contenu sa « fonction tribunicienne » (voir 
Lavau 1981) . D’autre part, il emprunte à la téléréalité, le goût de l’exposition, voire de 
l’exhibition . Se montrer sans aucune forme de réserve devient une habitude chez As-
sane Diouf . Sous ce dernier rapport, Aslama et Pantti soulignent un point de lecture 
important :
16 Ce mélange de satisfecit et d’exhibitionnisme semble aussi répondre de divers autres paramètres, liés à la 
revanche sociale de l’exclu, dans un contexte socioculturel de type consumériste . Il peut être utile de noter 
également qu’Assane Diouf ne se considère pas comme un exclu . On y reviendra plus loin .
17 «ASSANE DIOUF N 111 », posté par ‹ DAKAR 24 › le 5 mars 2019 (https://www .youtube .com/
watch?v=Iyk7NAR0nc8, dernière consultation le 12 avril 2019) .
18 Traduisant en anglais, ce qu’il venait de dire en langue wolof . 
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« Reality television seems to be a hybrid in many ways, but it is one-dimension-
al in its focus on the emotional . The question of emotion-based authenticity is 
crucial to reality television, as all talk situations seem to have one more implicit 
or explicit mission . They claim to disclose what truly occurred and how it was 
experienced » (Aslama et Pantti 2006 : 177) .
S’il apparaît parfois dans la rue ou vaque à quelque occupation, pour l’essentiel, cepen-
dant, les vidéos d’Assane Diouf sont plutôt enregistrées dans un décor intérieur . On le 
découvre alors généralement assis sur une chaise . En arrière-plan de la vidéo, il affiche 
les drapeaux des USA et du Sénégal, une carte de l’Afrique, la photo de son marabout, 
une paire de baskets posée en trophée, une peluche de tigre et divers autres objets . Il est 
habillé, selon les jours, de différentes façons : un maillot de l’équipe de basketball des 
Lakers ici ; un maillot de l’équipe nationale de football d’Italie là, et, parfois, il porte 
un blazer ou une chemise . S’il n’apparaît pas toujours avec sa casquette, Assane Diouf 
oublie rarement sa grosse chaîne autour du cou . Enfin, le spectateur ne peut manquer 
d’être intrigué par l’objet à l’apparence de gris-gris entourant son poignet droit et qu’il 
réajuste souvent à la manière des lutteurs sénégalais19 .
Toute cette mise en scène, soutenue par des étoffes, des dessins, des symboles et des 
objets d’apparat, évoque des attaches à des signifiants divers : le personnage joué par 
Assane Diouf se définit comme un émigré confortablement installé, un mouride, un 
guerrier, un homme branché, partisan d’une Afrique en lutte et aussi un Sénégalais 
mystiquement protégé .
C’est dans ce cadre kaléidoscopique que le personnage fantasque opère avec dex-
térité dans le maniement des couplets des variétés sénégalaises qu’il utilise pour mieux 
diffuser son message . Il n’hésite pas non plus à se montrer bon danseur . Le tout se 
tient dans une forme de laisser-aller et d’absence d’autocensure qui rejoint ce que nous 
décrivions plus haut comme une exigence de nudité ou de transparence devant son 
audience . Quelques invités sont parfois reçus sur l’interface notamment des internau-
tes qui téléphonent du Sénégal, mais surtout de l’étranger . Nous avons pu constater, 
du moins en apparence, que les appels pouvaient venir des États-Unis, de l’Italie, de la 
France, de l’Espagne, ou encore de la Chine . Il arrive au YouTuber, en bon maître de 
cérémonie, d’activer le haut-parleur de son téléphone, permettant ainsi à son auditoire 
de suivre la conversation qui a lieu durant son émission diffusée en direct . Chacun de 
ses directs prend pour cible une ou plusieurs personnes, du chef de l’État, Macky Sall, 
à son épouse, Marième Faye Sall, en passant par des membres du gouvernement, des 
19 Cet objet qui pourrait être un gris-gris, tout comme la manière ostentatoire avec laquelle il le resserre 
fréquemment, sont aussi une forme de message qu’il délivre . Dans l’imaginaire populaire, cela veut dire 
« Faites attention !! Je suis blindé sur le plan mystique .» . L’usage du terme « mystique » peut être mieux 
clarifié . En effet, il est compris dans le contexte social de sa mobilisation comme une force magique de 
protection contre les sorts que certains pourraient vouloir nous jeter . L’expression « retour à l’envoyeur » 
est aussi courante pour qualifier l’attitude que semble adopter ici Assane Diouf . Elle signifie que « tout 
ce que vous tenterez de me jeter comme mauvais sort, se retournera, par la force de la protection dont je 
jouis, contre vous » .
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chefs religieux, le procureur de la République, des célébrités du show-business et de 
la jet-set dakaroise . Et l’audience est au rendez-vous . En effet, lorsqu’il compte 2 700 
connexions simultanées pour son direct sur Facebook, la presse parle déjà de record 
d’audience établi par un Sénégalais et affirme que seules des stars arrivent à atteindre 
ces niveaux20 . À la fin du mois d’août 2017, il atteindra plus de 5 000 connexions si-
multanées . Chaque live donne lieu à des dizaines de milliers de vues lorsqu’il est posté 
sur YouTube . Dans ces vidéos, Assane Diouf ponctue ses saillies d’une formule qui 
a fait sensation au point de se retrouver dans des spots publicitaires ou des sketchs : 
« Partagé leen vidéo yi, partagé leen ko » (« Partagez les vidéos ! Partagez-les ! ») . Ici, 
le lien entre médias sociaux et économie digitale ne peut être entièrement éludé, au 
regard du développement rapide de la communauté d’abonnés d’Assane Diouf et sur-
tout la reprise, par les milieux du marketing et de la publicité, de ses slogans . Assane 
Diouf, ne l’oublions pas, est quelqu’un qui a le sens du marketing, même si, au demeu-
rant, le temps n’a pas permis de voir comment la chaîne « Domaram Tv » qu’il a créée 
pour porter sa marque aurait pu évoluer en termes de professionnalisation .
De « bête noire » des peoples au cauchemar du landernau 
politique et de l’establishment religieux
Le fulgurant développement des médias sénégalais depuis le début des années quatre-
vingt-dix a rendu publique la vie d’un nombre important de personnes (journalistes, 
animateurs, laudateurs, artistes, politiciens et marabouts amateurs de buzz) dont les 
vies sont suivies par la population et qui font l’objet de potins en tout genre . De la 
même façon, une culture de l’usage des réseaux sociaux comme modalité d’expression 
et de publicisation des petites querelles internes à la jet-set dakaroise s’est consolidée 
durant la dernière décennie . De nombreuses vidéos circulent en racontant des histoi-
res aussi fantasques que désolantes, des petites haines ordinaires, des messages détour-
nés, que les célébrités locales s’adressent . Des jeunes webactivistes se sont également 
emparés de ces réseaux pour s’improviser critiques ou satiristes sociaux . C’est fort de 
ce contexte, et surtout grâce à son expérience du milieu du show-business, qu’Assane 
Diouf entre en scène et met à profit un style qui va rapidement faire la différence : 
colère, indignation, et surtout violence verbale vont être une partie essentielle des in-
grédients de son succès . Le propos d’Assane Diouf peut d’autant plus séduire qu’il 
s’ancre dans des ressources narratives très classiques, plaçant au cœur de ses intrigues 
des histoires de trahison, d’abandon et de reniement des amitiés passées .
Aussi voulons-nous surtout tenter, dans cette section, de dresser une carte des ci-
bles et des thèmes de la courte carrière d’Assane Diouf . Il est possible de brosser cette 
carte dans une évolution logique à trois temps . Chacun de ces trois tournants repré-
sente, plus ou moins spécifiquement, un groupe particulier d’acteurs qu’Assane Diouf 
20 « Facebook Sénégal : Assane Diouf bat des records sur le web avec plus de 2700 personnes connec-
tées… » . Osiris, le 2 août 2017 (http://www .osiris .sn/Facebook-Senegal-Assane-Diouf-bat .html) .
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a pris pour cible autour de quelques thèmes de prédilection formant un noyau ou 
spectre qualifiable d’objet discursif structurant . Cette rhétorique se décline sous les 
récurrences de la revivification de l’orthodoxie confrérique en général et mouride en 
particulier, de la moralisation de la vie publique, de la dénonciation des injustices so-
ciales, de la critique de l’hypocrisie sociale, de l’homosexualité et de la transhumance 
politique21 . Cette fibre moraliste va stimuler sa propension à révéler des informations 
sur la vie et les conversations privées de célébrités et personnes notables qu’il déclare 
par ailleurs très bien connaître22 . Ces dernières, quoique représentant des groupes re-
lativement distincts, n’en constituent pas moins un ensemble relativement homogène . 
Leur solidarité tient au lien de fréquentation et d’instrumentalisation réciproques qui 
existe (jusqu’à un certain point) entre ces différentes personnes issues du monde du 
spectacle et des médias, du monde politique et du groupe des marabouts . En effet, ces 
personnes constituent des clients les uns pour les autres et se rendent mutuellement 
service . Elles partagent des scènes, des cérémonies et des salons . Les multiples rencon-
tres et relations générées par leurs régulières interactions ont alimenté la machine mé-
diatique et critique du « maître des insultes » qui va les attaquer les uns après les autres 
ou tous ensemble à la fois .
De manière schématique, le premier groupe qui semble avoir offert à Assane Diouf 
une solide rampe de lancement dans le landernau des bloggeurs sénégalais semble plu-
tôt être lié au monde du spectacle . Assane Diouf, rappelons-le, a aussi un passé de 
« promoteur de spectacles » . Comme il le soutient lui-même, il aurait rendu possible 
à ce titre, durant les années qu’il a passées aux États-Unis, la tournée de plusieurs de ses 
compatriotes sénégalais connus : lutteurs, animateurs, musiciens ou encore comédiens . 
Les interactions qu’il aurait eues avec ces artistes et célébrités du monde de la culture, 
du sport et des médias ont constitué une réserve d’anecdotes qui a abondamment ali-
menté ses vidéos . Au-delà de l’admonestation, du dénigrement, de la dénonciation et 
de l’insulte, Assane Diouf, dans cette phase première de son ascension, a surtout réussi 
à convaincre qu’il était un homme qui connaît les raisons cachées des conflits qui tra-
versent le monde du show-business sénégalais23 .
21 Dans le discours populaire, la notion de transhumance politique est une image pastorale qui sert à 
décrire le mouvement de yo-yo des hommes politiques qui quittent toujours le camp des vaincus pour se 
retrouver dans le camp des vainqueurs, afin de mieux servir leurs intérêts et préserver leurs privilèges .
22 Rappelons qu’Assane Diouf ne se considère pas comme un exclu . Il lui arrive, régulièrement, de dé-
cliner des fragments biographiques qui lient sa trajectoire avec des places, des célébrités, des lignages, qui 
ont occupé une place importante dans la société sénégalaise . Selon lui, son éducation en pays mouride se 
serait faite avec des marabouts devenus des figures publiques ; il porterait le prénom d’un ami et condisci-
ple proche de l’ancien Président Wade . Lorsqu’il était encore enfant, il se serait fait repérer par Wade qui 
lui aurait témoigné une certaine affection . Il serait neveu de Cheikh Anta Diop . Il serait parti en vacances 
dans le village natal de celui-ci et aurait rencontré ses fils . Il serait aussi un petit fils des Rois du Sine (Pays 
sérère) . Ses parents et les parents de Youssou Ndour seraient des amis de longue date, et ainsi de suite . La 
vidéo qui suit est une illustration de ce qui vient d’être dit : « ASSANE DIOUF N 112 », posté par ‹ 
DAKAR 24 › le 27 mars 2019 (https://www .youtube .com/watch?v=uJAIjNXRG34&t=3003s, dernière 
consultation le 12 avril 2019) .
23 Par exemple, confronté à une polémique sociale sévère liée au port d’un sac féminin, Waly Seck, la jeune 
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Il est très important ici de montrer que le succès qu’Assane Diouf commence à enregis-
trer dans la sphère publique en tant que bête noire des peoples n’est pas sans contrepar-
ties . Il étale sur la place publique ce qu’il prétend savoir de certaines personnes, mais 
celles-ci aussi répondent et étalent sur la place publique ce qu’elles prétendent savoir de 
lui . À ce stade, la question de sa situation irrégulière aux États-Unis commence à se po-
ser et ses adversaires, souvent des partisans du régime en place, l’accusent de chercher à 
préparer sa chute en se faisant passer pour un martyr .
Au regard de ce qui précède, le développement de la critique injurieuse des hom-
mes politiques chez Assane Diouf pourrait donc être perçu comme une évolution à 
la fois logique et prévisible . Logique, par la chaîne de solidarité qui existe entre les 
personnes de la vie publique qu’il attaque . Prévisible, car sa tribune publique semble 
être devenue, par la force des choses, un instrument de réponses à la précarisation de 
son statut légal aux États-Unis . Macky Sall et son régime vont donc occuper une place 
croissante dans les diatribes de l’homme, et faire l’objet d’accusations récurrentes d’en-
richissement illicite, mais aussi de comportements non démocratiques24 . Assane Diouf 
déroule une véritable opération coup de poing, appuyée par des internautes motivés 
qui s’emparent de ses vidéos et les propagent sur les réseaux sociaux . Ses cibles, notam-
ment les hautes autorités de la République sénégalaise et leurs familles, sont touchées 
dans leur honneur, car Diouf ne cesse d’en faire des gens de peu, voire de rien, à coups 
de révélations calomnieuses aux conséquences désastreuses . La régularité et la violence 
des insultes combinées au succès populaire de ses vidéos créent un malaise au cœur de 
l’establishment politique et religieux . Les collaborateurs du chef de l’État ne peuvent 
star de la musique de variété sénégalaise, dénonce une cabale menée par des adversaires qui ont pris peur 
et qui n’admettent pas de le voir devenir populaire . Assane Diouf, récupérera la communication du chan-
teur pour mettre un nom sur ces « adversaires » dénoncés, en filigrane, dans le propos du chanteur . Il 
désignera en particulier Pape Diouf, autre grande star, considéré jusque-là comme le potentiel successeur 
de la vedette mondiale Youssou Ndour (https://www .youtube .com/watch?v=ut6_70_6K6c, dernière 
consultation le 30 décembre 2018) .
Ailleurs, il se présente comme le « grand » d’Akon qui l’appellerait « brother » et qui lui retournerait ses 
messages textos en l’appelant . Il le met en garde contre Youssou Ndour (prétendant ainsi connaitre suffi-
samment bien l’artiste) . En réalité, Assane Diouf a cherché, régulièrement à dépeindre Youssou Ndour et 
sa famille (enfants, frères et sœurs) comme un groupe qui représente une puissante machine qui trônerait 
dans les milieux de la culture et des médias, position à partir de laquelle cette famille, et Youssou Ndour en 
premier, négocierait avec le régime en place . Pour Diouf, cette « puissance » des Ndour se serait construi-
te de manière peu éthique . Assane Diouf soutient qu’il a été escroqué de 14 000 dollars par le label Prince 
Arts, détenu par un des frères de Youssou Ndour, qui aurait annulé un contrat qu’il aurait signé avec 
Pape Diouf pour des prestations aux États-Unis . Assane Diouf insiste également sur le fait que la sœur de 
Youssou Ndour, Ngoné Ndour, aurait produit une émission à succès Sen Petit Galé qui exploiterait les 
enfants . Pape Diouf, qu’il perçoit comme le protégé des Ndour, devient une de ses cibles favorites . Une 
rixe opposera d’ailleurs les gardes du corps de Pape Diouf à Assane Diouf à Xelcom peu de temps après le 
retour forcé de celui-ci au Sénégal : « Assane DIOUF explique sa bagarre avec Pape DIOUF à XELCOM 
», posté par ‹ Ndarinfo .com › le 7 octobre 2017 (https://www .youtube .com/watch?v=nFy-5YuQsXo, 
dernière consultation le 13 avril 2019) .
24 Il fait, à ce titre, régulièrement allusion à l’expérience démocratique des États-Unis et à l’importance des 
libertés d’opinion et d’expression .
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plus continuer de faire semblant que l’affaire Assane Diouf est juste incongrue, et sont 
obligés de monter au créneau pour contenir la charge de Diouf contre leur patron . 
Le directeur de cabinet du président Sall, cité par les médias en ligne, s’est indigné 
au cours d’une émission de radio bien suivie : « J’ai quelque part souvent peur pour 
le Sénégal, parce que je sens qu’il y a une montée réelle de l’indiscipline, de l’incons-
cience, de l’irresponsabilité et ça doit inquiéter les Sénégalais . Si je vois maintenant que 
l’exercice favori, c’est l’injure, surtout adressée à des autorités telles que le président de 
la République, le Premier Ministre, le Gouvernement, les chefs religieux, les directeurs 
d’écoles, les enseignants… personne n’est respectée 25» . Il ajoutait, plus loin : « […] Il 
appartient aux autorités qui sont investies du pouvoir de sanction de faire ce qu’elles 
doivent faire, il n’y a pas de stratégie particulière contre des irresponsables… Quelque 
part, il y a une dimension clinique qu’il faut observer, c’est inquiétant, il nous faut un 
ressaisissement collectif pour réagir et protéger notre corpus social26» . Alors que l’État 
sénégalais enclenche la riposte, le « maître des insultes », de manière imperceptible, 
mais en toute logique, poursuit son escalade . Il va alors cibler de façon croissante le 
dispositif symbolique des ordres confrériques et la complaisance que ceux-ci témoi-
gnent au régime en place . Assane Diouf va alors considérer que les responsables des 
institutions confrériques sont « descendus de la voie tracée par leurs ancêtres », et 
le point culminant de cette odyssée allait être la sortie frontale qu’il a faite contre le 
porte-parole du khalif général des mourides . Sortie qui allait lui valoir une tentative 
de lynchage de la part de certains disciples qui se réclament du khalif, mais aussi un 
placement en détention, comme nous l’avons vu en supra .
Dans cette posture offensive (ou de survie selon le point de vue), deux dimensions 
fortes et révélatrices se mettent en place dans l’objet discursif d’Assane Diouf, et qui 
nous intéressent ici . L’influenceur ne se contente en effet plus de mots (profanes ?) 
du domaine politique pour construire sa querelle contre la figure du chef politique 
sénégalais et de ses soutiens . Il va se mettre à broder pour le chef de l’État, de manière 
symbolique, la tunique de pharaon . Sall devient, dans la rhétorique de Diouf, le tyran, 
transgresseur et arrogant vis-à-vis de Dieu et des croyants . Pour affronter un tel régime, 
Assane Diouf est conduit à requalifier sa cause . Il ne sera plus seulement alors le mili-
tant ou l’activiste, mais le missionnaire de la moralisation de la vie publique, l’annon-
ceur de l’avènement de la justice sociale, mais surtout encore le combattant de la foi et 
plus particulièrement le gardien du temple de l’héritage des guides propagateurs de l’is-
lam confrérique sénégalais, dont le Cheikh Amadou Bamba en premier et son disciple 
Cheikh Ibrahima Fall . À ce stade, les rumeurs concernant les peoples qui lui ont valu 
ses premiers succès continuent d’agrémenter son discours, mais le cœur du propos a 
basculé . Et, surtout, chose remarquable, il cherche, désormais, à profiler son auditoire 
et n’arrête plus de dire qu’il s’adresse spécifiquement à la masse des jeunes gens qui sont 
assis aux portes des commerces, des kiosques à pain, des coins de rue ou qui errent à la 
25 Ayoba Faye : « Me Oumar Youm se confie : ‹ J’ai peur pour le Sénégal › » . Pressafrik, le 13 août 2017 
(https://www .pressafrik .com/Me-Oumar-Youm-se-confie-J-ai-peur-pour-le-Senegal_a169361 .html) .
26 Ibid .
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recherche de subsides ; population dont les parts du contrat social sénégalais auraient 
été volées par des personnes qui se font passer pour respectables mais qui ne seraient 
guère plus que de vulgaires détrousseurs et charlatans
C’est à l’occasion de ce virage qu’il va aussi davantage veiller à réorienter le message 
de ses vidéos vers le registre discursif de la conscientisation . Il prétend alors « réveiller 
les Sénégalais », leur « faire prendre conscience de leurs droits » autant d’objectifs 
présentés comme leitmotiv . De fait, cette re-symbolisation de son action n’est qu’une 
des réponses qu’il va apporter face à la riposte de l’establishment qui s’organise, comme 
nous allons le voir .
Organiser la contre-attaque : la défaite d’Assane Diouf ou la 
victoire à la Pyrrhus de l’establishment ?
Assane Diouf a suscité chez les personnes qu’il a attaquées : du mépris, de l’indiffé-
rence, des contrepoints, mais aussi des opérations répressives . Cette section décrit et 
analyse de façon sommaire quelques aspects seulement de l’organisation, de la signifi-
cation et des implications du retour de bâton qui a frappé le YouTuber . Nous allons 
également examiner la défense d’Assane Diouf dans ce contexte de punition . Deux 
évènements, à ce titre, paraissent déterminants : son expulsion des États-Unis suivie 
de son refoulement au Sénégal, et les incidents à l’origine de son procès, notamment 
sa sortie médiatique contre le porte-parole du khalif des mourides . Dans l’un et l’autre 
cas, la clameur qui a accompagné la situation a constitué le signe manifeste d’un dé-
bat ou tournant sociétal qui débordait, très largement, la personne propre d’Assane 
Diouf .
Le « maître des insultes » aurait été signalé aux autorités américaines, par les auto-
rités sénégalaises, comme étant en situation de séjour irrégulier aux États-Unis, puis 
comme terroriste . Cette action imputée au gouvernement de la République du Séné-
gal, à travers la clameur publique, et dirigée contre un ressortissant sénégalais basé à 
l’étranger, a divisé l’opinion, contraignant le gouvernement à communiquer officielle-
ment sur le retour forcé d’Assane Diouf au Sénégal, mais sans le nommer au demeu-
rant27 .
27 Le journaliste sénégalais basé à New-York, Dame Babou, a déclaré à l’époque de la polémique sur les 
causes réelles de l’expulsion d’Assane Diouf, que c’était le motif « d’actes d’agression » qui avait été men-
tionné sur la fiche d’expulsion de ce dernier . Cité dans la presse en ligne, on peut lire : « On a parlé de 
terrorisme . J’ai dit qu’aux Etats-Unis, dès que vous êtes entre les mains du service de l’Immigration, c’est 
un problème de papiers . Il ne s’occupe pas de vol de voiture, ni d’accidents . Le motif officiel écrit sur 
le document de déportation de Assane Diouf, c’est pour agression . Il y a certains délits que vous com-
mettez, même si vous avez des documents, vous êtes expulsés », dit-il avant d’ajouter : « Le FBI n’arrête 
pas quelqu’un pour terrorisme et le libère après deux heures ? Ça n’a pas de sens » . (Ayoba Faye : « Le 
journaliste Dame Babou établi aux Etats-Unis révèle : ‹ Ce qui a été écrit sur le document de déportation 
d’Assane Diouf…› » . Pressafrik, le 31 août 2017 . https://www .pressafrik .com/Le-journaliste-Dame-Ba 
240 Mouhamed Abdallah Ly et Abdourahmane Seck
Il faut bien dire ici que ses adversaires n’ont pas eu besoin de se torturer les méninges 
pour porter un coup fatal à Assane Diouf . En effet, c’est Diouf lui-même qui a avoué 
être entré aux États-Unis en 2001 avec les documents de voyage de son frère Mame 
Cheikh Diouf . Ensuite, c’est lui-même qui affichera un soutien bruyant à l’imam 
Alioune Ndao, détenu à l’époque pour financement au terrorisme, mais qui bénéfi-
ciera par la suite d’un classement sans suite de l’affaire . Assane Diouf ira jusqu’à de-
mander aux chauffeurs dakarois qui conduisent des bennes de sable de cogner le mur 
de la prison de Rebeuss afin d’en extraire imam Ndao et Khalifa Sall, l’ancien maire de 
Dakar, opposant au président Sall, détenu également à cette époque, après avoir été 
reconnu coupable, par la justice sénégalaise, de malversation .
Assane Diouf sera arrêté tout d’abord par le FBI le 18 août 2017 et, plus tard, re-
mis aux services américains de l’Immigration, après avoir transité par une prison de 
haute sécurité en Louisiane . Ces épisodes, et surtout, l’appel téléphonique qu’Assane 
Diouf aura pu passer, dans le Live Facebook, d’une autre webactiviste sénégalaise, Hé-
lène Gaye, sont largement relayés pas la presse en ligne sénégalaise . Assane Diouf y 
raconte les conditions de son arrestation et met en garde le Gouvernement du Sénégal : 
« Sept voitures, 20 personnes venues de Washington avaient encerclé ma maison à la 
Nouvelle-Orléans avant de m’arrêter . Je les ai vus depuis ma fenêtre . Quand ils ont 
ouvert la porte, je fumais un joint de boon (yamba en wolof ou chanvre indien) . Ils 
m’ont dit qu’ils ne sont pas venus pour ça . Tout ça c’est l’œuvre du Gouvernement 
sénégalais parce que je les insulte jour et nuit . Mais ils ne vont pas me faire taire »28 .
Cette toute dernière phrase concentre une grande partie de l’enjeu du retour forcé 
d’Assane Diouf au Sénégal . En effet, comment Diouf allait-il contenir d’un côté une 
pression sociale qui ne pouvait manquer d’être plus forte et de l’inciter à adoucir son 
discours, et de l’autre satisfaire les abonnés de sa chaîne YouTube qu’il n’a su attirer et 
fidéliser que par le biais de ses insultes ? De fait, on peut noter un moment de flotte-
ment lorsque Diouf reprend ses vidéos en direct depuis le Sénégal . Celles-ci demeu-
rent, en effet, relativement épurées dans cette première période . Il n’insulte plus à tout-
va et essaie de montrer que le sens ultime de ses propos vise à instruire et à faire prendre 
conscience, comme nous l’indiquions plus haut . Cette phase est, cependant, de courte 
durée . Les insultes allaient reprendre une place assez importante dans son propos . Le 
dilemme auquel Assane Diouf a fait face n’était pas des moindres : soit continuer sur sa 
lancée et risquer de perdre des soutiens de proximité dans son nouveau cadre concret 
de vie soit mettre de l’eau dans son vin, et perdre la base populaire qui avait accompa-
gné son ascension . Il allait choisir de protéger son style injurieux, tout en essayant de 
ne pas passer pour un partenaire encombrant par rapport aux adversaires du régime 
(hommes d’affaires, leaders politiques, chefs religieux) . Pour réussir ce double écart, 
il lui fallait re-symboliser son arme fatale : l’injure . Au fond, Assane Diouf va osciller 
bou-etabli-aux-Etats-Unis-revele-Ce-qui-a-ete-ecrit-sur-le-document-de-deportation-d-Assane-Diouf_ 
a170058 .html) .
28 « Un début de calvaire… » . SeneNews.Com, le 22 août 2017 (https://www .seneplus .com/diaspora/
un-debut-de-calvaire-0) .
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entre deux perspectives . D’une part, il s’évertue de justifier ses insultes comme une 
pratique sociale et culturelle bien établie au Sénégal et donc, il rejettera, dans ces mo-
ments, les pressions morales l’invitant à réviser son langage, et renverra les censeurs ou 
conseillers à leur hypocrisie . D’autre part, et de manière plus conciliante, il expliquera 
que recevoir une insulte ou en proférer n’est pas quelque chose de réellement grave, car 
après tout, « cela ne tâche pas29» .
Assane Diouf opacifie ici, de manière consciente ou involontaire, le sens étymo-
logique du mot « insulte » (du latin insultare)30 à savoir : transgression et sédition, 
en amalgamant la distinction sociolinguistique entre violence verbale personnelle et 
violence verbale rituelle (voir Labov [1972] 1976) . En effet, d’une part, Assane Diouf 
insulte gratuitement et vulgairement les mères de ses cibles, dans un répertoire fort 
coloré, marqué par un leitmotiv : « di naa xorom » (je salerai), et d’évoquer le vagin 
de la mère de la personnalité visée . D’autre part, toutefois, Assane Diouf fait usage de 
grossièretés et d’insultes, sans que l’on ne puisse parler, du point de vue sociolinguisti-
que, de violence verbale personnelle . Par exemple, la chaîne YouTube à travers laquelle 
il diffuse ses vidéos est prénommée Domeram TV . « Doomaraam », mot de la langue 
wolof qui ponctue fréquemment ses conversations et qui signifie « bâtard » . Ce mot 
est composé de la racine « doom » (enfant) et du suffixe « aram » qui est en réalité un 
emprunt à la langue arabe « haram » (interdit/ prohibé mais également inviolable et 
sacré) . Seulement, dans le parler des jeunes, « doomaraam », « bâtard », a été re-caté-
gorisé en mot affectueux, dans de nombreuses situations31 .
Dans tous les cas, cette ambiguïté ne sera pas suffisante à sauver Diouf de ses ad-
versaires qui tirent parti d’un de ses directs contre le porte-parole du khalif des mou-
rides et des réactions que cela a suscitées pour le faire arrêter et le traduire en justice . 
Le ministre de la justice de l’époque, Ismaëla Madior Fall, profitera d’une cérémonie 
sociale à Touba pour forger une expression relativement nouvelle dans le débat public 
sénégalais : « insulte à un ministre du culte » et qui sera fortement reprise par la suite à 
29 Traduction d’un proverbe wolof qui dénie à l’injure toute force illocutoire, notamment lorsque le 
destinataire la juge comme parole insignifiante .
30 Centre National de Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales: https://cnrtl .fr/definition/dmf/
insulte?idf=xxx;etym=insultare (consulté le 10 juin 2020) .
31 Plusieurs chercheurs sénégalais ont travaillé, du reste, sur ces formes de violence verbales rituelles . C’est 
le cas de la pratique de joutes injurieuses opposant des coépouses et leurs familles le soir où une nouvelle 
épousée rejoint la concession de son époux, polygame, appelé xaxar, en milieu wolof (Cissé 2010) . En 
milieu sereer, les Sañit étudiés par Amade Faye (2008 et 2016) pouvaient injurier n’importe qui dans la 
société, y compris les autorités les plus puissantes, sans être inquiétés . Selon Amade Faye, la société sereer 
garantit l’impunité à ses Sañit qui font dans l’insanité, l’obscénité, le sarcasme, l’invective et la menace 
contre les pouvoirs et les anciens . Cette impunité étant toutefois moins au service du désordre verbal que 
celui du bon ordre social . En effet, la désinvolture apparente des Sañit est ce qui leur permet de traquer, de 
débusquer et de dénoncer librement les pratiques néfastes ou cachées des pouvoirs et des ainés . Les Sañit 
se posent donc en « milice de la vertu, hostile aux aînés » et exercent leur impunité dans l’inversion de 
la hiérarchie et de l’autorité . Dans le même ordre de phénomène de culture fonctionnelle de la violence 
verbale rituelle, on peut citer les travaux de Aboubacry Sow (2017) sur les Coolooji et Almube Ngaï chez 
les Pulaar .
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travers les médias . Dans cette sortie, Ismaëla Madior Fall affirme avec force, en s’adres-
sant aux autorités de Touba, la volonté du gouvernement de punir sévèrement celles et 
ceux qui, via les réseaux sociaux, s’en prennent aux chefs religieux . Il dira : « La loi sera 
appliquée dans toute sa rigueur contre toute personne qui s’attaquera à un ministre 
du culte . Je ne citerai pas de nom, mais déjà des gens sont sous mandat de dépôt . Et à 
chaque fois que des faits d’injures sur les réseaux sociaux sont avérés le ou les coupables 
seront sévèrement punis, conformément au code pénal 32» . L’allusion à Assane Diouf, 
qui est alors depuis deux mois déjà emprisonné et en attente de jugement, est sans 
équivoque . Toutefois deux énoncés restent instructifs, dans cette deuxième phase cri-
tique depuis son retour au Sénégal . Le premier est dans les précisions qu’Assane Diouf 
ne cessera d’apporter, aussi bien dans ses dernières interventions publiques jusqu’au 
tribunal correctionnel, et qui ne changeront rien à sa situation . Il y déclare : « Je n’ai 
pas insulté les chefs religieux . J’ai juste demandé à Serigne Bass d’où lui viennent les 
milliards qu’il a . Il a des maisons à coups de milliards . J’ai le droit de parler avec Bass 
Abdou Khadre . On a été éduqués par Serigne Bara . Serigne Bass n’est pas un mara-
bout, il est juste un porte-parole des mourides . Un chef religieux est un homme qui a 
ses « daara », ses champs, nourrit ses talibés et non un homme qui est dans sa niche 
dorée et qui demande des « adiya » . Et au Sénégal c’est ce qu’il y a »33 . Certes le tribu-
nal n’aura pas retenu, en fin de compte, la charge d’ « insulte à un ministère du culte », 
mais la nature de la sentence laisse entendre ce que son avocat, Maître Clédor Ciré 
Ly, avancera : « La mort sociale » de son client . Ce qu’il faut noter dans ce premier 
énoncé, c’est bien cette idée que l’État, à travers, le Parquet qui avait requis cinq ans 
d’emprisonnement ferme contre Assane Diouf34, a voulu donner un signal fort aux 
éventuels successeurs d’Assane Diouf . Par la même occasion, on peut penser que l’État 
a cherché à rassurer le haut personnel de l’institution confrérique .
Dans le deuxième énoncé que l’on retrouve dans la vidéo de 11 minutes35 que nous 
évoquions au début de cet article, Assane Diouf, après être revenu sur la brutalité et les 
circonstances de l’attaque intervenue à son domicile, reprend un message qu’il va répé-
ter plusieurs fois : « […] Je ne me tairai pas, jamais ! Je le jure au nom de Serigne Fallou . 
Je ne me rendrai pas, je ne demanderai pardon à personne ! Je le jure au nom de Serigne 
Fallou […] C’est en lui que j’ai foi » . Il opère par la suite une séparation entre un état 
premier et authentique, et un deuxième état déviant du mouridisme . Et c’est dans le 
rapport au politique et, particulièrement les relations avec les détenteurs du pouvoir 
gouvernemental, qu’il voit le problème : « Le Sénégal, ça ne devrait pas être un Sénégal 
32 Aminata Diouf : « Injures sur les réseaux sociaux-Ismaïla Madior Fall prévient : ‹ La loi sera appliquée 
dans toute sa rigueur › » . PressAfrik, le 15 janvier 2018 (https://www .pressafrik .com/%E2%80%8BInjures- 
sur-les-reseaux-sociaux-Ismaila-Madior-Fall-previent-La-loi-sera-appliquee-dans-toute-sa-rigueur_ 
a176273 .html) .
33 Voir l’article en ligne en date du 8 janvier 2019 sur le site l’express.sn : « Lourde sanction : Assane Diouf 
dans une prison à ciel ouvert » (https://www .lexpress .sn/Lourde-sanction-Assane-Diouf-dans-une-pri 
son-a-ciel-ouvert_a25 .html) .
34 Ibid .
35 https://www .youtube .com/watch?v=tYgXfwbsQqA (Dernière consultation le 27 mars 2019) .
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où quand le gouvernement débarque avec ses présents, vous prenez fait et cause pour 
lui, et quand les disciples ou les serviteurs sont dans le besoin, vous gardez sereinement 
le silence . Oui c’est cela et je le dis haut et fort » . Lorsque son amie webactiviste tente 
de le recentrer en lui demandant de clarifier si oui ou non il est l’auteur des propos atta-
quant le khalif des mourides qu’on est en train de lui prêter sur Internet, Assane Diouf 
ne saisit la balle au rebond que pour mieux relancer l’objet de sa querelle contre l’insti-
tution confrérique . Il ne cherche donc pas, manifestement, à ouvrir une porte de sortie, 
mais à pousser jusqu’au bout la logique de son engagement . En effet, il se contente de 
répondre rapidement qu’il n’a jamais attaqué le khalif de Touba et que les images qui 
circulaient à ce moment-là sur la Toile étaient manipulées, avant de repréciser le sens 
de sa sortie médiatique qui était en train d’avoir des incidences tumultueuses : « Je n’ai 
jamais attaqué Serigne Sidi Moukhtar . Ce que j’ai dit est clair, j’ai dit : « Quiconque ne 
se conduira pas comme il se doit, nous le rappellerons à l’ordre… (Tu vois) . Et ceci qui 
qu’il puisse être, du porte-parole au khalif général… (Tu vois) . Et [le problème36] c’est 
ce mot de khalif général que j’ai prononcé… Mais combien avons-nous ici de khalifs gé-
néraux ? Mais combien avons-nous de khalifs généraux au Sénégal ? Thanks You37, et 
voilà toute la question : je n’ai pas prononcé le nom de Sidi Moctar38 . Mais, [par contre, 
oui39], pour ce qui est de Serigne Bass Abdou Khadre, c’est moi qui ait posé la question 
« d’où lui venaient ses milliards ?» . Et cette question je la poserai encore demain, et 
encore après-demain… » . Une attitude bien singulière qui peut être interprétée soit 
comme suicidaire, soit comme inscrite dans la logique des recompositions des jeux de 
rôle et d’attente entre disciples et corps dirigeant de l’institution confrérique . En réa-
lité, contrairement à une idée très répandue et qui pourrait faire penser que la voix du 
disciple ne saurait se faire entendre contre l’establishment, plusieurs exemples existent 
qui montrent que cela n’est pas toujours le cas, et encore moins lorsque les enjeux po-
sés recoupent des contradictions sociales, politiques ou économiques . Assane Diouf 
est loin de constituer la voix la plus téméraire ou éventuellement perturbante qu’une 
partie du clergé mouride a affrontée dans le passé . Par contre, il représente quelque 
chose qui semble inédit, au niveau de l’échelle d’action, et qui semble étaler, jusqu’à 
ses limites les plus extrêmes, ces fameux processus de subjectivation dans lesquels les 
réappropriations de l’héritage du chef fondateur de la confrérie entraînent l’émergence 
de disciples qui tiennent à être fidèles sans être pour autant obligés . Ce qui est aussi 
en jeu dans cette transition, il faut le préciser, ce n’est pas un relâchement du lien ou 
de l’identité religieuse et confrérique, mais au contraire son approfondissement (voir 
Seck 2010) . Cet approfondissement dans une forme davantage intime et moins sujette 
à l’encadrement classique entraîne justement cette situation dans laquelle le disciple 
fait valoir son désir d’aller plus loin que le marabout dans la défense du temple . Reste à 
36 Le terme est sous-entendu dans son propos .
37 En anglais dans le propos .
38 Le nom est prononcé différemment chaque fois et nous le rendons tel qu’il apparaît dans la bande so-
nore .
39 Sous-entendu dans le propos .
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savoir de quel temple on parle . Lorsqu’Assane Diouf poursuit ici son propos, il donne 
à mieux penser ce que nous venons d’avancer : « […] Maintenant si, pour cette raison 
précise [le fait d’interpeler sans aucune précaution oratoire, Serigne Bassirou Abdou 
Khadre], les mourides se lèvent et décident de tuer Assane Diouf… [la voix se fait plus 
calme et grave au moment où il poursuit]… Yeah, c’est ceci que j’ai toujours demandé 
à Serigne Touba : finir en martyr de sa cause . Oui, cela veut dire qu’il a exaucé les priè-
res que je lui ai adressées, (… tu vois ce que je veux dire ?) . En faisant des mourides les 
mains de mon martyr (… tu vois ce que je veux dire), il a accédé à mes prières d’une 
manière inespérée . Je rends donc grâce à Dieu, encore et encore » .
Et Assane diouf de conclure à propos de ceux qu’il accuse alors de chercher à cas-
ser sa voix : « […] mais il faut qu’ils sachent au moins une chose, Ils doivent savoir au 
moins une chose : « Assane Diouf a déjà marqué l’histoire40 ! » et [ce] geste (… tu vois) 
survivra à ma mort » .
En guise de conclusion
Cet article a tenté d’analyser la courte et fulgurante carrière de webactiviste d’Assane 
Diouf, en la situant à l’intérieur d’une perspective plus large qui permet de revisiter 
le sens du contrat social sénégalais (voir Cruise O’Brien 1992) . Les différentes identi-
tés revendiquées par Assane Diouf, à titre personnel, s’inscrivent toutes dans le tissu 
conflictuel du Sénégal actuel . Elles y déterminent des points de bascule qui viennent 
mettre à mal nombre de certitudes dans le partage des rôles à la base du contrat social 
sénégalais consacrant deux signataires majeurs (l’État et les marabouts) et un bénéfi-
ciaire aphone et mineur (le peuple) .
D’origine rurale, le mouridisme est devenu une partie intégrante de la culture ur-
baine . Et ceux qui, comme Assane Diouf, revendiquent une culture ou socialisation 
urbaine, savent tout également afficher, comme identité fondamentale, leur qualité de 
disciple mouride . En grandissant au sein des villes, l’ordre confrérique mouride gagne 
aussi, par devers lui, des troupes et des espaces qui ne répondent pas forcément aux 
caractéristiques de ses bases sociales de départ . Assane Diouf se situe au cœur de cette 
contradiction, il incarne tout autant le disciple qui se veut sans reproche et même prêt 
au martyr que le fidèle sévèrement rappelé à l’ordre . Cheikh Anta Babou ne s’y trompe 
pas lorsqu’il décrit, de manière plus large encore, ce tournant :
« The urbanization of the Muridiyya and the transformation of the order’s 
economy has resulted in the creation of new Murid religious institutions and 
sub-identities, a new role for the Murid in Senegalese civil society, a new un-
derstanding of the principle of ndigël (religious ordinance), new ways of in-
40 L’expression est exclamative et est dite en français dans le propos .
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teracting with the shaykh, and a reevaluation of the power of the state and its 
rapports with the Murid leadership » (Babou 2013 : 137–138) .
Perçus sous l’angle des expériences migratoires sénégalaises de ces 40 dernières années 
et qu’a connu Assane Diouf durant 16 ans, ces changements se font encore plus nets . 
En effet, les communautés migrantes sénégalaises, même si elles continuent d’abriter 
d’importantes clientèles des régimes en place, sont devenues des foyers politiques de 
contestation de ces derniers . La critique de l’état du pays devient un cri de ralliement, 
qu’Internet permet d’amplifier et de répercuter sur le débat national . De manière plus 
remarquable encore, ces expériences migratoires ont été le creuset de nouvelles maniè-
res de se penser et de s’organiser en tant que disciples, autour d’initiatives aux multiples 
enjeux et agendas (voir Lanza et Seck 2018) . Ces nouvelles formes d’auto-organisation 
ont induit des accélérations inouïes des phénomènes de rationalisation bureaucratique 
que Momar Coumba Diop avait déjà cernées dans son étude sur les dahira-s en contex-
te urbain (1981) . Ici encore, Cheikh Anta Babou prolonge, d’une façon éclairante, la 
description de la culture organisationnelle qui accompagne les nouvelles manières de 
se dédier à sa confrérie, en surlignant l’importance de la redevabilité . Pour lui :
« [ . . .] with the internationalization of the Muridiyya, new dahiras appeared 
that were modeled on the interna- tional nongovernmental organizations, as 
shown by the example of Hizbut Tarqiyyah and Matlabul Fawzayni, and the 
Foundation Cheikhul Khadim, which are run by a board of secretaries account-
able to the membership » (Babou 2013 : 138) .
Enfin, les identifications mourides revendiquées par Assane Diouf, bariolées et in-
disciplinées, sont aussi nourries par ces cadres de changement globaux qui viennent 
télescoper d’autres formes de changements beaucoup moins bruyantes décrites par 
Cheikh Guèye au début des années 2000 . En effet, à propos de l’espace confrérique 
qui a donné, sans doute, le plus à penser ce fameux contrat social sénégalais, Cheikh 
Guèye, dans son ouvrage Touba : la capitale des Mourides (Guèye 2002), s’interro-
geait, entre autres, autour de deux notions constitutives à ses yeux, de deux tendances 
qui affecteraient l’institution confrérique : d’une part la fragmentation du symbole et 
d’autre part le délitement de l’autorité . Guèye souligne : « Cette fragmentation qui 
trouve son origine dans les premiers conflits de succession a été accentuée et formalisée 
par Serigne Abdoul Ahad Mbacké dans les années soixante-dix . Elle a consisté en une 
demande de reconnaissance officielle de l’identification des lignages à des morceaux de 
la ville . Cette fragmentation du symbole et des méthodes de la gestion urbaine est à la 
base du délitement de l’autorité khalifale » (Guèye 2002 : 300) .
On le voit donc, c’est une situation globale complexe qui a rendu possible la mé-
saventure d’Assane Diouf, auteur de cris et d’insanités dans l’espace public qui en 
ont choqué plus d’un . Mais ce qui semble être un coup de folie, à y regarder de près, 
ne pourrait très bien être qu’une variante dans les multiples figures du « sauve-qui-
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peut », qu’expérimentent les Sénégalais depuis fort longtemps (voir Seck 2017)41 . As-
sane Diouf n’est qu’un membre de ce corps social secoué et défiguré par la quantité 
et la diversité des défis auxquels il doit faire face et dont les différentes composantes 
cherchent chacune à garantir et protéger leurs parts . Diouf est un entrepreneur social 
et un opérateur idéologique comme beaucoup d’autres, qui fait bon usage des armes 
à sa disposition pour, comme il l’a si bien dit, « remplacer son père », « construire de 
belles villas » et « conduire de jolies voitures » . De diffuseur de buzz sur les peoples, il 
se retrouve au cœur d’une quasi affaire d’État qui n’a pas voulu dire son nom . Assane 
Diouf a navigué dans cette histoire qui le dépasse, mais dont il dit qu’elle retiendra à 
jamais son nom, avec le vocabulaire qui est le sien, celui dont l’historien et linguiste Jac-
ques Guilhaumou qualifie de parole inaudible : « réduite à des cris terrifiants et à des 
injures, la parole populaire est inaudible pour les élites » (Guilhaumou 2008 : 60) .
Ce que nous avons voulu faire, c’est justement nous saisir de cela comme d’un cor-
pus qui n’a pas à être ignoré dans la galerie de « notre corpus social » pour reprendre 
l’expression du ministre Youm . En cela, nous espérons au moins avoir réussi à signaler 
deux observations signifiantes dans la lecture des croisements entre « entreprenariat 
social et idéologique », « sauve-qui-peut », « contrat-social sénégalais à l’épreuve » 
et… le Sénégal de demain .
En premier lieu, les migrations clandestines issues de la crise de confiance envers 
l’ascenseur social promis par l’État-développeur, qui s’est renforcée des années soixan-
te à la seconde transition démocratique, a produit des figures non homologuées de 
la contestation de l’establishment politico-religieux, figures qui contre toute attente 
n’ont pas pris ombrage de n’avoir pas réussi à l’école, de n’avoir pas eu de diplômes, et 
qui produisent un discours social qui non seulement rencontre son audience, touche 
sa cible, suscite des vocations, mais aussi contribue à positionner au sein du champ 
confrérique d’autres modalités de participation .
En second lieu, l’affaire Assane Diouf révèle, à notre sens, une poussée subversive 
pour une renégociation de ce qui doit être « dicible » dans le Sénégal d’aujourd’hui . 
Ainsi, la transgression des normes socioculturelles liées à la politesse, à la bienséance, à 
l’encontre des autorités politique et maraboutique, renseigne sur une intention d’arri-
ver à de nouvelles possibilités d’échanges avec les pouvoirs établis .
Toutefois, l’expédition punitive menée par des disciples à l’encontre d’Assane 
Diouf, ainsi que la condamnation d’exception qu’il aura subie, semblent avoir montré 
une résistante forte de ces mêmes pouvoirs à descendre de leur piédestal .
41 A propos des figures du « sauve-qui-peut », nous référons aux discours et comportements sociaux 
et politiques qui amènent chaque citoyen à tenter de tirer sa part du jeu, sans trop tenir en compte, la 
dimension collective . 
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Addendum
Quinze mois après la dernière mouture de cette contribution, Assane Diouf a été, de 
nouveau, arrêté et emprisonné, le 2 juin 2020 . Cet incident est survenu suite à une 
vidéo qu’il a produite et diffusée en direct le 31 mai 2020, sur fond d’une persistante 
pénurie d’eau, dans la banlieue de Dakar, à deux jours du retour officiel des élèves dans 
les salles de classe, suite à un arrêt des cours lié aux mesures étatiques de lutte contre 
la propagation du coronavirus42 . Le propos central de la vidéo est une critique des 
pouvoirs publics à qui il reproche une gestion calamiteuse de la pandémie de la Co-
vid-19 . Cependant, au cours de ce live, Assane injuria, fidèle à son style, copieusement 
le Président Sall et son frère Aliou Sall (maire de Guédiawaye) . Il associera aux insultes 
l’épouse du Président, Marième Faye Sall, ainsi que le frère de cette dernière, Mansour 
Faye, non moins ministre du développement communautaire, de l’équité sociale et 
territoriale43 .
Diouf a filmé son arrestation et l’a diffusée en direct sur les réseaux sociaux, lui 
donnant ainsi un caractère aussi populaire que spectaculaire44 . Son avocat souligne 
toutefois que les motifs de l’arrestation de son client n’auraient pas à voir avec les insul-
tes proférées, mais pour « incitation à des attroupements armés » et « outrage à agent 
dans l’exercice de ses fonctions »45 .
Notons, accessoirement, qu’au cours de cette vidéo réalisée le 31 mai, Diouf est 
aussi revenu brièvement et allusivement sur son antagonisme avec ses agresseurs qui se 
réclament disciples de la confrérie mouride, non sans réactualiser son positionnement 
de laudateur des guides fondateurs des confréries . Cette nouvelle affaire ouvre ainsi 
une énième séquence dans l’odyssée manifestement inachevée d’un « disciple indisci-
pliné » .
42 « Vidéo bi motax police arrêté Assane Diouf, il insulte gravement macky sall et Mariéme Faye Sall », pos-
té par ‹Radio Dakar Internationale› le 1er juin 2020 (https://www .youtube .com/watch?v=eiBbneJT2gg, 
dernière consultation le 16 juin 2020) . 
43 Les insultes contre le Président et sa famille font ressortir des accusations de prédation des ressources 
publiques . Assane Diouf alimente sa charge en puisant, pour chacun des concernés, sur des actualités plus 
ou moins anciennes ou récentes les concernant .
44 « Arrestation de Assane Diouf », posté par ‹ Seneweb TV › le 1er juin 2020 (https://www .youtube .
com/watch?v=TDrul3X7rHI, dernière consultation le 16 juin 2020) . 
45 Mamadou Sall : « Affaire Assane Diouf : Me Ciré Clédor Ly trouve la charge ‹ rigolo › et dépose une 
plainte contre la police » . Senego.com, le 9 juin 2020 (https://senego .com/affaire-assane-diouf-me-cire- 
cledor-ly-trouve-la-charge-rigolo-et-depose-une-plainte-contre-la-police_1104356 .html) . 
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Conclusion: Tomorrow Is Another Everyday – 12 
Religion and the Shifting Terrain of Quotidian 
Experience
Robert Launay
Islam, more than any other religion, is too often categorized in Manichean terms: 
“good Muslims” and “bad Muslims” (Mamdani 2004), Sufis and Salafis, tolerant and 
intolerant, secular and religious . More recently, Samuli Schielke (2009, 2015; Schielke 
and Debevec 2012) has stressed the ways in which Islam (like any other religion or 
for that matter any ideology) intersects with and interacts with ordinary life, with 
concerns about family, honor, romantic love, or consumer goods among a multitude 
of others . Piety, he argues, is just one “grand scheme” among others, an uncertain 
compass in the rough waters of everyday experience . Like any other theoretical con-
cept, Schielke’s notion of the “everyday” risks reification . Everyday, it is important to 
emphasize, is precisely not like any other day, but rather contingent on place and on 
time . The essays in this volume, by presenting cases from countries that are all over-
whelmingly (though not necessarily officially) Muslim – Egypt, Iran, Tunisia, Niger, 
Senegal – collectively demonstrate how varied the experience of the everyday can be 
within the contemporary Muslim world, through the interplay of striking differences 
but also striking similarities .
One dimension that is absolutely central to almost all of these chapters is gender . 
The expression of gender in everyday contexts is, it must be stressed, by no means 
exclusive to Islam . Even so, the extent to which these concerns emerge prominently 
in so many of these chapters is striking . It would be a grave mistake to attribute these 
empirical and theoretical preoccupations with the liberal biases of Western observers 
uncomfortable with alternative modes of being in the world, not least because many of 
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these papers are authored by Muslim women and men . I would argue that what distin-
guishes gender in Islam from other religious traditions is the emphasis on visibility, on 
the ways in which women are expected to behave and especially to dress in public . As 
Sounaye points out, men may adopt Islamic dress codes (see also Renne 2018), though 
these are not nearly so pervasive .
As an index of women’s everyday religious practice, the hijab seems virtually over-
determined, a visible means of revealing – and also at times of concealing – one’s reli-
gious engagement . Perhaps for this reason, the hijab is at the center (quite literally!) of 
this volume, the principal if not the only subject of the chapters by Sadjed, Föllmer, 
Matri, and Sounaye, and somewhat more incidentally for Franke . What these chapters 
reveal, individually and collectively, is that exactly what the hijab is intended to or 
understood as indexing is anything but straightforward . To cite only one example, as 
Sadjed rightly points out, it is far too simplistic to reduce the contrast between wearing 
lipstick and wearing the chador to opposition to or support for the Iranian regime .
As this example suggests, politics and the State are an important dimension in de-
termining the meanings of everyday action in Islamic religious life . Political regimes, 
however, are hardly fixed entities, and several of the nations discussed in different 
chapters have undergone regime change once if not more . In Iran, for instance, as 
Föllmer argues, wearing the chador was an act of political opposition under the Shah’s 
aggressively secularizing rule . In the Islamic republic, on the other hand, “bad-hejabi” 
– how and not simply whether one wears the hijab – can (rightly or wrongly) be in-
dexed as a token of political and/or religious resistance . Behaviors are not always easy 
to categorize; if the women of Enqelab Street may remove their hijab and silently wave 
it on a stick in protest, the silence of passersby is more ambivalent; are they ignoring 
or endorsing such protest? Similar shifts in the meanings of the hijab or other forms 
of public religious (or irreligious) behavior are equally characteristic of Egypt (Musto-
nen, Franke) or Tunisia (Matri) . Regimes do not only inflect the meanings of public 
behavior . They may induce retreats into the private sphere; women’s Qurʾān study 
circles (Franke, Sadjed) are a way of insulating participants from the public, and a 
fortiori the regime’s gaze .1 But it would be a grave mistake to limit historical shifts in 
meaning to instances of regime change . As Sounaye shows, the hijab, once an index of 
adherence to Islamist movements (Izala, Sunnance) in Niger, has now become such a 
standard practice that even prostitutes wear it, if only as a means as concealing, rather 
than revealing, their behavior in public .
Even in countries where political opposition and sometimes radical change have 
deeply inflected the meanings of religious life, it is a grave error to understand such 
meanings exclusively in political terms . Considerations of class run through these 
chapters as insistently as politics, and often intersect with political engagements . 
Mustonen discusses the example of an article in an English-language lifestyle maga-
1 Of course, women’s Qurʾān study circles are not by any means simply a product of regime changes, 
and are a global feature of women’s engagement with Islam; see Masquelier (2009), Van Doorn-Harder 
(2006) and Mouftah (2019) .
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zine in Egypt criticizing the political interference of religion in everyday life at the out-
set of the presidency of Muhammed Morsi, denouncing the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
project of constitutional reform . At stake, in particular, was the mixing of sexes in dis-
cotheques and swimming pools, sites of elite sociability . However, Sadjed shows how 
class concerns sometimes override rather than reflect political engagements in Iran . 
Western-style clothing, sometimes hastily identified with opposition to the regime, 
is actually far more an index of upward social mobility . Wearers of the chador, on 
the other hand, are sometimes suspected of opportunistically attempting to ingratiate 
themselves with government officials rather than expressing genuine religious com-
mitment . In any case, the oppositional Green Movement involved participants wear-
ing the chador as well as those dressed in more Western-style clothing .
As this last example demonstrates, class is intimately related to consumption . One 
of the participants in the upper middle class Qurʾān study groups described by Franke 
was concerned with the question: can one wear nail polish during salat? The very ques-
tion prevents any disentangling of class, gender, consumption, and everyday religious 
practice . Another participant even compared the benefits she derived from Qurʾān 
study to yoga practice, suggesting that in a neo-liberal economy, Qurʾān study is, in 
a real sense, another form of consumer choice . This comparison with yoga calls to 
mind the fitness centers in Dakar described by Sieveking . While the passion for fitness 
is shared across class lines, it is equally clear that mixed gender fitness centers cater to a 
relatively prosperous clientele, if not to the elite . Not surprisingly, women’s dress, and 
particularly the hijab, are the locus where gender, class, consumption, and religios-
ity intersect most conspicuously . As Matri notes for contemporary Tunisia, the hijab 
is integrated into a “look” precisely as it has become more and more commonplace . 
Combined with other items of clothing (even tight-fitting jeans), it becomes an item 
of fashion, in stark opposition to the kind of hijab worn by elderly or rural women, 
and as such a marker of class as much as of religiosity (Sounaye makes a very similar 
point for Niger) .2
These relationships between gender, class, religion, and consumer preferences are 
all reflected, projected, and disseminated through mass media . Several chapters discuss 
very different types of media and starkly contrasting forms of involvement . Mustonen 
uses the example of print media, specifically an Egyptian magazine targeting an elite 
audience (it is, after all, in English) reflecting their specific concerns about the politici-
zation of religion and its possible effects on elite patterns of sociability . Diop mentions 
television in her chapter on Senegal, noting how the tone and content of programs 
during the month of Ramadan is adjusted to correspond more closely to norms of 
Islamic religiosity than at other times of the year . Finally, Ly and Seck analyze the de-
liberately outrageous behavior of an erstwhile internet star, Assane Diouf, a behavior 
conceivably modeled on American talk radio; Diouf had indeed sojourned for some 
time in the United States before being expelled as an undocumented immigrant .
2 On the hijab and Islamic fashion, see also Moors (2003), Tarlo (2010), Rabine (2013) and Masquelier 
(2013) .
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It is important to point out that the meanings of individual behaviors, their status 
as indices of religiosity or for that matter of irreligiosity, is not at all fixed . The hijab, 
again, functions as a convenient example, though it certainly should not be taken as 
a unique, much less uniquely important, sign . It can be a sign of protest or a sign of 
conformity, an article of fashion or a token of the rejection of worldly fashion . The 
religious significance of everyday behavior is inherently contextual and consequently 
fluctuating and subject to historical change at the micro as well as the macro level . The 
meanings of behaviors ultimately hinges on their evaluation, first of all in terms of 
the ways in which they are the objects of discourse . Sieveking’s chapter furnishes the 
striking example of how a Muslim cleric could categorize “dance” as illicit but accept 
“fitness” as legitimate . Both activities involve relatively scantily clad people, sometimes 
in gender mixed environments, moving their bodies rhythmically . Clearly, evaluation 
depends on the ways they are categorized rather than the concrete content of the be-
havior  .
Silence is important as well as speech . Sometimes, the silence is on the part of the 
person committing (or omitting) the action, most dramatically perhaps in the case of 
the women of Enqelab Street but also, more discreetly, among some of the participants 
of the Qurʾān study group in Alexandria . A participant who does not always pray five 
times a day is unsurprisingly unwilling to raise the issue in public; but this is also the 
case of a woman who does not wear the hijab, and who fears that if she elicits a spoken 
judgment she will be obliged either to conform to or to flout the collective norm . In-
deed, Diop shows how speech and silence can be dialectically intertwined . In Senegal, 
prominent celebrities whose public behavior seems to violate religious norms flaunt 
their loyalty to prominent Sufi shaykhs as a gambit to affirm their ultimate religiosity, 
while the shaykhs themselves pass over such declarations in silence, neither approving 
nor disapproving . Assane Diouf, again in Senegal, attempted to frame his behavior 
by categorizing himself as a Baye Fall, in other words as someone whose transgressive 
behavior was nonetheless intrinsically religious, but whose online attacks of religious 
leaders led to violent reprisal, a demarcation of the limits of silence .
Collectively, these chapters demonstrate that the understanding of everyday re-
ligious behavior cannot be detached from considerations of gender, of class, of con-
sumption, of mediation, indeed of speech and of silence . These different factors cannot 
be neatly separated out, but are constantly in dialectical interplay with one another . 
Nor are they fixed, but on the contrary in perpetual fluctuation . They are subject, in 
other words, to history, sometimes writ large – like regime change – sometimes writ 
small – like fashion . Attempts to separate out Islam from this fluctuation, to identify 
a transhistorical if not ahistorical essence, are bound to distort the fleeting realities we 
can observe – and live – in everyday life .
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The contributions to the present volume show that the countries that are often presented in the literature as forming part of a stereotypical and seemingly monolithic “Islamic 
world” in fact represent considerable diversity. From Iran to Senegal, we encounter a 
vast array of social and religious structures, historical trajectories, political regimes and 
relative positions of societies and individuals. We encounter also, in many different and 
often unexpected ways, the individual in multiple contexts. The present volume presents 
perspectives on everyday life in Muslim societies beyond the spectacular. From a broad 
academic background in Islamic and Iranian studies, social anthropology, sociology, 
philosophy and history, its contributors show that everyday life as well as religious 
practice in countries as diverse as Senegal, Niger, Egypt, Tunisia and Iran is not informed 
by one single “Islamic” tradition, but rather by multiple and often surprisingly different 
modes of religiosity and non-religiosity.
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